# Polybius book 3 (Rhone to the Taurini), English: E. S. Shuckburgh (1889), Project Gutenberg #44125 (vol. 1), fetched 2026-09-14.
# Gutenberg keeps Shuckburgh's [Sidenote] headings but not chapter numbers; use texts/polybius_3_english.txt (Paton) for numbered sections.

[Sidenote: The length of the march from Carthagena to the Po, 1125
Roman miles.]

+39.+ At this period the Carthaginians were masters of the whole
Mediterranean coast of Libya from the Altars of Philaenus,[174]
opposite the Great Syrtis, to the Pillars of Hercules, a seaboard of
over sixteen thousand stades. They had also crossed the strait of the
Pillars of Hercules, and got possession of the whole seaboard of Iberia
on the Mediterranean as far as the Pyrenees, which separate the Iberes
from the Celts—that is, for a distance of about eight thousand stades:
for it is three thousand from the Pillars to New Carthage, from which
Hannibal started for Italy; two thousand six hundred from thence to
the Iber; and from that river to Emporium again sixteen hundred; from
which town, I may add, to the passage of the Rhone is a distance of
about sixteen hundred stades; for all these distances have now been
carefully measured by the Romans and marked with milestones at every
eighth stade.[175] After crossing the river there was a march up stream
along its bank of fourteen hundred stades, before reaching the foot of
the pass over the Alps into Italy. The pass itself was about twelve
hundred stades, which being crossed would bring him into the plains
of the Padus in Italy. So that the whole length of his march from New
Carthage was about nine thousand stades, or 1125 Roman miles. Of the
country he had thus to traverse he had already passed almost half in
mere distance, but in the difficulties the greater part of his task was
still before him.

[Sidenote: Coss. P. Cornelius Scipio and Tib. Sempronius Longus. B.C.
218. The Consuls are sent, one to Spain, and the other to Africa.]

[Sidenote: Placentia and Cremona.]

[Sidenote: Outrage by Boii and Insubres.]

+40.+ While Hannibal was thus engaged in effecting a passage over the
Pyrenees, where he was greatly alarmed at the extraordinary strength
of the positions occupied by the Celts; the Romans, having heard the
result of the embassy to Carthage, and that Hannibal had crossed
the Iber earlier than they expected, at the head of an army, voted
to send Publius Cornelius Scipio with his legions into Iberia, and
Tiberius Sempronius Longus into Libya. And while the Consuls were
engaged in hastening on the enrolment of their legions and other
military preparations, the people were active in bringing to completion
the colonies which they had already voted to send into Gaul. They
accordingly caused the fortification of these towns to be energetically
pushed on, and ordered the colonists to be in residence within thirty
days: six thousand having been assigned to each colony. One of these
colonies was on the south bank of the Padus, and was called Placentia;
the other on the north bank, called Cremona. But no sooner had these
colonies been formed, than the Boian Gauls, who had long been lying in
wait to throw off their loyalty to Rome, but had up to that time lacked
an opportunity, encouraged by the news that reached them of Hannibal’s
approach, revolted; thus abandoning the hostages which they had given
at the end of the war described in my last book. The ill-feeling still
remaining towards Rome enabled them to induce the Insubres to join in
the revolt; and the united tribes swept over the territory recently
allotted by the Romans, and following close upon the track of the
flying colonists, laid siege to the Roman colony of Mutina, in which
the fugitives had taken refuge. Among them were the _triumviri_ or
three commissioners who had been sent out to allot the lands, of whom
one—Gaius Lutatius—was an ex-consul, the other two ex-praetors. These
men having demanded a parley with the enemy, the Boii consented: but
treacherously seized them upon their leaving the town, hoping by their
means to recover their own hostages. The praetor Lucius Manlius was
on guard in the district with an army, and as soon as he heard what
had happened, he advanced with all speed to the relief of Mutina.
But the Boii, having got intelligence of his approach, prepared an
ambuscade; and as soon as his army had entered a certain wood, they
rushed out upon it from every side and killed a large number of his
men. The survivors at first fled with precipitation: but having gained
some higher ground, they rallied sufficiently to enable them with much
difficulty to effect an honourable retreat. Even so, the Boii followed
close upon their heels, and besieged them in a place called the
village of Tannes.[176] When the news arrived at Rome, that the fourth
legion was surrounded and closely besieged by the Boii, the people in
all haste despatched the legions which had been voted to the Consul
Publius, to their relief, under the command of a Praetor, and ordered
the Consul to enrol two more legions for himself from the allies.

+41.+ Such was the state of Celtic affairs from the beginning to the
arrival of Hannibal; thus completing the course of events which I have
already had occasion to describe.

[Sidenote: Tiberius Sempronius prepares to attack Carthage.]

Meanwhile the Consuls, having completed the necessary preparations for
their respective missions, set sail at the beginning of summer—Publius
to Iberia, with sixty ships, and Tiberius Sempronius to Libya, with a
hundred and sixty quinqueremes. The latter thought by means of this
great fleet to strike terror into the enemy; and made vast preparations
at Lilybaeum, collecting fresh troops wherever he could get them, as
though with the view of at once blockading Carthage itself.

[Sidenote: Publius Scipio lands near Marseilles.]

Publius Cornelius coasted along Liguria, and crossing in five days
from Pisae to Marseilles, dropped anchor at the most eastern mouth of
the Rhone, called the Mouth of Marseilles,[177] and began disembarking
his troops. For though he heard that Hannibal was already crossing the
Pyrenees, he felt sure that he was still a long way off, owing to the
difficulty of his line of country, and the number of the intervening
Celtic tribes. But long before he was expected, Hannibal had arrived
at the crossing of the Rhone, keeping the Sardinian Sea on his right
as he marched, and having made his way through the Celts partly by
bribes and partly by force. Being informed that the enemy were at hand,
Publius was at first incredulous of the fact, because of the rapidity
of the advance; but wishing to know the exact state of the case,—while
staying behind himself to refresh his troops after their voyage, and to
consult with the Tribunes as to the best ground on which to give the
enemy battle,—he sent out a reconnoitring party, consisting of three
hundred of his bravest horse; joining with them as guides and supports
some Celts, who chanced to be serving as mercenaries at the time in
Marseilles.

[Sidenote: Hannibal reaches the Rhone.]

+42.+ Meanwhile Hannibal had reached the river and was trying to get
across it where the stream was single, at a distance of four days’
march from the sea. He did all he could to make the natives living by
the river friendly to him, and purchased from them all their canoes of
hollow trunks, and wherries, of which there were a large number, owing
to the extensive sea traffic of the inhabitants of the Rhone valley.
He got from them also the timber suited to the construction of these
canoes; and so in two days had an innumerable supply of transports,
every soldier seeking to be independent of his neighbour, and to have
the means of crossing in his own hands. But now a large multitude of
barbarians collected on the other side of the stream to hinder the
passage of the Carthaginians. When Hannibal saw them, he came to the
conclusion that it would be impossible either to force a passage in
the face of so large a body of the enemy, or to remain where he was,
for fear of being attacked on all sides at once: and he accordingly,
on the third night, sent forward a detachment of his army with native
guides, under the command of Hanno, the son of the Suffete[178]
Bomilcar. [Sidenote: A detachment crosses higher up the river.] This
force marched up stream along the bank for two hundred stades, until
they arrived at a certain spot where the stream is divided by an eyot,
and there halted. They found enough wood close at hand to enable them,
by nailing or tying it together, to construct within a short time a
large number of rafts good enough for temporary use; and on these they
crossed in safety, without any one trying to stop them. Then, seizing
upon a strong position, they kept quiet for the rest of the day: partly
to refresh themselves after their fatigues, and at the same time to
complete their preparations for the service awaiting them, as they had
been ordered to do. Hannibal was preparing to proceed much in the same
way with the forces left behind with himself; but his chief difficulty
was in getting the elephants across, of which he had thirty-seven.

[Sidenote: The crossing begun.]

+43.+ When the fifth night came, however, the division which had
crossed first started before daybreak to march down the opposite bank
of the river and attack the barbarians; while Hannibal, having his men
in readiness, began to attempt the passage of the river. He had filled
the wherries with the heavy-armed cavalry, and the canoes with the most
active of his foot; and he now arranged that the wherries should cross
higher up the stream, and the canoes below them, that the violence of
the current might be broken by the former, and the canoes cross more
safely. The plan for the horses was that they should swim at the stern
of the wherries, one man on each side of the stern guiding three or
four with leading reins: so that a considerable number of horses were
brought over at once with the first detachment. When they saw what the
enemy meant to do, the barbarians, without forming their ranks, poured
out of their entrenchments in scattered groups, feeling no doubt of
being able to stop the crossing of the Carthaginians with ease. As soon
as Hannibal saw by the smoke, which was the signal agreed upon, that
the advanced detachment on the other side was approaching, he ordered
all to go on board, and the men in charge of the transports to push
out against the stream. This was promptly done: and then began a most
anxious and exciting scene. Cheer after cheer rose from the men who
were working the boats, as they struggled to outstrip each other, and
exerted themselves to the utmost to overcome the force of the current.
On the edge of either bank stood the two armies: the one sharing in the
struggles of their comrades by sympathy, and shouting encouragement
to them as they went; while the barbarians in front of them yelled
their war-cries and challenged them to battle. While this was going on
the barbarians had abandoned their tents, which the Carthaginians on
that side of the river suddenly and unexpectedly seized. Some of them
proceeded to set fire to the camp, while the greater number went to
attack the men who were standing ready to resist the passage. Surprised
by this unlooked-for event, some of the barbarians rushed off to save
their tents, while others prepared to resist the attack of the enemy,
and were now actually engaged. Seeing that everything was going as
he had intended, Hannibal at once formed the first division as it
disembarked: and after addressing some encouraging words to it, closed
with the barbarians, who, having no time to form their ranks, and being
taken by surprise, were quickly repulsed and put to flight.

[Sidenote: Completed.]

[Sidenote: Message from friendly Gauls.]

+44.+ Being thus master of the passage of the river, and victorious
over those who opposed him, the first care of the Carthaginian
leader was to bring his whole army across. This being expeditiously
accomplished, he pitched his camp for that night by the river-side, and
on the morrow, when he was told that the Roman fleet was anchored off
the mouths of the river, he detached five hundred Numidian horsemen
to reconnoitre the enemy and find out their position, their numbers,
and what they were going to do; and at the same time selected suitable
men to manage the passage of the elephants. These arrangements made,
he summoned a meeting of his army and introduced Magilus and the other
chiefs who had come to him from the valley of the Padus, and caused
them to declare to the whole army, by means of an interpreter, the
resolutions passed by their tribes. The points which were the strongest
encouragement to the army were, first, the actual appearance of envoys
inviting them to come, and promising to take part in the war with Rome;
secondly, the confidence inspired by their promise of guiding them by
a route where they would be abundantly supplied with necessaries, and
which would lead them with speed and safety into Italy; and, lastly,
the fertility and vast extent of the country to which they were going,
and the friendly feelings of the men with whose assistance they were
about to fight the armies of Rome.

Such was the substance of the speeches of the Celts. When they had
withdrawn, Hannibal himself rose, and after reminding the soldiers
of what they had already achieved, and pointing out that, though
they had under his counsel and advice engaged in many perilous and
dangerous enterprises, they had never failed in one, he bade them “not
lose courage now that the most serious part of their undertaking was
accomplished. The Rhone was crossed: they had seen with their own eyes
the display of goodwill and zeal of their allies. Let this convince
them that they should leave the rest to him with confidence; and while
obeying his orders show themselves men of courage and worthy of their
former deeds.” These words being received with shouts of approval, and
other manifestations of great enthusiasm, on the part of the soldiers,
Hannibal dismissed the assembly with words of praise to the men and
a prayer to the gods on their behalf; after giving out an order that
they should refresh themselves, and make all their preparations with
despatch, as the advance must begin on the morrow.

[Sidenote: Skirmish between reconnoitring parties.]

+45.+ When the assembly had been dismissed, the reconnoitring party
of Numidians returned in headlong flight, after losing more than half
their numbers. Not far from the camp they had fallen in with a party
of Roman horse, who had been sent out by Publius on the same errand;
and an engagement took place with such fury on either side, that the
Romans and Celts lost a hundred and forty men, and the Numidians more
than two hundred. After this skirmish, the Romans pursued them up to
the Carthaginian entrenchments: and having surveyed it, they hastened
back to announce to the Consul the presence of the enemy. As soon as
they arrived at the Roman camp with this intelligence, Publius put his
baggage on board ship, and marched his men up the bank of the river,
with the earnest desire of forcing the enemy to give him battle.

But at sunrise on the day after the assembly, Hannibal having stationed
his whole cavalry on the rear, in the direction of the sea, so as to
cover the advance, ordered his infantry to leave the entrenchment and
begin their march; while he himself waited behind for the elephants,
and the men who had not yet crossed the river.

[Sidenote: The passage of the elephants.]

+46.+ The mode of getting the elephants across was as follows. They
made a number of rafts strongly compacted, which they lashed firmly
two and two together, so as to form combined a breadth of about fifty
feet, and brought them close under the bank at the place of crossing.
To the outer edge of these they lashed some others and made them join
exactly; so that the whole raft thus constructed stretched out some way
into the channel, while the edges towards the stream were made fast to
the land with ropes tied to trees which grew along the brink, to secure
the raft keeping its place and not drifting down the river. These
combined rafts stretching about two hundred feet across the stream,
they joined two other very large ones to the outer edges, fastened very
firmly together, but connected with the others by ropes which admitted
of being easily cut. To these they fastened several towing lines,
that the wherries might prevent the rafts drifting down stream, and
might drag them forcibly against the current and so get the elephants
across on them. Then they threw a great deal of earth upon all the
rafts, until they had raised the surface to the level of the bank, and
made it look like the path on the land leading down to the passage.
The elephants were accustomed to obey their Indian riders until they
came to water, but could never be induced to step into water: they
therefore led them upon this earth, putting two females in front whom
the others obediently followed. When they had set foot on the rafts
that were farthest out in the stream, the ropes were cut which fastened
these to the other rafts, the towing lines were pulled taut by the
wherries, and the elephants, with the rafts on which they stood, were
quickly towed away from the mound of earth. When this happened, the
animals were terror-stricken; and at first turned round and round, and
rushed first to one part of the raft and then to another, but finding
themselves completely surrounded by the water, they were too frightened
to do anything, and were obliged to stay where they were. And it was by
repeating this contrivance of joining a pair of rafts to the others,
that eventually the greater part of the elephants were got across.
Some of them, however, in the middle of the crossing, threw themselves
in their terror into the river: but though their Indian riders were
drowned, the animals themselves got safe to land, saved by the strength
and great length of their probosces; for by raising these above the
water, they were enabled to breathe through them, and blow out any
water that got into them, while for the most part they got through the
river on their feet.

+47.+ The elephants having been thus got across, Hannibal formed them
and the cavalry into a rear-guard, and marched up the river bank away
from the sea in an easterly direction, as though making for the central
district of Europe.

The Rhone rises to the north-west of the Adriatic Gulf on the northern
slopes of the Alps,[179] and flowing westward, eventually discharges
itself into the Sardinian Sea. It flows for the most part through
a deep valley, to the north of which lives the Celtic tribe of the
Ardyes; while its southern side is entirely walled in by the northern
slopes of the Alps, the ridges of which, beginning at Marseilles and
extending to the head of the Adriatic, separate it from the valley of
the Padus, of which I have already had occasion to speak at length. It
was these mountains that Hannibal now crossed from the Rhone valley
into Italy.

Some historians of this passage of the Alps, in their desire to
produce a striking effect by their descriptions of the wonders of this
country, have fallen into two errors which are more alien than anything
else to the spirit of history,—perversion of fact and inconsistency.
Introducing Hannibal as a prodigy of strategic skill and boldness, they
yet represent him as acting with the most conspicuous indiscretion;
and then, finding themselves involved in an inextricable maze of
falsehood, they try to cut the knot by the introduction of gods and
heroes into what is meant to be genuine history. They begin by saying
that the Alps are so precipitous and inaccessible that, so far from
horses and troops, accompanied too by elephants, being able to cross
them, it would be very difficult for even active men on foot to do so:
and similarly they tell us that the desolation of this district is so
complete, that, had not some god or hero met Hannibal’s forces and
showed them the way, they would have been hopelessly lost and perished
to a man.

Such stories involve both the errors I have mentioned,—they are both
false and inconsistent.

+48.+ For could a more irrational proceeding on the part of a general
be imagined than that of Hannibal, if, when in command of so numerous
an army, on whom the success of his expedition entirely depended,
he allowed himself to remain in ignorance of the roads, the lie of
the country, the route to be taken, and the people to which it led,
and above all as to the practicability of what he was undertaking
to do? They, in fact, represent Hannibal, when at the height of his
expectation of success, doing what those would hardly do who have
utterly failed and have been reduced to despair,—that is, to entrust
themselves and their forces to an unknown country. And so, too, what
they say about the desolation of the district, and its precipitous and
inaccessible character, only serves to bring their untrustworthiness
into clearer light. For first, they pass over the fact that the Celts
of the Rhone valley had on several occasions before Hannibal came,
and that in very recent times, crossed the Alps with large forces,
and fought battles with the Romans in alliance with the Celts of the
valley of the Padus, as I have already stated. And secondly, they are
unaware of the fact that a very numerous tribe of people inhabit the
Alps. Accordingly in their ignorance of these facts they take refuge
in the assertion that a hero showed Hannibal the way. They are, in
fact, in the same case as tragedians, who, beginning with an improbable
and impossible plot, are obliged to bring in a _deus ex machina_ to
solve the difficulty and end the play. The absurd premises of these
historians naturally require some such supernatural agency to help them
out of the difficulty: an absurd beginning could only have an absurd
ending. For of course Hannibal did not act as these writers say he did;
but, on the contrary, conducted his plans with the utmost prudence.
He had thoroughly informed himself of the fertility of the country
into which he designed to descend, and of the hostile feelings of its
inhabitants towards Rome, and for his journey through the difficult
district which intervened he employed native guides and pioneers, whose
interests were bound up with his own. I speak with confidence on these
points, because I have questioned persons actually engaged on the
facts, and have inspected the country, and gone over the Alpine pass
myself, in order to inform myself of the truth and see with my own eyes.

[Sidenote: Scipio finds that Hannibal has escaped him.]

+49.+ Three days after Hannibal had resumed his march, the Consul
Publius arrived at the passage of the river. He was in the highest
degree astonished to find the enemy gone: for he had persuaded himself
that they would never venture to take this route into Italy, on account
of the numbers and fickleness of the barbarians who inhabited the
country. But seeing that they had done so, he hurried back to his ships
and at once embarked his forces. He then despatched his brother Gnaeus
to conduct the campaign in Iberia, while he himself turned back again
to Italy by sea, being anxious to anticipate the enemy by marching
through Etruria to the foot of the pass of the Alps.

[Sidenote: Hannibal’s march to the foot of the Alps.]

Meanwhile, after four days’ march from the passage of the Rhone,
Hannibal arrived at the place called the Island, a district thickly
inhabited and exceedingly productive of corn. Its name is derived
from its natural features: for the Rhone and Isara flowing on either
side of it make the apex of a triangle where they meet, very nearly
of the same size and shape as the delta of the Nile, except that the
base of the latter is formed by the sea into which its various streams
are discharged, while in the case of the former this base is formed
by mountains difficult to approach or climb, and, so to speak, almost
inaccessible. When Hannibal arrived in this district he found two
brothers engaged in a dispute for the royal power, and confronting each
other with their armies. The elder sought his alliance and invited
his assistance in gaining the crown: and the advantage which such a
circumstance might prove to him at that juncture of his affairs being
manifest, he consented; and having joined him in his attack upon his
brother, and aided in expelling him, he obtained valuable support from
the victorious chieftain. For this prince not only liberally supplied
his army with provisions, but exchanged all their old and damaged
weapons for new ones, and thus at a very opportune time thoroughly
restored the efficiency of the troops: he also gave most of the men
new clothes and boots, which proved of great advantage during their
passage of the mountains. But his most essential service was that, the
Carthaginians being greatly alarmed at the prospect of marching through
the territory of the Allobroges, he acted with his army as their
rear-guard, and secured them a safe passage as far as the foot of the
pass.

[Sidenote: The ascent.]

+50.+ Having in ten days’ march accomplished a distance of eight
hundred stades along the river bank, Hannibal began the ascent of the
Alps,[180] and immediately found himself involved in the most serious
dangers. For as long as the Carthaginians were on the plains, the
various chiefs of the Allobroges refrained from attacking them from
fear of their cavalry, as well as of the Gauls who were escorting
them. But when these last departed back again to their own lands,
and Hannibal began to enter the mountainous region, the chiefs of
the Allobroges collected large numbers of their tribe and occupied
the points of vantage in advance, on the route by which Hannibal’s
troops were constrained to make their ascent. If they had only kept
their design secret, the Carthaginian army would have been entirely
destroyed: as it was, their plans became known, and though they did
much damage to Hannibal’s army, they suffered as much themselves. For
when that general learnt that the natives were occupying the points
of vantage, he halted and pitched his camp at the foot of the pass,
and sent forward some of his Gallic guides to reconnoitre the enemy
and discover their plan of operations. The order was obeyed: and he
ascertained that it was the enemy’s practice to keep under arms, and
guard these posts carefully, during the day, but at night to retire
to some town in the neighbourhood. Hannibal accordingly adapted his
measures to this strategy of the enemy. He marched forward in broad
daylight, and as soon as he came to the mountainous part of the road,
pitched his camp only a little way from the enemy. At nightfall he gave
orders for the watch-fires to be lit; and leaving the main body of his
troops in the camp, and selecting the most suitable of his men, he had
them armed lightly, and led them through the narrow parts of the road
during the night, and seized on the spots which had been previously
occupied by the enemy: they having, according to their regular custom,
abandoned them for the nearest town.

[Sidenote: The Gauls harass the army.]

+51.+ When day broke the natives saw what had taken place, and at
first desisted from their attempts; but presently the sight of the
immense string of beasts of burden, and of the cavalry, slowly and
painfully making the ascent, tempted them to attack the advancing
line. Accordingly they fell upon it at many points at once; and the
Carthaginians sustained severe losses, not so much at the hands of
the enemy, as from the dangerous nature of the ground, which proved
especially fatal to the horses and beasts of burden. For as the ascent
was not only narrow and rough, but flanked also with precipices, at
every movement which tended to throw the line into disorder, large
numbers of the beasts of burden were hurled down the precipices with
their loads on their backs. And what added more than anything else to
this sort of confusion were the wounded horses; for, maddened by their
wounds, they either turned round and ran into the advancing beasts of
burden, or, rushing furiously forward, dashed aside everything that
came in their way on the narrow path, and so threw the whole line into
disorder. Hannibal saw what was taking place, and knowing that, even
if they escaped this attack, they could never survive the loss of all
their baggage, he took with him the men who had seized the strongholds
during the night and went to the relief of the advancing line. Having
the advantage of charging the enemy from the higher ground he inflicted
a severe loss upon them, but suffered also as severe a one in his
own army; for the commotion in the line now grew worse, and in both
directions at once—thanks to the shouting and struggling of these
combatants: and it was not until he had killed the greater number of
the Allobroges, and forced the rest to fly to their own land, that
the remainder of the beasts of burden and the horses got slowly, and
with difficulty, over the dangerous ground. Hannibal himself rallied
as many as he could after the fight, and assaulted the town from
which the enemy had sallied; and finding it almost deserted, because
its inhabitants had been all tempted out by the hope of booty, he
got possession of it: from which he obtained many advantages for the
future as well as for the present. The immediate gain consisted of a
large number of horses and beasts of burden, and men taken with them;
and for future use he got a supply of corn and cattle sufficient for
two or three days: but the most important result of all was the terror
inspired in the next tribes, which prevented any one of those who lived
near the ascent from lightly venturing to meddle with him again.

[Sidenote: Treachery of the Gauls.]

+52.+ Here he pitched a camp and remained a day, and started again. For
the next three days he accomplished a certain amount of his journey
without accident. But on the fourth he again found himself in serious
danger. For the dwellers along his route, having concerted a plan of
treachery, met him with branches and garlands, which among nearly all
the natives are signs of friendship, as the herald’s staff is among the
Greeks. Hannibal was cautious about accepting such assurances, and took
great pains to discover what their real intention and purpose were.
The Gauls however professed to be fully aware of the capture of the
town, and the destruction of those who had attempted to do him wrong;
and explained that those events had induced them to come, because they
wished neither to inflict nor receive any damage; and finally promised
to give him hostages. For a long while Hannibal hesitated and refused
to trust their speeches. But at length coming to the conclusion that,
if he accepted what was offered, he would perhaps render the men
before him less mischievous and implacable; but that, if he rejected
them, he must expect undisguised hostility from them, he acceded to
their request, and feigned to accept their offer of friendship. The
barbarians handed over the hostages, supplied him liberally with
cattle, and in fact put themselves unreservedly into his hands; so that
for a time Hannibal’s suspicions were allayed, and he employed them as
guides for the next difficulty that had to be passed. They guided the
army for two days: and then these tribes collected their numbers, and
keeping close up with the Carthaginians, attacked them just as they
were passing through a certain difficult and precipitous gorge.

[Sidenote: Severe losses.]

+53.+ Hannibal’s army would now have certainly been utterly destroyed,
had it not been for the fact that his fears were still on the alert,
and that, having a prescience of what was to come, he had placed his
baggage and cavalry in the van and his hoplites in the rear. These
latter covered his line, and were able to stem the attack of the enemy,
and accordingly the disaster was less than it would otherwise have
been. As it was, however, a large number of beasts of burden and horses
perished; for the advantage of the higher ground being with the enemy,
the Gauls moved along the slopes parallel with the army below, and by
rolling down boulders, or throwing stones, reduced the troops to a
state of the utmost confusion and danger; so that Hannibal with half
his force was obliged to pass the night near a certain white rock,[181]
which afforded them protection, separated from his horses and baggage
which he was covering; until after a whole night’s struggle they slowly
and with difficulty emerged from the gorge.

[Sidenote: Arrives at the summit.]

Next morning the enemy had disappeared: and Hannibal, having effected
a junction with his cavalry and baggage, led his men towards the head
of the pass, without falling in again with any important muster of the
natives, though he was harassed by some of them from time to time;
who seized favourable opportunities, now on his van and now on his
rear, of carrying off some of his baggage. His best protection was his
elephants; on whatever parts of the line they were placed the enemy
never ventured to approach, being terrified at the unwonted appearance
of the animals. The ninth day’s march brought him to the head of the
pass: and there he encamped for two days, partly to rest his men and
partly to allow stragglers to come up. Whilst they were there, many of
the horses who had taken fright and run away, and many of the beasts of
burden that had got rid of their loads, unexpectedly appeared: they had
followed the tracks of the army and now joined the camp.

[Sidenote: 9th November.]

+54.+ But by this time, it being nearly the period of the setting of
the Pleiads, the snow was beginning to be thick on the heights; and
seeing his men in low spirits, owing both to the fatigue they had
gone through, and that which still lay before them, Hannibal called
them together and tried to cheer them by dwelling on the one possible
topic of consolation in his power, namely the view of Italy: which lay
stretched out in both directions below those mountains, giving the
Alps the appearance of a citadel to the whole of Italy. By pointing
therefore to the plains of the Padus, and reminding them of the
friendly welcome which awaited them from the Gauls who lived there,
and at the same time indicating the direction of Rome itself, he did
somewhat to raise the drooping spirits of his men.

[Sidenote: The descent.]

Next day he began the descent, in which he no longer met with any
enemies, except some few secret pillagers; but from the dangerous
ground and the snow he lost almost as many men as on the ascent.
For the path down was narrow and precipitous, and the snow made it
impossible for the men to see where they were treading, while to
step aside from the path, or to stumble, meant being hurled down the
precipices. The troops however bore up against the fatigue, having
now grown accustomed to such hardships; but when they came to a place
where the path was too narrow for the elephants or beasts of burden to
pass,—and which, narrowed before by landslips extending about a stade
and a half, had recently been made more so by another landslip,—then
once more despondency and consternation fell upon the troops.
Hannibal’s first idea was to avoid this _mauvais pas_ by a détour, but
this route too being made impossible by a snow-storm, he abandoned the
idea.

[Sidenote: A break in the road.]

+55.+ The effect of the storm was peculiar and extraordinary. For
the present fall of snow coming upon the top of that which was there
before, and had remained from the last winter, it was found that the
former, being fresh, was soft and offered no resistance to the foot;
but when the feet reached the lower frozen snow, they could no longer
make any impression upon it, but the men found both their feet slipping
from under them, as though they were on hard ground with a layer of mud
on the top. And a still more serious difficulty followed: for not being
able to get a foothold on the lower snow, when they fell and tried to
get themselves up by their hands and knees, the men found themselves
plunging downwards quicker and quicker, along with everything they laid
hold of, the ground being a very steep decline. The beasts, however,
when they fell did break through this lower snow as they struggled to
rise, and having done so were obliged to remain there with their loads,
as though they were frozen to it, both from the weight of these loads
and the hardness of the old snow. Giving up, therefore, all hope of
making this détour, he encamped upon the ridge after clearing away the
snow upon it. He then set large parties of his men to work, and, with
infinite toil, began constructing a road on the face of the precipice.
One day’s work sufficed to make a path practicable for beasts of burden
and horses; and he accordingly took them across at once, and having
pitched his camp at a spot below the snow line, he let them go in
search of pasture; while he told off the Numidians in detachments to
proceed with the making of the road; and after three days’ difficult
and painful labour he got his elephants across, though in a miserable
condition from hunger. For the tops of the Alps, and the parts
immediately below them, are completely treeless and bare of vegetation,
because the snow lies there summer and winter; but about half-way down
the slopes on both sides they produce trees and shrubs, and are, in
fact, fit for human habitation.

[Sidenote: He reaches the plains.]

+56.+ So Hannibal mustered his forces and continued the descent; and
on the third day after passing the precipitous path just described he
reached the plains. From the beginning of his march he had lost many
men by the hands of the enemy, and in crossing rivers, and many more
on the precipices and dangerous passes of the Alps; and not only men
in this last way, but horses and beasts of burden in still greater
numbers. The whole march from New Carthage had occupied five months,
the actual passage of the Alps fifteen days; and he now boldly entered
the valley of the Padus, and the territory of the Insubres, with such
of his army as survived, consisting of twelve thousand Libyans and
eight thousand Iberians, and not more than six thousand cavalry in all,
as he himself distinctly states on the column erected on the promontory
of Lacinium to record the numbers.

At the same time, as I have before stated, Publius having left his
legions under the command of his brother Gnaeus, with orders to
prosecute the Iberian campaign and offer an energetic resistance to
Hasdrubal, landed at Pisae with a small body of men. Thence he marched
through Etruria, and taking over the army of the Praetors which was
guarding the country against the Boii, he arrived in the valley of the
Padus; and, pitching his camp there, waited for the enemy with an eager
desire to give him battle.

[Sidenote: Digression on the limits of history.]

+57.+ Having thus brought the generals of the two nations and the war
itself into Italy, before beginning the campaign, I wish to say a few
words about what I conceive to be germane or not to my history.

I can conceive some readers complaining that, while devoting a great
deal of space to Libya and Iberia, I have said little or nothing
about the strait of the Pillars of Hercules, the Mare Externum, or
the British Isles, and the manufacture of tin in them, or even of the
silver and gold mines in Iberia itself, of which historians give long
and contradictory accounts. It was not, let me say, because I thought
these subjects out of place in history that I passed them over; but
because, in the first place, I did not wish to be diffuse, or distract
the attention of students from the main current of my narrative; and,
in the next place, because I was determined not to treat of them in
scattered notices or casual allusions, but to assign them a distinct
time and place, and at these, to the best of my ability, to give a
trustworthy account of them. On the same principle I must deprecate
any feeling of surprise if, in the succeeding portions of my history,
I pass over other similar topics, which might seem naturally in place,
for the same reasons. Those who ask for dissertations in history on
every possible subject, are somewhat like greedy guests at a banquet,
who, by tasting every dish on the table, fail to really enjoy any
one of them at the time, or to digest and feel any benefit from them
afterwards. Such omnivorous readers get no real pleasure in the
present, and no adequate instruction for the future.

+58.+ There can be no clearer proof, than is afforded by these
particular instances, that this department of historical writing stands
above all others in need of study and correction. For as all, or at
least the greater number of writers, have endeavoured to describe the
peculiar features and positions of the countries on the confines of
the known world, and in doing so have, in most cases, made egregious
mistakes, it is impossible to pass over their errors without some
attempt at refutation; and that not in scattered observations or casual
remarks, but deliberately and formally. But such confutation should
not take the form of accusation or invective. While correcting their
mistakes we should praise the writers, feeling sure that, had they
lived to the present age, they would have altered and corrected many of
their statements. The fact is that, in past ages, we know of very few
Greeks who undertook to investigate these remote regions, owing to the
insuperable difficulties of the attempt. The dangers at sea were then
more than can easily be calculated, and those on land more numerous
still. And even if one did reach these countries on the confines of the
world, whether compulsorily or voluntarily, the difficulties in the way
of a personal inspection were only begun: for some of the regions were
utterly barbarous, others uninhabited; and a still greater obstacle
in way of gaining information as to what he saw was his ignorance
of the language of the country. And even if he learnt this, a still
greater difficulty was to preserve a strict moderation in his account
of what he had seen, and despising all attempts to glorify himself by
traveller’s tales of wonder, to report for our benefit the truth and
nothing but the truth.

+59.+ All these impediments made a true account of these regions in
past times difficult, if not impossible. Nor ought we to criticise
severely the omissions or mistakes of these writers: rather they
deserve our praise and admiration for having in such an age gained
information as to these places, which distinctly advanced knowledge.
In our own age, however, the Asiatic districts have been opened up
both by sea and land owing to the empire of Alexander, and the other
places owing to the supremacy of Rome. Men too of practical experience
in affairs, being released from the cares of martial or political
ambition, have thereby had excellent opportunities for research and
inquiry into these localities; and therefore it will be but right
for us to have a better and truer knowledge of what was formerly
unknown. And this I shall endeavour to establish, when I find a fitting
opportunity in the course of my history. I shall be especially anxious
to give the curious a full knowledge on these points, because it was
with that express object that I confronted the dangers and fatigues
of my travels in Libya, Iberia, and Gaul, as well as of the sea which
washes the western coasts of these countries; that I might correct the
imperfect knowledge of former writers, and make the Greeks acquainted
with these parts of the known world.

After this digression, I must go back to the pitched battles between
the Romans and Carthaginians in Italy.

[Sidenote: Rest and recovery.]

[Sidenote: Taking of Turin.]

+60.+ After arriving in Italy with the number of troops which I have
already stated, Hannibal pitched his camp at the very foot of the Alps,
and was occupied, to begin with, in refreshing his men. For not only
had his whole army suffered terribly from the difficulties of transit
in the ascent, and still more in the descent of the Alps, but it was
also in evil case from the shortness of provisions, and the inevitable
neglect of all proper attention to physical necessities. Many had quite
abandoned all care for their health under the influence of starvation
and continuous fatigue; for it had proved impossible to carry a full
supply of food for so many thousands over such mountains, and what they
did bring was in great part lost along with the beasts that carried it.
So that whereas, when Hannibal crossed the Rhone, he had thirty-eight
thousand infantry, and more than eight thousand cavalry, he lost
nearly half in the pass, as I have shown above; while the survivors
had by these long continued sufferings become almost savage in look
and general appearance. Hannibal therefore bent his whole energies to
the restoration of the spirits and bodies of his men, and of their
horses also. When his army had thus sufficiently recovered, finding
the Taurini, who live immediately under the Alps, at war with the
Insubres and inclined to be suspicious of the Carthaginians, Hannibal
first invited them to terms of friendship and alliance; and, on their
refusal, invested their chief city and carried it after a three day’s
siege. Having put to the sword all who had opposed him, he struck such
terror into the minds of the neighbouring tribes, that they all gave in
their submission out of hand. The other Celts inhabiting these plains
were also eager to join the Carthaginians, according to their original
purpose; but the Roman legions had by this time advanced too far, and
had intercepted the greater part of them: they were therefore unable to
stir, and in some cases were even obliged to serve in the Roman ranks.
This determined Hannibal not to delay his advance any longer, but to
strike some blow which might encourage those natives who were desirous
of sharing his enterprise.

[Sidenote: Approach of Scipio.]

[Sidenote: Tiberius Sempronius recalled.]

+61.+ When he heard, while engaged on this design, that Publius had
already crossed the Padus with his army, and was at no great distance,
he was at first inclined to disbelieve the fact, reflecting that it was
not many days since he had left him near the passage of the Rhone, and
that the voyage from Marseilles to Etruria was a long and difficult
one. He was told, moreover, that from the Tyrrhenian Sea to the Alps
through Italian soil was a long march, without good military roads.
But when messenger after messenger confirmed the intelligence with
increased positiveness, he was filled with amazement and admiration
at the Consul’s plan of campaign, and promptness in carrying it out.
The feelings of Publius were much the same: for he had not expected
that Hannibal would even attempt the passage of the Alps with forces
of different races, or, if he did attempt it, that he could escape
utter destruction. Entertaining such ideas he was immensely astonished
at his courage and adventurous daring, when he heard that he had not
only got safe across, but was actually besieging certain towns in
Italy. Similar feelings were entertained at Rome when the news arrived
there. For scarcely had the last rumour about the taking of Saguntum
by the Carthaginians ceased to attract attention, and scarcely had
the measures adopted in view of that event been taken,—namely the
despatch of one Consul to Libya to besiege Carthage, and of the other
to Iberia to meet Hannibal there,—than news came that Hannibal had
arrived in Italy with his army, and was already besieging certain towns
in it. Thrown into great alarm by this unexpected turn of affairs, the
Roman government sent at once to Tiberius at Lilybaeum, telling him
of the presence of the enemy in Italy, and ordering him to abandon
the original design of his expedition, and to make all haste home to
reinforce the defences of the country. Tiberius at once collected
the men of the fleet and sent them off, with orders to go home by
sea; while he caused the Tribunes to administer an oath to the men of
the legions that they would all appear at a fixed day at Ariminum by
bedtime. Ariminum is a town on the Adriatic, situated at the southern
boundary of the valley of the Padus. In every direction there was stir
and excitement: and the news being a complete surprise to everybody,
there was everywhere a great and irrepressible anxiety as to the future.