These are the measurements and documents that would move the numbers in the finding, with the direction they would move them.

1. A winter snow profile at the tent site. A pit line through a 1959-like snowpack at the fixed 1959 position, extending 10 m upslope of the cut. A buried weak layer under a 0.3 to 0.5 m wind slab on the step above the cut would raise the slab from 45 to about 65 per cent and the snow trigger to about 80. Repeated pits showing hard, homogeneous, well-bonded snow to the ground on the step, which is what Borzenkov reports for pits cut in 2010, 2014, 2015 and 2019, would push the slab toward 20 per cent. Nobody has dug a pit line up the step above the fixed 1959 position with this question in mind.
2. The 1959 tent position on the 2021 drone model. The prosecutors fixed the site by photogrammetry in 2019; Puzrin and Gaume's September 2021 survey gives a 9 cm ground model on which steps above 28 degrees run continuously across the slope. Overlaying the two would name the step that lay above the cut, with its angle and length, which is what the model's slab size and release delay are computed from. The 30 m public model used here cannot see steps and does not bear on them.
3. The missing chemical and histological sheets of the 1959 autopsies. A toxin or a propellant metabolite in the tissues would cut the natural-cause figure sharply and revive the military version. Clean results would close the largest item in the residual.
4. Exhumation of Dubinina and Thibeaux-Brignolle with modern imaging, which the relatives' June 2026 demand would bring about for all nine. Zolotaryov's private exhumation of 2018 is the precedent: it confirmed the 1959 rib findings, added three scapula fractures the act had missed and excluded a blast wave, but it could not place or date the injuries. Broad compression fractures with no localised blows on the other two would confirm the ravine; fracture geometry or soft-tissue evidence of blows or a weapon would overturn the finding outright. Tumanov's "different lines" claim about the ribs is tested by the same examination.
5. A range or telemetry record for 1 to 2 February 1959 from Kapustin Yar, Tyuratam or the air-defence forces of any launch whose trajectory passed over 61.8° N, 59.4° E. The published launch lists contain none; an archival record would revive the rocket version and would need to be reconciled with the absence of debris and blast damage.
6. The hourly synoptic record of 1 to 2 February 1959 at Burmantovo, Ivdel and Nyaksimvol from the archive of Roshydromet, the Russian weather service. A recorded fall-wind event, a sudden onset to 25 m/s or more at the time the tent was abandoned, would raise the wind-only trigger above the snow trigger; a steady 8 to 15 m/s would lower it.
7. The written conclusions and the nine expert reports of the 2019–20 check, held in the Sverdlovsk state archive with restricted access. The microclimate and snow reports were never published; their raw numbers would replace the reconstructed weather used here.
8. The original 26 to 28 February 1959 negatives of the tent, the slope above it and the flashlight, at full resolution. A crown line, a debris lobe or a clean surface above the tent would each settle the debris question in one direction.
9. A dynamic model of the ravine bank collapse. The finding uses a static and quasi-static calculation to show that 2 to 4 m of drifted snow on a person against a stream bed gives the observed chest compression. A material-point simulation of the actual bank geometry, of the kind Gaume and Puzrin ran for the tent, could show that the collapse cannot deliver the load, which would send the injuries back to the tent and to Buyanov's version.