# Polybius, Histories book 3, English: W. R. Paton, Loeb Classical Library (1922), as transcribed by Bill Thayer,
# LacusCurtius https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Polybius/3*.html (fetched 2026-09-14).
# Section numbers are Thayer's (Loeb/Büttner-Wobst numbering). Numbering: 3.chapter.section. Footnote markers kept as [n].
# Chapters: 3.33.17-18, 3.34-35, 3.39-42, 3.44-56, 3.60-61.

## Polybius 3.33
3.33.17  No one need be surprised at the accuracy of the information I give here about Hannibal's arrangements in Spain, an accuracy which even the actual organizer of the details would have some difficulty in attaining, and I need not be condemned off-hand under the idea that I am acting like those authors who try to make their misstatements plausible.
3.33.18  The fact is that I found on the Lacinian promontory a bronze tablet on which Hannibal himself had made out these lists during the time he was in Italy, and thinking this an absolutely first-rate authority, decided to follow the document.

## Polybius 3.34
3.34.1  Hannibal, after taking all precautions for the p81 safety of Africa and Spain, was anxiously awaiting the arrival of the messengers he expected from the Celts.
3.34.2  He had informed himself accurately about the fertility of the land at the foot of the Alps and near the river Po, the denseness of its population, the bravery of the men in war,
3.34.3  and above all their hatred of Rome ever since that former war with the Romans which I described in the preceding Book to enable my readers to follow all I am about to narrate.
3.34.4  He therefore cherished high hopes of them, and was careful to send messengers with unlimited promises to the Celtic chiefs both on this side of the Alps and in the mountains themselves,
3.34.5  thinking that the only means of carrying the war against the Romans into Italy was, after surmounting, if possible, the difficulties of the route, to reach the above country and employ the Celts as co-operators and confederates in his enterprise.
3.34.6  When the messengers arrived and reported that the Celts consented and awaited him, at the same time saying that the crossing of the Alps was very toilsome and difficult, but by no means impossible, he drew out his troops from their winter quarters in the early spring.
3.34.7  As the news of what had happened in Carthage had just reached him, his spirits were now high, and trusting in the favourable disposition of the citizens, he now called openly on his men to join him in the war against Rome,
3.34.8  impressing upon them the demand of the Romans that he and all his principal officers should be given up to them, and pointing out at the same time the wealth of the country they were p83 bound for and the friendly feelings of the Gauls who would be their allies.
3.34.9  When he saw that the soldiers listened gladly and were as eager as himself to be off, he commended their alacrity and after ordering them to be ready on the day fixed for his departure, dismissed the meeting.

## Polybius 3.35
3.35.1  Having completed the arrangements I mentioned above during the winter and thus assured the security of Africa and Spain, he advanced on the day he had fixed with an army of about ninety thousand foot and twelve thousand horse.
3.35.2  Crossing the Ebro, he set about subduing the tribes of the Ilurgetes, Bargusii, Aerenosii, and Andosini as far as the Pyrenees,
3.35.3  and having reduced them all and taken some cities by assault, with unexpected rapidity indeed, but after many severe engagements and with great loss,
3.35.4  he left Hanno in command of all the country on this side of the river, pla­cing the Bargusii under his absolute rule, as he mistrusted them most, owing to their friendly sentiments toward Rome.
3.35.5  He assigned to Hanno out of his own army ten thousand foot and one thousand horse, and he left with him all the heavy baggage of the expeditionary force.
3.35.6  He dismissed at the same time an equal number of troops to their homes, with the view of leaving them well disposed to himself and encouraging the hope of a safe return in the rest of the Spaniards, not only those who were serving with him, but those who remained at home, so that if he ever had to call on them for reinforcements, they might all readily respond.
3.35.7  With the rest of his force, thus lightened of its impedimenta and p85 consisting now of fifty thousand foot and about nine thousand horse, he advanced throughout the Pyrenees towards the crossing of the Rhone,
3.35.8  having now an army not so strong in number as serviceable and highly trained owing to the unbroken series of wars in Spain.

## Polybius 3.39
3.39.1  Dismissing this matter I will now continue my narrative.
3.39.2  At the time of which we are speaking the Carthaginians were masters of all that part of Africa which looks towards the Mediterranean from the Altars of Philaenus5 on the Greater Syrtis as far as the Pillars of Hercules.
3.39.3  The length of this coast-line is •more than sixteen thousand stades.
3.39.4  Crossing the straits at the Pillars of Hercules they had similarly subdued all Iberia as far as the point on the coast of the Mediterranean where the Pyrenees, which separate the Celts from the Iberians, end.
3.39.5  This spot is •about eight thousand stades distant from the mouth of this sea at the Pillars of Hercules,
3.39.6  the distance being •three thousand stades from the Pillars to New Carthage, from which place Hannibal started for Italy, •two thousand six hundred stades from hence to the Ebro,
3.39.7  and from the Ebro to Emporium •one thousand six hundred stades.
3.39.8  From Emporium to Narbo it is •about six hundred stades, and from Narbo to the passage of the Rhone about sixteen hundred, this part of the road having now been carefully measured by the Romans and marked with milestones at every eighth stade.
3.39.9  From the passage of the Rhone, following the bank of the river in the direction of its source as far as the foot of the pass across the Alps to Italy, the distance is p93 •fourteen hundred stades,
3.39.10  and the length of the actual pass which would bring Hannibal down into the plain of the Po, about twelve hundred.
3.39.11  So that to arrive there he had, starting from New Carthage, to march •about nine thousand stades.
3.39.12  Of this, as far as distance goes, he had nearly traversed the half, but if we look to difficulty far the largest part lay before him.

## Polybius 3.40
3.40.1  While Hannibal was thus attempting to cross the Pyrenees, in great fear of the Celts owing to the natural strength of the passes,
3.40.2  the Romans, having received from the envoys they had sent to Carthage an account of the decision arrived at, and the speeches made there, and on news reaching them sooner than they had expected that Hannibal had crossed the Ebro with his army, determined to send, with their legions, the Consuls Publius Cornelius Scipio to Spain and Tiberius Sempronius Longus to Africa.
3.40.3  While occupied in enrolling the legions and making other preparations they were pushing on the project of establishing in Cisalpine Gaul the colonies on which they had decided.
3.40.4  They took active steps to fortify the towns, and ordered the colonists, who were about six thousand in number for either city, to be on the spot within thirty days.
3.40.5  The one city they founded on this side of the Po, calling it Placentia, the other, which they named Cremona, on the far side.
3.40.6  Scarce had both these colonies been established when the Boii Gauls, who had been for long as it were lying in wait to throw off their allegiance to Rome, but had hitherto found no p95 opportunity,
3.40.7  elated now by the messages they received assuring them of the near arrival of the Carthaginians, revolted from Rome, abandoning the hostages they gave at end of the former war which I described in my last Book.
3.40.8  Calling on the Insubres to join them, whose support they easily gained owing to their long-standing rancour against Rome, they overran the lands which the Romans had allotted to their colonies and on the settlers taking to flight, pursued them to Mutina, a Roman colony, and there besieged them.
3.40.9  Among those shut up there were three men of high rank who had been sent to carry out the partitionment of the country, Gaius Lutatius, a former Consul, and two former Praetors.
3.40.10  On these three requesting a parley with the Boii, the latter consented, but when they came out for the purpose they treacherously made them prisoners, hoping by means of them to get back their own hostages.
3.40.11  When the Praetor Lucius Manlius, who with his troops was occupying an advanced position in the neighbourhood, heard of this, he hastened up to give help.
3.40.12  The Boii had heard of his approach, and posting ambuscades in a certain forest attacked him from all sides at once as soon as he reached the wooded country, and killed many of the Romans.
3.40.13  The remainder at first took to flight, but on getting to higher ground rallied just enough to give their retreat an appearance of order. The Boii following at their heels shut this force too up in the place called Vicus Tannetis.6
3.40.14  When the news reached Rome that the p97 fourth legion was surrounded by the Boii and besieged, they instantly sent off the legions destined for Publius under the command of a Praetor to its assistance, ordering Publius to enrol other legions from the allies.

## Polybius 3.41
3.41.1  The condition and course of Celtic affairs from the outset up to the arrival of Hannibal were such as I have narrated here and in the previous Book.
3.41.2  The two Roman Consuls, having made all preparations for their respective enterprises, set sail early in summer to take in hand the operations determined on, Publius bound for Iberia with sixty ships and Tiberius Sempronius for Africa with a hundred and sixty quinqueremes.
3.41.3  With these he threatened such a redoubtable expedition and made such vast preparations at Lilybaeum, collecting all kinds of forces from everywhere, that it seemed as if he expected to sail up to Carthage and at once lay siege to it.
3.41.4  Publius, coasting along Liguria, reached the neighbourhood of Marseilles from Pisa in five days,
3.41.5  and coming to anchor off the first mouth of the Rhone, known as the Massaliotic mouth,
3.41.6  disembarked his forces there, having heard that Hannibal was already crossing the Pyrenees, but convinced that he was still at a distance of many days' march owing to the difficulty of the country and the numbers of Celtic tribes between them.
3.41.7  Hannibal, however, who had bribed some of the Celts and forced others to give him passage, unexpectedly appeared with his army at the crossing of the Rhone, having marched with the Sardinian Sea on his right.
3.41.8  Publius, when the arrival of the enemy was reported to him, being partly incredulous owing to the p99 cupidity of their advance and partly desirous of ascertaining the exact truth — while he himself was refreshing his troops after their voyage and consulting with his Tribunes in what place it would be wisest to offer battle to the enemy —
3.41.9  sent out three hundred of his bravest cavalry, giving them as guides and supports certain Celts who were in the service of the Massaliots as mercenaries.

## Polybius 3.42
3.42.1  Hannibal, on reaching the neighbourhood of the river, at once set about attempting to cross it where the stream is single at a distance of about four days' march from the sea.
3.42.2  Doing his best to make friends with the inhabitants of the bank, he bought up all their canoes and boats, amounting to a considerable number, since many of the people on the banks of the Rhone engage in maritime traffic.
3.42.3  He also got from them the logs suitable for making the canoes, so that in two days he had an innumerable quantity of ferry-boats, every one doing his best to dispense with any assistance and relying on himself for his chance of getting across.
3.42.4  In the meantime a large force of barbarians had gathered on the opposite bank to prevent the Carthaginians from crossing.
3.42.5  Hannibal observing this and concluding that as things stood it was neither possible to force a crossing in face of such a strong hostile force nor to put it off, lest he should find himself attacked on all sides,
3.42.6  sent off on the third night after his arrival a portion of his army, giving them native guides and pla­cing them under the command of Hanno, the son of Bomilcar the Suffete. p101
3.42.7  Advancing up the bank of the river for •two hundred stades they reached a place at which the stream divides, forming an island, and here they stopped.
3.42.8  Using the timber they found ready to hand and either nailing or lashing logs together they soon constructed a number of rafts sufficient for their present need, and on these they crossed in safety, meeting with no opposition.
3.42.9  Occupying a post of some natural strength they remained there for that day to rest after their exertions and at the same time to prepare for the movement which they had been ordered to execute.
3.42.10  Hannibal, moreover, with the part of the army that remained behind with him, was similarly occupied.
3.42.11  The question that caused him the greatest embarrassment was how to get the elephants, thirty-seven in number, across.

## Polybius 3.44
3.44.1  The Carthaginian general, having thus made himself master of the passage and defeated the enemy, at once occupied himself in fetching over the men who had been left on the other bank,
3.44.2  and having in a very short time brought his whole army across encamped for that night beside the river.
3.44.3  Next morning, hearing that the Roman fleet was anchored off the mouths of the Rhone, he selected five hundred of his Numidian horse and sent them off to observe the whereabouts and number of the enemy and what they were about.
3.44.4  At the same time he set the proper men to the task of bringing the elephants across
3.44.5  and then called a meeting of his soldiers and, introdu­cing Magilus and the other chieftains who had come to him from the plain of the Po, made the troops acquainted through a dragoman with what they reported to be the decision of their tribes.
3.44.6  What encouraged the soldiers most in their address was firstly the actual and visible presence of those Gauls who were inviting them to Italy and promising to join them in the war against Rome,
3.44.7  and secondly the reliance they placed on their promise to guide them by a route which would take them without their being exposed to any privations, rapidly and safely to Italy.
3.44.8  In addition to this the Gauls dwelt on the richness and extent of the country they were going to, and the eager spirit of the men by whose side they were about to face the armies of Rome.
3.44.9  The Celts, after speaking in this sense, withdrew,
3.44.10  and Hannibal p107 himself now came forward and began by reminding them of their achievements in the past: though, he said, they had undertaken many hazardous enterprises and fought many a battle they had never met with ill success when they followed his plans and counsels.
3.44.11  Next he bade them be of good heart considering that the hardest part of their task was now accomplished, since they had forced the passage of the river and had the testimony of their own eyes and ears to the friendly sentiments and readiness to help of their allies.
3.44.12  He begged them therefore to be at their ease about details which were his own business, but to obey orders and behave like brave men and in a manner worthy of their own record in the past.
3.44.13  When the men applauded him, exhibiting great enthusiasm and ardour, he commended them and, after offering a prayer to the gods on behalf of all, dismissed them, bidding them get everything ready expeditiously as they would start on their march next day.

## Polybius 3.45
3.45.1  After the assembly had broken up the Numidian scouts who had been sent out to reconnoitre returned, the greater part of the force lost and the remainder in headlong flight.
3.45.2  Not far from their own camp they had fallen in with the Roman cavalry sent out by Publius on the same errand, and both forces had shown such heroism in the engagement that the Romans and Celts lost about a hundred and forty horsemen and the Numidians more than two hundred.
3.45.3  Afterwards the Romans carried their pursuit close up to the Carthaginian camp, and having surveyed it, turned and hastily rode off to report to the Consul the arrival of the p109 enemy, and on reaching their camp did so.
3.45.4  Publius at once put his baggage on board the ships and started with his whole army marching up the river bank with the view of encountering the Carthaginians.
3.45.5  Hannibal, on the day after the assembly, advanced his cavalry in the direction of the sea to act as a covering force and then moved his infantry out of the camp and sent them off on their march,
3.45.6  while he himself waited for the elephants and the men who had been left with them. The way they got the elephants across was as follows.

## Polybius 3.46
3.46.1  They built a number of very solid rafts and lashing two of these together fixed them very firmly into the bank of the river, their united width being •about fifty feet.
3.46.2  To these they attached others on the farther side, prolonging the bridge out into the stream.
3.46.3  They secured the side of it which faced the current by cables attached to the trees that grew on the bank, so that the whole structure might remain in place and not be shifted by the current.
3.46.4  When they had made the whole bridge or pier of rafts •about two hundred feet long they attached to the end of it two particularly compact ones, very firmly fastened to each other, but so connected with the rest that the lashings could easily be cut.
3.46.5  They attached to these several towing-lines by which boats were to tow them, not allowing them to be carried down stream, but holding them up against the current, and thus were to convey the elephants which would be in p111 them across.
3.46.6  After this they piled up a quantity of earth on all the line of rafts, until the whole was on the same level and of the same appearance as the path on shore leading to the crossing.
3.46.7  The animals were always accustomed to obey their mahouts up to the water, but would never enter it on any account, and they now drove them along over the earth with two females in front, whom they obediently followed.
3.46.8  As soon as they set foot on the last rafts the ropes which held these fast to the others were cut, and the boats pulling taut, the towing-lines rapidly tugged away from the pile of earth the elephants and the rafts on which they stood.
3.46.9  Hereupon the animals becoming very alarmed at first turned round and ran about in all directions, but as they were shut in on all sides by the stream they finally grew afraid and were compelled to keep quiet.
3.46.10  In this manner, by continuing to attach two rafts to the end of the structure, they managed to get most of them over on these,
3.46.11  but some were so frightened that they threw themselves into the river when half-way across. The mahouts of these were all drowned, but the elephants were saved,
3.46.12  for owing to the power and length of their trunks they kept them above the water and breathed through them, at the same time spouting out any water that got into their mouths and so held out, most of them passing through the water on their feet.

## Polybius 3.47
3.47.1  After the elephants had been put across, Hannibal, taking them and his cavalry and forming these into a rear-guard, advanced up the river bank away from the sea in an easterly direction as though making for the centre of Europe.
3.47.2  The Rhone rises north-west of the head of the Adriatic on the northern p113 slope of the Alps, and running in a south-westerly direction, falls into the Sardinian Sea.
3.47.3  A great part of its course is through a deep valley, to the north of which lives the Celtic tribe of the Ardyes, while on the south it is bounded for its whole extent by the northern spurs of the Alps.
3.47.4  The plain of the Po which I described above at length is separated from the Rhone valley by the lofty main chain of these mountains, which starting from Marseilles extends to the head of the Adriatic.
3.47.5  It is this chain which Hannibal now crossed to enter Italy from the Rhone valley.
3.47.6  Some of the writers who have described this passage of the Alps, from the wish to impress their readers by the marvels they recount of these mountains, are betrayed into two vices ever most alien to true history; for they are compelled to make both false statements and statements which contradict each other.
3.47.7  While on the one hand introdu­cing Hannibal as a commander of unequalled courage and foresight, they incontestably represent him to us as entirely wanting in prudence,
3.47.8  and again, being unable to bring their series of falsehoods to any close or issue they introduce gods and the sons of gods into the sober history of the facts.
3.47.9  By representing the Alps as being so steep and rugged that not only horses and troops accompanied by elephants, but even active men on foot would have difficult in passing, and at the same time picturing to us the desolation of the country as being such, that unless p115 some god or hero had met Hannibal and showed him the way, his whole army would have gone astray and perished utterly, they unquestionably fall into both the above vices.

## Polybius 3.48
3.48.1  For in the first place can we imagine a more imprudent general or a more incompetent leader than Hannibal would have been,
3.48.2  if with so large an army under his command and all his hopes of ultimate success resting on it, he did not know the roads and the country, as these writers say, and had absolutely no idea where he was marching or against whom,
3.48.3  or in fact if his enterprise were feasible or not?
3.48.4  What they would have us believe is that Hannibal, who had met with no check to diminish his high hopes of success, ventured on a course that no general, even after a crushing defeat and utterly at his wits' end, would take, to march, that is, into a country as to which he had no information.
3.48.5  Similarly, in what they say about the loneliness, and the extreme steepness and difficulty of the road, the falsehood is manifest.
3.48.6  For they never took the trouble to learn that the Celts who live near the Rhone not on one or on two occasions only before Hannibal's arrival but often, and not at any remote date but quite recently, had crossed the Alps with large armies and met the Romans in the field side by side with the Celts who inhabit the plain of the Po (as I narrated in an earlier Book)
3.48.7  nor are they aware that there is a considerable population in the Alps themselves; but in entire ignorance of all this they tell us that some hero appeared and showed the road.
3.48.8  The natural consequence is that they get into the same difficulties as tragic dramatists all of whom, to bring p117 their dramas to a close, require a deus ex machina, as the data they choose on which to found their plots are false and contrary to reasonable probability.
3.48.9  These writers are necessarily in the same spirit and invent apparitions of heroes and gods, since the beginnings on which they build are false and improbable; for how is it possible to finish conformably to reason what has been begun in defiance of it?
3.48.10  Of course Hannibal did not act as these writers describe, but conducted his plans with sound practical sense.
3.48.11  He had ascertained by careful inquiry the richness of the country into which he proposed to descend and the aversion of the people to the Romans, and for the difficulties of the route he employed as guides and pioneers natives of the country, who were about to take part in his adventure.
3.48.12  On these points I can speak with some confidence as I have inquired about the circumstances from men present on the occasion and have personally inspected the country and made the passage of the Alps to learn for myself and see.

## Polybius 3.49
3.49.1  Now the Roman Consul Publius arrived at the crossing of the river three days after the departure of the Carthaginians, and finding the enemy gone was in the highest degree astonished,
3.49.2  as he had been convinced that they would never venture to march on Italy by this route owing to the number and unruly character of the native inhabitants.
3.49.3  On seeing that they had done so he returned with all speed to his ships and began to embark his forces.
3.49.4  Sending his brother to conduct the campaign in Spain, he himself turned back and made sail for p119 Italy with the design of marching rapidly through Etruria and reaching the foot of the pass over the Alps before the enemy.
3.49.5  Hannibal, marching steadily from the crossing-place for four days, reached a place called the "Island," a populous district produ­cing abundance of cornº and deriving its name from its situation;
3.49.6  for the Rhone and Isère running along each side of it meet at its point.
3.49.7  It is similar in size and shape to the Egyptian Delta; only in that case the sea forms the base line uniting the two branches of the Nile, while here the base line is formed by a range of mountains difficult to climb or penetrate, and, one may say, almost inaccessible.
3.49.8  On arriving there he found two brothers disputing the crown and posted over against each other with their armies,
3.49.9  and on the elder one making overtures to him and begging him to assist in establishing him on the throne, he consented, it being almost a matter of certainty that under present circumstances this would be of great service to him.
3.49.10  Having united with him therefore to attack and expel the other, he derived great assistance from the victor;
3.49.11  for not only did he furnish the army with plenty of corn and other provisions but he replaced all their old and worn weapons by new ones, thus freshening up the whole force very opportunely.
3.49.12  He also supplied most of them with warm clothing and foot-wear, things of the greatest possible service to them in crossing the mountains.
3.49.13  But the most important of all was, that the Carthaginians being not at all easy on the p121 subject of their passage through the territory of the Allobroges, he protected them in the rear with his own forces and enabled them to reach the foot of the pass in safety.

## Polybius 3.50
3.50.1  After a ten days' march of •eight hundred stades along the bank of the Isère7 Hannibal began the ascent of the Alps and now found himself involved in very great difficulties.
3.50.2  For as long as they had been in flat country, the various chiefs of the Allobroges had left them alone, being afraid both of the cavalry and of the barbarians who were escorting them.
3.50.3  But when the latter had set off on their return home, and Hannibal's troops began to advance into the difficult region, the Allobrogian chieftains got together a considerable force and occupied advantageous positions on the road by which the Carthaginians would be obliged to ascend.
3.50.4  Had they only kept their project secret, they would have utterly annihilated the Carthaginian army, but, as it was, it was discovered, and though they inflicted a good deal of damage on Hannibal, they did more injury to themselves;
3.50.5  for the Carthaginian general having learnt that the barbarians had seized on these critical positions, encamped himself at the foot of the pass, and remaining there
3.50.6  sent on in advance some of his Gaulish guides, to reconnoitre and report on the enemy's plan and the whole situation.
3.50.7  His orders were executed, and on learning that the enemy remained most strictly at their post during the day-time but retired at night to a neighbouring township, he adapted his measures to this intelligence p123 and arranged the following plan.
3.50.8  He advanced openly with his whole army, and on approaching the difficult points he encamped not far from the enemy.
3.50.9  As soon as it was night, he ordered the fires to be lit, and leaving the greater part of his forces there, took the men most fitted for the enterprise, whom he had lightened of their accoutrements, and passing through the narrow part of the road occupied the posts abandoned by the enemy, who had retired as usual to the town.

## Polybius 3.51
3.51.1  At daylight the enemy observed what had happened and at first desisted from their project,
3.51.2  but afterwards on seeing the long string of sumpter-animals and horsemen slowly and with difficulty winding up the narrow path, they were tempted by this to molest their march.
3.51.3  On their doing so and attacking at several different points, the Carthaginians suffered great loss chiefly in horses and sumpter-mules, not so much at the hands of the barbarians as owing to the ground.
3.51.4  For the road up the pass being not only narrow and uneven but precipitous, the least movement or disturbance caused many of the animals to be pushed over the precipice with their packs.
3.51.5  It was chiefly the horses on being wounded which caused the disturbance, some of them, terrified by the pain, turning and meeting the pack-animals and others rushing on ahead and pushing aside in the narrow path everything that came in their way, thus creating a general confusion.
3.51.6  Hannibal, on seeing this and reflecting that there would be no chance of safety even for those who escaped from the battle if the pack-train were destroyed, took with him the men p125 who had occupied the heights at night and hastened to render assistance to the head of the marching column.
3.51.7  He inflicted great loss on the Allobroges, as he was charging from higher ground, but the loss was equally heavy among his own troops,
3.51.8  since the column on the march was thrown into further confusion in both directions at once owing to the shouting and struggling of those taking part in this combat.
3.51.9  It was only when he had put the greater part of the Allobroges to the sword and compelled the rest to take to flight and run for their own land, that the remainder of the pack-train and the horses got slowly and with great difficulty over the dangerous part,
3.51.10  and he himself rallying as many troops as he could after the fight, attacked the town from which the enemy had issued to make their onslaught.
3.51.11  He found it nearly deserted, as all the inhabitants had been tempted out by hope of pillage, and seized on it. This proved of great service to him for the future as well as the present;
3.51.12  for not only did he recover a number of pack-animals and horses and the men who had been captured together with them, but he got a supply of corn and cattle amply sufficient for two or three days,
3.51.13  and in addition to this he struck such terror into the next tribes that none of those in the neighbourhood of the ascent were likely to venture to molest him.

## Polybius 3.52
3.52.1  For the present, he encamped here, and after a stay of one day resumed his march.
3.52.2  For the following days he conducted the army in safety up to a certain point, but on the fourth day he was again placed in great danger.
3.52.3  The natives near the pass conspired together and came out to meet him with treacherous intentions, holding olive-branches p127 and wreaths, which nearly all the barbarians use as tokens of friendship, just as we Greeks use the herald's staff.
3.52.4  Hannibal, who was a little suspicious of such proffer of alliance, took great pains to ascertain what their project and general motives were.
3.52.5  When they told him that they knew all about the capture of the city and the destruction of those who had attempted to do him wrong, and assured him that for this reason they were come to him, as they neither wished to inflict nor to suffer any injury, and on their promising to give him hostages from among themselves,
3.52.6  he for long hesitated, distrusting their word. But, reflecting that if he accepted their offers, he might perhaps make them more chary of attacking him and more pacific, but that if he refused, they would certainly be his declared enemies, he finally agreed to their proposals, and feigned to accept their friendship.
3.52.7  Upon the barbarians now delivering the hostages and providing him with cattle in abundance, and altogether putting themselves unreservedly into his hands, he trusted them in so far as to employ them as guides for the next difficult part of the road.
3.52.8  But after two days march these same barbarians collecting and following on the heels of the Carthaginians, attacked them as they were traversing a certain difficult and precipitous gorge.

## Polybius 3.53
3.53.1  On this occasion Hannibal's whole army would have been utterly destroyed, had he not still been a little apprehensive and foreseeing such a contingency placed the pack-train and cavalry at the head of the column and the heavy infantry in the rear.
3.53.2  As the latter now acted as a covering force, the disaster was less serious, the infantry p129 meeting the brunt of the attack.
3.53.3  But in spite of all this a great many men, pack-animals, and horses were lost.
3.53.4  For the enemy being on higher ground skirted along the slopes and either by rolling rocks down or by hurling stones from the hand threw the Carthaginians into such extreme peril and confusion
3.53.5  that Hannibal was compelled to pass the night with half his force at a certain place defended by bare rocks and separated from his horses and pack-train, whose advance he waited to cover, until after a whole night's labour they managed to extricate themselves from the defile.
3.53.6  Next day, the enemy having taken their departure, he joined the cavalry and pack-animals and advanced to the summit of the pass, encountering no longer any massed force of barbarians,
3.53.7  but molested from time to time and in certain places by some of them who took advantage of the ground to attack him either from the rear or from the front and carry off some of the pack-animals.
3.53.8  In these circumstances the elephants were of the greatest service to him; for the enemy never dared to approach that part of the column in which these animals were, being terrified by the strangeness of their appearance.
3.53.9  After an ascent of nine days Hannibal reached the summit, and encamping there remained for two days to rest the survivors of his army and wait for stragglers.
3.53.10  During this interval a good many of the horses which had broken away in terror and a number of those sumpter-animals which had thrown off their packs returned strangely enough, having followed the track of the march, and came into the camp.

## Polybius 3.54
3.54.1  As it was now close p131 on the setting of the Pleiads snow had already gathered on the summit, and noti­cing that the men were in bad spirits owing to all they had suffered up to now and expected to suffer
3.54.2  he summoned them to a meeting and attempted to cheer them up, relying chiefly for this purpose on the actual view of Italy, which lies so close under these mountains, that when both are viewed together the Alps stand to the whole of Italy in the relation of a citadel to a city.
3.54.3  Showing them, therefore, the plain of the Po, and reminding them of the friendly feelings of the Gauls inhabiting it, while at the same time pointing out the situation of Rome itself, he to some extent restored their spirits.
3.54.4  Next day he broke up his camp and began the descent. During this he encountered no enemy, except a few skulking marauders, but owing to the difficulties of the ground and the snow his losses were nearly as heavy as on the ascent.
3.54.5  The descending path was very narrow and steep, and as both men and beasts could not tell on what they were treading owing to the snow, all that stepped wide of the path or stumbled were dashed down the precipice.
3.54.6  This trial, however, they put up with, being by this time familiar with such sufferings,
3.54.7  but they at length reached a place where it was impossible for either the elephants or the pack-animals to pass owing to the extreme narrowness of the path, a previous landslip having carried away •about one and a half stades of the face of the mountain and a further landslip having recently occurred, and here the soldiers once more became disheartened and discouraged.
3.54.8  The Carthaginian general at first thought of avoiding the difficult part by a detour, but as a fresh fall of snow made progress p133 impossible he had to abandon this project.

## Polybius 3.55
3.55.1  The state of matters was altogether peculiar and unusual. The new snow which had fallen on the top of the old snow remaining since the previous winter, was itself yielding, both owing to its softness, being a fresh fall, and because it was not yet very deep,
3.55.2  but when they had trodden through it and set foot on the congealed snow beneath it, they no longer sunk in it, but slid along it with both feet, as happens to those who walk on ground with a coat of mud on it.
3.55.3  But what followed on this was even more trying.
3.55.4  As for the men, when, unable to pierce the lower layer of snow, they fell and then tried to help themselves to rise by the support of their knees and hands, they slid along still more rapidly on these, the slope being exceedingly steep.
3.55.5  But the animals, when they fell, broke through the lower layer of snow in their efforts to rise, and remained there with their packs as if frozen into it, owing to their weight and the congealed condition of this old snow.
3.55.6  Giving up this project, then, Hannibal encamped on the ridge, sweeping it clear of snow, and next set the soldiers to work to build up the path along the cliff, a most toilsome task.
3.55.7  In one day he had made a passage sufficiently wide for the pack-train and horses; so he at once took these across and encamping on ground free of snow, sent them out to pasture,
3.55.8  and then took the Numidians in relays to work at building up the path, so that with great difficulty in three days he managed to p135 get the elephants across, but in a wretched condition from hunger;
3.55.9  for the summits of the Alps and the parts near the tops of the passes are all quite treeless and bare owing to the snow lying there continuously both winter and summer, but the slopes half-way up on both sides are grassy and wooded and on the whole inhabitable.

## Polybius 3.56
3.56.1  Hannibal having now got all his forces together continued the descent, and in three days' march from the precipice just described reached flat country.
3.56.2  He had lost many of his men by the hands of the enemy in the crossing of rivers and on the march in general, and the precipices and difficulties of the Alps had cost him not only many men, but a far greater number of horses and sumpter-animals.
3.56.3  The whole march from New Carthage had taken him five months, and he had spent fifteen days in crossing the Alps, and now, when he thus boldly descended into the plain of the Po and the territory of the Insubres,
3.56.4  his surviving forces numbered twelve thousand African and eight thousand Iberian foot, and not more than six thousand horse in all, as he himself states in the inscription on the column at Lacinium relating to the number of his forces.
3.56.5  About the same time, as I stated above, Publius Scipio, leaving his forces with his brother Gnaeus with orders to conduct operations in Spain and vigorously combat Hasdrubal, arrived by sea at Pisa with a small following.
3.56.6  Marching through Etruria and taking over from the Praetors the frontier legions which were engaged with the Boii, he reached p137 the plain of the Po, and encamping there, waited for the enemy, being anxious to give him battle.

## Polybius 3.60
3.60.1  I have already stated the strength of Hannibal's army when he entered Italy.
3.60.2  Once arrived there he at first encamped at the very foot of the Alps to refresh his forces.
3.60.3  For his men had not only suffered terribly from the toil of ascent and descent of the passes and the roughness of the road but they were also in wretched condition owing to the scarcity of provisions and neglect of their persons, many having fallen into a state of utter despondency from prolonged toil and want of food.
3.60.4  For it had been impossible to transport over such ground a plentiful supply of provisions for so many thousand men, and with the loss of the pack-animals the greater part of what they were carrying perished.
3.60.5  So that while Hannibal started from the passage of the Rhone with thirty-eight thousand foot and more than eight thousand horse he lost in crossing the passes, as I said above, about half his whole force,
3.60.6  while the survivors, owing to the continued hardships they had suffered, had become in their external appearance and general condition more like beasts than men.
3.60.7  Hannibal, therefore, made every provision p145 for carefully attending to the men and the horses likewise until they were restored in body and spirit.
3.60.8  After this, his forces having now picked up their strength, when the Taurini who live at the foot of the mountains quarrelled with the Insubres and showed no confidence in the Carthaginians,
3.60.9  he at first made overtures for their friendship and alliance, but on their rejecting these he encamped round their chief city and reduced it in three days.
3.60.10  By massacring those who had been opposed to him he struck such terror into the neighbouring tribes of barbarians that they all came in at once and submitted to him.
3.60.11  The remaining Celtic inhabitants of the plains were impatient to join the Carthaginians, as had been their original design,
3.60.12  but as the Roman legions had advanced beyond most of them and cut them off, they kept quiet, some even being compelled to serve with the Romans.
3.60.13  Hannibal, in view of this, decided not to delay, but to advance and try by some action to encourage those who wished to take part in his enterprise.

## Polybius 3.61
3.61.1  Such was the purpose he had in view when the news reached him that Publius had already crossed the Po and was quite near at hand. At first he refused to believe it,
3.61.2  reflecting that he had left him only a few days previously near the crossing of the Rhone and that the coasting voyage from Marseilles to Etruria was long and difficult,
3.61.3  and learning further by inquiry that the road through p147 Italy from the Tyrrhenian Sea to the Alps was likewise very long and not suited for the march of troops. But when more messengers continued to arrive bringing the same news in a more definite form,
3.61.4  he was struck with amazement at the whole project of the Consul and the way he had carried it out. Publius had very much the same feeling;
3.61.5  for at first he had never expected that Hannibal would even attempt to cross the Alps with foreign forces, and if he ventured on it he thought that certain destruction awaited them. So that, his anticipations being such, when he heard that Hannibal was safe
3.61.6  and was already besieging towns in Italy he was amazed too at his daring and venturesomeness.
3.61.7  In Rome itself the intelligence had much the same effect. The stir created by the last news of the Carthaginians — that they had captured Saguntum —
3.61.8  had only just subsided, measures had been taken to meet this situation by sending one Consul to Libya who was to besiege Carthage itself, and the other to Spain to fight, as they thought, with Hannibal there; and now news came that Hannibal was in Italy with his army and already laying siege to some cities.
3.61.9  The thing therefore seemed altogether astounding to them, and in great alarm they sent urgent orders to Tiberius at Lilybaeum, informing him of the arrival of the enemy and bidding him abandon his present project and hasten to the help of his own country.
3.61.10  Tiberius at once collected the crews of his fleet and dispatched it with orders to make for home. From his soldiers he exacted through the Tribunes an oath that they would all be p149 at Ariminum on a certain day before bed-time.
3.61.11  This is a city on the Adriatic at the southern edge of the plains of the Po.
3.61.12  So that as there was great stir and activity all round, and as the news that arrived was what nobody expected, there was on both sides that intense concern for the future which an enemy cannot afford to neglect.

## Footnotes (LacusCurtius: Paton's Loeb notes and Thayer's additions; numbers match the [n] markers above)
[1] Livy calls it Castala. Thayer's Note: No such name appears in the text of Livy anywhere online. (My initial note was good enough as far as it went; my friend Jona Lendering did the needed homework and found it lurking under Cartala (Livy, XXI .5) . Whether Castala is a legitimate variant in the manuscripts or just a garden-variety typo in the Loeb edition, which seems more likely to me, I can't say. I haven't seen a critical edition of Livy.)
[2] Of Chaereas nothing is known. Sosylus was Hannibal's Greek teacher and accompanied him on his campaign.
[3] i.e. claims him as his slave.
[4] Cf. Bk. V .21.4 .
[5] Originally the boundary between Egypt and Cyrene.
[6] Near Parma.
[7] Polybius says simply "the river." Thayer's Note: The reason for the editorial emendation is given in W. H. Hall, The Romans on the Riviera and the Rhone , p28 .
[8] i.e. the Ticino. Livy wrongly makes it to be the bridge of boats over the Po. The engagement took place near Victumulae, the modern Vigevano, º on the right bank of the Ticino.
[9] Otherwise Arpi.
[10] The text has Daunii.
[11] Otherwise Volturnus .
[12] Odyssey , X .232.
[13] This is not consistent with the statement in Chapter 69 . Thayer's Notes: a This suggests that the booty they expected was not objects or money, but slaves. At this period of Roman expansion, man­ power was the most precious commodity: this underscores the wishful thinking recorded by Polybius.