J THIS BOOK IS THE PROPERTY S I Dr. J.B.ANDREWS. i Sup t of the BUFFALO STATE ASYLUM LINCOLN ROOM UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LIBRARY MEMORIAL t/x Class of 1901 founded by HARLAN HOYT HORNER and HENRIETTA CALHOUN HORNER , /r?"3 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION CAMPAIGNS OF THE CIVIL WAR.—\. THE OUTBREAK EEBELLION" JOHX G. mCOLAY PRIVATE BECKETABT TO PRESIDENT LINCOLN NEW YORK CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 743 AND 745 Broadwat 1881 COPYKIOHT BY CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 1881 Trow's Printing and Bookbinding Comtany 201-213 East \ith Street NEW YORK H n ' PEEFAOE. Upon urgent and repeated request from the publishers, the author consented to lay aside temporarily a larger and more important literary task, to wi-ite for them this initial volume of the " Campaigns of the Civil War." Personal observation and long previous investigation had furnished him a great variety of new material for the work ; and this was opportunely supplemented by the recent publication of the Official War Eecords for 1861, both Union and Confed- erate, opening to comparison and use an immense mass of historical data, and furnishing the definite means of verify- ing or correcting the statements of previous writers. Under these advantages the author has written the pres- ent volume, basing his work on materials of unquestioned authenticity — books, documents, and manuscripts — and, in- deed, for the greater part, on official iniblic records. His effort has been a conscientious and painstaking one, making historical accuracy his constant aim. If, unfortunately, he has committed any errors, he hopes they may prove only vi PREFACK such as from the meagi'eness or conflicting nature of the evidence any one might fall into. He would gladly have appended to his pages full references and citations, but want of space absolutely forbade. So many kind friends have encouraged and aided him, that he finds it impossible to acknowledge theii* sendees in detail, and therefore takes this occasion to return to one and all his sincere thanks. Government oflScials, especially, of all gi'ades, have with uniform courtesy aflPorded him eveiy facility in their power. "Without free access to the various departments and archives — and, above all, to the vast histori- cal treasures of the Libraiy of Congress — it would have been exceedingly diflBcult to gather and verify the numerous facts, quotations, names, and dates, which his narrative required. Washington, D.C. February 26, 1881. COIsTTEKTS. CHAPTER I. PACK Secession, 1 CHAPTER II. Chakleston Harbor, 17 CHAPTER III. The Confederate States' Rebellion, . ... 39 CHAPTER IV. Lincoln, 45 CHAPTER V. Sumter, 56 CHAPTER VI. The Call to Arms, 69 CHAPTER VII. Baltimore, ; . . 82 CHAPTER VIII. • Washington, 91 CHAPTER IX. Ellsworth, 105 yiii CONTENTS. CHAPTER X. PAGE Missouri, 115 CHAPTER XL Kentucky, 126 CHAPTER XIL West Virginia, 137 CHAPTER XIII. Patterson's Campaign, 155 CHAPTER XIV. Manassas, 169 CHAPTER XV. Bull Run, 181 CHAPTER XVI. The Retreat 197 CHAPTER XVII. Conclusion, 206 LIST OF MAPS. PAGE Charleston Harbor, 21 Route of the Massachusetts Sixth through Balti- more, 85 Routes of Approach to Washington, . . . .93 Field of the West Virginia Battles, .... 148 Patterson's Campaign, 159 Bull Run — The Field of Strategy, .... 177 Bull Run — Battle op the Forenoon, .... 184 Bull Run — Battle of the Afternoon, . . . 189 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. CHAPTER L SECESSION. The fifth day of October, 1860, is the initial point of the American Rebellion. Its conception, animus, and probably its plans, lay much farther back. It had been seriously proposed once or twice before, but it was then that its for- mal organization was begun. On that day Governor Gist, of South Carolina, wrote a confidential circular letter, which he despatched by the hand of a special messenger, to the governors of what were commonly designated the Cotton States. In this letter he asked an interchange of opinions which he might be at liberty to submit to a consultation of leading men of South Carolina. He said South Carolina would unquestionably call a convention as soon as it was ascertained that a majority of Lincoln electors were chosen in the then pending presidential election. "If a single State secedes," he said, " she will follow her. If no other Btate takes the lead. South Carolina will secede (ia my opin- ion) alone, if she has any assurance that she will be soon followed by another or other States ; otherwise it is doubt- ful." He asked information, and advised concerted action. North Carolina was first to respond. The people would 1 •2 THE OUTliUEAK OF REBELLION. not, so wTote the governor under date of October 18th, con. sider Lincohi's election a sufficient cause for disunion, and the Legislature would probably not call a convention. The Governor of Alabama, under date of October '25th, thought Alabama would not secede alone, but would secede in co- operation with two or more States. The Governor of Mis- sissippi, under date of October 2Gth, wrote : "If any State moves, I think Mississippi will go with her." On the same day the Governor of Louisiana answered : " I shall not ad\-ise the secession of my State, and I will add that I do not think the people of Louisiana will ultimately decide in favor of that course." The Governor of Georgia, under date of Octo- ber 31st, advocated retaliatory legislation, and ventured his opinion that the people of Georgia would wait for some overt act. Florida alone responded with anything like en- thusiasm, but only after the lapse of a month. Her gover- nor said that Florida was "ready to wheel into line with the gallant Palmetto State, or any other Cotton State or States," and thought she would unquestionably call a convention. The discoui-aging tone of these answers establishes, beyond controvei-sy, that, excepting in South Cai-olina, the rebellion was not in any sense a popular revolution, but was a con- spiracy among the prominent local office-holdei"s and politi- cians, whith the jjcople neither expected nor desii-ed, and wliich they were made eventually to justify and uphold by the iisual arts and expedients of conspiracy. Directly and in(Urectly, the South had practically con- trolled the government during its whole existence. Excited to ambition by this success, she sought to perpetuate that control. The extension of slavery and the creation of addi- tional Slave States was a necessaiy stej) in the scheme, and became the well-defined single issue in the presidential elec- tion. But in this contest the South for the tirst time met SECESSION. 3 oveiTV'lielming defeat. The choice of Lincohi was a conclu- sive and final decision, in legal form and by constitutional majorities, that slaveiy should not be extended ; and the l^opular vote of 1860 transfen-ed the balance of power irre- vocably to the Free States. In the political discussions throughout this presidential campaign, as well as in pi'eceding years, the South had made free and loud use of two leading arguments, always with' telling eflfect : the fii'st, to intimidate the North, was the thi-eat of disunion ; the second, to "fire the Southern heart," was the entirely unfounded alarm-ciy that the North, if suc- cessful, would not merely exclude slavery from federal ten-i- tories, but would also destroy slaveiy in the Slave States. The unthinking masses of the South accepted both these arguments iu theii* literal sense ; and Southern public opin- ion, excited and suspicious, became congenial soil in which the intended revolt easily took root. The State of South Carolina, in addition, had been little else than a school of treason for thii'ty years. She was, moreover, peculiarly adapted to become the hotbed of con- spiracy by the fact that of all the States she was least re- publican in both the character of her people and the form of her institutions. She was exclusive, aristocratic, reaction- ary ; had a narrow distmst of popular participation in gov- ernment, and longed for the distinctions of caste and pii\-i- lege in society. It would seem that, before the governors' replies were all received, the consultation or caucus for which they were solicited was held, and the i^rogi'amme of insuiTection agi-eed upon. Circumstances rendered a special session of the South Carolina Legislature necessaiy. The election was held during the month of October. Local fanaticism toler< ated no opposition party in the State, and iinder the manipu- 4 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. lation of the conspirators the prevailing question was, who was the most zealous "resistance" canditlate. To a legis- lature elected from this kind of material, Governor Gist, on November 5th, sent a defiant, revolutionaiy message — the first official notice and proclamation of insun-ection. He declared that "our institutions" were in danger from the hostility of the " fixed majorities" of the North ; and recom- mended the calling of -a State convention, and the i^urchase of aims and material of war. A lingeiing doubt about the result of the presidential contest ai^pears in the foi-mal choice bv the Legislature, of electoi*s who woiild vote for Breckenridge and Lane. But that doubt was short-lived. The morning of November 7th brought the certain news of the election of Lincoln and Hamlin on the pre\'ious day, and the rejoicings which would have been uttered over their defeat became jubila- tions that their success oflfered the long-coveted pretext for disunion. From this time forth everything was managed to swell the revolutionary furor. The Legislature immediately ordered a convention, made approj^riations, passed military bills. The federal office-holders, with much public flourish of their patriotic sacrifice, resigned their offices. Military companies enrolled themselves in the city ; organizations of minute- men si^rang up in the rui-al neighborhoods. Drills, parades, meetings, bonfires, secession harangues, secession cockades, palmetto flags, purchase of fire-anns and powder, singing of the Mai-seillaise — there is not room to enumerate the fol- lies to which the general populace, especially of Charleston, devoted their days and nights. There was universal satis- faction : to the conspiratoi-s, because their schemes were progressing ; to the rabble, because it had a continuous liolidav. SECESSION. 5 Amid unflagging excitement of tliis character, wliich re- ceived a daily stimulus from similar proceedings beginning and growing in other Cotton States, November and the first half of December jiassed away. Meanwhile a new governor, Fi-ancis W. Pickens, a revolutionist of a yet more radical type than his predecessor, was chosen by the Legislature and inaugurated, and the members of the Convention au- thorized by the Legislatiu-e were chosen at an election held on December 6th. The South Carolina Convention met at Columbia, the capital of the State, according to apj^oint- ment, on December 17, 1860, but, on account of a local eiji- demic, at once adjourned to Charleston. That body was, like the Legislature, the immediate outgrowth of the cur- rent conspiracy, and doubtless counted many of the conspira- tors among its members. It therefore needed no time to make up its mind. On the fourth day of its term it passed unanimously what it called an Ordinance of Secession, in the following words : "We, the people of the State of South Carolina, in convention assembled, do declare and ordain, and it is hereby declared and or- dained, that the ordinance adopted by us in convention on the 23d day of May, in the year of our Lord 178S, whereby the Constitution of the United States of America was ratified, and also all Acts and parts of Acts of the General Assembly of this State ratifying amendments of the said Constitution, are hereby repealed ; and that the Union now subsisting between. South Carolina and other States, under the name of the United States of America, is hereby dissolved." Conscious that this document bore upon its face the plain contradiction of their pretended authority, and its own pal- jjable nullity both in technical fomi and essential principle, the convention undertook to give it strength and jDlausi- bility by an elaborate Declaration of Causes, adopted a few days later (December 24:th) — a sort of half -parody of Jeflfer- 6 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. soil's masterinece. It coulil, of course, quote no direct warrant from the Constitution for secession, but sought to deduce one, by imiilication, from the language of the Decla- ration of Independence and the Xth Amendment. It re- asserts the absurd paradox of State supremacy — jjersistently miscalled " State Eights " — which reverses the natural order of governmental existence ; considers a State suijerior to the Union ; makes a part greater than the whole ; turns the pyramid of authority on its ajjex ; plants the tree of liberty Avith its branches in the ground and its roots in the air. The fallacy has been a hundred times analyzed, exposed, and refuted ; but the cheap dogmatism of demagogues and the automatic machineiy of faction peqietually conjures it up anew to astonish the sucklings and terrify the dotards of politics. The notable point in the Declaration of Causes is, that its complaint over giievances past and present is against certain States, and for these remedy was of coui-se logically barred by its own theoiy of State supremacy. On the other hand, all its allegations against the Union are concerning dangers to come, before which admission the moral justiti- cation of disunion falls to the ground. In rejecting the remedy of future elections for future wrongs, the conspiracy discarded the entire theory' and principle of republican gov- ernment. One might suiijjose that this exhausted their coiuiterfcit philosophy — but not yet. Greatly as they groaned at un- friendly State laws — seriously as they pretended to fear damage or si^oliation under futiu'e federal statutes, the bur- den of their anger rose at the sentiment and belief of the North. "All hope of remedy," says the manifesto, "is ren- dered vain by the fact that the iiublic oi)inion at the North has invested a groat political error with the sanctions of a laoro erroneous religious belief." Tliis is language one SECESSION. 7 might exiDecfc from the Pope of Rome ; but, that an American convention should denounce the Liberty of oijinion, is not merely to i-ecede from Jefferson to Louis XTV. ; it is flying from the town-meeting to the Inquisition. Nor can the final and persistent, but false assumjition of the South, be admitted, that she was justified by prescriptive privilege ; that, because slavery was tolerated at the forma- tion of the government, it must needs be protected to perpe- tuity. The Constitution makes few features of our system perpetually obligatory. Almost everything is subject to amendment by three-fourths of the States. The New World Eeimblic was established for reform — not for mere blind conservatism, certainly not for despotic reaction. The slavery question, especially, was ever since 1808 broadly imder the control of the j)eople. On the one hand. Congress had legal ijower to tolerate the African slave trade ; on the other, thi'ee-foiu-ths of the States might lawfully abolish slavery, as was done near the close of the Rebellion. To effect necessary and salutary political changes, in the ful- ness of time, by lawful and j)eaceful election through con- stitutional majorities, as a prudent alternative to the violence and horror of revolution, is one of the many signal blessings which republican representative government confers on an intelligent nation. The Ordinance of Secession of South Carolina was passed in secret session, a little after mid-day, on December 20th. The fact was immediately made ijublic by huge placards issued from the Charleston printing-offices ; and by special direction of the convention, the event was further celebrated by filing guns, ringing bells, and other jubilations. To cany this studied theatrical effect to its fullest extent, a session of the convention was held that same night, to which the members marched in procession, where the formal sign- 8 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. ing of the Ordinance was sought to be magnified into a solemn public ceremony; after which the chairman pro- claimed South Carolina an "independent commonwealth." TN'ith all their aflectation of legality, formality, and present justification, some of the members were honest enough to acknowledge the true character of the event as the culmina- tion of a chronic conspiracy, not a spontaneous revolution. " The secession of South Carolina," said one of the chief actors, " is not an event of a day. It is not anything pro- duced by Mr. Lincoln's election, or by the non-execution of the Fugitive Slave Law. It is a matter which has been gatheiing head for thirty years." This, Asith many similar avowals, crowns and completes the otherwise abundant proof that the revolt was not only against right, but that it was without cause. The original suggestion of Governor Gist in his circular lettev, for a concerted insun-ection, fell upon fmitful soil. The events which occun-ed in South Cai-olina were in sub- stance duplicated in the neighboring States of Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. These States, however, had stronger and more f onnidable union minorities than South Carolina ; or rather, if the tnith could have been ascertained with safety, they had each of them decided ma- jorities averse to secession, as was vii-tually acknowledged by their govemoi-s' replies to the Gist circular. But during the presidential camj^aign, the three Southern parties, for fac- tional advantage, had ried with each other in their denuncia- tions of the hated "Black Republicans" — they had berated each other as " submissionists " in secret league or sympathy with the Abolitionists. The partisans of Breckenridge— generally either active or latent disunionists — were ready, positive, and relentlessly aggressive ; the adherents of Bell and of Douglas were demoralized and suspicious. When SECESSION. 9 Lincoln's election was, so unexpectedly to many, rendered certain, they could not recover in time to evade the search- ing question which the conspirators immediately thrvist at them, "whether they would submit to Black Eepublican inile." A false shame and the inexorable tyi-anny of South- ern public opinion made many a voter belie the honest con- victions of his heart, and answer No, when at the very least he would gladly have evaded the inquuy. The prominent office-holders, governors, senators, con- gressmen, judges, formed in each State a central clique of conspiracy. The governors had official authority to issue proclamations, to convene legislatures, to call out and com- mand such militia as existed. Had their authority been wielded in behalf of the Union, no general revolt would have been possible ; but, exercised without scrapie or rest to promote secession, insurrection began with an official pres- tige which swei^t the hesitating and the timid irresistibly into the vortex of treason. Even then it was only by per- sistent nursing, management, and in many cases sheer deceit that a semblance of majorities was obtained to justify and apparently indorse the conspirators' plots. Legislatures were convened, commissioners sent from State to State, con- ventions called, military bills passed, minute-men and vol- unteer companies organized. Deliberative bodies were ha- rangued by the conspirators' emissaries, and showered with inflammatoiy telegrams. After the meeting of Congress the fii'e-eaters of Washington held almost nightly caucuses, and sent addresses, solicitations, and commands from the capital. Individual opinion was overawed ; the government was not only silent, but constantly yielding ; legislative deliberation became, in secret session, legislative intrigue ; pretexts were invented to defer and omit all proper scratiny of election re- turns. The "State" was the idol of the hour. "The State 10 THE OUTBREAK OK REUELLION. commands " was as desjiotic a foiToiila as " The king com- mands " ; and the voter's personal judgment, the very hasis and life-gi\'ing princ'ii)lc of republics, was ol)literatcd between the dread of jjroscription and the blighting mildew of the doctrine of supreme State allegiance. Certain features of the stniggle desei'S'e special exidana- tion. The " in-ein-essible conflict" between Korth and South, between freedom and slavery, was not confined to the two sides of Mason and Dixon's line ; it found a certain ex- pression even in the Cotton States themselves. Most of these States embi-ace tenitoiy of a i*adically different quality. Their southern and sea-coast front is a broad belt of sea- islands, marshes, river-swamps, and low alluvial lands, ex- ceedingly unhealthy from malarial fevers in the hot season, but of unsui*passed fertility, and i)ossessing the jiicturesque aspects of an exuberant half-tropical vegetation. This is the region of the great cotton, rice, and sugar plantations which have made the South rich aud famous ; here the St. Claira and Legrees of real life counted their slaves by hundreds, and aspired to sybaritic lives in amj^le, hospitable mansions, surrounded by magnificent and venerable live-oak and mag- nolia groves, avenues of stately palms, princely gardens of native and exotic bloom, and illimitable hedge-lines of the Cherokee rose ; a swarm of house-servants to minister to pam- pei'ed indolence and disi^ense a lavish hospitality ; a troop of field-hands to fill the cotton, rice, or sugar houses ; a blend- ing of Ai'cadian simplicity and feudal pretension ; every plan- tation with its indulgent master, its exacting overseer, its submissive slaves. These were the lights of the jncture ; abler pens have painted the horrible backgi-ound of bloody slave-whips, barbarous slave-codes, degrading slave-auctions, yellow fever, cypress-swamjis, the bloodhound hunt, and the ever-present di'ead of servile insmi'ection. From such SECESSIOX. 11 surroundings came the morbid dreams of an unholy leagiic between perpetual bondage and free trade, which should rear a gigantic slave empire, before which the intellect, the power, the splendor, and the government of all preceding ages and nations should fade and wane. The northern half of the Cotton States was very different ; here were thin, sandy uplands of meagre productiveness ; monotonous forests of pine and sciiib-oak, running again in- to the more varied and romantic scenery of the subsiding spurs of the Alleghanies ; blue crags, bright streams, shin- ing waterfalls, and the changing, deciduous foliage of the North. Great slave-plantations could not floui-ish here ; white population predominated; agriculture was varied ; the husbandman had a sterner stniggle with nature ; and com- munities were burdened with all the economic and social detriments of the slave system, having none of its delights. A dense slave population and ultra secessionism were, therefore, the mle in the southern, and white majorities and union feeling in the northern districts of the Cotton States. Therefore, also, political power lay in the slave region, which again was allied to the comm.ercial interests clustering about southern seaports. All the leverage was in the hands of treason — offices, ostracism, advantage in representation, com- mercial ambition, party ascendancy. The wonder is, not that secession succeeded in the struggle, but that there was any serious contest at all. With all this, there is strong ground for belief that insuiTection gained its ends at last only through chicane, deceit, and fraud. Not a single Cotton State but Texas dared to submit its Ordinance of Secession to a direct vote of the people. The struggle assumed its most determined phase in Geor- gia. She was the Empire State of the South, and, therefore, indispensable to the conspiracy, in which distinguished citi- 12 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. zeus of liei*s — Governor Brown, Secretaiy Cobb, Senators Toombs and Iverson, and others — were conspicuous ring- leadei-s. The more rabid fire-eaters desired that the Legis- lature should at once pass an act of secession ; Stephens and other conservatives opposed this course. " The Legishiture were not elected for siich a pui^pose," said he. " They came here to do their duty as legislator. They have swom to support the Constitution of the United States. They did not come here to disruj^t this government. I am, therefore, for submitting all these questions to a convention of the peo- ple." In due time a convention was called by iinanimous vote of the Legislature. Then followed a spirited campaign to elect delegates. It early became evident that, wliile the people of Georgia were irritated to the point of demanding new guai*antees for slaverv', they were decidedly against dis- union. Thereupon the conspirators invented a bold trick. " The tnith is," exjilains Alexander H. Stephens, " in my judgment the wavering scale in Georgia was turned by a sen- timent the key-note to which was given in the words, ' We can make better tei-ms out of the Union than in it.' .... This one idea did more, in my opinion, in carrying the State out, than all the arguments and eloquence of all others com- bined. Two-thii'ds at least of those who voted for the Ordi- nance of Secession, did so, I have but little doubt, with a view to a more certain refomiation of the Union." The heresy of supreme State allegiance was, however, the final and all-conquering engine of treason. Mr. Stephens him- self, in his memorable speech in defence of the Union, is the striking illusti-ation o^Gulliver helpless in the cobwebs of Lilliput. To secede, he declared, was to break the Con- stitution. Good faith required the South to abide the elec- tion in peace. Lincoln could do her no hann against an ad- verse House and Senate. He adjured them not to rashly try SECESSION. 13 the expeiiment of change ; for liberty, once lost, might never be restored. These were words of sober wisdom, and, fear- lessly adhered to by a few fli-m men, they might have para- lyzed the revolt. Yet in the same speech he declared that, if Georgia seceded, he should bow to the will of her people — in other words, break the Constitution, break faith, and lose liberty. On this " easy descent " Georgia slid to her min. Under such examples the convention passed the se- cession ordinance, 208 to 89. While thus in the States of South Carolina, Georgia, Ala- bama, Florida, INIississippi, and Louisiana, the conspiracy made pretentious efforts to clothe rebellion in the robes of law, and hide it behind the shield of constitutional forms, it pursued an altogether bold and unblushing course of usur- pation in the State of Texas. The famous and somewhat eccentric General Houston was governor. His own long straggle to bring Texas into the Union made him loth to join in its destruction. He resisted the secession c-onspir- acy ; but his southern pro-slavery prejudices also imbued him with the prevalent antagonism to the Republican party. He therefore nursed a scheme to carry Texas back into inde- pendent sovereignty, and, with her temtoiy and population as a basis, to undertake the conquest and annexation of Mexico. Biit the conspii'ators, ignoring all restraint, without a shadow of legality, assembled a revolutionaiy State conven- tion, and on FebiTiaiy 1st passed an ordinance of secession, with a provision submitting it to a popular vote. Houston, pursuing his side intrigue, approved a joint resolution of the State Legislature (Febiaiary -Itli) to legalize the conven- tion, but accompanied his approval with a protest that it should have no effect except to elicit public decision on the single question of adherence to the Union. "When in due 14 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. iime an alleged vote (taken on February 23d) ratifying the ordinance was submitted to liim, he refused to recognize fur- ther acts of the convention ; whereuijon the enraged conven- tion (March IGth) declared his office vacant, and empowered the lieutenant-governor to seize the executive authority. Meanwhile General Twiggs, commanding the Federal troojis in Texas, by treasonable connivance, on Febniaiy 18th suiTendered the military posts and property to a hasty collection of about a regiment of rebels in ai-ms, purjiorting to act by authority of the convention, and set the various scattered detachments of the army in motion to evacuate the State. Before this had taken place, the newly inaugui-ated Lincoln administration sent a messenger to Houston, who was still rejiuted by i)ublic iixmor to be loyal, and offered to concentrate a strong body of the United States trooj^s under the new commander, Colonel Waite, fonn an entrenched camp, and sustain his authority as governor. Houston, however (March 29th), refused the offer ; and having neither the United States Government nor the people of Texas to lean ui)on, the conspii'ators relentlessly pushed him into an ignoble obscuxity and transferred the State to the militaiy domination of the Rebellion. Thus, by easy stages and successive usurpations of author- ity, rebellion accomplished the first step of its operations unmolested and unopposed. South Carolina, as we have seen, seceded on December 20, 1860 ; Mississippi on January 9, 18G1 ; Florida on January 10th ; Alabama on January 11th ; Georgia on Januaiy 19th ; Louisiana on January 2Gth ; and Texas on Febniaiy 1st. The various ordinances are in sub- stance that devised and adopted by South Carolina. All the States put on the airs of independent republics, though this l)rctence was of short duration, as was designed and arranged by the conspiracy. SECESSION. 15 But the mere perversion of elections, the adoption of a secession ordinance, and the assumption of independent au- thority, was not enough for the Cotton Republics. Though they hoped to evade ci\"il war by shrewd intrig-ue, they well understood they had no certain immunity from it. It was therefore essential to possess the anns and military posts within their borders. There were in the seceded States one quite extensive na^-y-yard, at Pensacola, Florida ; twelve to fifteen harbor-forts along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, capa- ble of mounting a thousand guns, and having cost over five millions ; half a dozen arsenals, containing an aggregate of one hiindred and fifteen thousand ai'ms, transfeiTed there from northern arsenals by Secretai-y Floyd about a year be- foi'e, on pretence of danger from slave insuiTections. In ad- dition there were three mints, four important custom-houses, three revenue-cutters on duty at the several seaports, and a variety of other miscellaneous property. This estimate does not include the already mentioned public property surren- dered by General Twiggs in Texas, which of itself formed an aggregate of eighteen military posts and stations, and arms and stores to a large amount and value. This property had been purchased with the money of the Federal Government ; the land on which the buildings stood, though perhaps in some instances donated, was vested in the United States, not only by the right of eminent domain, but also by formal legislative deeds of cession from the States themselves. It was now assumed that the heresy of State supremacy, through which the States pretended to derive their authority to pass secession ordinances, also restored to them the right of eminent domain, or that they had always retained it ; that therefore they might, under the law of nations, justifiably take possession, holding themselves responsible in money 16 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. damages to be settled by negotiatiou. The liyiiothcsis and its parent dogma were of course both jjalpably false and absurd. The Government of the United States, unlike other great nations, has steadily ojjposed the maintenance of a large military force in time of j)eace. The whole regular anny amounted to only a little over seventeen thousand men. These, as usual, were mainly occupied in defence of the west- ern frontier against hostile Indian tribes. Consequently, but three of these southern forts were gan-isoned, and they by only about a company each. An equal force was stationed for the protection of the arsenals at Augusta, Ga., Mt. Vei-non, Ala., and Baton Eouge, La. As a necessaiy part of the conspiracy, the governors of the Cotton States now, by official order to their cxtempoiized militia companies, took forcible possession of these forts, arsenals, navy-yard, custom-houses, and other property, in many cases even before their secession ordinances were l^assed. This was nothing less than le\7"ing actual war against the United States, though as yet attended by no vio- lence or bloodshed. The ordinaiy process was, the sudden ai)i5earance of a superior armed force, a demand for sur- render in the name of the State, and the compliance under protest by the officer in charge — salutes to the flag, jieaceable evacuation, and unmolested transit home being gi-acioiisly permitted as military courtesy. To this coui-se of proced- ure three exceptions occiiiTed : first, no attempt was made against Foi-t Taylor at Key West, Fort JeflFei*son on Tortugas Island, and Fort Pickens at Pensacola, on account of the dis- tance and danger ; second, part of the troops in Texas were eventually refused the promised transit and captured ; and third, the forts in Charleston Harbor undei-went i)eculiar vi- cissitudes, to be specially naiTated in the next chapter. CHAPTER n. CHARLESTON HARBOR. Conspiracy was not confined to Soutli Carolina or tlie Cot- ton States ; unfortunately, it had established itself in the Mghest official circles of the national administration. Three members of President Buchanan's cabinet — Cobb of Georgia, Secretary of the Treasuiy, Floyd of Virginia, Secretary of War, and Thompson of Mississippi, Secretary of the Interior — had become ardent and active disunionists. Grouped about these three principal traitors were a number of subordinate and yet influential functionaries, all forming together a central secession cabal, working, in daily and flagrant viola- tion of their official oaths, to jjromote the success of the Southern conspiracy. After the meeting of Congress, on the first Monday of December, the Senators and Rejaresentatives from the Cotton States were in Washington to counsel, prompt, and assist this cabinet cabal, and the President was subjected to the double influence of insidious stiggestion from within, and personal pressure from without his adminis- tration, acting in regulated concert. No taint of disloyal jjuri^ose or thought aj^pears to attach to President Buchanan ; but his condition of mind predis- posed him in a remarkable degi'ee to fall under the control- ling influence of his disloyal coimsellors. He possessed the opposing qualities of feeble will and stubborn prejudice ; advancing years and decreasing vigor added to his irresolu' 18 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. tion and embarrassed his always limited capabilities. In the defeat of Breckenridge, whom he had championed, and in the sweeping success of the Republicans, he had suffered scorching rebuke aud deep humiliation. His administration was condemned, his policy was overthrown ; his proud party Avas a hoj^eless Avreck. He had no elasticity of mind, no buoyancy of hojie to recover from the shock. ^Vithal he had a blind disbelief in the ijopular judgment ; he refused to recognize the fact of an advei-se decision at the ballot-box. After his long affiliation with Southern men in thought and action, he saw, as it were, tlu'ough Southern eyes ; his mind dwelt i^ainfuUy on the fancied wrongs of the South. His natural impulse, therefore, was to embarrass and thwart the Reiniblican victoiy by siich official utterance and adminis- tration as would occur in his brief remainder of office ; and this was probably also the first and natui-al feeling of even the loyal membei-s of his Cabinet, who were prominent and devoted Democratic jmrtisans. The presidential election decided, it was necessaiy to be- gin the preparation of his annual message to Congress, which would convene in less than a month. Just about this time came the thickening reports of Southern insurrection and the ostentatious resignations of the Charleston Federal officials. The first exj^ressions from loyal members of the Cabinet were that rebellion must l)e put down. But this remedy gi-ated harshly on Buchanan's partisan prejudices. He had aided these Southern malcontents to intrigue for slavery, to comjilain of oppression, to threaten disunion. To become the public accuser of his late allies and friends, under disaster and defeat, doubtless seemed desertion aud black ingratitude. The Cabinet traitoi-s had no such scru- ples. They were ready enough to desert the President, but thov wanted firet to use him. CHARLESTON HARBOR. 19 When, on December 3d, the President's message was laid before Congress, it was found to contain the most unjust and indefensible allegations, the most glaringly inconsistent and in'econcilable doctrines, the most childish and useless suggestions. He charged that Southern discontent was caused by " long-continued and intemperate interference of the Northern jDeople wdtli the question of slavery in the Southern States," in face of the well-luiown fact that South- ern interference in free territory was the cause of the crisis. He declared that, while a State had no right to secede, the Constitution gave no right to coerce a State into submission when it had withdra'svn, or was attempting to witlnb-aw, from the confederacy. This was raising a false issue. The ques- tion was not of acting against a State for either constitu- tional or unconstitutional efforts, but of suppressing insur- rection and punishing indiWduals for violation of United States laws. Finally, he argued that, to enforce United States laws, a United States Court must first issue a wi-it and a United States Marshal execute it ; and that where judges and marshals had resigned, and a universal pojiular feeling ojjposed, such execution became impossible. In this he ignored the fact that he had power to instantly appoint new judges and marshals, and make the whole army, navy, and militia of the nation a jwsse comitatus to execute their process ; and within one month after signing this mes- sage, he, himself, actually nominated a citizen of Pennsylva- nia Collector of the Port of Charleston, in signal defiance of his own theory. As a fitting climax to such puerile reason- ing, he urged an amendment of the Constitution that would give slaveiy the veiy concession in repudiation of which the l^eople had just ovei"whelmingly elected Lincoln. As a specimen of absurdity, stupidity, and wilful wi'ong-headed- ness, this message is not equalled in American political lit- 20 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. erature. For this extraordinary state paper, which eflfectu- ally tied the hands of the administration and opened to re- bellion a pathway free from obstruction or danger, the trio of consjiirators in the Cabinet, Cobb, Floyd, and Thompson, may be reasonably held responsible. How they beguiled a I'resident of waning mental powers and naturally feeble pur- pose, may be easily enough imagined ; but how they silenced the honest logic of their loyal colleagues, is yet one of the riddles of history. The first and chief solicitude of the South Carolinians was to gain pos.session of the Charleston forts. To secede, to organize their little State into a miniature rei^ublic, was in- deed a vast achievement in their own eyes ; but they were shrewd enough to perceive that their claim to independence and sovereignty would be ridiculed by the family of nations if they could not control their outi and only seaport. That alone would give them a free highway to the world at large ; with that they could offer the benefits of commerce, security from tempests, refuge from the perils of war, to ships of other nations ; could negotiate advantageous treaties, and jierhaps conclude powerful alliances. " We must have the forts " was therefore the watchword of the secret caucus ; and before long, from every street -corner in Charleston, came the impatient echo, "The forts must be ours." The city of Charleston lies on a tongiie of land between the Ashley and Cooper rivers ; from theii" confluence the bay extends eastward some four miles to the open sea. Three foiis defend the harbor. The first and smallest is Cas- tle Piuckney, an old-time stnicture of brick, and of insignifi- cant strength in modem warfare. It lies one mile from the city ; it was capable of holding a war gaiiison of 100 men ; and its aionament of twenty-two guns was at the time com- plete. Farther out is the second in size and importance^ CHARLESTON HARBOR. 21 Fort Moultrie, situated on Sullivan's Island, some foiir miles from the city, very near the mouth of the harbor, on its northern side. It dates back in name and heroic repittation to the Revolution, when, however, it was little else than an extemporized batteiy of j)almetto-logs and sand. In mod- ern times it has been rebuilt in brick, under scientific con- struction, and though lying disadvantageously low, it had been changed into an effective channel defence, capable of mounting fifty-five guns en barbette and holding a garri- son of 300 men. The third and most important work was Map of Charleston Harbor. Fort Sumter, also of brick, but of more imposing size. It was situated about the middle of the harbor entrance, and back half a mile from its mouth ; it was erected on a shoal 22 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. raised to an artificial island ; the walls were eight feet thick and forty feet high, with two tiers of casemates ; it was five- sided, enclosing a sjjace of about 300 by 350 feet, and in its casemates and on its ramimrt it was designed for 140 guns ; its proper war-garrison was 650 men. In addition to these forts in the harbor, there were two government buildings in the city of Charleston : the Custo-n-House and the Uni- ted States Ai'senal, the latter containing a total of 22,4:o0 arms. To guard and hold possession of this i:)roperty, there were in the arsenal a niilitaiy storekeeper and fourteen enlisted men. Castle Pinckney was occupied only by an ordnance sergeant and his family ; Fort Sumter by one or two engi- neer officers, employing one hundred and ten workmen in re- pairs ; Fort Moultrie alone, in addition to another party of fifty workmen employed by the engineer officer in charge, had a gan'ison of sixty-nine soldiers and nine officers under Major Eobert Anderson, who had command of the whole harbor and all the forts. The walls of Moultrie were low, and at one place almost submerged in the drifting sand- banks of Sullivan's Island ; a storming party, the comman- dant reported, could ran like rats over the ram^jarts. Par- ties of Charlestonians frequently visited it to spy out its weak points ; volunteer companies were organized in the city for the expedition of capture ; scaling-ladders were pre- pared to make the attempt a certainty ; the talk of the street- labble and the newspapers made no concealment of their exulting confidence that they held Moultrie in the hollow of their hand. Hospitable fire-eaters went even so far as to invite Major Anderson to comfortable dinners, and to tell him, in confidential frankness over their wine, that they re- S2)ected liim as an officer and loved him as a Soiitherner, but that thov "must have tlio fort." CHARLESTON HARBOR. 23 For the time being, however, the inner councils of the con- spiracy seem to have frowned upon any rash or premature attempt upon Moultrie, and to have sagely relied on obtain- ing possession through intrigue and negotiation, since the latter method would not carry with it any danger of reprisal or punishment. A most important advantage in this direction had already been gained by Mr. Buchanan's adoption of the doctrine of non-coercion ; the next essential step was to pre- vent any reinforcements from coming into Charleston Harbor. Though not perhaps susceptible of historical i^roof, strong- inference warrants the belief that Floyd, Secretary of War, inspired by the "Washington cabal of traitors, procured the appointment of Anderson to the command with the hope that as a Southern man he would lend himself to an easy surren- der of the forts. To Floyd, also, seems to have been com- mitted the further siiiaenasion of the intrigues res^jecting them. He still avowed himself a unionist ; but he disproved ^his public declarations by a steady series of sei'vices and favors to the rebellion, of whose design he could not have remained in ignorance. Congress had met, the message had been delivered, the fatal doctrine of non-coercion conceded by the President and adopted as an administration policy. Under its protecting promises treason not only proceeded with accelerated or- ganization in the Cotton States, but made its avowals, its boasts, and its threats in Congress. South Carolina and se- cession were the topics of the hour — Moultrie and Anderson the central and growing objects of anxiety ; and at length the North, through its senators and representatives, and still more loudly through its newspaper press, began to bring its influence upon the President for reinforcement and jDrepara- tion. At the same time the secessionists congTegated at Washington were no less alert and active ; they obtained 24 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. Biiclianan's tacit inomiso that he would send no reinforce- ments unless Moultrie were attacked, and had hampered Anderson with confidential instmctions from Floyd, to take no otTensive measiires until in the nature of things, through a sudden assaiilt, he would be overwhelmed and powerless. These conflicting eflbrts brought on a Cabinet crisis and forced the President to a direct official decision. Geneml Cass, the Secretary of State, had his home in Michigan ; and feeling the stiliening influence of Northwestern sentiment, and ha\'ing, besides, his own somewhat sluggish though patriotic blood roused by the high-handed and unchecked ' intrigues of the conspirators, began to in.sist that reinforce- ments be sent to Charleston. Buchanan becoming also a trifle anxious over the situation, sent for Floyd. Floyd, suave and deceitful, dallied, evaded, pooh-poohed the danger, had resoi-t to chivali-ic bombast. The South Carolinians, he said, were honorable gentlemen. They would scorn to take the forts. They must not be imtated. At length, finding the President growing unusually obstinate in his new fancy, Floyd sought refuge in the suggestion that General Scott be consulted. Scott was a Virginian ; Floyd secretly thought he would fall in with the cun-ent secession drift, and perhaps ofiicially ad\'ise the surrender or evacuation of the forts to " conciliate " South Carolina. General Scott, scarcely able to rise from his sick bed in New York, hastened to Washington on December 12th. Floyd liad hitherto with studied neglect kept him excluded from knowledge of War Department affairs ; but now, for the fii-st time consulted, and recognizing the gravity of the situation, the Genei-al heartily joined Cass in recommending that rein- forcements be instantly sent. Floyd was suqjrised, disapjiointed, disconcerted. He summarily rejected the advice of Scott, as he had o})i)osed CHARLESTON HARBOR. 25 that of Cass. Seizing adroitly upon a phrase of Buclianan's message, wliicla affirmed the duty of the President to protect public property, he said : True, it is simply a question of property. You need no army to assert that. Place an ord- nance sergeant in the fort ; he will represent the sovereignty and the projirietary rights of the United States as well as a regiment. This was a subtle and skilful thrust. Mr. Bu- chanan's slow intellect was both flattered and confused by ha\dng his own misstatement of a vital political principle quoted and turned upon him. He had not the wit to rejoin that neither political sovereignty nor proprietary right were longer complete if possession was once lost. Nevertheless, Buchanan had a dim consciousness of treachery. He con- tinued to plead with his secretary that he ought to send re- inforcements ; warning him that a loss of the forts under the circumstances would cover the name of Floyd "with an infamy that all time can never eiface." Floyd was well nigh in despair. He turned upon the President all his florid Southern rhetoric, all the tinal armoiy of ofiended Southern dignity, and the ever-ready threats of Southern resort to violence. Send troops to Charleston, he concluded, and the swarming and enraged South Carolinians would not leave one brick of Moultrie upon another. Nor was Floyd content to risk the issue ui^on his own eloquence. He gave the note of alarm to every i^rominent traitor in Washington, and without delay they flocked around the doubting, hesitating President — Hunter, Mason, Jefferson Da-^-is — the whole busy cabal of plotting, caucusing conspir- ators, filling him alternately with such deceitful promises of good behavior and such terrible visions of revolutionary violence, that Mr. Buchanan was both frightened and soothed into a reluctant compliance with their advice. It was the scene of the wilv Yivieu and the vielding Merlin re-enacted ; 26 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. and while the Sage of Wheatland slept in doting confidence, every conspiring secessionist cried "Fool ! " and wrought "the cbarm Of woven paces and of wavinj^ hands," 'to complete their secret web of conspiracy. The issue was decided in the Cabinet meeting of December 13th ; after a spirited re-argument, the President told his Secretary of State that he was soiTy to differ with him, but that he could not order reinforcements to Charleston ; where- upon General Cass tendered his resignation and retired from official life. Cobb had resigned from the Cabinet a few days before. Black, the Attorney -General, was now made Secre- tary of State ; Thomas of Mainland, Secretary- of the Treas- uiy ; and Edwin M. Stanton appointed Attorney-General. If Mr. Buchanan flattered himself that his concession to Floyd, Davis, and the cabal, would stay the tide of disunion in the South, he was quickly undeceived. At the veiy time the Cabinet meeting was holding its final discussion of the question of reinforcements, a mysterious jiaper was being circulated for signature throxigh the two houses of Congi-ess, and on the second day following, the newspapei-s which an- nounced the retirement of Cass also contained the first defi- nite and authentic proclamation of concerted revolution by the Cotton States, and the proposal to fomi a Southern re- public* It was a brief document, but pregnant with all the * "TO OrR CONSTITUENTS. " Washington, December 14, 18(iO. "Theargnment is exhaustetl. All hope of relief in the Union, through the agency of committees, congressional legislation, or constitutional amendments, is extinguished, and we trust the South will not be deceived by nppoaninccs or the pretence of new guarantees. In our judgment the Republicans are resolute in the purpose to grant nothing that will or ought to satisfy the South. We are satisfied the honor, safety, and independence of the Southern people require the CHARLESTON HARBOR. 27 essential purposes of the conspiracy. It was signed by about one-half the Senators and Representatives from the States of North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Missis- sippi, Louisiana, Florida, Texas, and Arkansas, and is the " official " beginning of the subsequent " Confederate States," just as Gist's October circular was the " official" beginning of South Carolina secession. On the fifth day after the publication of this manifesto, the South Carolina Convention passed, signed, and published its ordinance of secession, as already related ; and now it was resolved to demand j^ossession of the Charleston forts as an incident of sovereignty and independence. It was assumed that the President would not refuse to yield them up after peaceful diplomatic negotiation, and upon an offer to ac- count for them as property in a regular business settlement between the two governments. The convention, acting up- on this theory, appointed three commissioners to proceed to "Washington to treat for the deliveiy of the forts, maga- zines, light-houses, and other real estate, for an apportion- ment of the public debt, for a division of all other property, and generally to negotiate aboiit other measures and ar- rangements. All this proceeded with the decontm and mock solemnity organization of a Southern confederacy — a result to be obtained only by separate State secession — that the primary object of each slaveholding State ought to be its epcpdy and absolute separation from a Union with hostile States." (Signed by : Representatives Pugh, Clopton. Moore, Curry, and Stallworth, of Alabama ; Senator Iverson and Representatives Underwood, Gartrell, Jackson, Jones, and Crawford, of Georgia ; Representative Hawkins, of Florida ; Represent- ative Hindman, of Arkansas ; Senators Jefferson Davis and A. G. Brown, and Representatives Barksdale, Singleton, and Reuben Davis, of Mississippi ; Representatives Craige and Ruffin, of North Carolina ; Senators SlidcU and Benjamin, and Representative Landrum, of Louibiana ; Senators VVigfall and Hemphill, and Representative Reagan, of Texas; Representatives Bon- ham, Miles, McQueen, and Ashmore, of South Ciirolina.) 28 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. in -which children play at kings and queens. The commis- sioners reached Washington on December 26th, and Mr. Bu- chanan, with all the curiosity and palpitation of an actor in a new di-ama, seems to have looked upon it not as the miser- able farce of consi^iracy which it was, but as a real piece of government business. The commissioners immediately made their jiresence known, and the President ajjpointed an inter- view for them at one o'clock next day. Before that hour ar- rived, however, news of a totally unlooked-for event gave their intended negotiation an entirely new direction and result. That event was the sudden militaiy movement by Major Andei-son, transfening his entire gan-ison from Fort Moul- trie to Fort Sumter, in Charleston Harbor, on the night of the commissioners' an'ival in Washington, December 26. Daily observation left him no doubt that Moultrie was to be assaulted ; every day strengthened the design, increased the preparation, augmented the drilled and undrilled forces to be joined in the undertaking. There was no longer hope that the President would heed his repeated calls and send him reinforcements. There was, however, one resource yet available. Sumter was the real key to the harboj-. Cap- tain Foster and his engineer force of workmen and mechan- ics had now prepared it for occupancy, and could soon make ib ready for defence. Its guns commanded Moultrie. There was no approach to it except by boats, and, for a time, at least, he would be beyond the reach of the C!harleston mob and its improvised scaling-ladders. Thoughts like these, long-present and familiar to his mind, were once more care- fully revolved and re-examined, when on Christmas night he returned from a neighboring holiday merrymaking to his somewhat cheerless quarters in Moultrie ; and before he re- tired to his sleep, he took his secret resolve to abandon Moultrie and take i)ost in Sumter. CHARLESTON HARBOR. 29 The 26th of December was a busy day for the comman- dant. There were vessels to be hired, and an excuse invented to send away the families, the baggage, the unnumbered im- jyedimenta of the garrison. For this, one or two chosen stafif- officers must be let into the secret. Finally, boats must be provided and concealed on the beach, in which to cross the men. Anderson's personal care was extended to every detail, and every item of preparation moved like clock-work. The families and baggage were got off in the afternoon. A sunset parade of the men was ordered, ostensibly to be on the alert against assault, a species of exercise with which the garri- son had become somewhat sorely familiar. The supper stood smoking on the officers' mess-table, when Captain Doubleday, second in command, was hastily called to Major Anderson, who now for the first time told him that he must have his company under arms and ready to march to the beach in twenty minutes. Everything proceeded as had been ar- ranged, without delay and without accident ; even the rebel guard-boats, which had recently been set to patrolling the bay to render such a movement impossible, failed to make any discovery. By nine o'clock that night the transfer was an assured success ; the officers sat down to eat the supper in Sumter which had been cooked for them in Moultrie. A small detail of men and an officer were left behind to spike guns, burn carriages, cut down the flag-staff, and to com- jjlete during the night the removal of needed supplies ; they finished their work and joined their comrades in Sumter a little after sunrise next morning. This movement filled the Union sentiment of the country with the liveliest exultation. It Avas a spontaneous, uncalcii- lating act of jjatriotism which will enslu'ine the name of An- derson in grateful recollection so long as American histoiy shall be read. Advance news of the event was sent from 30 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. Charleston to the commissionei"s ou the morning of December '27th; and they immediately communicated it to Mr. Bu- chanan, whom it threw into a most emban-assing peq^lexity. He i)osti)oned the commissioners' interview, and summoned his Cabinet to consider the situation. Floyd at once declared the movement to be in violation of orders ; and the Presi- dent himself, in his chagiin that his Southern friends should have a new burden of complaint, was half-inclined to peremp- torily order Anderson back to Moultrie. He was pnident enough, however, to suspend his judgment until Anderson could be heard ; for he had lately become cognizant of the eijuivocal and double-tongued insti-uctions which Floyd, ■without his knowledge, had sent liini, and which he infen'ed might at least technically justify Anderson's movement. On Friday, December 28th, he gave the commissioners their promised interview. Mr. Buchanan, himself, writes that " on their introduction he stated that he could recog- nize them only as jirivate gentlemen, and not as commission- ers from a sovereign State ; that it was to Congress, and to Congress alone, they must appeal. He nevertheless ex- pressed his willingness to communicate to that body, as the only competent tribunal, any propositions they might have to offer." He does not appear to have realized that this jn-o- posal was in reality a quasi-recognition of South Carolina's claim to independence, and a misdemeanor meriting im- peachment. What is a thousand times more astounding, however, is that, on their part, the commissioners were too stupid to perceive the vast advantage of this concession and offer. It would have placed the President before the public, and be- fore foreign powers especially, in the attitude of their apolo- gist, if not their advocate. It would have committed him to refrain from any hostile action against Soixth Carolina dur- CHARLESTON HARBOR. 31 ing the pendency of such debate as the proposition might provoke in Congress. It would have thrust a firebrand into Congress, to complicate and divide every faction and element in politics except their own friends ; in short, it would have made Washington City the principal centime of revolution. Fortunately for the country, their blindness lost to secession its only jiossible chance of peaceful success. Under the impression that Mr. Buclianan was completely within the domination of the Cabinet cabal, the commis- sioners made an angry complaint against Anderson, and haughtily demanded "explanations," threatening that, if these were not satisfactory, they would suspend their nego- tiations. Such a threat from applicants for i-ecognition and favor was the very acme of stupidity and maladdress. Andei-son little suspected — perliaps never knew — how nar- rowly he escajjed disavowal and disgi-ace by the President of the United States, for his act of fidelity and ijatiiotisni. The conspirators had shrewdly calculated on their influence over Mr. Buchanan. For two days he hesitated, leaning evi- dently to the counsels of his secession advisers. There were protracted Cabinet sessions, acrimonious debates, and a final struggle between the President's disloyal counsellors from the South and the loyal ones from the North, over the pos- .sGssion and Control of their temporizing, vacillating chief. It was not till the latter were on the point of resigning that the President was brought to a direct decision against the conspirators ; even then, but for an outside complication, the resiilt might have been doubtful. For about a week Floyd and Thompson had both been in bad odor. A ti-ans- action, in which near a million dollars' worth of Indian Trust Bonds were abstracted from a safe in the Interior De- partment and replaced by Floyd's premature acceptances, looked so much like official theft that it was occupying the 32 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. attention of the courts and greatly exercising the mind of the President. The spell was finally broken on December 31st, when Mr. Buchanan accepted Floyd's resignation, which the latter re- luctantly tendered on the 29th ; he also sent the commissioners their definite answer, namely : that, whatever might have been his first inclination, the Governor of South Carolina had, since Anderson's movement, forcibly seized Fort Moultrie, Castle Pinckney, and the Charleston Arsenal, Custom-House, and Post-Oflice, and covered them with the Palmetto flag ; that under such circiunstances he could not and would not with- draw the Federal troops from Sumter. This ended the rebel mission. They departed abruptly for home, leaving behind them an insolent rejoinder to the President's letter, charging him with tacit consent to the scheme of peaceable secession. Governor Pickens (newly chosen by the Legislature, De- cember 14th) was i^erhaps the most daring revolutionist in South Carolina, and as commander-in-chief of the State forces he at once assumed and exercised dictatorial powers. "Within three or four days after his seizure of the forts he or- dered the selection of suitable points on the islands foi-ming the bay, and the commencement of batteries to command the ship-channels against reinforcements. It was the beginning of the long and eventful siege of Sumter. Moultrie was soon restored to its offensive powers ; Castle Pinclcney passed into his hands imdamaged ; wilh a working force of volunteers impelled by fanatical zeal, supplemented by the more effi- cient labor of large gangs of slaves freely furnished from the city and jjlantations of the neighborhood, batteiy after bat- teiy rose around Anderson's sti'onghold, Tinmolested and un- checked for thi-ee long months, until, in an encompassing ring of tire, and under the sheer overweight of metal and num- bers, the proud flag of Sumter went down in temporary hu- CHARLESTON HARBOR. 33 miliation. And that the drama should not lack its interludes of grotesque farce, all through tliis continuation of contu- macy, insurrection, rampart-building, guu-j)lanting, and ac- tual repeated firing on the flag of the United States, the "Re- public " of South Carolina, through its governor, its legisla- ture, its convention, and its partisans, clamorously insisted and reiterated that the Government was waging war upon it. The Cabinet crisis of December 31st, and the retirement of Floyd, greatly changed the attitude of the Government to- ward rebellion. Holt was made Secretary of War, and be- came at once the Hercules of the national defence. Black, though as Attorney-General he had in November written an official opinion against coercion, was so far changed that he now zealously advocated the reinforcement of Sumter. All the unionists of the Cabinet — Black, Holt, Stanton, even Toucey in a mild way, and not long afterward Dix with memorable %agor — joined heartily in preparation to vindicate the national authority. General Scott was placed in military control ; and the President, being for a period kept by loyal ad\'ice in a more patriotic mood, permitted various precau- tionaiy measures to be taken, among which, a well-designed, though finally abortive effort to reinforce Sumter, was per- haps the most noteworthy. Various plans to send men and provisions to Anderson wei'e discussed, and it was at last decided to attempt stratagem. A swift merchant-steamer, the " Star of the West " was char- tered in New York, loaded with the needed supplies and two hundred and fifty recruits ; thus prepared, she sailed on her errand on the night of January 5, 1861. The eff'ort to keep the expedition an entire secret had not succeeded. Notice of her departure went to Charleston from New York; and in addition to this, Thompson, the conspiring Secretaiy of the Interior, who at the last moment learned the fact in Cabinet a 31 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. meeting, also warned Lis Charleston friends of her coming. Anderson does not seem to have received his notice, though he gathered from newspapers that some such enteiiariso was being matured. He was, therefore, not gi-eatly sur- prised, when on the morning of January 9th he was liastily infomied that a strange vessel was entering the harbor, and hurrying upon the rampart, saw her steaming up the chamiel in the direction of Sumter. She presented no war- like api^earance ; men and supplies were hidden below decks. But in these nine days of January the rebels had rejmired Moultrie and completed one or two sand-batteries at the harbor entrance, and, thoroughly infonned of the character and destination of the vessel, they began a vigorous fire ujion her as soon as she came within range. At this, finding concealment no longer important, her captain ran up a large United States flag, a signal which dispelled all doubts An- dei"son may have had that she indeed came to bring him the wished-for relief. He gave orders to man his guns and jjre- jiare to fire on the batteries ; meanwhile the steamer, tho\igh hit once or twice, had passed the first batteries without serious damage. Now, however, the course of the channel would oblige her to steam directly toward the ready guns of Moultrie, and the sight of this new peril seems to have daunted the courage of the officer in charge. Anderson saw with deep chagrin that, just as he was ready to cheer and gi'eet the new-comer by returning the I'ebel fire, the steamer suddenly slackened her speed, then put about, and ran once more unharmed i)ast the rebel batteries and through the hos- tile cannon-balls out to sea. Anderson's blood was hot with the insult his own eyes had witnessed to the flag and sovereignty of the United States. He sat down and wrote a brief note to the Governor of South Carolina, demanding to know if the firing on the vessel and CHARLESTON HARBOR. 35 tlieflag had Ijeen by his order, and declaring that, iinless the act wex'e dischiimed, he would close the harbor with the guns of Sumter. It would have been better to have left the threat unuttered. Governor Pickens was more than a match for him in bravado ; he immediately avowed and justified the act. Anderson in a second note so far receded as to say that he had made up his mind to first ask his government for instiiictions, and requested safe-conduct for a bearer of dis- patches. This emboldened the governor to a second trial of bluster ; next day he sent Anderson a formal demand for the surrender of Sumter. Anderson replied rather meekly that he could not comply with the demand ; but that, if the gov- ernor saw fit " to refer this matter to Washington," he would depute an officer to accompany the messenger. The Charleston conspirators, never at a loss to talk or intrigue, were really not yet ready to fight. They caught eagerly at this truce which Anderson offered them ; it would renew the negotiations which their commissioners had so unceremoniously abandoned ; above all, it would afibrd them ample time to complete their harbor batteries and collect troops against further expeditions of reinforcement or attack. On Januaiy 12tli, therefore, I. W. Hayne, the Attorney- General of South Carolina, proceeded to Washington as an envoy to carry to President Buchanan the governor's demand for the surrender of Sumter, with authority to give in return the pledge "that the valuation of such property will be ac- counted for by this State upon the adjustment of its relations with the United States." Hayne had, however, scarcely reached his destination when a superior influence took control of him and his mis- sion. By the middle of Januaiy most of the Cotton States had passed ordinances of secession, seized the undefended military posts within their limits, and were addressing each 36 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. other as independent States. But no amount of official va- poring or local ostentation could convince even themselves of either dignity or power ; especially it could not, in the eyes of the world, magnify petty cotton republics into serious importance or influence. However they might temporarily paralyze the laws of the Union, the constitutional rights of the nation were unbroken, and the military power of the Government slumbered like a mighty giant. To brave his ten-ible awakening the necessity of early combination in some system of common defence was too apparent to need ar- gument. The senators and representatives of seceded States, though some of them had already withdi-awn from Congress, ■were yet lingering in Washington as the most central point for obsen-ation and consultation. The formation of a South- ern confederacy was, from the first, a recognized pui-pose, announced in their manifesto of December llth, and again repeated in letters from a secret caucus held Januaiy 5th. Indeed, the whole programme probably dated back to the early days of the session, when it may be presumed the plan was elaborated by a few of the leading spirits. So far, though some of their combinations had failed, yet in the main the scheme had moved on with ever-growing strength from success to success. By the middle of January the con- spirators in Washington realized that they must hurry the completion of their organization during the brief continu- ance of the expiring administration. Even the belligerent Governor Pickens was made to understand the advantage of such a course. " Mr. Lincoln,"' he wrote, " cannot possibly do more for us than Mr. Buchanan has done." When there- fore, most unexpectedly. South Carolina obtained through Anderson's off'er a new chance to propose negotiation, the central cabal at Washington resolved to make it the means of gaining time to set a common provisional government in CHARLESTON HARBOR 37 motion, without on theii" part furnishing the pretext for any miiitaiy movement which might threaten or check their plans. They therefore met in a caucus, and appointed a committee consisting of Senators Fitzpati'ick, Malloiy, and Slidell ; this committee began and earned on a dilatory cor- respondence with Mr. Hayne and with the President, which they managed to prolong into Febmary, all that while keep- ing open the Anderson truce by the assumption that nego- tiations were jjending. Mr. Buchanan, always indisposed to act, always welcoming any excuse to postpone decision, fell easily into the toils of this side intrigue for delay. Some of his counsellors must have seen through the transparent game w'ith much impatience, for the whole affair was at last rather abruptly ended. On Febmary 6th, Secretaiy Holt wrote for the President to Hayne, that neither the proposed sale of Fort Sumter, nor its relinqiiishment under South Carolina's claim of eminent domain, could for a moment be thought of, since it was not a mere question of property, as had been assumed, but involved political rights of the high- est national importance. This closed the correspondence, and Hayne went home to report the second failure to obtain the forts by dijjlomacy. But the conspirators had gained their main point. This negotiation paralyzed and postponed all the plans and prepa- rations to send help to Anderson, upon which some of the Cabinet members had labored with zeal and earnestness ; while on the other hand, on February 4th, two days preced- ing Hayne's dismissal, the Provincial Congress of the rebel States assembled at Montgomery, Ala., and by the 18th of that month had comj)leted and inaiigiirated the provi- sional government under which the local insurrections of the Cotton States became an organized rebellion against the government of the Union. 38 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. Nor was tliis the only advantage which the consinracy had secured. Since the 12th of Januaiy a condition of things existed in the harbor of Pensacola, Fla., similar to that at Charleston. The insurgents had threatened, and the offi- cer in charge had surrendered the Pensacola Navy Yard. Lieutenant Slemmer, of the army, with a little ganison of foi"ty-six men, held Fort BaiTancas. Finding he could not defend his post, nor Fort McRee, also on the mainland, he, with a loyal courage which will ever render his name il- lustrious, repeated the strategy of Andereon, and moved his slender command, augmented by thirty ordinary seamen from the na%-y yard, on the morning of January 10th, to Fort Pickens, a large and more defensible work standing at the harbor entrance, on the western end of Santa Rosa Isl- and. The Government hurriedly sent a few ahips of war to assist him, while the rebels began gatheiing an army to assault the fort. Under cover of the Hayne negotiation. Sen- ator Mallory managed to draw the President into an agi-ee- ment, embodied in formal orders dated January 29th, that Fort Pickens should not be reinforced unless it were as- saulted by the rebels, or preparations were made to do so. The Hayne business disposed of, there was once more a little flurry of war consultations at the Executive Mansion to devise and dispatch a new expedition to reinforce Sumter. This time a few small vessels belonging to the Coa.st Survey were to be assembled and placed under command of Captain Ward, of the navA', for that purpose ; the details of the plan do not ajipear to have transpired. But the President's ener- getic moods were lamentably short ; by the 23d of Febi-uary this scheme, also, was definitely abandoned, probably for the ovemiling reason that but nine days remained of Mr. Buchanan's presidential term. CHAPTER m. THE CONFEDERATE STATES' REBELLION. On the fourth day of Febniary, 1861, while the Peace Con- ference *laet in Washington to consider propositions of com- promise and concession, the delegates of the seceding States convened in Montgomery, Ala., to combine and solidify the general conspiracy into an organized and avowed rebellion. Such action had been arranged and agi-eed upon from the beginning. The congressional manifesto from Washington, as far back as December llth, advised that "we are satisfied the honor, safety, and independence of the Southern people require the organization of a Southern confederacy — a re- sult to be obtained only by sejjarate State secession." This agreement of the Washington caucus was steadily adhered to. The specious argument invented in Georgia, that " we can make better terms outside of the Union than in it," and the public declaration of Mississii:)2ii's commissioner in Bal- timore, that secession " was not taken with the view of break- ing up the i^resent government, but to assure to her (Missis- sippi) those guarantees and i^rinciples of liberty which had been pledged to her by the fathers of the Revolution," were but tricks of the conspiracy for local use and effect. The managers well understood that if the States were once com- mitted to secession, the mere revolutionary momentum of the crisis would cany them to whatever combination they might devise. 40 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION. The whole plan appears to have been more fully matured and adopted in a Washington caucus held on the night of Januaiy 5, 18G1, at which time four important points were arranged : 1st, the Cotton States should immediately secede ; 2d, that delegates should be chosen to meet in Montgomery, " to organize a confederacy," not later than February loth ; 3d, that the conspirators would remain in Congress as long as possible, to obstruct coercive legislation ; and 4th, that Jeflferson Davis, Slidell, and Malloiy be appointed a com- mittee to cany out the objects of the caucus. Thus, more than a month before his inauguration as rebel president, the leader of the consjiiracy was entrusted with the sujjervision and management of the plot. The caucus progi-amme was executed with but slight delation. The States seceded, appointed delegates to Montgomery, and the conspiratore withdrew from Congress at the last moment to assume the more active control of the rebellion in theii* respective States. As events progressed it became evident to the leaders that it was important to complete their new government before the expiration of INIr. Buchanan's teim. They understood perfectly his temper and purpose. Though he denied them the treasonable complicity they had hojied and asked, and discontinued the important concessions with which be began, he still stood committed to non-coercion. What his successor might decide was uncertain. Repeated efforts had been made to draw from Lincoln some expression of liis intention — some forecast of his policy, but they had been unifonnly unsuccessful. Accordingly the secession delegates met in Montgomerv- on February' 4th, instead of the 15th, as had been first ar- ranged, and organized a pro\'isional Congress, and a few days thereafter (Febniaiy 8, 1861) adopted a proN-isional THE CONFEDERATE STATES' REBELLION. 41 government, to be known as " Tlie Confederate States of America." There was little difficulty in amving at this re- sult ; most if not all tlie seceders' State conventions had de- clared a wish that their proposed new government should be modelled on that of the United States. From this they proceeded to the work of framing a per- manent constitution. This was a somewhat slower process, though it was also comjjleted and adopted by the provisional Congress on March 11, 1861. Few changes from the Con- stitution of the United States were made. The new consti- tution professed to be established by " each State acting in its sovereign and independent character," instead of simply by "We the people." It provided that in newly acquired tenitory " the institution of negi'o slaveiy, as it now exists in the Confederate States, shall be recognized and protected by Congress and by -the Territorial Government " ; also for the right of transit and sojourn for " slaves and other jjrop- erty," and the right to reclaim "slaves and other j)ersons" to service or labor. It did not, as consistency required, i^ro- vide for the right of secession or deny the right of coercion ; on the contrary all its imjilications were against the former and in favor of the latter, for it declared itself to be the supreme law of the land, binding on the jiidges in every State. It pro\'ided for the punishment of treason ; and de- clared that no State should enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation, grant letters of marque and reprisal, coin money, lay duties, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, make any compact with another State or with a foreign power — a sweeping practical negation of the whole heretical dogma of State supremacy upon which they had built their revolt. The day after the rebel Congress adopted its pro^dsional government, it elected (Februaiy 9, 1861) Jefferson Davis, 42 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. of Mississippi, President, and Alexander H. Stephens, of Georgia, Vice-President of the new Confederacy. The re- ported vote for Davis is unanimous ; but it is historically related by Stephens that Howell Cobb and Robert Toombs were also asjiirants, and that Davis himself preferred the chief command of the rebel armies. For the moment, how- ever, offices were plenty, and each of the leaders received a prominent station. Cobb remained presiding officer of the rebel Congress ; Toombs became Secretary of State ; and if not completely satisfied, all acquiesced in the distribution of honors. Da^'is Avas sent for and inaugurated at Montgomery, on Monday, February 18th. In his inaugural address he in- timated that they would i^ermit the non-seceded Slave States to join their confedei-acy ; " but, beyond this," he con- tinued, " if I mistake not the judgment and will of the peo- ple, a reunion ■with the States from which we have separated is neither practicable nor desirable." If the remotest doubt remained, from in-evious indications and this official hint, that the whole jjui-pose and animus of the revolt was the establishment of a powerful slaveocracy, tliat doubt was removed by the public declaration of Mi\ Stephens, the new Vice-President. In a speech which he made at Savannah, Ga., on the 21st of March, he defined the raling idea of the conspiracy in the following frank lan- guage : '■ The prevailing ideas entertained In- liim (Jefferson) and most of the leading statesmen at the time of the formation of the old constitution, were that the enslavement of the African was in violation of the laws of nature ; that it was wrong in principle, socially, morally, and politically. It was an evil they knew not well how to deal with ; but the gen- eral opinion of that day was, that somehow or other, in the order of Providence the institution would be evamescent and THE CONFEDERATE STATES' REBELLIO:Nr. 43 pass away. Tliis idea, tliougli not incorporated in the Consti- tution, was the jirevailing idea at that time. The Constitu- tion it is tme, secured every essential guarantee to the insti- tution while it should last, and hence no argument can be justly urged against the constitutional guarantees thus se- cured, because of the common sentiment of the day. Those ideas, however, were fundamentally wrong. They rested upon the assumption of the equality of races. This was an error. It was a sandy foundation, and the government built -upon it fell when the storm came and the wind blew. Our new government is founded u^jon exactly th^ opposite idea ; its foundations are laid, its comer-stone rests, upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man ; that slave- ry, subordination to the superior race, is his natural and normal condition. This, our new government, is the first in the history of the world, based upon this great jjliysical, philosophical, and moral truth." Mr. Stephens was no less enthusiastic in his estimate of the material resources of the new confederacy. " We have all the essential elements of a high national career," con- tinued he. " The idea has been given out at the North, and even in the Border States, that we are too small and too weak to maintain a separate nationality. This is a great mistake. In extent of ten'itory we embrace 564,000 square miles and upwards. This is upwards of 200,000 square miles more than was included within the limits of the original thirteen States. It is an area of countiy more than double the tenitoiy of France or the Austrian Empire. France, in round numbers, has but 212,000 square miles ; Austria, in round numbers, has but 248,000 square miles. Ours is greater than both com- bined. It is greater than all France, Spain, Portugal, and Great Britain, including England, Ireland, and Scotland to- gether. In pojiulation we have upwards of 5,000,000, accord- 44 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. ing to the census of 1860 ; this includes white and black. The entire population, including white and black, of the original Thirteen States was less than 4,000,000 in 1790, and still less in 1770, when the independence of our fathers was achieved. If thev, with a less population, dared maintain their independence against the greatest power on earth, shall we have any apprehension of maintaining otu-s now ? " CHAPTER IV. LINCOLN. From tlie false political principles and the perilous official neglect of the old administration — from the dissensions and impotence of Congress, and from the threatening attitude and the hostile preparations of the South, all parties and persons now turned to the President-elect and the incoming administration. During the winter many earnest but over- hasty patriots had besought him to intervene by some pub- lic declaration. But Mr. Lincoln preserved a discreet si- lence, though in confidential letters to responsible personal friends of opposing politics he rejjeated his former assertions that, while adhering tenaciously to the Eepublican doctrine of " No extension of slavery," he bore no ill-will to the South, meditated no aggression on her rights, and would on the contrary treat her with liberal indulgence in matters of minor controversy. x\s the day of inauguration approached, various legisla- tures of the Free States by formal resolutions in\'ited liim to visit their cajiitals on his way to Washington ; a call which liis deep popular sympathy moved him to accept. Starting from home on the 11th of Februai-y, he accordingly pass.od through the principal cities between Springfield and New York, and between New York and Washington. Unprecedented crowds came forth to see the new Chief 46 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. Magistrate. Could the quick intelligence of the American people be othei-wise than intensely curious to behold this remarkable man, whose strange career they had heard out- lined in the recent election speeches? His obscure birth in the deep seclusion of the Kentucky forests ; how he read Weems' Life of Washington by the flickering firelight in an humble pioneer cabin in Indiana ; how, as a tall emigrant- boy, he sjilit rails to fence his father's clearing in Illinois ; how, launching his solitary canoe on the Sangamon, he sought his own fortune, becoming flatboatman, postmaster, deputy county surveyor, and captain of volunteers in the Black Hawk Indian War; how, commencing with a boiTowed Blackstone, he argued cases before neighborhood juries, fol- lowed itinerant Circuit Courts from county to county, and gradually became the first law^'er in his State ; how in a primitive community, where politics dealt with every office from postmaster to President, he rose in iiublic service from Eejiresentative in the Vandalia Logislature to President- elect of the nation. The peoijle had also heard how this elevation was tried by the touchstone of sleepless rivalry, of unscrupulous criticism, of a mighty political conflict of party and of jirinciple. How, in the momentous slaver^' discussion of the day, he was the champion who had overcome Douglas, the hitherto victori- ous Philistine of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill ; his matchless definition of the j)olitical injustice of slaveiy, applicable to all nations and ages : " When the wliite man governs liimself, that is self-government ; but when he governs liimself and also governs another man, that is more than self-govern- ment— that is despotism ; " his irrefutable statement of the natural right of evers* man " to eat the bread, without leave of anybody else, which his own hand earns ; " his j^rojihetic statesmanship, in declaring that "the Union cannot perma- LINCOLN. 47 nently endure half slave and half free," ionv months befoivv Wm. H. Seward proclaimed the " irrepressible conflict." So much, the newspapers, campaign documents, and stump speakers had told the country. The remainder, which his intimate Illinois neighboi's could have related, the peo- ple half divined from what they heard. That he had risen from obscurity to fame, from ignorance to eloquence, from want to ralership, uncontaminated by vice, undefiled by temptation, without schools, without family influence, with- out wealtli ; championed by no clique, fraternity, or sect ; clinging to no skirt of corporation, interest, or combination ; conspicuous without affectation, winning popularity without art, and receiving consideration without parade ; rendering his party not only every service it requested, but, l)y his tal- ent, leading it from despondency to success, and from suc- cess to renown ; meanwhile, at every stage of his career, walking among his fellow-men with such irreproachable per- sonal conduct, that his very name grew into a proverb of in- tegrity, and passed among the people of his entire State as the genuine coin-cun-ent and i-ecognized token of social, moral, and i^olitical uprightness. Malicious gossip and friendly jest had both, during the campaign, described the " railsplitter " candidate as possess- ing great personal ugliness ; this was now seen to be au utter mistake. The peoj^le beheld in the new President a man six feet four inches in height, a stature which of itself would ho hailed in any assemblage as one of the outward signs of leadership ; joined to this was a spave but muscular frame, and large and strongly marked features coiTesponding to his unusual stature. Quiet in demeanor, but erect in bearing, his face even in repose was not unattractive ; and when lit up by his open, genial smile, or illuminated in the utterance of a strong or stirring thought, his countenance was positively 48 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. handsome. His voice, latched in leather a liigli key, but of great clearness and penetration, made his public remarks audible to a wide circle of listeners. His speeches were shoi*t ; but his pithy, epigrammatic sentences, full of logical directness and force, j^resented the questions of the hour in new and unwonted aspects, which the exhaustive discussions of the campaign had not yet reached. It would be impossible within any short space to give an analytic summary' of the twenty to thirty short addresses he delivered on this journey. But, so long as the nation shall live, every American ought to remembor liis thrilling key- note of that crisis, uttered in his very first speech at Indian- apolis ; an admonition equally valuable to statesmen or peo- ple in every emergency which the future may bring. " The people," said he, " when they rise in mass in behalf of the Union and the liberties of their country, tiiily may it be said, ' The gates of hell cannot prevail against them.' In all try- ing i^ositions in which I shall be jjlaced — and doubtless I shall be j^laced in many such — my reliance will be upon you and the people of the United States ; and I wish you to re- member, now and forever, that it is your business and not mine ; that if the Union of these States and the liberties of this people shall be lost, it is but little to any one man of fifty-two years of age, but a great deal to the thirty millions of jieople who inhabit these United States, and to their pos- terity in all coming time. It is your business to rise up and jireserve Union and liberty for yourselves, and not for me." For one thing Mr. Buchanan and his Cabinet should be re- membered with gratitude. All winter long there had been fears and rumors that the conspirators were maturing a plot to seize the capital, the public buildings, and the archives, forcibly prevent the inauguration of Lincoln, and thus make themselves the de facto successors of the Buchanan adrainis- LINCOLN. 49 tration. Tliere were indeed many threats, boasts, and warn- ings, to justify apprehension on this score, but an investiga- tion held by a Committee of Congress, disclosed no traceable combination. Under such api^rehension, however, Mr. Bu- chanan authorized General Scott to assemble sufficient troops at Washington to insure both a peaceable count of the electoi*al votes on Febmary 13th, and the peaceable in- auguration of the President-elect, which latter event took place with due formalities, and in the presence of great crowds, on the 4th of March, 1861. Mr. Lincoln's inaugural address made a frank declaration of his policy on the leading points of controversy. He re- peated that he had no purpose, directly or indirectly, to in- terfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it existed. But he also asserted that the Union is perpetual ; that secession resolves or ordinances are legally void ; that acts of violence, within any State or States, against the au- thority of the United States, are insurrectionary or revolu- tionary ; and that to the extent of his ability he should cause the laws to be faithfully executed in all the States. The Union would defend itself, hold its property and places, and collect the duties and imposts ; " but, beyond what may be necessary for these objects, there will be no invasion, no using of force against or among the people anywhere." There should be no bloodshed or violence, unless forced up- on the national authority. Temporary discontent he would tolerate ; the exercise of offices in disaffected districts he would forego ; he would continue to furnish the mails unless repelled ; he would endeavor to preserve that sense of per- fect security most favorable to calm thought and renewed allegiance. An unanswerable argument against disunion and an earnest appeal to reason and lawful remedy, he fol- lowed by a most impressive declaration of peace and good- 4 50 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. will : " In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow-countrymen, and not in mine, is the momentous issue of civil war. The Government will not assail you. You can have no conflict \vithout being yourselves the aggressors. You have no oath registered in heaven to destroy the Government ; while I shall have the most solemn one to presen-e, jjrotect, and defend it." Unhappily the burden and difficulty of adniinisti^ation was already header than he or the public were aware. He had come into office sharing the general belief that IVIajor Ander- son was secure in his stronghold of Sumter until the rebel batteries should become jjowerful enough to diive him out. On the contrary, a subtler and more imfailing enemy than the rebels — stai'vation — was rajiidly forcing the brave little garrison to surrender. On the morning after inaugiuation letters from Sumter were put into the President's hands, showing that the fort contained pro%T5ious for only a little more than a month longer, and adding the i^rofessional opinion of Anderson and his officers that a well-appointed fleet and an army of twenty thousand men would be needed to raise the siege, so formidable had the encircling rebel batteries already become. Such a fleet and such an army were not in existence, nor could they be organized for many months. After mature considei-ation General Scott advised the President that it was practically impossible to relieve or reinforce Sumter, and that, as a mere military question, it was necessary to order its evacuation. To Mr. Lincoln, who had only a few days before publicly promised the nation that he would " hold, occupy, and pos- sess, the property and places belonging to the Government," this was indeed a tiTing alternative. He ordered a rc-ex- amination of the whole subject, and Cabinet, militaiy, and LINCOLN. 51 naval officers joined in its discussion. Among the plans of relief was one urged by Captain G. V. Fox, who, even under General Scott's adverse criticism, convinced the President and a majority of the Cabinet that he could, by means of open boats and small tugs, in a dark night throw a small quantity of provisions and a few men into the fort. The po- litical aspects of the case, however, remained still to be con- sidered. The President, therefore, on March 15th propounded to his Cabinet the written question, " Assuming it to be possible to provision Fort Sumter, is it wise under all the circumstances of the case to attempt to do so ? " To this the Cabinet made written replies, five members arguing against the policy of attempting relief, and only two in its favor. The majority, led by Mr. Seward, argued that any possible relief would only be temporary, and that a disastrous failure, and the eventual loss of the fort would produce more damaging political results, than to give it up at once under the imperative military necessity already existing, and for which the new administration was in no wise responsible. Two or three collateral questions connected themselves with the main one. The exposed situation of Fort Pickens had become known to Lincoln, and one of his earliest official acts was to order its reinforcement from the fleet ; but of the conditions of the January truce he was not informed. He was therefore waiting in painful anxiety to receive news that his order had been executed and Pickens reinforced, for the suc- cessful strengthening of that point would have an important influence in deciding the question of Sumter. Another secondary consideration was the attitude of Vir- ginia. Rebel influences in her Legislature had ordered a State convention, to which convention her people had elected a large majority of professedly loyal members. Their loyal- ty, however, was of a qualified sort, deeply tinctured with LIBRARY UNIVERSITY OF ait«in»» 52 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION, factional prejudice, and irritated with the imaginary wrongs of the South. Upon this element, rebel intrigue and con- spiracy were woi-king with telling effect ; and instead of de- claring and jiractisiug frank and direct adherence to the Government, the union members were fulminating baseless complaints, demanding impossible guarantees, and pleading indulgent excuses for the course of South Carolina and the Cotton Eepublics. And tliis condition of misdirected and unstable loyalty was also wide-spread among the leaders and people of the Border States of Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri. How to deal vnth such a morbid and disturbed public sen- timent— how to treat this unnatural, contradictory, and half- hearted allegiance, was a i^roblem of direct bearing on the Sumter question. Mr. Seward, optimist by nature, believed and argued that the revolution throughout the South had spent its force and was on the wane ; and that the evacuation of Sumter, and the manifestation of kindness and confidence to the Rebel and Border States, would undemiine the con- spii-acy, strengthen the union sentiment and union majori- ties, and restore allegiance and healthy political action with- out resort to civil war. Mr. Lincoln shared Seward's pacific inclinations, but not his optimism. He deferred his decision ; gathered informa- tion from Anderson, from Charleston, from Richmond, waited in anxious suspense for news from Pickens. No substantial encouragement, however, reached him from any quarter. Anderson had no faith in a relief expedition. All union sen- timent had disappeared from South Carolina. The Virginia Convention was e\adently playing fast and loose with treason ; and finally, General Scott was so far wrought upon by the insane cry for concession to gratify the morbid patriotism which yet found expression in the South, that he advised LINCOLN. 53 the evacuation of Pickens as well as Sumter. To crown all, news came that the commander of the fleet at Pcnsacola had refused to allow the reinforcement of Fort Pickens from the ships, because of Buchanan's January truce, and of the tech- nical objection that General Scott's order had not come through the regular channels of the Navy Department. Amid these gi'owing difficulties and dangers Mr. Lincoln felt that the time for decisive action had an-ived. On March 29th a second and final cabinet discussion was held, in which there appeared a change of sentiment. Four of his seven counsellors now voted for an attempt to relieve Anderson, and at the close of the meeting the President ordered the preparation of the expedition proposed by Captain Fox. Three shijDs cf war, with a transport and three swift steam- tugs, a supply of open boats, pro%dsions for six months, and two hundred recruits, were fitted out in New York with all possible secrecy, and sailed from that port, after unforeseen delays, on April 9th and 10th, under sealed orders to ren- dezvous before Charleston Harbor at daylight on the morn- ing of the 11th. Coincident wdth this, the President, deeming the safety of Fort Pickens no less essential than that of Sumter, at once sent new and peremptory orders to the commander of the fleet, and also ordered the secret prejjaration of another and separate naval expedition to still further strengthen that post. The simultaneous prej^aration of the two produced a certain confusion and mutual embarrassment ; but the latter was got off first, and, aniving safely, increased the garrison of Fort Pickens, including those already landed from the fleet, to 858 men, with provisions for six months, thus ren- dering it impregnable to rebel assault. If we may credit abundant indications, the authorities at Montgomery did not believe they would need to resort to 54 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION. their guns. As soon as the provisional government was or- ganized, three rebel commissioners were appointed to pro- ceed to Washington to negotiate for " recognition," for " ad- justment of differences," and for possession of the federal forts. Two efforts to obtain Sumter by intrigue had failed ; nevertheless, they still had faith a third attempt might suc- ceed with the new administration. Through a conspirator who still professed loyalty, they presented their application to Mr. Seward, Secretary of State. Mr. Seward answered courteously, but decidedly, that the new administration could have nothing to do either with the rebel government or its emissaries ; and to a written paper sent to the State Department by the commissioners, he wrote an unofficial "memorandum" reply of the same purport. This properly finished the negotiation ; but the commissioners, authorized to do so by the government they affected to represent, sought excuse to delay their departure, and Associate Justice Campbell, of the Supreme Court of the United States, volunteered to act as an unofficial intermedi- ary in continuing to press their eiTaud upon the Secretary of State. Campbell had at the beginning publicly opposed se- cession and still professed loyalty ; and in that friendly and patriotic guise was admitted by the Secretary of State to an intimacy he could never have gained under his true colors. It seems that Seward, in this unofficial intimacy, did not hesi- tate to tell Campbell of his own willingness to give up Sum- ter, and of his belief that the President, upon the recom- mendation of General Scott, would order its evacuation. This was about the time of the first Cabinet discussion of the direct proposition, when five members voted for evacua- tion and only two against it, and the general situation of affairs strongly siapported Mr. Seward's coui"se of reasoning. Whatever may have been his language, a patriot could not LINCOLN. 55 have misunderstood it. But Campbell liad meanwhile be- come so far committed to the cause of the conspiracy, that he conveyed his information to the commissioners as a vir- tual pledge of the evacuation of Sumter, and they sent the news to Montgomery in high glee. As a matter of fact. President Lincoln had not at that date decided the Sumter question ; he was following his own sa- gacious logic in aniving at a conclusion, which was at least partially reached on the 29th of March, when, as we have seen, he made the order to prepare the relief expedition. By this time, Campbell, in extreme impatience to further re- bellion, was importuning Seward for exjjlanation ; and Sew- ard, finding his former prediction at fault, thought it best not to venture a new one. Upon consultation, therefore, the President authorized him to caiTy to Campbell the first and only assurance the Administration ever made with regard to Sumter — namely — that he would not change the military status at Charleston without giving notice. This, be it obsei-ved, occuiTed on the 1st of April, about which time the policy of Seward favoring delay and concilia- tion finally and formally gave way before the President's stronger self-assertion and his carefully matured purpose to force rebellion to put itself flagrantly and fatally in the wrong by attacking Fort Sumter. CHAPTER V SUMTER. GovEKNOK Pickens, of South Carolina, began about the 1st of Januaiy to build batteries to isolate and reduce Fort Sumter; and the newly made General Beauregard was on the 1st of March sent by the rebel government to Charleston to assume dii'ection of military affaii*s and to complete the IDrejjai-ations for its capture. The Governor had been ex- ceedingly anxious that the capture should be attempted be- fore the expu'ation of Mr. Buchanan's presidential term — that is, between the 12th of Febmai-y and the 4th of March. "Mr. Buchanan cannot resist," wrote the Governor to Jeffer- son Davis, "because he has not the power. Mr. Lincoln may not attack, because the cause of quaii-el will have been, or may be considered by him, as past." But the rebel Presi- dent doubtless thought it unwise to risk offending and alien- ating his -pai-tj friends at the North by placmg the responsi- bility of such an affront and loss upon theii- admmistration. Even when General Beauregard came, the Governor was ad- monished that no attack must be attempted without mature preparation, as a failure would seriously demoralize and per- haps prematurely WTeck the rebellion. Beauregard found, as he reports, that Sumter was natu- rally " a jierfect Gibraltar," and that only the weakness of the ganison rendered its capture reasonably feasible. He SUMTER. 57 therefore set himself to work, first of all, to devise obstruc- tions and defences against expected reinforcements, and sec- ondly, to build batteries to breach the walls. He was him- self a skilful engineer ; many of the works were already well advanced ; there was an ample supply of guns and mortars ; he had but to make requisitions to obtain unlimited slave labor to do the dnidgery of ditching and raising embank- ments ; his improvised volunteer army could give all their time to drill and artillery practice ; and, most favorable of all, this work went on in certain immunity from any molestation except through the chance of a relieving expedition to come by sea. The commander was ambitious, the men were en- thusiastic, and the Governor untiring in his revolutionary ardor and impatience. It is, therefore, little wonder that, after a month of laborious effort and co-operation, Beaure- gard telegraphed (April 1st) to Montgomery ; " Batteries ready to open Wednesday or Thursday. What instructions?" Up to this time the rebel government indulged the jsleas- ing hope that Lincoln would give up the fort and save them the dreaded ordeal of war. Justice Campbell had ingeni- ously misrejiorted the sense and purport of Seward's conver- sations ; and the commissioners and their Washington cronies, with equally blind zeal, sent rosy despatches on the strength of exaggerated street-rumors. So confident were they of such a result that Governor Pickens, Secretary Walker, and General Beaiiregard found some difficulty in settling among themselves the exact conditions upon which they would per- mit Anderson and his garrison to depart when the order to evacuate Sumter should be sent him. The illusion began to fade away on the 1st of April, when Commissioner Crawford telegraphed to Governor Pickens : " I am authorized to say this Government will not undertake to supply Sumter without notice to you." This language 58 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION. did not resemble the order for evacuation they had been im- patiently expecting, and the rebel authorities at once deter- mined to make Anderson feel the pressure of the siege. Next day, orders were issued to stop all courtesies to the garrison ; to prohibit all supplies from the city ; to permit no one to depart from the fort, and to establish the rigid surveillance of hostile lines. Anderson himself, relying upon rebel rumors and Craw- ford's baseless despatches, appears to have made up his mind that the garrison would be withdrawn; and he expresses himself as being " greatly surprised " when on April 7th he received a confidential letter, drafted by Lincoln, but copied and signed by Cameron, under date of April 4th, informing him that a relie%-ing expedition would be sent ; requesting him to hold out, if possible, till its arrival ; stating also, however, that the President desired to subject him and his command to no unusual danger or hardship beyond those common in militai-y life, and therefore authorizing him to capitulate when in his judgment it might become necessary. One of the few faults chargeable to Anderson is that to this thoughtful and considerate instruction, framed by Lincoln himself (but which he supposed to be the language of Cam- eron), he replied in a petulant and ill-natured spirit, writing: "I frankly say that my heart is not in the war which I see is to be thus commenced." His subsequent gallantry, and steadfast loyalty, however, justify his countrymen in a lib- eral forgiveness of the passing indiscretion. It turned out curiously enough that Anderson's letter was, through a dis- honorable trick of the rebels, captured by them and sent to Montgomery, where during the whole war it remained buried in the Confederate archives, and hence the offensive sentence never came to the knowledge of the kind-hearted and generous Lincoln. SUMTER. 59 Following the notice received throiigh Crawford, the re- bels were for about a week in a tantalizing fever of sus- pense and uncertainty. The most contradictory telegrams came from their commissioners and secret advisers in Wash- ington ; the most perplexing and misleading rumors reached them from New York. The war powers of the Union were clearly enough astir ; troops were moving and ships were loading ; but for what object ? Was their destination Sum- ter or Pickens, New Orleans, or St. Domingo? Different circumstances pointed to any or either of these places, but the most subtle espionage failed to obtain the certain clue. The mystery was finally solved on the evening of April 8th. A government messenger arrived in Charleston, repoi-ted himself to Governor Pickens, and was immediately admitted by him to an interview at which General Beauregard was jjresent. The messenger read to them an official communi- cation, di'afted by President Lincoln. It ran as follows : " I am directed by the President of the United States to notify you to expect an attempt will be made to sujpply Fort Sumter with provisions only, and that if such attempt be not resisted, no effort to throw in provisions, arms, or am- munition will be made without further notice, or in case of an attack upon the fort." The next morning after this notice was read to Governor Pickens and General Beauregard in Charleston, the main portion of the relieving expedition, under command of Cap- tain G. V. Fox, sailed from New York Harbor. It consisted of the transport Baltic with the pro-sdsions and contingent reinforcements, the war-steamers Pawnee, Pocahontas, Har- i-iet Lane, and the steam-tugs Uncle Ben, Yankee, and Free- born. The fleet had orders to rendezvous ten miles east of Charleston Harbor on the morning of April 11th. The in- structions to Captain Fox were short, but explicit : " You will 60 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. take charge," wrote the Secretary of War, " of the transpoi-ts in New York, having the troops and supplies on board, and endeavor in the first instance to deliver the subsistence. If you are ojiposed in this, you are directed to report the fact to the senior naval officer of the harbor, who will be in- structed by the Secretary of the Navy to use his entire force to open a passage, when you will, if possible, effect an en- trance, and place both troops and supplies in Fort Sumter." Lincoln's notice having been communicated to the Con- federate authorities in Montgomeiy, Jeffereon Davis and his compeers in revolution resolved to begin the war without further delay. To permit provisions to be sent to Andereon, after three months of battery-building, would jeopardize the confidence and adhesion of the ultra fire-eatere, and suffer the insurrection to collapse. The notice was received on the evening of April 8th ; next day, the 9th, appears to have been spent in delibei-ation and in verifying the situation by inquiries from the rebel commissioners in Washington ; on the 10th, Beauregard was instructed to demand the evacua- tion of Sumter, and, in case of refusal, to reduce it. At two o'clock in the afternoon of the following day (April 11th), he sent two of his aids to make the demand, in answer to which Anderson, with the unanimous concurrence of his officei-s, wrote a prompt refusal. The occasion seems to have called out some general conversation, in the course of wliich An- derson said to the aids : "I will await the first shot, and if you do not batter us to pieces, we will be stai-ved out in a few days." The remark repeated to Beauregard and to MontgomeiT, caused the impression that Anderson desired to capitulate, and another message was sent him, offeiing to permit him to do so at his own convenience, if he would designate the time, and agi*ee in the meanwhile not to use his guns against the rebels imless they should fire on Sum- SUMTER. 61 ter. Anderson was shrewd enougli to see that this would leave their gnns free to beat back the fleet, and shaped his reply accordingly. He stated that he would evacuate the fort by noon on the 15th of April, " and that I will not, in the meantime, open my fires upon your forces, unless com- pelled to do so by some hostile act against this fort or the flag of my Government, by the forces under your command, or some portion of them, or by the peiiaetration of some act showing a hostile intention on your part against this fort or the flag it bears, should I not receive, prior to that time, controlling instructions from my Government, or additional supplies." This reply was, of course, unsatisfactory to the rebels. The interchange of these several messages had consumed the afternoon and night of April 11th, and at 3:20 a.m., of the. morning of April 12th, Beauregard's aids handed Ander- son a note stating that he would open fire upon Sumter in one hour from that time. The inhabitants of Charleston had now for more than three months followed the development of secession and re- bellion with unflagging zeal and daily interest, until they began to regard the afiairs of Sumter as their own pet and exclusive drama. It had afforded them excitement upon ex- citement— speeches, meetings, drills, parades, flag-raisings, bonfires, salutes, music, and banners ; reaching into their social and family life, it had carried their fathers, sons, brothers, and friends away into the camps and trenches. Sumter had been their daily talk and nightly dream ; and this interest grew into a morbid curiosity as the drama ap- proached its long-predicted climax. There had been little or no efi'ort to conceal the changing aspects of preparations and orders during the last few days ; and, as a result, the general popiilace of the city became informed, almost as well 62 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. as the officers, of the precise hour when the bombardment would begin. In the gray and yet uncertain twilight of this April morning, therefore, the Charlestonians of all ages and sexes came thronging down the streets to the whai-ves of the city, to find favorable locations for \'iewing the coming spec- tacle, in something of the spirit in which Rome of the Caesars crowded to the Coliseum to witness the savage and sanguinaiy combats of the arena. At half-past four o'clock, on the morning of April 12th, 1861, while yet the lingering night lay upon the waters of the bay, leaving even the outline of Fort Sumter scarcely disceiTiible, the assembled spectators saw a flash from the mortar battery near old Fort Johnson, on the south side of the harbor, and an instant after a bombshell rose in a slow, high curve through the air, and fell upon the fort. To the beholders it was the inauguration of the final scene in their local drama ; to the nation and world at large, it began a conflict of such gigantic i^roportions and far-reaching conse- quence, that it will forever stand as one of the boldest land- marks in history. Gun after gun responded to the signal, until, in the course of another hour, all the encircling rebel batteries were in the heat and acti%dty of a general bombard- ment. Universal wonder was created at the time, and continiied curiosity has been excited since, by the fact that this bom- bardment, ending in the suiTender of the fort, should have continued for the space of thirty-six hours without the loss of a single life in the besieged garrison. The apparent mys- tery is easily enough understood when we come to study and comprehend the exact conditions and coui'se of the fight. Fort Sumter was a work dating from compai'atively recent times, built of brick upon an artificial island fonned in the SUMTER. 63 shallows nearly midway at the entrance of Charleston har- bor. It was a five-sided structure, about three hundred by three hundred and fitty feet in size ; its walls were some eight feet thick and forty feet high. It was capable of mounting one hundred and forty guns, two tiers in case- mates and one behind the parapet. When Anderson took possession of it the preceding Christmas, the casemates were in an unfinished condition, and only a few guns were mounted. Captain Foster, the accomplished engineer of the fort, had, however, since then, by the many expedients known to military science, and by help of a considerable force of workmen and laborers, pushed its defences forward to a state of relative completeness, even with the limited means and materials within the fort. Most of the embra- sures of the lower tier of casemates were closed. A total armament of forty-eight guns was ready for use. Of these twenty-one were in the casemates, and twenty-seven on the rampart, en barbette. The garrison consisted of nine com- missioned officers, sixty-eight non-commissioned officers and privates, eight musicians, and forty-three non-combatant workmen, to whom, during the last ten days, the besiegeis had refused permission to depart, in order that they might help consume Anderson's small stock of provisions, and thus hasten the process of reducing the fort by starvation. The rebels had built their siege-works on the approaching points of the islands forming the harbor. These lay in a sort of triangle about the fort : Sullivan's Island, containing Fort Moultrie, to the northeast at a distance of 1,800 yards ; Cum- ming's Point, on Morris Island, to the south at a distance of 1,300 yards ; and on James Island, near old Fort Johnson, to the west at a distance of 2,500 yards. Their total armament embraced forty-seven guns. Thus, in numbers, the armaments appeared about equal, 64 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. but the existing conditions created an immense disparity. Anderson's fire was diffused ; the rebel fire was concentrated. Anderson's barbette guns, more than half his pieces, were exposed ; most of the rebel guns were sheltered in bomb- proofs of palmetto logs and sand ; some protected with slop- ing roofs of railroad iron. Anderson had only a gan-ison of 128 souls all told ; while a volunteer force of from four to six thousand supjDorted the rebel batteries. The greatest difference, however, was in the quality of the ordnance. Anderson's guns could only deliver a horizontal fire against the besiegers' earth-walls and bomb-proofs. But seventeen of the rebel pieces were mortars, delivering what is termed a vertical fire ; that is, throwing their bursting shells by means of a high cui-ve through the air, so as to drop down uj)on the parapet and inside the walls of the besieged fort. The garrison of Sumter, notwithstanding its tedious con- finement, was in excellent spirit, and, since the long ajipre- hended contest had finally come, was quite ready to make a manful resistance. Even the forty-three non-combatant workmen caught the impulse of fight and freely volunteered their help. The needful preparations had been already made, and since the 10th eveiy one had by order changed his quarters into the gun casemates. Here they were se- curely housed when at 4.30 a.m. the rebel cannonade began. It was not yet daylight, and for some hours the fort made no reply, but lay in the morning twilight as silent and ap- parently as unconcerned as if it were tenantless. The ra- tions had ah'eady become uncomfortably short ; the last bar- rel of flour was issued two or three days before, and now there was little left to subsist upon except pork and water. On this mainly the command made a breakfast, and at about seven o'clock Captain Abner Doubleday fired the first gun from the fort at an iron-clad battery on Cumming's Point. SUMTER. 65 Reliefs were .stationed at other guns, and soon Sumter was sending back a spii-ited reply. The three hours of unopposed bombardment from the rebel batteries had by this time already determined one im- portant phase of the tight. Carefully Avatching the effect of the enemy's cannonade, it was apjaarent, without further ques- tion, that under the concentrated missiles of their guns, and particularly because of the precision of their vertical fire, it would be folly to expose the gunners on the ramj)ai't or the ojaen parade of the fort. Had Sumter contained a full war garrison, new men could have replaced those killed or dis- abled ; but, with his slender force, Anderson decided that he could not afford this risk, and therefore at once ordered an abandonment of all the barbette guns and a few mounted on the parade to throw shells, restricting the men rigidly to the casemates. Thus at one swoop his fighting armament was reduced more than one-half. This, however, was not the worst ; it practically annihilated the oflfensive strength of the fort. Of the twenty -one casemate guns but four were forty- two pounders , the rest only thirty-twos, a weight of metal of little avail against the enemy's strong earthworks and iron roofs. In this way the cannonade went actively on during the forenoon of Ajjril 12th, without much damage or effect, ex- cept upon the buildings in both Sumter and Moultrie, ordi- narily occupied as baiTacks and quarters. Sumter suffered most in this respect : the balls striking the face of its walls merely buried themselves in the brick-work, without passing through; but fhose which nearly or quite grazed the para- pet, in their fall took the buildings or wall in reverse, com- ing as they did from three sides. The men, however, while sheltered in casemates, were beyond the reach of these mis- siles. So too of the bombs. Falling on the parapet and the 5 GG THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. open parade of Sximter and exploding, their destructive force spent itself upon mere inanimate material. About noon Anderson's men found they had been working with too much ardor ; that their stock of 700 cartridges would soon be exhausted. They set themselves to work to remedy this deficiency, though with small speed, for they had only six needles in the fort with which to sew up cartridge-bags. Toward one o'clock a new hope cheered them ; they saw two ships, and soon after a thii-d, beaiing the stars and stripes, appear off the harbor ; it was a part of the relieving expedition they had been warned to expect. Unfortunately, it proved unable to succor the fort either on that or the suc- ceeding day. Through a confusion of orders, the flagship of the squadi'on with its commanding officer, and the instruc- tions for this emergency, and having on board also the sail- ors who were required to man the boats to carry the supjilies and soldiers to Sumter, had been detached from this duty and sent to the Gulf of Mexico. A severe storm delayed some of the vessels, and prevented the tugs from reaching the harbor ; and this storm also prevented the officers from making use of the limited resources remaining. Therefore, to their chagrin, they and their men were forced by these untoward cii'ciimstances, and through no neglect of their own, to remain for twenty-four hours little else than specta- tors of the bombardment to its close. During the afternoon of the first day Sumter kept up its fire, though with gi'eatly slackened speed. Only six guns were kept in action for the remainder of the day : two against Cumming's Point on the south, and four against Fort Moidtrie and other batteries on Sullivan's Island to the noi-th. At nightfall even these ceased, as also did most of the guns in the rebel batteries ; their mortal's, however, keeping up a sullen and steady discharge of bombs upon SUMTER. 67 the fort at intervals of about ten minutes, the whole of the dark and stormy night which followed. On the morning of the second day, April 13th, the rebels began their general cannonade with both increased vigor and increased precision ; to which the garrison, after its breakfast of pork and water, and having somewhat replen- ished its stock of cartridges, again made a " spiteful" reply. It is impossible to estimate how long this mere interchange of shot and shell might have continued, had not other ele- ments intervened to bring the combat to a close. On three of the five sides of Sumter, just inside the walls, stood long and substantial buildings used as ban-acks, offi- cers' quarters, and for other jDurposes. These had been sev- eral times set on fire by hot shot during the first day, though as often readily extinguished by the garrison. The rebels had not failed to notice the effect ; and on the second morn- ing their use of these missiles became more frequent. About nine o'clock of the second day these buildings were once more in a blaze, and this time the fire caught in a portion of the roof of the officers' quarters which it was not imme- diately possible for the men to reach. The flames were quickly beyond control ; and now the serious problem was to remove as much powder from the magazine as might be needed for use, before that proceeding should become im- possible. Fifty barrels were thus obtained and distributed about the casemates, when it was necessary to close and se- cure the door of the magazine. Thus, by noon of the second day, the inmates of the fort were exposed, not alone to the peril of the enemy's shot and shell, but also to the immediate discomfort and danger of a serious conflagration. Within the limited area of the fort the heat became intense ; the air was filled with floating cinders ; and, blown downward bv the current of the sea- 68 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. breeze, a stifling, blinding smoke finally drove the men into the casemates, and even to these retreats the floating fire- flakes pursued them. The situation became too dangerous to keep the fifty barrels of powder rescued from the maga- zine ; by order of Anderson, all but five were rolled out of the embrasures into the sea. About one o'clock the flagstaff of the fort was shot away, having been hit a number of times preNaously ; and, although the flag was soon after again raised on a jury-mast on the parapet, the clouds of smoke concealed it from the rebel view. Seeing the great conflagration, the disaiojiearance of the flag, and a total cessation of fire from Sumter's guns, they not unreasonably concluded that the garrison was ready to sun-ender. The eccentric Senator Wigfall, doing duty as a volunteer aid on one of the islands, was sent by a subordinate officer to ascertain the fact ; and, being brought before the commander, with more grandiloquence than au- thority, offered to peiTnit Anderson to name his own terms of evacuation. Anderson replied that he would accept the teiTBS offered liim by Beauregard at the time of his fii-st summons, on the 11th. Wigfall thereupon returned to his post, where, in turn, with more enthusiasm than memoiy, he reported an unconditional sun-ender. Meanwhile, three aids arrived direct from Beauregard, with an offer of assistance to extinguish the flames, and the misunderstaniling became apparent. Anderson, in some anger, was disposed to renew his fight ; upon suggestion of the aids, however, he waited till the blunder could be refeiTed to Beauregard. This commander reconciled all difficulty by agi'eeing to Anderson's iiroposal ; and at noon of the following day, Sunday, April 14, 1861, the faithful commander and his faithful ganison, with an impres- sive ceremony of prayer and salute, hauled down the flag of the United States, and evacuated Fort Sumter. CHAPTEK VI. THE CALL TO ARMS. The assault upon Fort Sumter had doubtless been ordered by the rebel government under the hope, if not the belief, that it would not provoke immediate or widespread civil war. It is probable that they anticipated it would biing on military movements and measures of a local and defensive character ; but neither the size of the Federal army, nor the very limited war organization set on foot by the rebel con- gress,, pointed as yet to hostilities on an extended scale. The South well knew that the frontier could not be entirely stripped of regulars ; they assumed, or so pretended, that existing laws authorized no call of the militia ; and, judging from the neglect of Congress, at its recent session, to pass a force bill, they might reasonably infer that it would be dif- ficult for the new administration to obtain coercive legisla- tion. Most of all, however, they relied upon a friendly feel- ing toward the South from their late Democratic party allies. Throughout the last presidential election, Northern Democrats had magnified Southern complaints as insuifer- able grievances, and predicted the coming revolution as a terror to obstinate voters. President Buchanan even went so far in his annual message as to asseri that a neglect of Northern States to repeal their personal liberty laws would justify the South in revolutionary resistance. The news- 70 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. paper press was full of kindi-ed echoes. Potent public voices had declared that the North would not entertain — nay, would not permit, a policy of subjugation. Ex- Presi- dent Fi-anklin Pierce — Buchanan's predecessor — had given Jefferson Da^•is very broad confidential assurances on this head. "Without discussing the question of right," WTote he, Januaiy 6, 1860, " of abstract power to secede, I have never believed that actual disraption of the Union can occur without blood; and if, through the madness of Northern Abolitionism, that dire calamity must come, the fighting will not be along Mason's and Dixon's line merely. It [will] be within our own borders, in our own sti-eets, between the two classes of citizens to whom I have referred. Those who defy law and scout constitutional obligations will, if we ever reach the arbitrament of arms, find occupation enough at home." As the oracle of another faction, Douglas had made an elaborate argument in the Senate to show that the President possessed no right of coercion ; repeating the theory of Bu- chanan's message, that the army and na\7' and the militia of the States could not move except behind a marshal with Ms WTit, and that both the tongue and the arms of justice were dead in South Carolina. Similar encouragement came from many individuals of lesser note. It even appeared tliat the spirit of secession was finding a lodgment in the North. A member had declared on the floor of Congress that the Em- pii'e State would set up her own separate sovereignty ; while in a still more radical ambition the Mayor of New York City, in an official message, proposed the secession of that me- tropolis, and its assumption of territorial independence as a " free city." The firing on the Star of the "West, in January, had in a slight degi-ee touched the national pride, and some- what checked the gathering current of seditious uttei*ance ; THE CALL TO ARMS. 71 but there was no lack of cliques and coteries in the gi'eat cities of the North who secretly nursed plots and projects contingent on possible insurrectionary commotions and chances. One of the rebel commissioners to Washington, in the interim during which Justice Campbell relieved them of their labors of diplomatic intrigue, visited New York, where he was waited upon by the spokesman of one of these North- ern cabals, who poured into the ears of his credulous lis- tener the recital of a most marvellous scheme of local con- spiracy. Two hundred of New York's best citizens, he said, were at that moment elaborating a jalan to secede from both the Union and the State, seize the navy yard at Brooklyn, and the forts in the harbor, and declai'e New York a free city. The informant was perhaps an adventurer anxious to pocket a liberal subsidy ; yet, as an echo of Mayor Wood's official proposition, the incident was not without its signifi- cance, and the eager commissioner repeated the tale by let- ter to Jefferson Davis, countersigned by his own personal faith that there was " something in it." Jefferson Davis was by far too shrewd a leader to look for a literal fulfilment of any of these extravagant predictions or projects ; but they afforded him a substantial basis for the belief that this class of sentiment would at least oppose and thwart the new administration in any quick or extended measures to suppress the " confederate " revolt. On the part of the North, also, there had been grave mis- apprehension of the actual state of Southern opinion. For ten years the Southern threats of disunion had been empty bluster. The half-disclosed conspiracy of 1856 did not seem to extend beyond a few notorious agitators. The more serious revolutionaiy signs of the last three months— the re- tirement of Southern members from Congress, the secession of States, the seizure of federal forts and the formation of 72 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. the Montgomery provisional goveniment — were not realized in their full force by the North, because of the general con- fusion of politics, the rush and hurry of events, the delusive hopes of compromise held out by Ck)ngressional committees and factions, and the high-sounding professions of the Washington i)eace conference. More potent than all was the underlying disbelief of the North that the people at large in the South felt the stress of any real grievance. The loss of slave runaways was their most tangible accusation. Would that evil be cured by moving the Canada line down to the Ohio ? If separate nationality was the object, could ten millions overcome twenty millions? — could precarious Southern credit cope with the solid accumulations of North- em capital ? — could a monotonous Southern agriculture try expedients with the famous mechanical skill of the Free States ? — could cotton crops feed armies like the great com, wheat, hay, pork, and cattle regions? — and finally, would the great West peimit a foreign flag to close or cover the mouth of the Mississippi ? The bare suggestion seemed, and was, nonsense. They indeed saw clearly enough the ambition, treachery, and desperation of certain Southern leaders ; but the North did not believe that these leaders could, in Yan- cey's language, " precipitate the Cotton States into a revolu- tion " ; that passing chagiln over a lost election could goad the whole Southern people, without substantial cause, into the horror and ruin of a hopeless ci\-il war. The firing on Sumter cleared up the political atmos- phere as if by magic. The roar of Beauregard's guns changed incredulity into fact. There was no longer room for doubt. This was no mere emeute. Seven seceding States, \s-ith their machinery of local government and the crazy zeal of an inflamed reaction, stood behind the guns. The cool deliberation of the assault betokened plan, pur- THE CALL TO ARMS. 73 pose, and confidence. The conspiracy had given way to revohition. The news of the assault on Sumter reached Washington on Saturday, Apiil 13th ; on Sunday morning, the llth, the President and Cabinet were met to discuss the surrender and evacuation. Sunday, though it was, Lincoln with his own hand immediately drafted the following proclamation, which was dated, issued, telegraphed, and published to the whole country on Monday morning, April 15th. " PROCLAMATION "BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. "'Whereas, the laws of the United States have been for some time past and now are opposed, and the execution thereof obstructed in the States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Lou- isiana, and Texas, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial procaedings, or by the powers vested in the marshals by law : now therefore, I, Abkaham Li>xolx, President of the United States, in virtue of the power in me vested by the Con- stitution and the laws, have thought fit to c-all forth, and hereby do call forth the militia of the several States of the Union, to the aggregate number of seventy-five thousand, in order to suppress said combina- tious and to cause the laws to be dulj^ executed. " The details for this object will be immediately communicated to the State authorities through the War Department. I appeal to all loyal citizens to favor, facilitate, and aid this effort to maintain the honor, the integrity, and existence of our National Union, and the perpetuity of popular government, and to redress wrongs already long enough en- dured. I deem it proper to say that the first service assigned to the forces hereby called forth will probably be to repossess the forts, places, and property which have been seized from the Union ; and in every event the utmost care will be observed, consistently with the ob- jects aforesaid, to avoid any devastation, any destruction of, or inter^ 4 74 THK OL'TUUEAK OF REBKLXJON. ference with property, or any disturbance of peaceful citizens in any part of the country , and I hereby command the persons composing the combinations aforesaid to disperse and retire peaceably to their respec- tive abodes within twenty days from this date. ■' Deeming that the present condition of public afTairs presents an ex- traordinary occasion, I do hereby, in virtue of the power in me vested by the Constitution, convene both Houses of Congress. Senators and Representatives are therefore summoned to assemble at their re- spective chambers at twelve o'clock, noon, on Thursday, the fourth day of July next, then and there to consider and determine such measures as, in their wisdom, the public safety and interest may seem to de- mand. '"In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed. " Done at the City of Washington, this fifteenth day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-one, and of the independence of the United States the eighty-fifth. "ABRAHAM LINCOLN. " By the President. " Wji.LiAM H. Seward, Sm-ftary of Stale." The possible contingency foreshatlowed bv Lincoln in liis Trenton address bad come ; and he not only I'edeemed his promise to " put the foot dowTi fiiTnly," but he took care to place it on a solid foundation. Nominally the call of the militia was based on the Act of 1795. But the broad lan- guage of the i^roclamation was an " ai)peal to all loyal citi- zens to favor, facilitate, and aid this effort to maintain the honor, the integrity, and existence of our National Union, and the perpetuity of pojnilar government." The President had taken care to so sliape the issue — so to strip it of all provo- cation or ingenious excuse, as to show the recldess malignity of the rebellion in showering red-hot shot on a standing gar- rison ; he now asked the people to maintain their a.ssanlted dignity and outraged authority ; touching not merely the machinery of forms and statutes, but invoking directly that THE CALL TO ARMS. 75 spirit of free government to preserve itself, against which in his opinion " the gates of hell " could not prevail. The correctness of his faith was equal to the wisdom of his policy ; for now there was seen one of those mighty manifestations of national will and national strength that mark the grand epochs of civilized histoiy. The whole country seemed to awaken as from the trouble of a feverish dream, and once again men entered upon a conscious recog- nition of their proper relations to the Government. Cross. puipose and ijeiplexed counsel faded from the public mind. Parties vanished from politics. Universal opinion recog- nized but two rallying-points — the camps of the South which gathered to assail the Union, and the armies of the North that rose to defend it. From eveiy Governor of the Free States came a prompt re- sponse of readiness to furnish to the President the desired quota of militia. In almost eveiy county of the North was begun the enlistment of volunteers. Meetings, speeches, and pai*ades voiced the public exhortation to patriotism. Flags and badges symbolized an eager and universal loyalty. Munificent individual donations, and subscriptions, and lib- eral apiDropriations from State Legislatures and municipal councils, poured forth laWsh contributions to arm, clothe, and equip the recniits. More than double the number of men required tendered their sei-vice. Before the lapse of forty-eight hours, armed comjianies and regiments of volun- teers were in motion toward the expected border of conflict. Public opinion became intolerant of dissent and cavil ; in many instances tumultuous mobs silenced or destroyed newspapei-s which had ventured to print disloyal or treason- able language. There was not the slightest sign or move- ment of the ijredicted division of Northern sentiment. New York joyfully ranged herself imder tlie flag in a monster 76 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. meeting of two hundretl thousand of her i)eoiile. Before the surging crowds that filled the streets, and drowned all noises in their huzzas for the Union, the Neio York Herald displayed the stars and stripes, and changed its editorials from a tone of sneering lament to a fierce and incessant war-ciy. Every prominent individual in the whole North was called or came voluntarily to prompt espousal of the Union cause by public letter or speech. Ex-President Buchanan, ex-President Piei'ce, Edward Everett, Genei"al Cass, Archbishop Hughes, Mayor Fernando Wood, John A. Dix, Wendell Phillips, Eobei-t J. Walker, Wm. M. Evarts, Edward D. Baker, Da^'id Dudley Field, John J. Crittenden, Caleb Cushing, Hannibal Hamlin, Democrats and Republi- cans, conseiTatives and radicals, natives and foreigners, Catholics and Protestants, Maine and Oregon, all uttered a common call to their countrymen to come to the defence of the Constitution, the Government, and the Union. Of all these recognized public leaders, however, the most energetic and powerful, next to Lincoln, was Stephen A. Doiiglas, who in the late election had received 1,128,049 Northern votes, and 163,525 Southern votes for President. As already men- tioned, he had, in a bold Senate sjieech, announced himself as opposed to a policy of coercion. But the wanton bom- bardment of Sumter exhausted his party patience, and stirred his patriotic blood to fresher and healthier impulses. On Sunday, April 14th, when the proclamation had not yet been many hours \ATitten and signed, he sought his life- long political antagonist, Abraham Lincoln, now President of the United States, and, in a long, confidential iuter^-iew, as- sured him of his readiness to join him in unrelenting war- fare against rebellion. The next morning's telegi-ai)hic de- spatches gave the countiy an authorized notice of the patri- otic alliance. In a few davs he started to his home in lUi- THE CALL TO ARMS. 77 nois ; and everrwlaere on his journey, and until his sudden death a few weeks later, he scarcely ceased his eloquent ap- peal to his fellow-citizens to rise in vindication of good faith, of system, of order in government ; declaring, with sen- tentious vigor, "every man must be for the United States or against it ; there can be no neutrals in this war — only pa- triots and traitors." Such was the gi-and uprising of the North. The South, ah'eady for three months past in the turmoil of insuiTection, was once more quickened to a new activity in her fatal enter- prise. She felt that the assault on Sumter was her final cast of the die. Her people are proud and impetuous, stronger in physical than in moral courage, more prone to daring in behalf of error than of suffering to sustain truth. This qual- ity was shi-ewdly recognized by one of the conspu'ators when he gave his hesitating confederates the bratal watchword : "You must sprinkle blood in the faces of the peoijle." Sumter was a bloodless conquest, but it nevertheless filled the South with the intoxication of combat. All sentiment adverse to secession and Southern independence had long since disappeared under the repression of a despotic public opinion ; but now the fei-vor of a fanatical crusade transfused the whole Southern population ; and their motley array of palmetto banners, rattlesnake flags, and almost as eccentric varieties of " stars and bars," became, in their wild i^olitical lunacy, the symbols of a holy deliverance. The Sumter bombardment, Lincoln's proclamation, and the enthusiastic war-spirit of the North, left the Confeder- ate authorities at Montgomeiy no further hope of obtaining peaceable separation by diplomacy or intrigue. In their scheme of independence, while counting, with much gi-eater accuracy than outsiders, upon the latent military resources of the South, they nevertheless seem to have based their 78 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. ultimate reliance upon foreign intervention in their belialf. " Cotton is king," they argued ; Europe cannot exist without it ; therefore, when American civil war locks up that daily food of European looms, and takes the means of earning daily bread from foreign labor, dividends from foreign capi- tal, and activity from foreign commerce, Eui'opean govern- ments must open our jiorts by recognizing and protecting our flag, especially if, in addition to their needed manufac- tuiing staple, we temj^t them with the commercial han'est of free trade. As the entering wedge to this i^olicy, Jefferson Da"\-is, on the 17th of Ajjril, issued his proclamation, offering letters of marque and reprisal, "under the seal of these Confederate States," to armed privateers of any nation. The commercial classes of England had, since the secession of South Caro- lina, manifested a strong sympathy for the rebellion, and he doubtless expected that the seas would soon swaiTU viith pred- atory adventurers under shelter of the " stars and bar^." A few vessels of this character* did, in the subsequent years of the war, inflict incalculable damage upon shii^ping sailing under the Federal flag ; but the extravagant scheme, of which this privateering proclamation was the key-note, with- ered in an early blight. Two days after its appearance President Lincoln issued a countef-ijroclamation, instituting a rigid blockade of the insurgent jjorts, and threatening that Jefferson Da^ds' privateers should be " held amenable to the laws of the United States for the prevention and punish- ment of piracy " — a warning which, from motives of public policy and the humane personal instincts of the President, was not literally enforced. The unexampled increase of the United States NaN-y, the cxtraordinaiy efficiency of the block- ade, the \-igilant foreign diplomatic sei-vice of the adminis- ti-ation, and, above all, its >agorous prosecution of the war, THE CALL TO ARMS. 79 left foreign powers no sufficient excuse, and overawed all passing temptations to intervene. And when tlie hour of distress and trial finally came to the industrial classes of England, the noble devotion of the Manchester cotton oper- atives to universal liberty put to shame and impotence the greedy cuj^idity of the cotton merchants of LiveiTpool. In addition to the six or seven thousand rebel troops as- sembled at Charleston to aid in the reduction of Sumter, and the four or five thousand sent to Pensacola to undertake the capture of Fort Pickens, Jeffei-son Da\'is' Secretary of War had, in anticipation of the results of the bombardment, on the 8th of April called upon the seceded States for a contingent of 20,000, to which there was again, on the 16th of April, added a further call of 34,000 volunteers. In seizing the Southern arsenals the seceded States had become possessed of over one hundred thousand "serviceable" arms; at least thirty thou- sand others had been secured by purchase fi'om Secretary Floyd. The arsenals also contained considerable quantities of miUtaiy equipments. A variety of military stores were among the property surrendered by Twiggs in Texas ; the seaboard forts, particularly those in Charleston Harbor, furnished a supply of heavj' guns. Southern recmits were abundant ; and out of these ready materials the Montgomery authorities proceeded as rapidly as possible, with the assistance of many skilful officers resigned or deserted from the Federal service, to improA-ise an army. Diplomatic agents were sent in haste to European courts. Measures were taken to thoroughly fortify the coast ; pennission was sought from the neighbor- ing States to blockade the Mississii^iji Eiver as high as Vicks- burg and Memphis. The Confederate Congi-ess was con- vened in sjjecial session ; and on April 29th Jefferson Davis sent them his message, announcing that he had " in the field, at Charleston, Pensacola, Forts Morgan, Jackson, St. Philip, 80 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. and Pulaski, uineteen tliousand men, and sixteen thousand are now en route for Virginia." Also, that ho further pro- posed " to organize and hold in readiness for instant action," an annj of one hundred thousand men. Between the fall of Sumter, however, and the date of this message, the whole revolution had undergone a remarkably rapid development, which essentially changed the scope and character of the contest. Hitherto the Border Slave States, as they were called — Maiyland, Yii'ginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, Arkansas, and Missouri — though from the beginning also deeply agitated, had taken no decisive action. Their people were divided in symj)athy and interest ; they favored slavery, but they also loved the Union. Every expression through a popular vote indicated strongly pre- l)onderant loyalty ; but with one excejjtion their State offi- cials were already secretly leagued with the secession con- spu-ators. Uiion them, too, the bombardment of Sumter fell like a sudden touchstone. The proclamation of President Lincoln, and the requisition of the Secretaiy of War for their quota of Union volunteers, left them no further chance of concealment. Compelled to take sides, their various gov- ernors replied to the call in an insulting and contumacious refusal. From that time foi-ward Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas were practically part and parcel of the rebellion, though some of these did not immediately make a jjretence of formal adhesion by ordinances or mili- tary leagues. It would be both ' tedious and needless to detail the various steps and j^hases of their seeming revolt ; i' is a record of bold conspiracy, shameless usui^pation, and despotic military domination, made possible by the sudden rush of popular excitement and jjassion consequent ujjon the fall of Sumter. The three others, Man-land, Kentucky, and Missouri, and also the western half of Virginia, were THE CALL TO ARMS. 81 eventually saved to the Union, partly by the inherent loyalty of their peoi^le, partly by the quick and sustaining presence of the Union forces. By these adhesions the revolution at a single bound aug- mented its area almost one-half, and nearly doubled its sup- porting population, its material resources, its claim to the serious attention of foreign nations. Its cliiefs and leaders were, of course, corresiDondingly elated and hopeful. "With a tei-ritory nearly four times as large as France ; with five and a half millions of whites, and three and a half millions of blacks ; producing by her agriculture a single staple, cotton, valued at two hundred million dollars annually ; with a greatly diversified climate ; with a long sea-coast, with several impor- tant harbors and many navigable rivers ; with mountains, with mines, with forests containing the most valuable ship-timber in the world ; with a greater variety of field and garden pro- ducts than usually falls to the lot of a single people — they be- lieved that they possessed the substantial elements of a homo- geneous, j)rosperous, and powerful nation. CHAPTER VII. BALTIMORE. Of all the Border Slave States, Virginia held the most equivocal and deceptive attitude. Beyond all doubt a ma- jority of her people desired to adhere to the Union, and at an election for members of a State convention held in Feb- ruary the majority of professedly Union men chosen was as three to one. But when this convention met, it appeared that many of these so-called Unionists had trifled with their constituents, and finally betrayed their trust ; they were Unionists only upon conditions to which the Union would never consent. Governor Letcher, of Vij-ginia, also labored in secret activity to promote secession. There was a pestif- erous clique of radical disunionists about Richmond, and, under an outward show of qualified loyalty, the conspiracy was almost as busy and as potent in the " Old Dominion" as in the Cotton States themselves. When Sumter fell, all this hidden intrigue blazed out into open insurrection. The convention, notwithstanding many pre\'ious contraiy votes, held-a secret session on April 17th, and passed an ordinance of secession, eighty-eight to fifty-five. The gradual but sys- tematic arming of the State militia had been going on for a year past. Governor Letcher insultingly refused the Presi- dent's call for troops on the 16th, and immediately set mili- taiy expeditions in movement to seize the United States BALTIMORE. 83 "Navy Yard at Norfolk, and tlie United States Armory at Har- per's Ferry. The convention made a pretence of submitting the question of secession to a popular vote, to be taken on May 23d follo-«-ing ; and then, as if in mockery, entered at once into a secret militaiy league vcith. the " Confederate States " on April 24th, placing Jefferson Davis in control of all her armies and militaiy affaii's, and filling the State •with. "foreign" regiments from the South. In the Border State of Maryland the situation was some- what different. The Unionists were also in the majority, with an active and influential minority for secession. Here, &" elsewhere, consjiiracy had been at work for months, and gained many of the prominent leaders iu politics. The Le- gislature was believed to be unreliable. Treason had so far taken a foothold in the populous city of Baltimore, that a secret recruiting office was sending enlisted men to Charles- ton. But all local demonstration was as yet baffled by the unwaveiing loyalty of the Governor of Mai-yland, Thomas Holliday Hicks. He had refused and resisted all the subtle temptations and schemes of the traitors, csi^ecially in declin- ing to call the Legislature together to give disunion the cloak of a legal starting-point. To understand correctly the series of siidden and startling events which now occiu-red in quick sitccession, it is neces- sary to bear in mind that the ten miles square of Federal teiTitory known as the District of Columbia, in which the capital of the countiy, Washington, is situated, lies between Virginia and Maryland, and was fonned out of the original tenitoiy of those States. In all wars, foreign or domestic, the safety of the capital, its buildings, archives, and officers, is, of course, a constant and a paramount necessity. To guard the City of Washing- ton against a mmored plot of seizure by the conspirators. 84 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. President Buchanan liad in Januaiy permitted Secretary Holt and General Scott to concentrate a small number of re^lar troops in it. Some of these had ever since remained there. As soon as President Lincoln decided to send pro- visions to Sumter, he had, in anticipation of coming dangers, ordered General Scott to take additional measures for the security of the capital, and to that end authorized him to muster into the sei-vice of the United States about fifteen companies of District militia. ^Mien Sumter fell and the proclamation was issued, as a still further precaution the first few regiments were ordered dii'ectly to Washington. To the Massachusetts Sixth belongs the unfading honor of being the first regiment, armed and equipped for service, to respond to the President's call. Musteiong on Boston Common, on Tuesday morning, April IGth, it embarked on railroad cars on Wednesday evening, Ai^ril 17th, and, after a continuous popular ovation along the route, it reached Phila- delphia Thiu-sday evening, April 18th. Friday, April 19 th, Avas the anniversaiy of the battle of Lexington, famous in American histoiy. Early that morning, after a short bivouac, the regiment was once more on its way. It had been warned of danger in Baltimore ; the unruly populace was excited by a series of secession meetings ; part of an unarmed Pennsyl- vania regiment had, in its ti*ansit, been hooted and stoned the evening before. As the train ajjproached the city, Col- onel Jones, commanding the Sixth, ordered his men to load and cap their rifles, and instructed them to pay no attention to insults or even ordinaiy missiles, but to vigorously return any attack with firearms. A misunderstanding existed about the method of proceed- ing. Colonel Jones expected that his regiment would march in a body through the open streets, and had made his dispo- sitions accordingly. When, therefore, the train halted, he BALTIMORE. 85 was surprised and disconcerted to find that the cars were suddenly detached from tlie train and from each other, and, with the troojjs still in them, were rapidly diuwn by horses through the streets on a track iiinning from the Philadelphia depot to the Washington depot, the two being about a mile apart. Himself and the regimental officers were in the first car ; others followed, and, until eight cars had thus passed, no detention or demonstration occurred. But an excited / WASHINGTON DEPOT Route of the Massachusetts Sixth through Baltimore, crowd meanwhile gathered along the track ; the ninth car was received with hootings and insults, was detained by slight obstiTictions, and, before it finally reached the Wash- ; ington depot, its windows were smashed by stones and bricks, and some of its occupants wounded by gun- and pistol-shots, the soldiers having also returned the scatteiing fire. By this time the crowd, grown to formidable proportions, and fully maddened, succeeded in placing more permanent 86 Tlir: OUTBRKAK OF RF.TlELLTOy. obstructions on the tmck — sand, paving-stones, hea^Tr an- chors from a wharf near by, and in one place had partially torn up a small bridge. Four companies still remained be- hind ; and these were now notified by the railroad employees of the dangers ahead, and the impossibility of proceeding in the cars as the preceding companies had done. The offi- cers thereupon consulted together, and determined to under- take the trip on foot ; and, j^lacing Captain Follansbee in command, they descended from their cars, formed deliber- ately on the sidewalk, and started forward. Almost at the outset they encountered an improvised pro- cession of the mob following a secession flag, and in an in- stant there was a quick and short vielee. Disentangling themselves from this, the officers urged the men into a double-quick, which, however, only encouraged the riotei*s, who looked upon it as a sign of fear and flight. New and increased crowds were soon met ; they were threatened in rear and front, and a discharge of firearms began from side- walks and windows. Then the order was given to return the fire. There was struggle, confusion, smoke, hooting, yells of "nigger thieves," "ti-aitors," men dropping on the sidewalk and falling from windows, and wounded soldiere crawling feebly away under the feet of the i-ushiug, howling mob. Into the midst of this teiTor there suddenly came a little ray of hoi:)o and help. People began to shout, " Here comes the Mayor ! " The city authorities, who had been waiting at the "Washington Depot, had heard of the riot and were has- tening to the rescue. The crowd fell back ; a man came up, shook hands with Captain Follansbee, sa^-ing, "I am the Mayor of Baltimore." Mayor Brown courageously placed liimself beside the captain, and, by voice and gesture, en- deavored to quell the tumult, but to little pmi:)ose. The BALTIMORE. 87 struggling, fighting column pushed ahead doggedly a square or two farther, the attack increasing rather than diminishing. The Mayor's own patience and temper was exhausted, and, seizing a gun from the hands of a soldier, he fired at and brought down one of the rioters. At this point. Captain Follansbec states, the Mayor disap- peared— most iwobably, as it would seem, because of the fortunate arrival of more effective help. Marshal Kane, chief of police, also hastening to the relief, here anived on the scene of conflict with a squad of fifty policemen. Tak- ing advantage of a favorable instant, he deployed his men in a line across the street, opened their ranks to allow the troops to pass thi'ough, and then, closing his line again, confronted the advancing mob wdth di*awn revolvers. The movement diverted a moment's attention and checked the onward rush ; the baiTier held fii-m, the column of soldiers passed quickly on, and, though it met one or two slight additional attacks, it made its way to the Washington Depot. Here also there was a great crowd and excited tumult ; the men were got into cars, and the train put into motion toward Washington under much difficulty ; but no bloodshed occuiTed till at the last moment, when a shower of stones or a pistol-shot pro- voked a return volley from a window of the rear car, killing a lirominent citizen. The number of casualties was never correctly ascertained. The soldiers lost four killed and some thirty wounded ; the citizens jirobably two or three times as many. With the departure of the Massachusetts Sixth, the Chief of Police supposed his immediate troubles at an end. But not yet ; he was again notified that a new riot was beginning at the Philadelphia Depot. Huri-ying there, he found that the regimental band had been left behind ; and worse still, that a large number of cars constituting the rear end of the 88 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. train, yet contained Small's Pennsylvania Brigade, number- ing some thousand men, all unai-med. The fonner had already been driven from their car and scattered ; the latter were just beginning to debark, entirely ignorant of what had happened. Gathering such of his policemen as were in the neighborhood. Marshal Kane iutenened actively and with success for their temporal^ protection ; and a hasty conference having been held with the railroad officers, the train was, by common consent, backed out of the depot and sjDeedily despatched on its return toward Philadelphia. These events took place in the forenoon, between ten and twelve o'clock. As the intelligence of the riot and its blood- shed was dififused through the gi'eat city, it called into im- mediate action the Avorst passions of the populace. For the remainder of the day the city was virtually at the mercy of the mob. By good fortune no general or widespread dam- age or spoliation occurred ; but many minor acts of injury and law-breaking were perpetrated with impunity. Persons were maltreated, newspai^ei-s were mobbed, and stores and gunshops were broken into and robbed of their contents. The secession conspirators were prompt in their endeavor to turn the incident to their own advantage. Under their management a mass meeting was called to meet that after- noon at four o'clock, in Monument Square, where, at the ap- pointed hour, an immense concourse assembled. All the sweeping tide of popular sentiment ran against the Union and the North. There was not a National flag to be seen. The State flag of Maryland was disj^layed above the rostnim. In substance, most of the speeches were secession hai-angues. Denunciation of the soldiers, eulogies of the South, appeal and protest against invasion and coercion, met stormy ap- plause. Governor Hicks was called to the stand, and yield- ing to the torrent of treasonable fuiy, made a short address BALTIMORE. 89 wliicli cliimed in witli the current outburst of liostile feeling. He intimated that the Union was broken, and that he was ready to bow before the will of the ijeoj^le. He would rather lose his right arm than raise il; to strike a sister State. Finding the Governor thus giving way, and the i^opulace of Baltimore rising in response to their revolutionary promptings, the conspii-ators pushed forward their scheme of insurrection with all diligence, and succeeded in placing Maryland in a state of thorough revolt against the General Government, which lasted nearly a week. They i^revailed on the Governor to call out the militia, which, under officers mostly inclined to secession, put all military acts and au- thority directly against the Union. They induced him to call a special session of the Legislature, and under the revo- lutionary terror of the hour, at a special election held in Baltimore the following week, a farcical minority vote was made to result in the choice of a city delegation to the Lower House, from among the rankest disunionists. They con- trolled the City Council, which, under plea of public defence, ajjpropriated half a million to purchase and manufacture arms and gather the material of Avar. From Baltimore the furor spread to the country towns, where companies were raised and ijatrols established under the instructions and command of the secession militia general of Baltimore. Within a few days the United States flag practically disap- peared from Maiyland. Their most effective act remains yet to be noticed. Near midnight of the day of the riot (April 19, 1861), the Mayor and jjolice authorities made an official order (secret at the time, but subsequently avowed) to burn the nearest bridges on the railroads leading into Baltimore from the Free States, and immediately sent out different parties (the Chief of Police himself leading one of them), to execute the order. MO Till-: OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. Before daylight next morning, the bridges at Melvale, Relay House, and Cockeysville, on the Harrisburg road, and over the Bush and Gunjiowder Eivers and Harris Creek on the Pliiladelphia road, were accordingly destroyed by fire, com- Ijletely severing railroad communication with the North. The excuse was that they feared reprisal and revenge from the Northern armies ; the real motive appears to have been the stronger underlying spirit of insuiTection. Mayor Brown claimed that Governor Hicks approved the order ; the Governor soon afterward publicly and ofBcially denied it. Whether Mayor Brown was a secession conspirator seems doubtful ; but it is hard to resist the inference that the revo- lutionists influenced his action. The controlling animus of the deed is clearly enough revealed in a telegram sent out that night by Marshal Kane : " Thank you for your oflTer ; bring your men in by the first train and we will arrange with the railroad aftenvard. Streets red with Maiyland blood. Send expresses over the mountains and valleys of Maryland and Virginia for the rifle- men to come without delay. Fresh hordes Avill be dowTi on us to-morrow (the 20th). We will fight them and whip them, or die." This language at night, from the man who that morning had risked liis life to protect the Massachusetts sol- diers, sufiiciently shows the overmastering outbreak of revo- lutionan' madness. CHxiPTEK Vm. WASHINGTON. In celebrating the attack and the fall of Snmtci- at Mont- gomery by a congratulatory speech and an official salute, the rebel Secretaiy of War ventured to predict that the Con- federate flag would float over the capitol at Washington before the first of May. Whether this was to be accom- IDlished by plot, by open military campaign, or through mere insurrectionaiy reversion, he did not explain. The idea, however, by long nursing and repeating, had become one of the fixed hopes of the rebellion. Wlien the news of the Baltimore riot reached the South, the fulfilment of the i^rophecy was believed to be at hand. The revolt, which for a few days continually grew until it spread over all Maryland, served to deepen the universal impression. The Baltimore conspirators themselves were animated to fresh daring by their flattering local j^rospects. They sent at once to Richmond for a sujiply of arms. Governor Letcher responded with alacrity to their request. Senator Mason hastened to Baltimore to give them encouragement and advice. Two thousand muskets were forwarded with all possible despatch for their iise. Twenty heavy guns were also ordered to be sent them a few days later, though it does not appear that the order could be fully executed. Meanwhile the Virginia rebels had possessed themselves of 92 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. Hai-per's Feny and established a camp there, and from this vantage-ground they aiTanged a system of confidential com- munication with Baltimore. Nor was Richmond alone hojie- ful. Even Montgomery became inspired by the ajjparently favorable opportunity. Jeflferson Davis telegi-aphed (Ajji-il 22d) to Governor Letcher : " Sustain Baltimore, if practica- ble. We reinforce you," and ordered thirteen regiments to be concentrated in the " foreign country " of Yii-ginia ; and with all the confidence of a positive secret understanding, the rebel Secretary of War issued his requisitions upon the non-seceded Border Slave States to furnish a jjortion of this force. In the North the bloody act of Baltimore luised the ah'eady seething war excitement to a pitch bordeiing on frenzy, and the public exjiressions of indignant wi-ath were in many instances disfigured by intemperate clamor for sweeping and indiscrinaiuate vengeance upon that city. These ebullitions of hot blood were, however, eveiywhere wisely turned into increased ardor and efi'ort to foi^ward speedy relief and am^jle reinforcement to the Federal cajji- tal. The monster meeting of New York was held on the fol- lowing day, at which a Union Defence Committee Avas foimed from the foremost citizens of the gi'eat metropolis ; and by this committee, money, ships, supplies, and marching regi- ments were provided and prepared to meet the thi-eatening requirements of the hour. Troops were, however, already on the way. Brigadier- Genei-al Butler, with the Eighth Massachusetts Regiment, reached Philadelphia on the afternoon of the riot. The famous Seventh Regiment of New York, under Colonel Lef- ferts, also anived there on the following morning. Here the i-ailroad officials gave the two commanders certain infor- mation of the burning of the i-ailroad bridges and the im- WASHINGTON. 93 possibility of reaching Wasliington, or even Baltimore, by the ordinary route, advising tliem, as an alternative, to pro- ceed by water to Annapolis, and thence march overland to rfolk^i-C^ Routes of Approach to Washington the capital. Acting as yet under separate State authority, and unable to agi-ee, the two regiments proceeded there by different routes, one descending and the other ascending Chesapeake Bay, Butler amving in Annapolis harbor before 94 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. daylight, on Sunday morning, April 21st, and Lefferts join- ing him there next morning, Monday, April 22d. On communicating A\-ith the shore, they were met by a protest from Governor Hicks, waiTung them not to land. With all his stubborn and ingi-ained loyalty, the Governor was of a timid and somewhat vacillating nature, and for the moment the clamor of the Baltimore mob overawed his cooler judgment. In this conflict between lawful duty and popular pressure, he, too, caught at the flimsy j^lea of " State " suj^remacy, and, in addition to presuming to forbid the national flag on Maryland soil, wrote a letter to the Presi- dent, asking that the troops be ordered elsewhere, and suggesting that Lord Lyons, the British Minister, be re- quested to mediate between the Government and the rebels, a projiosal which was at once answered by a dignified rebuke from Mr. Seward. The administi-ation at, "Wasliington had not been unmind- ful of the dangerous condition of Maiyland ; but great reli- ance was placed upon the discretion and loyalty of Governor Hicks to avert danger. He had held several pei*sonal con- sultations with the President and Secretaiy of War ; had agreed to hold his people in check, and furnish four Mary- land regiments of picked Union men under the call ; and to make his compliance easier, the authorities consented that these should not be ordered South, but kept on service in their own State, or in the District of Cohimbia. The Gover- nor was frank enough to acknowledge his failure to keep his engagement. "We were an-anging and organizing forces," he wrote, " to protect the city and preserve order, but want of organization, of arms, prevented success. They had arms, they had the principal part of the organized militaiy forces with them ; and for us to have made the effoi*t under the cir- cumstances, would have had the effect to aid the disorderly WASHINGTON. 95 element. They took possession of the ai-mories, have the amis and ammunition, and I therefore think it prudent to decline (for the present) responding affirmatively to the requisition made by President Lincoln for four regiments of infantry." Unfortunately the disaster at Baltimore did not come sin- gle-handed. At the pictiu-esque little town of Harper's Ferry, where the Potomac Eiver flows through one of the gateways in the Blue Ridge, the United States had an exten- sive armory, containing much valuable machinery for the manufacture of rifles and muskets, originally located there because of the convenient and cheap water-power which the river affords. The town was famous as the scene of John Brown's invasion and capture. The seizure of this place with its works and its supposed strategical importance was an essential item in the conspiracy. A small company of regulars had been guarding it since January. One of Gen- eral Scott's first orders was to have a volunteer regiment detached to reinforce it, a precaution which could not be taken earlier because of the want of troops. With the quick secession of Virginia, however, the proposed help came too late. Governor Letcher pushed forward his State forces to menace the place with such haste, that, on the night of April 18th, Lieutenant Jones set fire to the establishment and withdrew his sixty men through Maryland into Pennsylva- nia. The Eebels immediately took possession, and though the fire had done much damage, the principal part of the machinery was rescued by them and afterward sent to Rich- mond. As already mentioned, a rebel camp was immedi- ately established, and its force in a few days augmented to two thousand four hundred men — doubtless with a view to join rebellious Maiyland in a descent upon Washington. Serious as was the loss of Haii)er's Feny, a sacrifice of infinitely greater proportions almost immediately followed. 96 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. Near Noi-folk, Ya., was one of the principal naval stations of the Government, the Gosjiort Navy Yard. This, too, was one of the piizes coveted by the conspiratoi-s ; its build- ings, suijplies, machinery-, diy dock, and especially a number of valuable ships, constituted a money value amounting to many millions ; and the imjiortance of their jiossession and use to either the insurgents or the Government, in a rebel- lion, was of course immeasurable. Beyond mere occupancy by a few oflBcers and a little handful of marines, the place was without substantial protection. The Lincoln adminis- tration had fully realized its exposure, but for want of troops could send it no early reinforcements. Such measures of precaution as were possible had long since been taken. The officers had been admonished to vigilance, and preparation made to bring away the more valuable ships. It was Gen- eral Scott's design to advance trooj^s to its sujiport the moment Fortress Monroe should be secure. Under these circumstances occurred the sudden fall of Sumter, the President's jiroclamation, the secession of Vir- ginia, and the immediate movement of Governor Letcher's State forces against both Harj)er's Feriy and Gosport. As a preliminary act, he thought to absolutely prevent the escape of the shij^s by obstructing Elizabeth Biver with small sunken vessels. The device did not completely succeed, though it greatly enhanced the danger. It is possible that all might yet have been ultimately saved, but for a contin- gency against which foresight was impossible. The ships were ready to move out ; the most valuable of them — the Mer- rimack— had steam up and was on point of sailing, when, by the treacheiy and false counsel of his subordinate offi- cers. Commandant McCauley, of the navy yardj whose loy- alty had hitherto not been suspected, revoked his i)enni.ssion to let her depart. WASHINGTON. 97 The officers charged with the removal humed to "Washing- ton to obtain superior orders ; but their absence and the necessaiy delay only rendered the situation worse. When they returned with a ship-of-war and a regiment, they found that, through a repetition of treasonable advice, the ships had been scuttled and were sinking. It was decided that neither rescue nor defence was now possible ; and on the night of April 20th, the officers of the relieving exjoedition undertook to destroy the yard, propei-ty, and all the ships, except one, in a great conflagration, to prevent their falling into rebel hands — an attempt, however, which proved only partially successful. Whether or not the actual emergency justified this enormous sacrifice, will perhaps always remain an open question among military experts. It was as necessaiy for the Administration to confide to the officers this discretion, as similar discretion in any military enterprise. They seem to have acted in good faith and upon their best judgment, and their action was accepted, perhaps with regret, but with full acquittal of duty conscientiously discharged. It may well be imagined that the authorities and inhabi- tants of the national cajDital watched the development of re- bellion in the neighboring States of Virginia and Maryland with the keenest anxiety. Washington, in tradition, tone, and aspiration, was essentially a Southern city. Slavery ex- isted and the local slave-trade flourished here ; in latter times the maintenance of the institution in the District of Columbia formed a distinct i^lank in Democratic platforms. Southern aiTOgance and Southern ambition had long domi- nated official society. All the cant and all the sneers of the haut ton of the capital were vented against mercenary Yan- keedom, and the rastic and provincial West, which had won the late presidential election. The confusion and contro- versy of faction exhibited during the winter session of Con- 7 98 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. gress shook the faith of many a political veteran. The se- cession harangues of conspicuous fire-eaters were openly ap- plauded from the House and Senate galleries. As the social lights faded one by one from the Congressional corridors and the promenades of Lafayette Park and Pennsylvania Avenue, the social sympathies of Washington to a large ex- tent followed them into the ecli^jse of their "foreign" con- federacy. These too, notwithstanding their complaints and defiance, departed with an e\-ident reluctance and regi-et into a countiy without a capital, and whose social and ofti- cial circles were yet in embiyo. A few were so unguarded as to distribute confidential nods and winks that they ex- jjected soon to return ; while no doubt all nursed the long- ing hoi^e that at no distant day they might reclaim and re- enter the city as theii* projier and natiiral heritage. It was this almost univei"sal Soiithern feeling which foiuid expres- sion in the prediction of the rebel Secretaiy of War, that the rebel flag would float over the dome of the cai^itol before the fii-st of May. There was, therefore, great doubt about the disposition and loyalty of the resident poi^ulation ; and the startling succession of disasters to the Union cause created a pro- found impression. Virginia's secession on the 17th ; Har- per's Feny lost on the 18th ; Baltimore in arms, and the Norih effectuaUy cut off on the 19th ; the Gosport Navy Yard sacrificed on the 20th — where would the tide of misfor- tune stop? Wavering Unionists found no gi-eat difliculty in forecasting the final success of rebellion ; sanguine seces- sionists already in their ^•isions saw the stars ancL strijies banished to the north of Mason and Dixon's line. Whatever the doubt, there was no other present resource but to rely largely ujion the good faith and order of Wash- ington City. The whole matter had been under the almost WASHINGTON. 99 constant investigation of General Scott and his subordinates since Januaiy ; and officers of earnestness and good judg- ment assured liina tliat tlie local militia would stand by the Govemment and the flag. In that assurance fifteen compa- nies of volunteers had, since the 9th of April, been enlisted, equipped, and armed for the defence of the city. A few in- di\-iduals out of these companies refused, at the last moment, to take the oath of enlistment, and were i^ublicly disgraced ; Init the remainder went into the service cheerfully, and, so far as is known, sei-ved their term loyally and honorably. Cliiefly, however. General Scott relied on some six com- jianies of troops from the regular anny, which he had con- centrated from various parts of the country in scattering driblets, among them being two light batteries of exception- ally good discipline and drill. These, together with a small force of marines to guard the marine barracks, were stationed at the critical points in the city ; secret instmctions were issued to designated officers to hurry, in case of alarm, to the charge and command of various piiblic buildings sj^e- cially prepared to resist sudden ingress or capture, and stored with ammunition and provisions against tempoi-ary siege ; and pickets and patrols were sent out to watch all the leading roads and bridges. 1 To aid thes'te, there had arrived in the city two detach- ments of volunteers from other States ; the first, some three or four hundred Pennsylvanians, on the evening of April 18th, who were armed and equipped after their arrival ; the second, the compact and courageous Massachusetts Sixth Regiment, on the evening of April 19th, after having, as already de< tailed, fought its way through Baltimore. This regiment was at once quartered in the Senate Chamber at the Capitol, which, with its extemporized barricades, began to take on the frowning aspect of a fort. 100 TIIE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. From the officers and men of tins regiment the President and other authorities learned verbally the dangerous charac- ter and proportions of the Baltimore riot. This occurred on Friday. Saturday brought him not only many letters and telegrams setting forth the details and increasing signs of disaffection, but a committee from the Baltimore authorities, to verbally represent the iinrestrained turbulence of the city, and to urge that fui'ther bloodshed be avoided by stopping the transit of troops. General Scott, to whom the request ■was at once referred, desii-ing the speedy presence of volun- teers to defend Wasliington rather than to fight a battle in Baltimore, suggested that they might be mai'ched around, instead of being brought thi-ough, that city. To this sugges- tion President Lincoln readOy agreed, and the committee assented to the an-angement. On the following day, Sunday, however, local riot had risen to general insurrection in Maiy- land, and the authorities of Baltimore, called to Washington by the President, now put forth the request that no more troops be brought through Maiyland. Tliis demand the President and Cabinet summarily rejected. It was agreed, however, that, if no resistance were offered to their march, either aroiind Baltimore or by way of Annapolis, they would not be forced through the city, and with that assurance the committee departed. Pending this discussion rumors came that a j)ortion of the Pennsylvania forces were advancing on Baltimore by way of the route from Harrisbiirg, and the committee soon returned, reporting a fresh tuiinoil in Baltimore, and an arming en mn.tae to resist their passage. The movement was unknown to the Pi'csident ; and to disabuse the Baltimoreans of any possible imputation of bad faith, Lincoln ordered that the detachment complained of s]iould return to Han-isburg, and come round by way of Annapolis ; also, however, giN-ing tho WASHINGTON. 101 committee formal notice that he would not thereafter again interfere to change mere military details. This order was, at the time, the occasion of much outcry against the Presi- dent fi-om excited critics who totally misapprehended its scojie and spirit. It simj)ly changed a dangerous, perhaps impossible march, to one pi-acticable and comparatively se- cure ; ifc did not surrender a general right, but only yielded a non-essential point to gain a real military advantage for Washington. The burning of the raih-oad bridges east and north of Bal- timore had permanently interrupted communication before daylight, on the morning of Saturday, April 20th ; on Sun- day night, Apiil 21st, the insiuTectionary authorities in the same place took possession of the telegrajDh oflBces and wires, and AVashington went into the condition of an isolated and blockaded city. Both from the Virginia and the Mary- land side there came exaggerated rumors of gathering hos- tile forces, and preparations for a coup de main against the capital ; and, though not actually or visibly threatened, the city was in the very nature of things forced into the priva- tions and inconveniences of a siege. Military arrangements and militaiy regulations became everywhere the rule. The public buildings were hedged with barricades and guarded by sentinels. The little steamers on the Potomac, and the stores of flour and grain in the Georgeto'mi mills were seized by the Government. Squads of cavalry dashed through the streets. Business practically ceased; the life and bustle of the city was hushed. Mere sojourners, and even many residents, took alarm, and hurried away by pri- vate conveyance. The hotels, which had a week before been thronged to overflowing, became deserted, or were haunted by only a few mute and white-faced guests, who looked like ajJiDaritions in contrast with their recent gayety. 102 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. As tlie gloom increased there began to be talk of general inilitaiy impressment for the defence of the city. This had the effect of finally exposing the loyalty or disloyalty of many Washington officers, clerks, residents, and habitues who had maintained a dubious silence. On Monday, Apiil 22d, quite a stamj^ede took jjlace into Yu-ginia and the South; some hundreds of clerks from the various depart- ments of Government, and a considerable number of officers of the army and navy, hitherto unable to decide between their treasonable inclinations and the atti-actions of their salaiies, finally resigned, and cast their fortunes with the Kebellion. The routine work of the departments went on with its machine-like monotony ; the cabinet members called on the President and discussed chances and rumors ; General Scott conferred with his subordinates, and made daily confidential reports to Lincoln. The situation, however, revealed noth- ing certain or definite. From the windows of the Executive Mansion a rebel flag could be seen flying at Alexandiia. One mmor asserted that a hostile detachment was being as- sembled near Mount Vernon ; a second, that an attack on Fort "Washington was imminent ; a third, that an investing force was being brought doMTi from Hai-per's Feny. Per contra, there came the welcome infonnation that there were ships and voliinteers at Annapolis ; but it was clouded with the rumor that their landing would be disputed and their march obstructed by Baltimore roughs and Maiyland militia, A pioneer train reported the railroad safe to the Junction, but nothing could be learned of its contlition beyond ; while several messengers, despatched to reach Annapolis, had re- turned unsuccessful. What was transpiring in the outer world could only be suiTuised; whether danger liu-ked far or neai" was a mystery incapable of present solution. Never- WASHINGTON. 103 tlieless, tlie President and Cabinet were not only calm, biit liopefvil, under General Scott's assurance that, with liis pres- ent force, the city and all the public buildings were entirely safe against ten thousand troops not better than the District volunteers. In point of fact, after some diplomacy with the Governor and Mayor, the Massachusetts Eighth and New York Seventh had really landed at Annapolis on Monday afternoon, Aj^ril 22d ; and, after still further delay in sifting threatening im- mors, in a somewhat deliberate local reconnoissance, and in repairing a disabled locomotive, the two regiments started on their march toward Washington, on Wednesday, the 24th. A year or two later this would have been considered tardy movement under the requirements of urgent danger; but, considering the surprise, the anxiety, the suspicions and un- certainties, and the want of preparation amid which they acted, there is much to excuse their caution and delay. They had few rations and no transportation. Full of high, patriotic zeal, they were new to the trials and privations of an actual campaign, even of so mild a type. Once started, however, they pushed ahead with pluck and perseverance, and by daylight next morning reached Annapolis Junction — a distance of some twenty miles — without opposition, ha\dng repaired the railroad track as they advanced. At the Junc- tion they found a raih'oad train in waiting, which, two hotu-s later, landed the famous " Seventh " at the capital. Then came their hour of i^eaceful triumph, in which they forgot their hunger and thirst, their bridge-building in the broiling sun, and their foot-sore scouting through the tedious mid- night hours. Debarking from the cars amid the welcome- shouts of an assembled throng, and forming with all the ready precision of their holiday drill, they marched with ex- ultant music and gayly fluttering banners up Pennsylvania lai THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. Avenue to the Executive Mansion, to receive the President's thankful salute. "With theii* arrival, about noon of the 25th of Ai)ril, all the gloom, and doubt, and feeling of danger to tho capital, vanished. In compai-ison with the unmurmuring endurance that t nidged through the Yazoo swamp.s, and tho unflinching courage that faced the dreadful carnage of the Wilderness, later in the war, this march of the "Seventh" was the merest regimental i)icnic ; but it has become historic because it mai'ked a turning-point in the national destiny, and signified the will of the i>eople that the cai)ital of the Union should remain where George Washington planted it. CHAPTEE IX. ELLSWORTH. It has akeady been related in a previous chapter how the incidents immediately following the fall of Sumter and the President's Proclamation — the secession of Virginia and the adhesion of other Border States — had doubled the strength and augmented the war preparations of the Eebel- lion. Upon the Government and the people of the North the experience of those eventful days was even more deci- sive. Whatever hope President Lincoln and his Cabinet may have entertained at the beginning, that secession could be controlled by the suppression of sporadic insurrections and the reawakening of the slumbering or intimidated loyalty of the South, necessarily faded out before the loss of Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Ai-lsansas, and the dangerous uprising in Maiyland. Not alone promj)t measures to save the capital of the nation were imperatively dictated by the sudden blockade and isolation of Washington, but wide- sj)read civil war, Avaged by a gigantic army and nav}% must become the inevitable price of maintaining the Union. For this work the seventy-five thousand three-months militia were clearly inadequate. It marks President Lincoln's accurate diagnosis of the public danger, and his jirompt courage and action to avert it, that, as early as April 26th, ten days after the fii'st jsroclamation, the formation of a new 106 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION. army had already been resolved upon ; and the "War Depart- ment began giving official notice that volunteers in excess of the first call could only be received for three yeai-s or during the war, the details of the new organizations, to consist of 42,034 volunteers, 22,714 regulars, and 18,000 seamen, being publicly announced on May 3d. No express jirovision of law existed for these measures, but Lincoln ordered them with- out hesitation, because the exigency did not admit of even the short delay of awaiting the assemblage of Congi-ess. He was too tiTie a tyi^e and representative of the peojDle to doubt one instant their sure support and apjiroval of a step which the Constitution covered with its pammount authority, and its impei-ative personal mandate to the President of the United States to " j^reserve, protect, and defend the Consti- tution of the United States." Following the march of the Seventh Kegiment, the An- najiolis route remained i)ei*manently open to the Union troojjs from the North. Day by day vessels anived in An- napolis Harbor with volunteer regiments, with j^rovisions and supplies for their maintenance, with war material for their equipment. These were transfeiTed rapidly over the repaired railroad to Wasliington City, and it was not long before the National Cajntal resembled a gi-eat militaiy camp. Troops found temporaiy lodgment in the various public buildings ; citizen recniits wrote lettei-s home on the sen- ators' desks, spouted buncombe for j^astime from the mem- bers' seats in the House of Bepresentatives, spread their lilankets for bivouac in the ample coiTidoi's of the Patent Office ; clusters of tents filled the public squares ; regimental tactics, practice in platoon-firing and artilleiy-drill went on in the sun-ouuding fields ; inspection and dress parade be- came fashionable entertainments ; military bands furnished unceasing open-air concerts ; the city bloomed with national ELLSWORTH. 107 flags. Tlae presence of an army brought an influx of ci^^l- ians that at once perceptibly augmented the floating popula- tion; and this Yankee invasion of a sleepy Southern city gave Washington a baptism of Northern life, activity, busi- ness, trade, and enterprise, which, for the first time after haK a century of sickly pining, made the metrojjolitan dreams of its founder a substantial hope and possibility. Under the vast enlargement of militaiy oi^erations to which the defence and maintenance of the Government was now driven by inexorable events, the utility and employment of the three-months vohmteers became necessarily limited and confined to a few local objects. The mature exijerience and judgment of General Scott decided that it would be useless, considering their very short term of sei'v'ice, to undertake with their help more than the ganisoning of Fort Monroe, the j^rotection of the Potomac, the defence of Wash- ington City, the restoi-ation of the militaiy routes through Baltimore to the North and West, the political control of Man-land, and possibly the recaptui'e of Haii^er's Ferry — a progTamme forming practically one combined measure — the defence of the militaiy frontier or line of the Potomac, fi'om the sea to the mountains. Larger projects must be post- poned for preparation ; ships must be improvised or built to enforce the blockade ; a new army must be gathered to oj)en the Mississi^jpi and restore authority in the South. The rebels, though now seriously checked, were yet indus- triously working theii* local consjiii-acy in Maryland to secure the final com^jlete insun-ection and adhesion of that State. The Legislature, apparently under their control, had met at Frederick, and was devising legislation under which to set up a militaiy dictatorshii). But the Administration at Wash- ington allowed them no time to gather strength at home, or draw any considerable supplies or help from Vii'ginia. The 108 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. President authorized General Scott to suspend tlie privilege of the writ of habeas corj^us within certain limits, and em- powered hini to aiTcst or disperse the Legislature in case they attempted treason. Annapolis was ganisoned and lightly fortified ; a militaiy guard was pushed along the rail- roads toward Baltimore simultaneously from the South and the North ; and, on May 13th, General Butler, by a bold, though entii'ely unauthorized movement, entered the city in the dusk of evening, while a convenient thunder-storm was raging, with less than a thousand men, pai-t of whom were the now famous Massachusetts Sixth, and during the night entrenched himself on Federal Hill. General Scott rojiri- mauded the "hazardous" movement ; nevertheless, the little garrison met no further molestation or attack, and soon, supported by other detachments, open resistance to the Govenmient disappeared from the entii'e State. Indepen- dent regiments of Maiyland volunteers entered the Federal service ; a sweeping political reaction also set in, demonstrat- ing that the Union sentiment was largely predominant ; be- tween which and the presence of Union troops the legisla- tive intrigue was blighted, and the persistent secession minority and almost iiTepressible local conspiracy were ef- fectually baffled, though not without constant -s-igilance and severe discipline throughout the remainder of the year. While the Government was thus mainly occupied in re- storing its authority in Maryland, the rebels were busy in militaiy organization in various parts of Virginia. Among the resignations from the Federal army were two officers of especial prominence — Joseph E. Johnston, Quartermaster- General, of the rank of Brigadier-General, and Kobert E. Lee, lately promoted to bo Colonel of the Fii-st Cavaliy. Lee was an oflScer of great promise, and a personal favorite of General Scott, who at once conceived the idea of putting ELLSWORTH. 109 Lim at the head of the Union army about to take the field ; and, on Saturday, April 20th, an infoimal and unofficial ten- der of this honor appears to have been made to him by Francis P. Blair, senior, as coming from Pi'esident Lincoln. In a letter written subsequent to the war, Lee says that he declined tliis offer. That same evening he wi'ote a resigna- tion from Ai-lington, and on Monday hurried off to Rich- mond, where he was appointed by Governor Letcher, and, on April 23d, publicly installed to command the military forces of Virginia. Lee did not share the radical clamor of many of the Rich- mond conspirators for an immediate advance to capture Washington. He discouraged mere reckless enthusiasm, and urged a defensive policy and methodical and thorough military preparation. CaiTying out this policy in his orders, directions were issued, and officers sent to different localities to call out and organize the State militia, to diill recruits, and collect materials and stores. Under his management companies and regiments soon sprang up, and Virginia, like the other Southern States, gi'adually became a general camp. It was not a gi-eat while before the jiresence of a military force at the principal points along the Potomac became evi- dent. Its concentration and offensive action either to close the river to navigation, or, when sufficiently strong, against "Washington, was, of coiu-se, only a question of time. The contact of hostile armies unavoidably provokes conflict. These changing conditions of Virginia required new jn'e- cautions for the defence of Washington. As early as May . 3d it was ascertained by the local officers and engineers that the Cai)itol building was only three and a half miles from Arlington Heights on the Virginia side of the liver, the Execiitive Mansion and various department buildings but two and a half, and Georgetown within one mile. The en- no THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. emy ah-eady had a detacliment quartered at Alexandria ; re- inforcements from the South might, in a single night, oceuiiy the heights and destroy the Virginia end of the bridges, and, speedily erecting mortar batteries, could destroy the city with bombs, unless they ■were attacked at a disad\-antttge and dislodged. It was, therefore, decided that the Union forces must occupy Ai-lington Heights to insure the safety of the city, though the necessaiy troops could not as yet be spared from the operations to secure Maiyland; and by reason of various delays, three weeks more passed away before the full preparations for the entei-prise were eom- l)leted. Finally, at two o'clock on the morning of May 24th, three columns crossed the Potomac and entered on the " sacred soil " of the Old Dominion : three regiments by the Aque- duct at Georgetown, four regiments by the Long Bridge from Washington, and one regiment, Ellsworth's Zouaves, from their camp below the city directly by steamer to Alexandria, the war steamer Pawnee being anchored off shore to protect the landing. The movement met no oppo- sition ; no considerable rebel force was stationed at the bridges, and the detachment at Alexandria, excepting a small troop of cavaliy, which was captured, evacuated that place on recei\'ing a notice, sent without authority by the com- mander of the Pawnee, to surrender or retire. It had been a beautiful moonlight night ; all the regi- ments were filled with an eager enthusiasm for the march ; the preparations were careful, the officers to supervise it intelligent and competent, the movements promi>tly begun and successfully completed. The whole entei-i)rise seemed on the very point of conclusion without an accident, when sudden news of the assassination of Colonel Ellsworth not only saddened the camjis on both sides of the Potomac, but ELLSWORTH. Ill east a new gloom, and spread a feeling of bitter ^•indictive- ness throughout every loyal State. Colonel Ellsworth was a young man of twenty -four, who, by the possession of a phenomenal combination of genius, energy, and self-confidence, had won the attention and ad- miration of the whole country. But a few years ago, foiled by misfortune in an attempt to begin professional Hfe in Chicago, he had suddenly found himself without money or friends — almost without bread. By the endurance of ex- treme privations, the pittance which he managed to earn with some temi^orai-y writing kept ofi" stai-vation. His ener- getic natui-e made active occuijation a necessity ; and per- hai^s as much to consume the evening hours, as with any other fixed iiurjjose, he became interested in studying and teaching others the manual of military drill. This led to the fonnation of a little volunteer company of about sixty Chi- cago youths — clerks and business emj)loyees — under his com- mand. Into their instruction he threw such a degree of enthusiasm, such originality in remodelling and adajDtiug old methods, such a grasji of purpose, and such a genius of con- trol, that, after about a year's training, he not only carried ofif the i^rizes for drill at the fairs and exhibitions in the neighboring counties, but confidently formed the bold jn-o- ject of showing to the public of the great cities that he had the best-di'illed company in America. They had no money, no commissariat, no transportation, but a friendly railroad gave them free tickets from Chicago to Detroit ; from there the proceeds of an exhibition diill carried them to the next city, and so on. At every step of their progi-ess, their actual dexterity in the maniial of anns can-ied admii-ation and applause by storm. AiTived at New York, they achieved a double triumph ; first before the uni- formed city militia in the open field, and afterward at night 112 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELUON. on the stage of the Academy of Music, before as fasliionablo an andience as ever iDackecI the walls or sjilit their kid gloves to encore the most famous jjrima donna. For three days the metropolitan newspapers were full of descriptions of their perfoimance and their personal appearance and history — above all, of their youthful commander, Ellsworth, the visible creator, embodiment, and inspii'ation of their admii'able accomplishment. Determined to leave no test imchallenged, they went even to show their proficiency to the military school at West Point, where the only criticism that could be passed iipon them was that they did not follow the " regu- lar " drill of the text-books. TMien they finally returned to Chicago, after a full tour, in which they had reaped uninter- nipted encouragement and acclaim, the name and fame of Ellsworth and his " Chicago Zouaves " were a part of the just interest and pi-ide of the whole country. Nevertheless, no one appreciated better than Ellsworth himself that this was but a possible beginning of better things. He had no ambition to remain either a mere drill- master or a raree showman, though his necessities had com- pelled him to make a somewhat spectacular beginning. There is not room here to trace his higher purposes and ideals of a general militia reform ; it is sufficient to say that for the bi-ain of a boy of twenty-four they were serious and comprehensive. There was then no thought of war ; and when Lincoln l)ecame President, Ellsworth sought his favor and was readily permitted to accompany him to Washington as one of his suite. The inauguration over, the President made him a second lieutenant of dragoons. Then came Huniter and the call for volunteers, and Ellsworth saw his opportunity. Hastening to the city of New York, he called together and harangued the fire companies of the metropo- lis ; in three days he had twenty-two hundred names in- ELLSWORTH. 113 scribed on liis recruiting lists ; ont of these he carefully selected a regiment of eleven hundred men, who chose him their colonel, and, bearing half a dozen beautiful presenta- tion flags, one of them publicly donated by Mrs. Astor, followed him to Washington, where they were mustered into the service among the earliest three years volunteers. It was at the head of this regiment that Colonel Ellsworth entered Alexandria at daylight of May 24th. The rebels received notice of his coming, and most of them retired with sufficient promptness to escape capture. Having seen the town securely occuioied and pickets posted to prevent sur- prise, Colonel Ellsworth remembered the rebel flag which had been for weeks flaunting an insulting defiance to the national capital. It was hoisted over the Marshall House, the principal hotel of Alexandria, and the Colonel was seized with the whim to take it down with his own hands — a foolish fancy, perhaps, when considered in cool judgment, bu.t one very natural to the heated enthusiasm of those early days of burning patriotic ardor. " Whose flag is that flying over this house?" demanded he, as he entered and ascended the stairs. " I don't Icnow," Avas the only response he could ob- tain ; but the demon of a hellish purpose lurked under the answer. He mounted to the roof with one or two compan- ions, cut the halyards, and started down with the treasonable emblem on his arm. The stairs were narrow and winding — they could descend only in single file — a soldier preceded and followed him. As he reached the third step above the landing on the second floor, a side door flew open, and the owner of the house, a man named Jackson, who had been lurking there in concealment like a tiger for his prey, sijrang out, and levelling a double-baiTelled shotgun, discharged ij full in the Colonel's breast — the fatal charge driving almost into his very heart a gold presentation badge inscribed "Non 114 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. nobis sed pro patria." Ellsworth fell forward in death with- out even a groan ; but the murder tlid not go unavenged, for in that same instant his assa-ssin also expu-ed by the double effect of a musket-charge and a bayonet-thrust from Ells- worth's foremost comimnion. If there remained a jjossibility of a sensational cUmas of deeper imjjort than Sumter and Baltimore, it was furnished by this hideous tragedy at Alexambia. The North had sup- posed that the first exhausted the cold-blooded recklessness of conspiracy. The second manifested the sudden fury of sectional excitement. But this last opened an unlooked-for depth of indiWdual hatred, into which the i)obtical animosi- ties of years between the North and South had finally ripened after four months of unintemii)ted manipulation by the consiiLracy. Under tliis unwelcome revelation there was no longer room to doubt the existence of widely pervading elements of an enduring civil war. Ellsworth was buried with imposing honors, from the famous East Room of the Executive Mansion, the President, Cabinet, and high officers of Government attending as mourners ; and as the telegraph filled the newspapers with details of the sad event, every household in the North felt as if the dark shadow of a funeral had lowered over its own hearthstone. CHAPTEE X. MISSOURI. CoxspiKACX bad been ■working witli untii'ing persistence in every Slave State since, and even before, the formal seces- sion of the Cotton States in January, and had cveiywhere made considerable advances, notably in the State of Mis- souri. Governor Jackson, of that State, had leagued himself with the secession plot, though still concealing his pui-jDose with outwai-d jirofessions of loyalty. Many subordinate of- ficers and members of the Legislature were secretly aiding him. Together they were leading jMissouri through the usual and well-established jiaths to ultimate treason, by means of official recommendations from the Governor and various shrewdly devised laws jiassed by the Legislature. They made a serious miscalculation, however, in the stereo- tyi)ed and hitherto always successfiil expedient of a State Convention. When that body was elected and met (Febra- aiy 28th), it showed such an overwhelming majority of Union members, that the jjlotters of treason were quite willing to hide their defeat in joining certain jiointed declarations by the convention against secession, and adjourning its sittings to the following December, tnisting their chances to a more pliant and treasonable legislatiire ; hoijing to bring about a policy of arming the State under jn-etence of local de- fence, and committing it to a neutral attitude under j^lea of nc, THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. local security. In all their efforts, however, they met the constant and cletermined watchfulness and opposition of zealous and fearless Unionists, among whom Frank P. Blair, junior, was a consj^icuous leader. It so happened, also, that in this State a small detachment of the regular army was, for the first time, rendered useful in thwarting the local development of di.sunion. At tho city of St. Louis was an arsenal belonging to the United States, containing a considerable quantity of aims and am- munition. To obtain these was from the beginning, as in other States, a prime object of Governor Jackson and his co-conspirators. They had in Januaiy, as they believed, perfected an intrigue for the surrender of the arsenal, by the officer in charge, into their hands and control. That aiTangement was soon blighted by the amval of reinforce- ments ordered there by General Scott to i^rotect the place, under command of an officer afterward famous — Captain Nathaniel Lyon, of the Second United States Infantry. Lyon was a man of outspoken anti-slavery principles, of unswerving loyalty to his flag, and of unsleeping vigilance over his post and the Government interests. By the middle of February enough recruits had been added by General Scott to his own comimny of eighty ti-ained regulars to raise his force to four hundred and eighty -eight men. Holding the same political convictions and patriotic im- pulses, Lyon and Blair became quickly united in an inti- mate personal friendship ; and very soon, also, Lyon's regu- lars and Blair's " Home Guards " sustained each other in a mutual reliance and protection. Their common watchful- ness over the arsenal was by no means wasted. Governor Jackson was detennined to establish by force wliat he had failed to accomplish by intrigue. He sent two tnisty agents to the Rebel President to solicit help in arms and ammuni- MISSOURI. 117 tion. "After learning," wrote Jefferson Davis, in reply, April 23cl, " as well as I could from the gentlemen accred- ited to me, wliat was most needful for the attack on the ar- senal, I have directed that Captains Green and Duke should be furnished with two twelve-pounder howitzei's and two thirty-two-pounder guns, with the proper ammunition for each. These, from the commanding hills, will be effective, both against the ganison, and to breach the enclosing walls of the place." Encouraged by this co-operation, the Governor, as his next step, instructed one of his militia generals, D. M. Frost, a West Point graduate, to assemble the available or- ganized and equipped volunteer companies of the State in a camp of instruction at St. Louis. The Governor had also convened his Rebel Legislature to meet in extra session on May 2d. The day following, May 3d, began the assembling of the militia in " Camj) Jackson," so named in honor of the Governor. Two regiments and j^art of a third soon amved ; and though some of the companies were either without po- litical bias, or of Union sentiment, a general spirit of seces- sion pervaded the camp, and its avenues were christened "Davis" and "Beauregard." The object of the organiza- tion soon became unmistakably linown to Lyon, Blair, and the Union Safety Committee, who, by the aid of skilful de- tectives, gained information of all its movements. On the night of May 8th, the cannon, ammunition, and some mus- kets furnished by Jefferson Da\'is, were landed from a Now Orleans steamer, in boxes marked "marble," and immedi- ately loaded upon di'ays and hauled out to the camp. Under this threatening disclosure, the Unionists felt they could no longer daily with the conspiracy. Ah-eady three weeks before, the United States Arsenal at Liberty, Mo., had been robbed of its arms by the disunionists, and Jeff. 118 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. Thompson was known to be actively drilling rebel com- panies at St. Joseph. They could not aflford to allow a con- centration of these and other treasonable forces. In the meanwhile the Washington authorities, receiWng Govomcr Jackson's insulting refusal to furnish troops, had ordered the enlistment of Blair's " Home Guards " into the United States service, to the number of four regiments, which order was soon increased to ten thousand men. With this force Lyon felt himself strong enough to crush the budding insurrection. On the morning of May 9th he disguised himself in female garb, and, seating himself be- side a friend in a barouche, was driven out into Camp Jack- son, personally and leisurely inspecting its strength, situa- tion, and militaiy aiiproaches. The next day the arsenal and the various volunteer anuories were alive with military preparation, and, at two o'clock in the afternoon, Lyon, at the head of his battalion of regulars, with six pieces of ar- tilleiy and six regiments from the lately organized Missouii Volunteers and Reserve Coii^s (as they were respectively called), marched rapidly through various streets of St. Louis, in two columns, concentrating at Camp Jackson. Before General Frost was well aware of the coming event, these regiments had surrounded his camj) and posted the batteries on commanding elevations. The camp thus invested, with batteries and arms ready for instant action, Lyon sent Frost a note, stating that his command was regarded as hostile to the United States, and demanding an immediate surrender, "with no other conditions than that all persons surrendering under tliis demand shall be humanely and kindly treated," and allowing half an hour's time for compliance. The cir- cumstances left Frost no alternative, and before the expira- tion of the half-hour he gave notice of his unconditional surrender. MISSOURI. 119 So far eveiytliing had gone as harmlessly as if the affair ■wei'e Bierelj a gala parade ; biit now a most deplorable oe- cuiTence succeeded. The march, the halt, and the capture greatly excited a vast crowd which the occasion di*ew to- gether; and scarcely had the homeward march with the prisoners begun, when the troojjs were assailed by secession rowdies with abusive language, stones, missiles, and finally a pistol shot or two. This last provoked a return volley with- out orders from one or two companies, by which, and the desultoiT shots succeeding, fifteen to twenty innocent by- standers and several soldiers were instantly killed. The untoward incident caused a dangerous fennent in the city, but the courageous efforts of the police prevented a general riot. The telegi'aphic news of the capture of Camg Jackson threw the Governor's revolutionaiy cabal and disloyal legis- lature sitting at Jefferson City into the utmost consternation. The Governor immediately sent out and caused a bridge on the i-ailroad from St. Louis to be bumed, to prevent any sudden descent by Lyon upon the capital ; and during the afternoon and night, the Legislature in secret session rushed through several acts specially designed to j)romote rebellion, which they had before been concocting with more circum- spection. A few days later, a militaiy bill, viriually making the Governor an iiTesponsible military dictator, was formally passed ; and having thus, as the conspirators thought, made all necessai-y legal preparations, the session was finally ad- journed on May 15th. General Harney, the ranking officer in the Department of the West, who had been temporarily called away, returned to St. Louis the day after the Camp Jackson affair, thus super- seding Lyon in command. It must be explained that events, and particularly antecedent conditions, had most unfortu- 120 THE OUTBRE^VK OF REBELLION. nately divided the Missouri Unionists into two bitterly an- tagonistic factions, which, indeed, continued throughout the whole four years' war. The Radicals, embracing the largo Gei-man jiopulation of St. Louis, and who foi-med the bulk of the Home Guard, were mainly of democi-atic antecedents, and strong anti-slaveiy sentiment ; these followed the leader- shij) of Blair and Lyon. The Conservatives, more generally of American natiWty, belonging rather to the wealthy and the business classes of the city, largely of Whig antecedents and strongly tinged with the " Know-Nothing " prejudices of former years, and holding veiy tolerant if not actually favorable sentiments toward slaverv*, grouped themselves about General Harney. The Radicals believed in defending the Government with steel and lead ; the Conservatives trusted tc> reclaim their'ening brethren with forbearance and moral suasion. Cold after-criticism finds both factions chargeable with extremes of feeling and speech ; but if the former were prone to excessive zeal, the latter were yet more culpable in a stupid over-caution. Such deep local antago- nisms, however, of nationality, class, and life-long political iwejudice, can hardly be expected to act with moderation in the blinding atmosphere of revolution. Harney was a loyal and courageous soldier, but lacked the quick, instinctive judgment of the statesman. Beset by noisy clamor on both sides, he vibrated to acts of conflicting rather than consistent administration. His first impulse was to order the disbandment of the Home Guards. Convinced that this was beyond his power, he soon after (May 1-tth) issued his proclamation justifying the capture of Camp Jackson, denouncing the Military Bill as an indirect seces- sion ordinance, and declaring that " Missouri must share the destiny of the Union." He also announced bis determina- tion to uphold the Government of the United States " at all MISSOURL 121 times and tmder all circtunstances ; " but his measures to carry out this loyal policy were not chosen with wisdom. Governor Jackson had at once proceeded to organize the militia of Missouri under his dictatorial military bill ; and Frost's military laurels having withered at Camp Jackson, the Governor made ex-Governor Sterling Price his general- in-chief. Price was less scrupulous in political strategy than Harney, and within a week he had enti*apped the un- wary Union commander into an agreement which tied up the Government forces in a role of mere idle lookers-on, while Governor Jackson's Missouri militia should without hinderance i3lace the State in active insurrection. " General Price," so ran the agreement, signed on May 21st, " having by commission full authority over the militia of the State of Missouri, undertakes, with the sanction of the Governor of the State, already declared, to direct the whole power of the State officers to maintain order within the State among the people thereof; and General Harney publicly declares that, this object being thus assured, he can have no occasion, as he has no wish, to make military movements which might otherwise create excitements and jealousies, which he most earnestly desires to avoid." This was to be done *' in subordination to the laws of the General and State Governments ; " but it gave the conspira- tors the right of initiative, and left them for a season the un- controlled, and even unobserved masters of the whole State .outside of St. Louis. Governor Jackson and General Price made such prompt use of their time, that before the end of the month reports of outrageous indignities upon Union men came from all parts of the State, and finally the threat- ening rumor that a rebel invasion from the Arkansas border was being encouraged and rapidly formed; and as fast as Harney broxight the facts to the notice of Price, that dis- 122 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION. Bembling conspirator waved them aside with an iinvaning, deliberate, and mendacious denial. This state of affairs was terminated on May 30th. ]Mis- Bouri matters had been watched with intense and daily solici- tude at "Washington. Each of the Union factions of that State had a siDokesman in the Cabinet, Postmaster-General Blaii" favoring Lyon and his friends, Attorney-General Bates those of Harney ; and the President therefore heard the complaints and justifications of both sides. Acting thus on full information, Lincoln, on May 18th, entrusted Fi*ank P. Blair, junior, with a confidential discretionaiy order to relieve Harney whenever he might deem it necessary. On May 30th, amid the thickening jjerils from the conspiracy, Blair felt himself justified in acting upon this discretion ; Harney was relieved, and Lyon once more placed in com- mand under a newly issued commission as brigadier-general of volunteers, a jjosition to which the first four Missouri regiments had unanimously chosen him. With Lyon once more in jiower, the conspirators felt that the crisis of theu* intrigues liad come. Governor Jackson and General Price therefore solicited an intenaew with the new commander, which being gi-anted, and a safeguard be- ing furnished them, they visited St. Louis on June 11th, and were met by Lyon and Blair, in a conference of several hours' duration. As might have been expected, their A-iews and objects were utterly at variance. The Governor proposed to neutralize Missouri by excluding United States troops and disbanding the Home Guards ; Lyon, on the contraiy, insist- ed that the Governor should disband his Missovui militia, and give the Government forces full liberty of movement and con- trol throughout the State. Sejiarating ujion these irrecon- cilable propositions, Governor Jackson and General Pi-ice hastened back to Jefferson City that same night, burning the MISSOURI. 123 railroad bridges beliind them to prevent j^ursiiit ; and on tlie following day, June 12th, the Governor issued a revolution- ary proclamation, calling fifty thousand militia into active service to "repel invasion." Lyon evidently expected little else from the rebellious Governor, for he seems to have been ready with plans and preparations to act against the open insurrection that func- tionaiy so defiantly proclaimed. The Missouri Eiver fur- nished a convenient military highway to the capital of the State ; and by the afternoon of June 13th, Lyon had an ex- pedition of three swift river steamers, containing a company of his regulars and several battalions of volunteers, in mo- tion. They anived before Jefferson City on the 15th of June, landed without opi)osition, occupied the town, and once more raised the Union flag over the State House. Governor Jackson and his Secretaiy of State precipitately fled, caiTying with them only the gi-eat seal of the State, to use in certifying their future publications under the pre- tended aiithority of Missouri. Learning at Jefferson City that the Governor and General Price were gathering a force and preparing to make a stand at Boonville, a town fifty miles faiiher uj) the Missouri River, Lyon, on June 16th, the day following his anival, leav'ing but a small guard at the capital, again hurriedly embarked his men, numbering about two thousand, and pushed energetically ahead, detennined to leave the enemy no time to recruit an army. The steamers passed over the intervening distance during the night, and early next morn- ing (June 17th) Lyon made an unopposed landing four miles below Boomdlle. The Governor's rallying call had indeed already been responded to by several thousand Missoimans, being, however, almost totally without organization, and veiy poorly armed. Half-way from his landing-place to the 124 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. town Lvon found a rebel line strongly jjostod ; a r.pinted fusillade quickly ensued, and for about twenty minutes the Union advance, composed of perhaps five hundred men, was held iu check. The enemy could, however, not long with- stand the fire of a regular batterj' which was brought up, and which, with the well-delivered volleys of the better- drilled Union volunteers, soon routed them in a general panic and flight. General Price early retired from Boon- ■ville on jilea of illness ; while Governor Jackson, who viewed the battle from a convenient hill some two miles off, seeing the disastrous result, once more betook himself to flight. Two on the Union, and fifteen on the rebel side, were re- ported killed, with the usual corresponding number of wounded. Twenty prisoners, two six-pounder guns, two se- cession flags, and the various suiii)lies of the rebel camp, furnished the Union force substantial trophies of victory. JIo\-ing cautiously foi-ward, Lyon occupied the town of Boon- ville, and issued a quieting jn-oclamation to its terror-stricken inhabitants, while the immature and boyish prisoners he had cai^tured were released on parole. This battle of Boonville ends the administration of Governor Jackson — he had long before forfeited his honor and authority by covei-t treason ; from henceforth his role is not only that of an oi>en traitor, but also of a mere fugitive pretender. The insurrection and flight of the Stat« officers left Mis- souii without local government. It happened, fortunately, that the State Convention, when in March it took a recess to the following DecemV>er, empowered a select committee to call it together at any time upon a pressing emergency. The emergency having thus come, the committee issued its call ; and the convention, minus some of its disloyal mem- bers, but yet baring a full constitutional (piorum, met onco more in Jeflei-sou City, on the 2l2d of July. It proceeded by MISSOURI 125 ordinance to declare the State offices vacant, to abrogate tlie Militaiy Bill and other treasonable legislation, and provide for new elections ; and finallv, on the 31st of July, it elected and inaugurated a pro%-isional government, whicli thereafter made the city of St. Louis its official headquarters. Hamil- ton E. Gamble, a Conseivative, was made Governor ; he an- nounced his unconditional adherence to the Union, and his authority was duly recognized by all those i:»oi'tions of the State which were not under militaiy control of the rebels during the fluctuating fortunes of the local guerilla warfare by which Missouri was so long tonuented and desolated. CHAPTER XL KENTUCKY. The Allegliany or Api>alacliian mountain cliain, a linndred miles broad and a tliousand miles long, extending from New York to Alabama, naturally sepai-ated the countiy into two 2)rincipal militaiy di\'isions : that of the East, comprising the Atlantic Coast and the Atlantic States ; that of the West, comprising the Mississippi River and its tributaries, and the "whole immense ten-itoiy of the Mississippi Valley. In the East, the line of hostility quickly established itself along the Potomac E-iyer, with "Washington as its strategical cen- tre ; this grew partly out of the jiaramount necessity of de- fending the capital, but also largely from the fact that the line from the sea to the mountains was not more than a hun- dred miles long, and could therefore be occupied and ob- .seiTed without delay. In the "West the distance from the mountains to the Mississippi River was nearly ten times as great. This alone would have retarded the definition of the militaiy frontier ; but the chief element of uncertainty and delay was furnished by the peculiar jiolitical contlition of the State of Kentucky, which of itself extends the whole distance from Virginia to Missoiui. It cannot i)erhai)s be afflnned with certainty that Governor Magoffin of Kentucky was a secession conspirator ; but his own language leaves no doubt that in opinion and expecta- KENTUCKY. 127 tion lio was a disimionist. He had remonstrated against tlie rash and separate movements of Sotith Carolina and the Cotton States ; but since their movement was made, he looked upon it as final and irrevocable, and committed him- self unqualifiedly against coercing them back to obedience. More than this, he argued that Kentucky was no longer safe in the Union, and declared she "will not and ought not to submit to the principles and policy avowed by the Republican party, but Tvill resist, and resist to the death, if necessary." In this view, he recommended to the Legislature, which met in January under his call, the project of a "Sover- eignty " State Convention, aiipropriations to purchase arms, and the immediate and active organization of the militia. None of these suggestions were, however, adopted by the Legislature, which contented itself for the present by pro- testing against coercion as unwise and inexpedient, and rec- ommending a call for a national convention. "While Ken- tucky sentiment was deeply pro-slaveiy, and business and commerce bound her strongly to the South, the patriotic example and teachings of Heniy Chiy had impressed upon her people a love and reverence for the Union higher and purer than any mere passing interest or selfish advantage. Nevertheless, as rebellion progressed, the State became seriously agitated and divided. When Sumter fell and the President issued his call for troops. Governor Magofiin in- sultingly refused comxiliance. This action in turn greatly excited the people of the three Border Free States of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, who thus beheld a not remote pros- pect of ha\'ing civil war brought to their own doors. They therefore looked immediately to the protection and control of the Ohio River. Their enthusiastic response to the Presi- dent's call had filled their capitals with volunteers, which 128 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION. were being armed and equipped by the Government. Ohio hurried oflf her earliest levies to Cincinnati ; those of Indi- ana were sent to her several exposed river towns. At the extreme southern point of Illinois was the city of Cairo, small in poinilation and commerce, but in a military point of view the commanding centre and key of the whole west- em river system. Its value was comprehended both east and west. No sooner had the Border Slave State Governors foi-wardod their disloyal refusals, than Secretary Cameron (April 19th), by telegraph requested the Governor of Illinois to send a brigade of four regiments to occupy it. There was not yet that total of militia in the Avhole State ; but within forty-eight hours an improvised expedition, nimiber- ing five hundred and ninety-five men and foiu- six-pounders, started from Chicago to caiTy out the Secretaiy's ordei-s, arriving at Cairo on the morning of Apiil 23d, where they were speedily reinforced to the required numbers. Under the Sumter bombardment, the President's call, and Magofiin's refusal, Kentucky was, for the moment, simply in a hopeless bewilderment, irresolution, and conflict of opinion. A strong minority, arrogating to itself much more than its numerical importance through noise and self-asser- tion, labored with zeal and energy for secession, but could make no substantial progress against the overv\"helming un- dercurrent of Union sentiment ; and these opposing factions, with the ultimate hope of influencing and gaining the waver- ing or undecided, joined somewhat unavoidably in an en- deavor to commit the State to an attitude of strict neutrality. Governor Magoffin and his personal adherents were ready to lend their official influence to cany the State into rebel- lion. The Governor sent an agent to the Governors of Arkansas and Louisiana to solicit arms ; and by way of justifying the act, he made a similar application to the KENTUCKY. 129 Governors of Indiana and of Missouri. No substantial suc- cess, however, attended these efforts ; and the Governor's application to the banks for money also resulted, in the main, in a discouraging refusal, largely due to the domi- nating Union sentiment, which suspected him of treasonable designs. A second endeavor to influence the Legislature remained equally barren. That body, which had only ad- journed on the 5th of April, was by proclamation once more called to meet in a second special session, beginning May 2d. The Governor's message, reciting the stai-tling events which had occun-ed, stigmatized the President's defence of the Government as " extraordinaiy usuii^ations," the enthusi- astic patriotism of the loyal States as "the frenzy of fanati- cism," and asserted with dogmatic stubbornness that " the late American Union is dissolved ; " recommending, as be- fore, a State convention, militaiy apiDroi^riations, and organ- ization of the militia. He also sent a messenger to ask the Governors of Ohio and Indiana to join him " in an effort to bring about a tmce between the General Government and the seceded States;" to which Governor Moiion woi-thily responded, "I do not recognize the right of any State to act as mediator between the Federal Government and a re- bellious State." The Unionists had a controlling majoxity in the Legisla- ture, and, considering the deep agitation and serious di\i- sions in Kentucky, used their power with gi-eat moderation and tact, doing as much both to aid the Government and to embarrass the conspirators" as was perhaps practicable under the circumstances. To still the prevailing neutrality clamor, the House of Eepresentatives, on May IGth, passed resolu- tions declaring that Kentucky " should, during the contest, occupy the position of strict neutrality," and also approving Governor Magoffin's refusal to furnish troops. In substan- 9 1 :0 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. tial legislation, however, the Governor received little aid or comfort. His most active lieutenant in contemplated trea- son was Simon B. Buckner, who about a vear before had succeeded in obtaining the passage of a rather energetic mili- tia law, under which the Governor appointed him Inspector- General and ranking commander in the State. It was liis and the Governor's project to put into the field and manip- ulate the " State Guard " which this law authorized, so as to precipitate Kentucky into rebellion. The Legislature, ignoring the Governor's request for a State Convention, addi*essed itself mainly to the task of turning the influence and support of the militia system from secession to union. A bill was framed and became a law May 24th, authorizing a loan of one million to jmrchase amis and munitions, but associating a controlling Union Board of Commissioners with the Governor to regulate its disbursement and the distribution of arms ; authorizing the formation of Home Guards for local defence ; and while it provided that the arms and munitions should not be used against the United States, nor against the Confederate States, unless to protect Kentucky against invasion — it re- quired that both officers and men of the Home Guards and State Guards should alike swear to support the Constitution of the United States and of Kentucky — the former law hav- ing required such an oath from the officere alone. "While Kentucky was thus settling down into an attitude of official neutrality, active popular undercurrents were busy in contrary tlirections. The more ardent secession leaders who raised companies to sen^e in the field, despairing of ob- taining commissions, arms, and active duty fi-om Governor Magoffin, quietly departed to obtain enlistment in the various rebel camps of tlic South. On the other hand, there were many unconditional Unionists in Kentuckv who KENTUCKY. 131 oi)enly scouted the policy of neutrality, and wlio from the fii-st were eager that the Government should begin enlist- ments and gather an anned force to support the Union sen- timent in the State. Colonels Guthiie and Woodruff opened a recmiting office on the Ohio side of the river, and as early as May 6th mustered two regiments into service, nominally as the First and Second Kentucky Volunteers, though in reality the men were principally from Ohio and Indiana. Notwithstanding the contumacious refusals of the Gover- nors of the Border Slave States, President Lincoln was not disposed to give up those States as lost. We have seen that, both in Maiyland and Missouri, he authorized direct enlist- ments under the supei-vision of United States officers. Lead- ing men having infoiTued him of the actual state of Ken- tucky sentiment, he, on May 7th, siiecially commissioned Major Anderson, of Fort Sumter fame, to proceed to Cincin- nati and muster into sei'vice all loyal volunteers who might offer themselves from Kentucky and West Virginia. Nor was he content with such merely negative encouragement. He felt a deep solicitude to retain Kentucky on the Union side. Veiy soon also the leading Kentuckians, who at the beginning had been most pertinacious to insist on neutrality, saw that it would be impossible for the State to maintain such an utterly absurd attitude. Mr. Lincoln, therefore, with their knowledge and consent, by the middle of May sent five thousand muskets to Kentucky in charge of Lieutenant William Nelson, and a committee of prominent Union leaders superintended their distribution to companies of loyal Kentucky volunteers which were being secretly formed in various parts of the State ; and since this venture proved successful, larger shipments soon followed. As yet all this was done quietly and secretly ; for an election was pending in the State, and the Unionists wished to avoid 132 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION'. the animosities wbich open warlike preparations would be sure to create. The elections once over, however, further disguise was thrown off, and at the beginning of July Lieu- tenant Nelson oi)enly established "Camp Dick Bobinson" in Central Kentucky. Into this he quickly gathered several thousand Union volunteei*s already previously recruited. Be- fore Secessionists or neutral Conservatives were well aMare of the fact, he had formed a self-sustaining militaiy post af- fording a secure rall}'ing-place and suppoil to Kentucky loyalists. Governor Magoffin ■WTote an official letter to President Lincoln, urging the removal of this and other Union camps from the State ; but the President replied that the force was composed exclusively of Kentuckians defend- ing their o^"n homes, and that, in accordance with the e^•i- dent popular sentiment of the State, he must decline to order them away. Under these vaiious influences the hopes and schemes of Governor Magoffin and his consjiiiing secession adherents withered and failed. The "State Guard" of Buckner lan- guished, and the loyal "Home Guai-ds" gi-ew in numbers and effective militai-y strength. So far it had been a contest of quiet, but very earnest political strategy, and the result was in exact conformity to the dominant popular sentiment manifested in the late elections by decisive Union majorities. Sustained by this sentiment, the effort could not well have failed ; but failure was rendered impossible, and the result greatly hastened, l)y the constant presence of a considerable number of Northern troops at Cairo, Cincinnati, and inter- mediate towns on the border, ready to intervene with active and decisive force, had the necessity at any time become imminent. Meanwhile suiToiinding events were rapidly matm-ing to force Kentucky from her neutral attitude. Not onlv had KENTUCKY. 133 hostilities commenced east of the Alieghanies, but active minor campaigns, closing with somewhat important battles, had taken place on each side of Kentucky. Eastward the rebels were driven out of West Virginia with disaster dui-ing July ; while, to the west, a serious invasion of Missouri was checked in August by the hardy, though over-daring courage of Lyon, who threw back a combined rebel column moving fi'om Ai-kansas northward, unfortunately at the costly sacri- fice of his own life. Unlooked-for success at Bull Eun had gi'catly encouraged the rebellion, but it felt the menace of growing danger in the West. Fremont had been sent to St. Louis, and, with a just pride in his former fame, the whole Northwest was eager to respond to liis summons, and follow ■ his lead in a grand and iiTesistible expedition down the Mississippi River in the coming autumn, which should open the Father of Waters to the Union flag and sever the tenitory of the Confederacy — a cherished plan of General Scott. The rebel General Pillow — somewhat wordy, but exceed- ingly active, and as yet the principal military authority in Tennessee — had long been warning Jefferson Davis to pve- pare against such an enterprise. He had been working with great energy to fortify Memi^his, and, by the middle of May, reported that he would soon have twenty pieces in bat- teiy. But at the same time he prophesied that " an effort will be made to effect a lodgment at Columbus, fortify that place, and, with a strong invading column, turn my works, attack them in reverse, cmsh my supporting force, capture the guns, and open the river. The northern portion of Ten- nessee is unfavorable, from the extent of oi3en countiy." He said he had asked Governor MagoflBn for permission to fortify Columbus, adding : " If he should withhold his con- sent, my present impression is that I shall go forward and 134 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION. occupy the work npon the ground of its necessity for pro- tecting Tennessee." But Jeflfersou DaA-is had too great hopes of Kentucky to create enmity by forcing her neutrality, and Pillow's scheme was necessarily postponed. As the autumn approached, however, Kentucky was clearly lost to the " Confederates." Of the members of Congress chosen at the election held Juno 20th, nine out of ten were loyal. At the general elec- tion held on the first Monday of August, the Unionists gained three-fourths of the members of each branch of the Legislature. Meanwhile the danger of a great Missis.sippi expedition from the North grew formidable. The lower Mississippi flows generally between level shores, and oflfers few points where the stream may be effectually obstructed by foi-titications. It was, therefore, desirable to secure all that were available, and the Kichmond authorities now re- solved to seize and hold Columbus, notwithstanding the fact that it lay in " neutral " Kentucky. Since July 4th the defence of the Mississippi River had been specially entmsted to Genei*al Leonidas Polk, fonuerly a bishop in the Protestant Episcopal Church, but who, since the outbreak of the rebellion, i)refen'ed to utilize his early West Point education, by laying aside his clerical fimctions and accepting a major-genei-al's commission in the Confed- erate sen-ice. On September 5th he began moving his forces northward, N-iolatiug the neutrality of Kentucky by occupj-ing the town of Hickman, on the Mississippi, within that State. The movement did not pass unobserved ; the Union commander at Cairo had, with eipial >'igilance, been stiulying the possibilities of the river system in his neigh- borhood. On the following day, Brigadier-General Grant jjroceeded, with two gunboats and an infantry force, to take possession of the town of Paducah, at the confluence of the KENTUCKY, 135 Cumberland and Tennessee Bivers witli the Ohio — a move- ment which bore important fimit a few months later. Gen- eral Polk, on his pai-t still marching northward, reached and occupied Columbus, on the Mississipi^i, on September 7th. Having hastily procured the endorsement of this step from Jetferson Davis, General Polk, on the 9th, formally notified Governor Magoffin of his presence in Kentucky. By this time also, the Unionists of the State had com- pleted and compacted their organization and authority, and demonstrated their strength and predominance. A new mili- tary dejjartment, consisting of Kentucky and Tennessee, and named the Department of the Cumberland, was, on Aug-ust 15th, created at Washington and placed under the command of General Anderson, and since September 1st that officer had made Louisville his headquarters. On the other hand, Buckner had abandoned his jn-ofessed neutrality and his militia command, and formally entered the rebel senice as a brigadier-general. Stationing himself just within Tennessee, south of Middle Kentucky, he was collect- ing the rebel members of his " State Guard" for a hostile expedition against the liomes of his former friends and neighbors. Another rebel force gathering under Zollicoffer, in East Tennessee, was watching its opportunity to advance into Kentucky through Cumberland Gap. Under these threatening aspects Governor Magoffin com- municated to the Legislature, then in session, General Polk's announcement of his arrival at Columbus. The altogether illogical and false role of Kentucky neutrality was necessari- ly at an end. The Legislature, by express resolutions under da,te of Sei)tember 14th, instracted the Governor to demand the unconditional withdrawal of the rebel forces from Ken- tucky, while other resolutions called on General Anderson to enter at once upon the active defence of his native State. A 136 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. little later, Kentucky still further and finally identified her- self with the loyal North. Enlistment under the Confede- rate flag was by law declared a misdemeanor, and the inva- sion of Kentucky by Confederate soldiei-s a felony, and hea\y i5unishment.s were prescribed for both offences. And since the Home Guards had only been organized for local protection, the Legislature now formally authorized the en- listment of forty thousand volunteers to " repel invasion," providing that they should be mustered into the ser\'ice of the United States, and co-operate ^^ith the annies of the Union. CHAPTER Xn. WEST VIRGINIA. Prior to 1861, the State of Virginia— the " Old Dominion" — extended from Chesapeake Bay westward to the Ohio River. This broad limit, however, gave her a defective boundary. The Alleghany Mountains, running through the very middle of the State, from northeast to southwest, com- pletely bisected her ten-itoiy into two divisions somewhat unequal in size, and greatly different in topographical fea- tui'es and character. East of the mountains, the land rises from a broad, low tide-water belt on the sea-coast, in a tolera- bly regular gradation of plains and plateaus, first to the Blue Ridge, then to the main Aijpalachian chain ; west of the dividing crest, the country retains its mountainous characteristics, a succession of lidges and a medley of hills, till it reaches the Ohio River. Not alone through earlier settlement, but also by reason of climate, soil, and situation, East Virginia remained the region of large plantations, heavy slave population, and profitable agriculture, especially in production of tobacco ; West Virginia, on the other hand, became the home of hunters, pioneers, lumbermen, miners, and in latter times the seat of a busy manufacturing indus- try— developing a diversified agriculture for local consump- tion, rather than the production of gi'eat staples for export. With preponderant population and wealth, East Virginia 138 THE OCTTBREAK OF REBELLION. absorbed political power, and selfishly laid and expended taxes to her local advantage, so that "West Vii'ginia was made to stand in the relation of a triljutary province, rather tlian an integral and equally favored part of the commonwealth. So too gi-ew up essential diflFerences in social tradition and aspiration. The tide-water population develoi)ed family estates, pretentious manor-homes, aristocratic exclusiveness, ancestral piide — peculiarities which could not tlirive in hunters' camps, or the shanties of miners and lumbermen. The whole world over, and in all ages, mountain and forest life has bred a sjiirit of self-reliance, of personal indepen- dence, of the recognition of individual equality, and rights of simple manhood. More than anything else, however, the system of slavery antagonized the two sections of the State. By the census of 1860, East Virginia contained 472,4:94 slaves ; while West Vii'ginia, with half as much free poimlation, embraced a total of only 18,371 slaves. It is therefore not surpiising that se- cessionism was rampant in the east, and that unionism pre- vailed in the west. Of the 55 final votes against the secret Ordinance of Secession in the Virginia Convention, 32 were cast by the West Virginia delegates, 14 others were con- tril)uted from other mountain counties ; the jiopulous plains and lowlands of the east supplied only 9. As in other parts of the South, the fungus of treason grew rankest in the hot- beds of the heavy slave counties ; the poison of conspiracy infected the centres of accumulated wealth, of inherited family pride, of over-fattened political ambition ; it was the Tylers, the Wises, the Floyds, the Masons, who, stuflfed to repletion with political benefits, turned with ungrateful hearts to destroy the temple of government, wherein as selfish and hypocritical priests they had conducted a dis- sembling and perverted worship. WEST VIRGINIA. 139 Wliile the Convention of Virginia was earning on its ec- centric and fluctuating political intrigues under guise of public deliberation, one of tlie West Virginia members of- fered resolutions making a somewliat startling, but entirely geiTQane application of the heretical theoiy of secession. "The right of revohition," he AVTote, "can be exercised as well by a portion of the citizens of a State against their State government, as it can be exercised by the whole people of a State against their Federal Government." "And that any change of the relation Virginia now sustains to the Federal Government, against the "washes of even a respectable minority of her people, would be such an act of injustice perpetrated itpon the rights of that minority as to justify them in changing their relation to the State Government by separating themselves from that section of the State that had thus wantonly disregarded theii* interests and defied their will." The conspirators in the convention wilfully shut their eyes to the iieiiinency of this logic, but among the people of West Virginia it remained a quick and pei'vading princi- ple of action. The Convention at Richmond passed its secret Ordinance of Secession on April 17th ; within a week popular movements were already on foot in the towns and populous counties of West Virginia, looking to a division of the State. Numerous causes contributed to this result. Political jealousy and injustice, though a powerful influ- ence, was not eveiything. Geogi-aphy had already ordained separation by a formidable mountain-bamer. Her peoi^le felt themselves an integral part of the Great West. They responded to the impulse of its commercial ambition, its material development, its expansive business energy. Wheel- ing aspired to rival Pittsburg and Cincinnati, not Richmond. They acknowledged neither tobacco nor cotton as kings ; UO THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. lumber, coal, iron, salt, petroleum, were their candidates for supremacy in trade. Their commerce followed their streams into the Oliio. The Miasissippi Valley was a broader market than the Atlantic sea-coast. Their busi- ness reached out for St. Louis, St. Paul, and Denver, as well as Memi)his and New Orleans. The eflfort, therefore, of the tide-water slaveholding aristo- crats to carry them into a cotton confedei"acy,,met an in- stantaneous and almost unanimous protest. The jiroiio-si- tiou was hardly a subject for discussion. To secede from secession was the common wish and determination. The only question was how to put their negative into effective operation. Eapid popular organization followed ; the Gor- emment at Washington was appealed to, and promised countenance and suppox't ; and on May 13th, delegates from twenty-five counties met at Wheeling to consiilt and de\'ise further action whereby they might fully and finally reinitli- ate the treasonable revolt of East Virginia. Circumstances favored their design. Under President Lincoln's call, the large and poijulous State of Ohio, West Vii'ginia's nearest neighbor, was organizing thirteen regi- ments of three months volunteei-s. This quota entitled her to a major-general ; and to tliis important command Gov- ernor Dennison appointed a young officer of thorough West Point training and varied experience — Captain George B. McClellan. He was also a personal favorite of General Scott, who had such confidence in his ability that he soon (May 3d) placed him in command of the Militai-y Depart- ment of the Ohio, created to include the three States of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, with headquarters at Cincin- nati, and to which West Virginia was not long after attached. The blockade of Washington, and other incidents, had sen-ed to keep Western quotas of troops oh the Ohio line, and the WEST VIRGINIA. 141 Unionists of West Virginia tlins found a substantial militaiy force at once in their immediate vicinity, with a command- ing officer insti-ucted to give them encouragement and sup- port, and carefully studying the possible oijportunities of service in their midst. Although the convention proceedings must have made the Eichmond authorities acquainted with the prevailing union sentiment of West Virginia, it is probable that they did not anticipate a general disaffection ; not only did Governor Letcher's proclamations for State militia include that section with apparent confidence, but he at an early day despaitched officers there to collect and organize it. Relatively, population was sparse and the country moun- tainous and hilly ; there were, therefore, two princii^al localities, or lines of transit, ti-avel, and business, where concentration could be best effected — one the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Eailroad, the other the valley of the Great Kanawha Eiver — and to these districts Governor Letcher sent his agents. Discouraging reporis were, how- ever, soon returned : that feeling was veiy bitter ; that union organizations existed in most of the counties ; that that section of the State was " verging on actixal rebellion." Fragments of rebel companies were indeed here and there springing up, but it became e^^dent that no local force suffi- cient to hold the country would respond to the Confederate appeal. On the other hand, the open disaffection, and the ominous gathering of forces at several points along the Ohio side of the river, pointed to a short tenure of Confederate authority. The Eichmond officials were, however, unwilling to lose their control without a straggle, and, in default of local military support, determined to maintain themselves with forces from East Vii'ginia. To that end they now sent a 142 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. few available companies, with some extra arms and supplies, from Staunton at the southern end of the Shenandoah Val- ley, by the Staunton and Parkei-sburg turnpike, a tolerably direct route, over the mountains, a distance of seventy-tive to a hundi-ed miles to Beverly, from which j)oint they might menace and overawe Grafton, the junction of the main stem of the Baltimore and Ohio Kaih'oad with its branches to Parkersburg and Wheeling. But the reaction against secession, the reawakening of union feeling, the growth and organization of the party which favored a permanent division of the State, lai-gely outran all the conspirators' eiforts and measures. Coun- ter-revolution being positive and aggi-essive, was not only stronger, but more active than the revolution which had given it birth and opportunity. The inhabitants showed more alacrity to take up anns for the Government than for Letcher and Lee. A West Vii'ginia regiment, fonned by Colonel Kelly to fight for the Union, gathered recruits more raj^idly at Wheeling, than the rebel camps which Colonel Portei-field had been sent to command and con- centrate between Beverly and Grafton. It will be remembered that the Richmond Convention had appointed the 23d of May (that being also a general election for members of the Legislature) as the day on which the people of Virginia should vote to ratify or reject the Ordinance of Secession. A curiously soi)histical and Pharisaical argument and appeal, published by Senator Mason in behalf of ratification, shows conclusively that the conspirators were in great apprehension lest their treason should be repudiated at the polls. But, with the State transfoiTued to a camp, and filled with Jeffei*son Davis' "foreign" regiments, the result could hardly be in doubt. Under complete militaiy domination, East Virginia WEST VIRGINIA. 143 voted to ratify ; West Virginia, comparatively free, voted to reject the Secession Ordinance. This event both justified and sustained the movements of the West Vii"ginia Unionists and the Government. If General McClellan had needed any further reasons for an active militaiy interference, they were furnished by the fact that Porterfield began burning bridges on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. Bealizing that delay was becoming dangerous, and prompted by directions from Washington, McClellan, on the 26th, ordered two regiments to cross the river at Wheeling, and two others at Parkersburg, and to simultaneously move fonvard by the branch railroads from each of these points to their junction at Grafton. Owing to the necessity of repairing burnt bridges, their progTess was cautious and slow. This gave ample time for Porterfield to become fujly informed of the movement ; whereupon he retired with his small command, stores and spare arms, to Philippa, on a country road, about fifteen miles directly south of Grafton, hoping to find there a secure retreat about which to gather a sufficient force to return and more thoroughly cut, harass, or control, the railroad. But the Union forces, being in superior numbers, and as- sisted with ready information by friendly local sentiment, gave the rebels little respite. General McClellan had for- warded additional regiments to Grafton, with Brigadier- General Mollis, an educated West Point officer, to command ; and he now adojited and completed an expedition already projected before his arrival by Colonel Kelly, who, with his West Virginia regiment, had a thorough knowledge of the country. Under i>retence of an advance on Harper's Ferry, Colonel Kelly, at the head of about two regiments, started eastward by rail on the morning of June 2d ; that evening a similar detachment under Colonel Dumont started west- 144 THH OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. ward ; both columns, however, soon left the cars, and by dif- ferent roads began a rapid march southward against Philip- pa. A fm-ious rain-storm during the night greatly impeded, but also comi)letely concealed, their unexpected advance. They arrived on opposite hills commanding the town, almost simultaneously at daylight of June 3d, though, by a mistake of the proper route, not in a position to cut oflF retreat Here they found Porterfield's command, something over a thousand strong, carelessly awaiting the anival of morning and the abatement of the storm, to begin a retreat which the rebel officers had informally resolved on the previous even- ing. The surjjrise was complete, and the attack so sudden and sharp as to force the rebels to disperse in utter rout and disorganization. Their loss in killed and captured was small, owing to the fatiguing night march which left the Union troops too thoroughly exhausted to make pursuit. The complete success of this fii-st dash at the enemy not only had the haj^piest effect in inspii-iting the Union troops, but it also encouraged and fortified the West Virginia Unionists in their political scheme of forming a new State. On the day after the " Philippa races," as the skirmish was facetiously nicknamed, a previously concerted agreement to elect delegates was carried out. These, representing about forty counties lying between the crest of the Alleghanies and the Ohio Eiver, met in a formal convention at Wheeling, on June 11th. Its first step (June 13th), was to repudiate the treasonable usurpations of the Richmond Convention and Governor Letcher, to pronounce their acts without authority and void, and to declare as vacated all executive, legislative, and judicial offices in the State held by those " who adhere to said convention and Executive." The second step was the adoption of an ordinance (June 19th) reorganizing the State government. On the following day the convention WEST VIRGINIA. 1^ appointed F. H. Piei-poinfc Governor, with iiu advisory council of five, to wield executive authority. A legislatiu'e was constituted by calling together, on July 1st, at Wheeling, such members chosen at the election of May 23d as would take a prescribed oath of allegiance to the Unitrl States and the restored government of Virginia, and larovidi u for filling the vacancies of those who refused. A similar provision con- tinued or substituted other State and county officers. After adding sundiy ordinances of urgent necessity to this groundwork of restoration, the convention on the 25th took a recess till August. The Legislature, however, met ac- cording to call, and took up the difficult task of devising legal enactments suitable to the revolutionary crisis ; and on July 9th, it chose two United States Senate: , who, four days later, were admitted and took part in the nr.rlonal legis- lation. So far, the work was siinj)ly a repudiation ol secession, and a restoration of the usurped government of the whole State. But the main motive and piirpose of the counter- revolution was not allowed to halt or fail. In August the Wheeling Convention reassembled, and on the 20th adojited an ordinance creating the new State of Kanawha, and pro- ^'iding for a ratifying popular vote to be taken mi the ques- tion in the following Ocfcol^er. It is not the province of this volume to follow further the political transformation of the " Old Dominion," thus inaugurated, except to add that the proposed " State of Kanawha " became the " State of West Virginia," and was duly admitted to the Union about two years later. Governor Piei-point, the head of the pro%isional govern- ment thus organized at Wheeling, made a formal applica- tion under the Constitution, to the Government of the United States, for aid to suppress rebellion and protect the 10 146 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. people against domestic violence ; and in furtherance of this object General McClellan ordered additional forces into the State from liis Department. Local enlistments had also by this time increased West Vii'ginia's own contingent to three regiments nnder his command. In addition to affording protection to Union sentiment, this militaiy occupation was designed to insure the safety of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroatl, not alone of Grafton as a strategical point, hut also of the valuable railroad bridge across the Cheat River, and numerous important tunnels in the mountains imme- diately east of it. Tlie precaution was nowise supei-fluous ; for the Rebel Government had some weeks before ordered a sj)ecial expedition to destroy them and permanently break this important line of communication. General Lee still had his eye on such a possibility, and wrote to his new com- mander, under date of July 1st, " the rupture of the railroad ai Cheat River would be worth to us an army." To effect this, and to hold West Vii-ginia — or at least to prevent the Union forces from penetrating thi-ough the mountains in the direction of Staunton — the rebel authori- ties now sought to repair the Philippi disaster by sending two new commanders to that region : Ex-Govemor Henry A. Wise, invested with the rank of brigadier-general, to the Kanawha Valley, and General Gamett, formerly a major in the Federal Army, to Beverly, to g-ather uj) and reorganize the dcbiis of Portertield's command, which they also took immediate measures to reinforce. (Jamett, arriving near the end of June, found that Poi-ter- field had retreated across an outlying mountain range into the Cheat River yalley, in which Beverly is situated. The turnpike from Staunton to Beverly is the central and prin- cipal mountain route within a Jong distance, both to the north and to the south. From Beverly northwestward the WEST VIRGINIA. 147 turnpike branches, one line going to Buckhannon through a pass over Eich Mountain, the other going to Philippi through a pass in the same range, but which is there named Laurel Hill, the latter being some seventeen miles farther north. " I regard these two passes," wrote Garnett, "as the gates to the northwestern country." Here, then, he proposed to fortify himself, to forage on the country beyond, and to leisurely watch his chance of breaking the railroad. His circumstances were not the most favorable. The troops which he found at Huttonsville on his arrival were "in a miserable condition as to arms, clothing, equipments, in- struction, and discipline." " The Union men," he also wrote, " are greatly in the ascendancy here, and are much more zealous and active in their cause than the Secession- ists. The enemy are kept fully advised of our movements, even to the strength of our scouts and pickets, by the coun- try people, while we are compelled to grope in the dark as much as if we were invading a foreign and hostile country." Nevertheless, he began a vigorous reorganization ; Lee im- mediately sent him reinforcements. In a short time he had Colonel Pegi'am established in the pass at Rich Mountain, with a regiment and six guns, while he himself held the pass at Laurel Hill with three or four regiments, leaving a detachment at Beverly. This was the situation when, early in July, General McClel- lan resolved to take the offensive and drive the rebels from West Virginia. He had arrived on the scene of action about the same time with Gamett ; and though he had a largely preponderating force in the State, it was considerably de- l^leted by the local garrisons necessary to i^rotect the rail- road, and to give confidence to Unionists in exposed towns. For the immediate work in hand General Morris had five or six regiments at Philijipi, confronting Garnett ; McClellau 118 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION, Field of the West Virginia Butties. WEST VIRGINIA. 149 dii-ectecT liiin to take an advanced position within two miles of the enemy's works at Laurel Hill, to give an impressipu that he intended the main attack, and to be ready to pursue, should they retreat. Meanwhile McClellan himself moved to Buckhannon with some seven regiments, with the design of turning the enemy's position on Eich Mountain. On the evening of Jxdj 9th he pushed forward to Roaring Creek, two miles from Pegram's entrenched camp. A reconnoissance on the 10th showed the enemy strongly posted in a mountain defile, where, with the large force he was supposed to have, a direct attack in front could only be made at great sacrifice. That evening Brigadier-General Eosecrans proposed a plan to turn the position, and McClellan (with some reluctance, it is said) iDermitted him to attempt it. At daylight of Jiily 11th, Eosecrans, with portions of four regiments — a total of nineteen hundi-ed men — set out, and, amid a well-nigh continuous rain-storm, by eleven o'clock cut and climbed their way through a palhless forest and thicket to the very crest of Eich Mountain. Their ascent was made south of the turnpike, while Pegram was expect- ing the attemjit on the north. To guard against either con- tingency, however, as his own camj^ and entrenchments were near the west base of the mountain, Pegram had sent a de- tachment of three hundi'ed and ten men and two guns back to where the turnpike crosses the summit, two miles in his rear. There, at the farm of a man named Hai-t, they had scarcely had time to throw up some slight entrenchments for their guns, when Eosecrans' force, advancing toward the road from the south, encountered them. The rebels made a plucky resistance, but the Unionists had such advantage in numbers that the contest was quickly decided. " We formed at about three o'clock," reports Eosecrans, " under cover of 150 THK OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. our skinniKhers, gnanling well against a flank attack from the diivt'tion of the rebels' position, and after a biisk fire which tlu-ew the rebels into confusion, carried their position by a charge, driving them from behind some log breast- works, and pni-sued them iixto the thickets on the mountain. We captureil twenty-one prisoners, two brass six-pounders, fifty stand of arms, and some com and provisions. Our loss was twelve killed and forty-nine wounded." He also places the reported burials of the rebels killed at one hundred and thirty-five, with about twenty wounded. McClellan had moved all his force up to Pegram's front, and was waiting to begin a direct assault when he should leam that Rosecrans had commenced the attack on the rear. But Rosecrans' fight on the very top of Rich Mountain dis- concerted the aiTaugenient. The messenger sent to com- municate between McClellan and himself rode unsus- pectingly up to a rebel jucket-guard, and was cajitured. McClellan waited all day in vain for the rear attack to be- pcin ; for when the engagement on the mountain was over, the day was already so far advanced, and Rosecrans' men were so thoroughly worn out with theii* toilsome ascent pre- ceding the fight, that it was deemed most j)i"udent to go into bivouac on the field of battle. McClellan was not in- formed of the fight and its result until the following day, July I'ith, when it was also ascertained that the whole rebel camj) and position had been i)recii)itately evacuated ; he was therefore now able, not only to secure their abandoned guns and supi^lies, but to push withoiit opposition along the turnpike entirely over the mountain and occupy Beverly. Pegmni had, on the 11th, personally gone to the moun- tain-top— only, however, to witness the defeat and disper- sion of his little detachment. Seeing himself thus in a trap, with McClellan in front and Rosecrans in secure possession WEST VTRGINIA. 151 of tlie road beliind liim, lie retiimed to his camp, and spiking Lis four guns, abandoned bis camj} and equijjage and under- took to escape, witli the remainder of his command — about six hundred men — l)y mart;hing northward along the moun- tain to join Garnett at Laiirel Hill. For the moment he suc- ceeded in ekiding both the Federal commanders, and after a laborious eighteen hours' march over an almost impassable route, found himself within three miles of Leedsville. Here, however, he received news that Garnett had also retreated, and that a strong Union column was in pursuit. Thus he was once more caught between two Union armies ; and see- ing no further avenue of escape, he that night, July 12th, sent a proposal of surrender to General McClellan, who, on the following morning (July 13th), received Pegram and his command, a total remainder of five hundi'ed and sixty men and thirty-three officers, as prisoners of war, at Beverly, where the half-famished rebel fugitives were only too glad to once more receive comfortable quarters and rations. The earliest fugitives who escaped from the battle of Eich Mountain, on the afternoon of July 11th, carried the news of that disaster to Beverly, enabling the rebel regiments stationed there to reti-eat southward, and also, as is prob- able, communicating the intelligence to Garnett at Laurel Hill. That officer, already seiiously threatened by General Morris in his immediate front, thereupon perceived that his position was no longer tenable, and ordered an immediate retreat. When Garnett reached Leedsville on the afternoon of the 12th, and heard that McClellan was at Beverly, he saw that his own further retreat to the south was also cut off. There was now no resource left but to adopt the i-ather desperate alternative of turning to the north and attempting to reach St. George and "West Union by a rough and difficult mountain road. His command of thirty-three hundred men 152 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION. and cnmbrons trains thereby necessarily became very much scattered and disorganized. Although he had some fifteen hours the start of the Union pursuit, an advance column of three Federal regiments, led by Captain Benham of the En- gineers, gained rai)idly on the fugitives. Notwithstanding every effort of the rebels to impede them by felling trees in the nan-ow mountain defiles, the Union advance came up with theii- v agon-ti-ain at Carrick's Ford, one of the crossings of Cheat la'.er, twenty -six miles northwest of Lairrel Hill, about noon of July 13th. Here Gamett in person faced about his rear-guard (a single regiment, according to the rebel report), and taking i^ost on a favorable and precipi- tous elevarion of the right liver bank, fifty to eighty feet high, jjlanted three guns to command the ford and approach- ing road, and prepared to defend his retreat. Steediiiju's regiment, with two guns, was leading the Union advance, ; ul came up on the low, naiTow a^jproach, within close mu.Si:efc-range, before they discovered the rebel line. A brisk engagement at once ensued, and the other two regi- ments soon aiiived. Owing to the restricted space, Milroy's regiment was obliged to take position where it could only deliver an oblique fire and at a greater distance. Dumont's regiment was thereupon ordered to advance and scale a diffi- cult heiglit in order to tvmi the enemy's left flank. Two companies had well-nigh gained the coveted position, when Benham received a mistaken report that the ascent was im- pi-acticable. He therefore ordered Dumont to retiuTi, to march his regiment along the veiy base of the hill on which the rebels were posted, to their right flank, and make the ascent the The manoeuvre was gallantly executed, and scarcely ha J Dumont begun mounting the height, when the rebel line Vnoke and fled, abandoning one of their gims. Betreat and pursuit were once more commenced ; and at WEST VIRGINIA. 153 the next ford, iierliajis a quarter of a mile fai-tlier on, there occnri'ed an intercliange of desultory skirmisli-fire between small parties of shai"pshooters, in which Gramett himself was killed. At this result the Federals abandoned further pui'suit, satisfied with the capture of the baggage-train, one gun, two stands of colors, and fifty i?risoners ; the casualties being thir- teen killed and forty wounded of the Federals, and twenty killed and ten wounded of the rebels. McClellan had ordered yet another column to be gathered u^j along the raili-oad to intercejjt the flying enemy at West Union ; but no substantial result followed the effort, and the remainder of Garnett's command escaped. Counted according to mere numbers, the battles of Eich Mountain and Can-ick's Ford fall into a ridiculous insigni- ficance in contrast with the gi'eat battles of the rebellion during the next three years. Hundreds of engagements, of gi-eater magnitude and much more serious loss of life, pre- ceded or followed the main contests of the war, of which histoiy will hardly make a note. But this petty skirmish with thi*ee hundi-ed rebels on Rich Mountain, and this rout of a little rear-guard at Canick's Ford, were sj)eedily fol- lowed by large political and military results. They closed a camjiaign, dispersed a rebel army, recovered a disputed State, permanently flushed back the military frontier. They enabled McClellan to send a laconic telegram, combining in one report * the scattered and disconnected incidents of * " IIUTTONSVILLE, YA., Julj 14, 1861. '"CoLOKEL Towssesd: " Garnett and forces routed ; his baggage and one gun taken ; his army demoral- ized ; Giirnett killed. We have annihilated the enemy in Western Virginia, and have lost thirteen killed, and not more than forty wounded. We have in all killed at least two hundred of the enemy, and their prisoners will amount to at 151 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. thi'ee diflferent days and happening forty miles apart, which (without exaggerating literal truth except as to the Union losses and number of prisoners) gave such a general imijres- sion of professional skill and achievement as to make him the hero of the hour, and which started a train of circum- stances that, without further victories, made him General-in- Chief of all the Armies of the United States, on the first day of November follo^\•ing. McClellan's campaign in West Virginia ends with the death of Garnett and the dispersion of his army. About a week afterward he was called to a new field of duty at Wash- ington City. There is not room in this volume to further describe militaiy operations in West Virginia during the remainder of the year 1861. Various movements and enter- prises occurred" under command of Wise, Floyd, and Lee, on the rebel side ; and under Cox, Rosecrans, Milroy, and other gallant officers of the Union army. With somewhat fluctu- ating changes, the rebels were gradually forced back out of the Great Kanawha Valley; and the aggregate result left West Virginia in possession of the Federal troops, her own inherent loyalty having contributed largely to this condi- tion. The union sentiment of the people was eveiywhei-e made more and more manifest, and the new State govern- ment was consolidated and heartily sustained, ending, as has already been mentioned, by her ultimate admission as a sepai-ate member of the Federal Union, in June, 1863. least one thousand. Have taken seven guns in all. I still look for the capture of the remnant of Garnett's army by General Hill. The troops defeated are the crack regiments of Eastern Virginia, aided by Georgians, Tennesseeans, and Ciiro- liuians. Our success is complete, and secession is killed in this country. "Geo. B. McClellan, "Major-General Commanding." CHAPTEE Xm. PATTERSON'S CAMPAIGN. Under tlie President's tkree montlis call the State of Peim- svlvania was required to furuisli sixteen regiments. This entitled her to two major-generals, and one of these, aj)- pointed by the Governor, was Robert Patterson. He had served with credit as a lieutenant and cajitain in the war of 1812, and as a major-general in the Mexican War ; General Scott regarded him as "an excellent second in command;" his selection seemed, therefore, natural and proper. Not- ^\ithstanding he had now reached the age of sixty-nine, he entered at once with alacrity on the task of organizing the three months volunteers in the city of Philadelphia. After the Baltimore riot and the Maryland uimsing, it became necessary to create the military " Dei^artment of Pennsylva- nia," comprising Pennsylvania, Delaware, and part of Mary- land, and Patterson was assigned to its command, with direc- tions to co-opeiate in restoring Union authority in Maryland. Sundry joint military movements j)rojected to accomplish this object, were happily soon rendered unnecessary by the rapid accumulation of troops at Washington, Butler's occu- pation of Baltimore, and the sweeping political reaction in Mainland. But, meanwhile, the rebels had established a strong camp at Harper's Feny, and Patterson's close atten- tion was thus very naturally transfeiTed to that point. The 15C) THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. three months troops couhl not be used in distant undertak- ings. Hero, however, was a worthy enterjirise at the very threshokl of Pennsylvania, which, sticcessfully prosecuted, would protect Maryland, relieve the Baltimore and Ohio Rail- road, encourage Virginia Unionists, and recover lost jirestige. Patriotic pride, political security, and military advantage seemed, to the minds of both Pattei-son and Scott, to ijresent combined reasons for an early recapture of Harper's Fei'iy. For tLi j purpose, Patterson, about the first of June, con- centrated his available troops at Chambersburg, Pa., and on the third of that month issued an address to the regi- ments under his command, announcing that "you will soon meet the insurgents." Orders from Geneml Scott, however, held him back until strong reinforcements could be sent, and an important diversion organized to aid him ; and while thus assisting, the General also admonished him to every prudence, reminding him that his expedition was " well projected, and that success in it would be an impor- tant stej} in the war ; but, there must be no reverse." With the increase of his force, and a closer survey of his task, Patterson's own estimate of his enteiinise gi'ew in mag- nitude. " Eemember, I beseech you," he wi-ote to the Sec- retary of War, under date of June 10th, " that Harper's Feny is (as I hiive said fi'om the fir.st) the place where the fii-st gi-eat bii'-tle will be fought, and the result will be decisive of the future. The insurgents are strongly intrenched, have an immense number of guns, and will contest eveiy inch of ground The importance of a victoiy at Harper's Feny cannot be estimated. I cannot sleep for thinking about it I beseech you, therefore, by our ancient friendship, give me the means of success. You have the means ; place them at my disposal, and shoot me if I do not use them to advantage." PATTERSON'S CAMPAIGN. 157 With such professions of a fighting spirit, the Administra- tion looked with some confidence for an ofi"ensive campaign, and sent its best regiments and ofiicers to take part in it. Both General Scott and General Patterson were, however, de- ceived in their expectation that the rebels meant to risk a bat- tle at that point. With a total force of something over seven- teen regiments, Patterson at length began his forward move- ment via Hagerstown and Williamsport. But so leisurely were his preparations and advance, that the rebels had every knowledge of his coming; and when, on June 15th, he finally reached the Potomac River, he found, instead of the "desperate resistance" which had been looked for, that Johnston had hastily evacuated Harper's Feri-y after destroy- ing the raih-oad bridge and si^iking his heavy gTins, and had retreated upon Winchester. Patterson and his officers were greatly mystified by this withdrawal of the enemy. "I believe it is designed for a decoy," wrote Fitz John Porter, Chief of Stafi", to Cadwala- der, second in command. " There may be a deep-laid plot to deceive us." " The whole aff'air is to me a riddle," wrote Cadwalader back to Porter. Advancing with a painful over- cftution, as if Johnston were the invader, a i^art of the army crossed the Potomac on the 16th of June. Finding the rumor of the evacuation true, Patterson took sufficient courage to report a victory. " They have fled, and in confusion," he wrote. " Their retreat is as demoralizing as a defeat ; and, as the leaders will never be caught, more beneficial to our cause. Hai-per's Feny has been retaken without firing a gun." "What movement, if any, in pursuit of the enemy, do you propose to make, consequent on the evacuation of Harper's Feny ? " asked General Scott by telegi-aph. " Design no pursuit ; cannot make it," replied Patterson. That deter- 158 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION. mination necessarily ended this first part of the campaign ; and Genei-al Scott thereupon ordered the extra reinforce- ments back to Washington. If the evacuation of Harrier's Ferry was a mystery to Pat- terson, it was a j^lain and common-sense necessity to the rebel commander. Occasionally an idea finds a tenacious and almost ineradicable lodgment in the public mind, without a shadow of reason or truth to justify it. Because the fan- atic John Brown selected Harijer's Ferry as the scene of his wild exploit, the public mind jumped to the conclusion that that spot was a natui-al stronghold, a Gibraltarfa Thei-mo- pylse. Now, the single mountain-line called the Blue Eidge, crossing the Potomac Kiver at Harjier's Ferry, is as far from being a mountain stronghold as a sti-aight line of picket- fence across a brook is from being a block-house. John Brown was as unsound in war as in politics. But it would seem that, even in highly ci\dlized nations, there lingers a remnant of the savage superstition that insanity is inspira- tion ; for strong minds caught at the suggestion that he had recognized in Harper's Ferry a negi-o Thermopylae. This was apparently the light in which the rebel authori- ties regarded the place, and its occupancy and retention was made a jjrime object at the beginning. Jefierson Davis him- self sent Johnston, one of his best officers, to command it. "My conversations with General Lee, in Eichmond," says Johnston, '^and the President's [Jefferson Davis] oral in- structions to me in Montgomery, had infoimed me distinctly that they regarded Harper's Ferry as a natui-al fortress, com- manding the entrance into the Valley of Virginia from Penn- sylvania and Maiyland, and that it was occupied in that idea, and my command not that of a militaiy district and active army, bat of a fortress and its garrison." When Johnston arrived, however, and made a personal in- PATTERSON'S CAMPAIGN. 159 Patterson's Campaigu. 160 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. spection of the neighborhood, he at once recognized the eiTor of this assumption. "There is no danger of attack in front," he \\T.-ote (May 26thj, " but the position is easily turned by crossing the river above or below. The present force is not sufficient for defence against a superior one at- tacking from the Virginia side. Belief, in case of invest- ment, could not be furnished. Considered as a position, I regard Harper's Feny as untenable against a strong enemy. We have outposts at the Point of Eocks, near the feny at Williamsport, and the bridge at Shepherdstown, the extreme points being at least thirty miles ajDart." Two days later he repeated his statement, his engineer reporting that "to hold this post, then, either as a fortress, a point d'ajyptd, or as a condition of the defence of the Virginia Valley, we require a force of from twelve to fifteen thousand men." Lee did not relish the alternative ; he sent him two addi- tional regiments, and wi'ote him that the abandonment of Harper's Feny " would be depressing to the cause of the South." But Johnston held stubbornly to his oi^inion, and wrote on June 6th, that, though the abandonment of Haiijer's Ferry might be depressing to the cause of the South, the loss of five or six thousand men would be more so. " And if they remain here," he added, " they must be captured or destroyed very soon after General McClellan's an-ival in the valley." The opinion was evidently based on the current i-umors that McClellan would bring Western troops to join Patterson. This decided warning had its effect on the rebel authori- ties, and under date of June 13th they authorized Johnston to retire upon Winchester, after destroying everything at Harper's Feny, "whenever the position of the enemy shall convince you that he is about to turn your position." But they coupled the permission with another strong reminder ; PATTERSON'S CAMPAIGN. 161 "The position of Hai-per's Ferry, as has been heretofore stated, is deemed vahiable beqause of its relation to Mary- land and as the entrance to the Valley of Virginia, the jjos- session of which by the enemy will separate the eastern and western sections of the State from each other, deprive us of the agricultural resoui-ces of that fertile region, and bring in its train political consequences which it is well believed you cannot contemplate without the most painful emotions." With Patterson on the point of moving against him, how- ever, Johnston allowed political consequences to take care of themselves, destroyed Harper's FeiTy on June 13th and 14th, and retired even before his permission was received. " We are twelve miles in advance of Winchester," he reported on the 17th ; " my only hope fi-om this movement is a slight delay in the enemy's advance. I believe his force to be about eighteen thousand ; oui's is six thousand five hundi'ed." Patterson admits that he had seventeen regiments — a force fully capable of the brilKant and important blow he had been ambitious to strike, but which he had neither the skill nor courtage to dii-ect. The succeeding two weeks furnish no incidents worthy of note in this connection. Practically the two armies re- mained in observation, inactive, and without definite plans. WTien General Scott withdi-ew the temporaiy reinforcements he had given Patterson to enable him to fight a battle, the latter once more retired to the north bank of the Potomac. For the moment militaiy attention was dii'ected elsewhere. McClellan was preparing his campaign in W^est Vii'ginia ; McDowell was strengthening the Federal occupation of Arlington Heights and Alexandi-ia ; the President and General Scott were deliberating upon possible operations against Manassas. In this inteiim Johnston remained in camj) about Winchester, iDushing his picket-line close up 11 162 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. to the Potomac, and keeping himself well informed by scouts and spies. Meanwhile the Confederate authorities, still anxious to hold the Shenandoah Valley, and having also in view a possible junction with Beauregard at Manassas, sent foi"ward reinforcements which raised Johnston's army to the effective strength of nine thousand, besides twenty-five hun- dred local militia in process of organization. Toward the end of June a movement against Manassas was resolved on at Washington. As a preliminaiy, General Scott once more suggested a definite task to Patterson. "Re-" main in front of the enemy," he telegraphed on June 25th, " wliile he continues in force between Winchester and the Potomac. If you are in superior or equal force, you may cross and offer him battle." Two days later he gave further emphasis to the suggestion by saying, " I had expected your crossing the river to-day in pursuit of the enemy." But Patterson complained that Johnston outnumbered him, and clamored for reinforcements and batteries. Reinforcements and batteries were ordered to join him, and he was also in- formed of the intended movement on Manassas ; upon which he again put on a bold fi-ont and crossed the Potomac at Williamsport, moving to ]Martinsburg, with sufficient oppo- sition to biing on a smart skirmish at Falling Waters, the enemy retiring toward Winchester as he advanced. From this point, during the short time he yet remained in command, Patterson's militaiy conduct becomes the subject of criticism and controversy. It is military usage — perhaps military necessity establishes the usage — that orders and di- rections from superior to subordinate officers are conveyed in brief words expressing or suggesting only the objects to be accomplished, and leaving methods largely at the discretion of him who has to perform the task. Following this estab- lished usage, General Scott, by his orders and directions PATTERSON'S CAMPAIGN. 163 from July 1st to tlie IStli, informed Patterson that McDowell •would make an advance against Beauregard, and that John- ston must be defeated or detained in the Shenandoah Valley, in order that their two armies might not unite and defeat McDowell. "I telegi-aphed to you yesterday," was Scott's language, " if not strong enough to beat the enemy early next week, make demonstrations so as to detain him in the valley of Winchester ; but if he retreats in force toward Manassas, and it be too hazardous to follow him, then con- sider the route via Key's Ferry, Leesburg, etc." That Pat- terson correctly understood the order is shown by his reply : " I have thus far succeeded in keeping in this vicinity the command under Genei-al Johnston, who is now i^retending to be engaged in fortifying at Winchester, but prejiared to retire beyond striking distance if I should advance too far. To-morrow I advance to Bunker Hill i^reparatoiy to the other movement. If an opiiortunity offei*s, I shall attack ; but, un- less I can rout, shall be careful not to set him in full retreat upon Sti-asburg." But the wishes of the Administration and General Scott were not allowed to depend alone on the customaiy orders. Patterson's former indecision and hesitancy had created a doubt of his disposition to fight ; and a similar hesitancy was once more manifesting itself in his complaints, requests, and especially in his growing exaggeration of his antago- nist's strength. It is always deemed hazardous to change commanders on the eve of battle, and therefore the alterna- tive was adopted of sending General Sandford to him with additional reinforcements ; who, wai^'ing his rank, should take command under Pattei-son, and prompt him in pushing forward the army. Sandford, accepting the duty, rejDorted to Patterson with four regiments from Washington, about July 10th ; the independent column under General Stone also 1G4 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. joined him immediately afterward, so that Patterson's army now numbered eighteen thousand two hundred according to his own estimate, or over twenty-two thousand according to the estimate of others, opposed to the rebel ai-my, which, altogether, Johnston states to have been less than twelve thousand men. It would appear that at this time two impulses struggled for mastery in Patterson's mind. Apparently he was both seeking and avoiding a battle. He had called a council of war at Martinsburg on the 9th ; and verifying the military adage that a council of war never fights, his officers had ad- vised him that he was on a " false line," and that he could most advantageously threaten Johnston from Charlestown. Accordingly, on July 12th, Patterson asked permission to transfer his forces to that line ; while a dispatch from Gene- ral Scott of the same date, in reply to a former letter, in sub- stance accorded him the j^ennission, but accomjjanied it with the significant reminder : " Consider this suggestion well, and excejit in an extreme case do not recross the Poto- mac with more than a sufficient detachment for your sup- plies on the canal." Such a movement upon Charlestown, made promptly at that date and under the then existing conditions, might have been judicious. But Patterson's dispatches show that fi'om this on he found nothing but reasons for fear and justifica- tion for inaction and retreat. He wanted a regiment of reg- ulars ; he said the time of the three months regiments was about to exjjire ; that his men were barefooted ; that the enemy was reinforced and fortified ; that " to attack under such circumstances, against the greatly superior force at "Winchester, is most hazardous." Under these renewed manifestations of timidity General Scott's patience began to give way, and he now sent Patter- PATTERSON'S CAMPAIGN. 165 sou two prompting telegrams, which ought to have waiTued the sluggish blood of even sixty-nine years to action. " Do not let the enemy amuse and delay you with a small force in front," he telegi-aphed July 17th, " whilst he reinforces the pVIanassas] Junction with his main body. McDowell's fii'st day's work has driven the enemy beyond Fairfax Court House. The Junction will probably be carried to-morrow." And again on the following day : " I have cei-tainly been ex- pecting you to beat the enemy. If not, to hear that you had felt him strongly, or, at least, had occupied him by threats and demonstrations. You have been at least his equal, and I suppose superior in numbers. Has he not stolen a march and sent reinforcements toward Manassas Junction ? A week is enough to win victories." Unfoi-tunately, Patterson, even before he received the first of these, had ah'eady com- mitted the fatal militaiy blunder of a retreat. But the questions were so searching, and so plainly conveyed a rep- rimand, that he replied in a tone of offended dignity : " The enemy has stolen no march upon me. I have kept him actively employed, and, by threats and reconnoissances in force, caused him to be re-enforced. I have accomplished in this respect more than the General-in-Chief asked, or could well be expected in face of an enemy far superior in num- bers, with no line of communication to protect." The answer was admirable in form and spirit, but it lacked the essential element of correctness. The enemy did not out- number him — was, in fact, only two-thirds as strong — and was at that moment actually making a rapid " stolen march " to Manassas, which Patterson did not discover till two days afterward. Understanding fully, both from General Scott's telegrams and General Sandford's personal explanations, that an ad- vance agauist Manassas Junction was in progress, which 166 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. would lead to a heavy battle between McDowell and Beaure- gard, Pattei*son bad moved from Martinsburg on July lotb, directly toward Johnston at Winchester, as far as Bunker Hill, within nine miles of the enemy. On the following day he ordered a slight reconnoissance. Until the night of the 16th it was believed by his officers that the advance meant fight. Every one understood that the critical moment had come, or was at hand. The time for elaboi-ate strategy or new combinations had j^assed. Confronting the enemy there were but thi'ee alternatives admissible under his im- perative duty : to hold him, to fight him, or to follow him. It is sad to relate that, with the complete advantage of numbei^ and. position, he did neither. In justice to him, however, it should always be remembered that his personal instinct was right, and that he was led into his fatal error mainly by the influence of his chief-of-stafl", Fitz John Por- ter. His senior aid-de-camp, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, relates the circum- stances under which he took his final decision : "At one time. General Patterson had given an order to move from Bunker Hill to Winchester. He was very unwil- ling to leave Johnston, even at Winchester, without attacking him ; and on the afternoon before we left Bunker Hill he decided to attack him, notwithstanding his strong force. " Question. Behind his intrenchments ? " Answer. Yes, sir ; it went so far that his order was waitten by liis assistant adjutant-general, Colonel Poi-ter. It was very much against the wishes of Colonel Porter, and he asked General Patterson if he would send for Colonel Abercrombie and Colonel Thomas, and consult them on the movement. General Patterson replied : ' No, sir ; for I know they will attemjit to dissuade me from it, and I have made up my mind to fight Johnston under all circum- PATTERSON'S CAMPAIGN. 167 stances.' That was the day before we left Blinker Hill. Then Colonel Porter asked to have Colonel Abercrombie and Colonel Thomas sent for and consulted as to the best manner to cany out his wishes. He consented, and they came, and after half an hour they dissuaded him from it." "With his intentions thus changed, Patterson late that night ordered a retrogi-ade movement; and the next day, July 17th, his anny marched to Chaiiestown — nominally as a flank movement, but practically in retreat, since it about doubled the distance between himself and the enemy. It adds neither excuse nor credit to himself or his advising subordinates that, as a partial justification, they had gulped down an absurd mmor about the enemy being forty thou- sand strong, without taking any efficient means to ascertain its coiTectness. And so lifeless and inefficient had the whole army become under such influences and management, tliat not till July 20th did Patterson leam the humiliating fact that he had wrecked the fair military rei^iitation of a lifetime by peiTaitting the enemy to escape through utterly inexcusable lack of energy and want of judgment. And if that reflection could be still further embittered, it was done by the early realization that his stupendous blunder had lost to the Union cause the first important battle of the war. Johnston was at "Winchester, in daily anticipation of Pat- terson's attack, when, a little aftpr midnight of July 17th, he received orders from the Confederate authorities to go at once to the help of Beauregard. Just twenty- foiu" hours had elapsed since Patterson's order to retreat, and the Union r.rmy was already at Charlestown. By nine o'clock on the morning of July 18th, Johnston's scouts brought him reports indicating clearly the actual situation. At noon of that day he had his whole efi'ective force of nine thousand men on the march ; at nightfall his advance passed through Ashby's 168 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION. Gap of the Blue Eidge; b^ eight o'clock on the 19th it was at Piedmont, the nearest station of the Manassas CJap llailroad, and embarking here in cars, seven regiments were in Beauregard's camp, at Manassas, that afternoon. John- ston himself, with another detachment, anived at Manassas at noon of Saturday, July 20th ; and most of the remainder of his force reached the battle-field of Bull Eun in the nick of time to take a decisive part in that famous conflict, about three o'clock on Sunday, July 21st. It was these nine thou- sand men of Johnston's army which not merely decided, but jirincipally fought the battle. Patterson could and ought either to have defeated or held them at Winchester. Only a little more than a month had elapsed since he had written to the Secretary of War, "Give me the means of success. You have the means ; j^lace them at my disposal, and shoot me if I do not use them to advantage." He would have fared ill under a literal enforcement of his own ofler. CHAPTER XIV. MANASSAS. Ox tlie 23(1 of Mav, 1861, according to the conspirators' programme, Virginia was put tlirougli the dumb show of indorsing the Secession Ordinance by a nominal popular vote; and ahnost immediately thereafter, about June 1st, the Confederate seat of government was transferred from Montgomeiy to Richmond. The reasons for this course were palpable; it gi-atified the local pride of the Old Dominion secessionists; it gave the reins of local military domination definitely into Jefiferson Davis' personal gi-asp ; ii placed him on the most advantageous frontier to meet the expected Union advance from Washington. This, as previ- ously related, had already seized upon Alexandria and Ai*- lington Heights, which were now being extensively fortified. Making a short speech to a serenade on the evening of June 1st, the rebel chief announced that Virginia Avas "to become the theatre of a gi-eat central camp, fi-om which will pour forth thousands of brave hearts to roll back the tide of this despotism." The local campaign had ah'eady taken shape before his aiTival. Since Lee was placed in command he had followed a ijolicy which looked less to the caj^ture of Baltimore than to the obstruction of the Potomac. His first and pilncipal task had been to organize the volunteers which Govei'- 170 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. nor Letcher called into sen-ice; and the earliest levies of Northern Viiginia were i)Osted at Manassas Junction, where railroads from Pdchmond, from Alexandiia, and from the Shenandoah Valley met. On examination, its sti*ategical vahie was found to be much gi-eater than was suspected at the beginning ; Colonel Cocke, the local commander, fii-st pointed out to Lee its important relation to the Shenandoah Valley. " These two columns," he writes, under date of May 15th, "one at Manassas and one at Winchester, could readily co-opei-ate and concentrate upon the one point or the other, cither to make head against the enemy's columns advancing down the valley, should he force Harper's Ferry ; or, in case we repulse him at Hai-jier's Feny, the Winchester sniiport- ing column could throw itself on this side of the mountains, to co-operate with the column at Manassas." With the gi'eat increase of Federal troops at Washington, and their seizure of Alexandria and Ai-liugton Heights, the jiost at Manassas Junction became of such prominence and importance, that Beauregard was sent to take command of it about June Ist. Beauregard was an officer of curiously un- equal merit : thoroughly educated, and highly skilful in the science and art of militaiy engineering, he had little capacity for administration, or sound judgment in the conception of large field-operations. Giddy to intoxication with laudation for his cheap \-ictoiy at Sumter, he now inWted upon his own head the contempt of the world, and of histoiy, by pub- lishing a proclamation in which, without provocation, he "charged the Union aiinies to have abandoned " all rules of civilized waiiare," and to have made " Beauty and Booty " their war-ciy. His next exi)loit was to excite the distni.st of the Richmond authorities upon his military abilit}-, by pro- posing a series of aggressive movements intended to annihi- late the Union armies and capture Washington ; liable, how- MANASSAS. 171 ever, to tlie objection, noted thereon by Jefferson Davis, tliat " the plan was based on the improbable and inadmissible supposition that the enemy was to await everywhere, isolated and motionless, until our forces could effect jimctions to attack them in detail." Meanwhile he rendered his sujieri- ors a real service in pointing out that the defence of his l^osition should be made, not with earthworks at Manassas, but with troops on the line of Bull Run, and for this he was urgent in demanding large reinforcements. As has been already mentioned, it was General Scott's oiiinion that the Government ought not to engage in any military undei-taldngs with the three months volunteers, be- yond those to which these forces had been already assigned and distributed, namely : to protect Washington and fortify Arlington Heights ; to garrison Fort Monroe and, if chance should offer, recapture tha Gosport Navy Yard at Norfolk ; to hold Baltimore and Maryland ; to prosecute Patterson's campaign against Harper's Ferry ; to recover West Virginia through McClellan's campaign ; to guard the Ohio line, and control Kentucky and Missouri. Larger and more distant operations, he believed, ought to be undertaken only with new armies formed of the three years volunteers, giving the summer to drill and preparation, and entering on combined movements in the favorable autumn weather. Important reasons, partly military, partly political, con- flicted with so deliberate a progi'amme. As events had shaped themselves, it seemed necessary to aid Patterson. The possibility that Beauregard and Johnston might unite their annies was clearly enough perceived ; hence, a column to threaten Manassas was proposed. Indications were also manifesting themselves that rebel batteries at narrow places might soon seriously embarrass the navigation of the Poto- mac. Chiefly, however, the highly excited patriotism of the 172 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION. North, eager to wipe out national insult and vindicate national authority, was impatient of what seemed tedious delay. The echoes of the Sumter bombaidment were yet in the air ; the blood on the Baltimore i^aving-stones was cry- ing loudly to heaven. For half a centiuy the nation had felt no close experience of war. The concjuests of peace had gi-own almost miracalous in speed and certainty. Rivers and mountains, distance and time, had become the obedient ministers of creative ingenuity and bold enterjjrise. Forget- ting that the achievements of peace encountered the opjjos- ing obstacles, not of man, but of nature alone, the North de- manded speedy as well as signal redress. It saw rebellion enthroned in the capital of Virginia; it saw a numerous Union army gathered at "Washington ; the newspapers raised the cry of " On to Richmond ; " and the p'opulai" heart beat in quick and well-nigh unanimous response to the slogan. Latterly a detachment sent out by General Butler from Fortress Monroe had met a repulse at Great Bethel, and near Washington a railroad-train under General Schenck had rtm into an ambush at Vienna station ; both were trifling losses, but at the moment supremely irritating to the pride of the North, and the fu-es of patriotic resentment once more blazed up with fi-esh intensity. General Scott's first project of an expedition against Manassas was made about the l)eginmng of June, the object then being not to fight a battle, but merely make a threaten- ing diversion to aid Patterson. There were at that time only s^me six thousand rebels at Manassas, according to Beaure- gard's report. Before the design could take final shape, Johnston had evacuated Harper's FeiTy, and Patterson's first movement was thereby terminated. This occun-ed about the middle of June. From that time on, the i)lan grew into the idea of a larger MANASSAS. 173 aud more decisive movement. Beauregard was receiving large reinforcements ; nevertheless, the strength of the Union army at Washington was such that it seemed entirely possible to provide every chance of success. McDowell, raised in rank from the grade of major to that of brigadier- general, and placed in command at Arlington Heights, sub- mitted a formal plan, at the request of the General-in-Chief, about June 2ith. His plan assumed that the secession forces at Mana'^sas and its dependencies would number twenty-five thousand ; that they would unavoidably become apprised of the movement, and every effort would be made to increase Beauregard's strength ; but that " if General J. E. John- ston's force is kept engaged by Major-General Patterson, and Major-Gcueral Butler occupies the force now in his vicinity (Fortress Monroe), I think they will not be able to bring up more than ten thousand men." Against such an array he proposed to move with a force of thirty thousand of all arms, and a reserve of ten thousand. The project was elaborately discussed, and finally agreed upon, at a council of war at the Executive Mansion, on June 29th, in which President Lincoln, his Cabinet, and the prin- cipal military officers took part. As ah-eady mentioned. General Scott was opposed to the undertaking ; but, after it was once resolved upon, he joined with hearty good-will in every effort to make it a success. McDowell was emphatic in his protest that he could not hope to beat the combined armies of Johnston and Beauregard; upon which Scott gave him the distinct assurance : " If Johnston joins Beauregard, he shall have Patterson on his heels." With this understand- ing, the movement was ordered to begin a week from that day. The enterprise did not escape the usual fate of unforeseen delay ; it marks gi'eat energy in McDowell that his expedi- 174 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. tion was only deferred a little over a week beyond the ap- pointed time. On the 16tL of July he issued his orders to march that afternoon. His anny was organized as follows : Fii-st Division, commanded by Tyler: an aggregate of 9,936 men, divided into foui' brigades, respectively under Keyes, Schenck, SheiTuan, and Kiehardson. Second Division, commanded by Huntee : an aggregate of 2,648 men, divided into two brigades, under Porter and Biumside. Thii'd Division, commanded by Hetxtzelsian : an aggie- gate of 9,777 men, divided into thi-ee brigades, under Frank- lin, "Wilcox, and Howard. Foiu-th Division, commanded by Kunvon : an aggi'egate of 5,752 men ; no brigade commanders. Fifth Division, commanded by Miles : an aggregate of 6,207 men, di^dded into two brigades, under Blenker and Davies. Thus, the total of his command, not including four regi- ments left in the Alexandiia and Aiiington forts, was 34,320 men. Fi'om this number, however, Eunyon's division may at once be deducted ; it was left behind to guard his com- munications, its most advanced regiment being seven miles in rear of Centreville. McDowell's actual moving column may therefore be said to have consisted of 28,568 * men, in- cluding artilleiy, a total of forty-nine guns, and a single bat- talion of cavahy. * From this number it is entirely just to make yet another deduction. The period of enlistment of the Fourth Tennsylvania Regiment, and of Captain Va- rian"s Battery of (New York) Light Artillery having expired, they were dis- charged by official order at Centreville, July 20th, the day before the battle. It will thus be seen that, insteal of the thirty thousand he asked for, McDowell had, perhaps, less than twenty-eight thousand nion, with forty-nine guns ; and official reports show that, instead of the thirty-five thousand rebels he expected to meet at ilanassjis, there were on the field thirty-two thousand men, with fifty-seven guns -less than his estimate, but about three thousand more than Lis own army. MANASSAS. 175 Of all machines, an army develops, perhaps, the greatest inefficiency from mere friction, or the greatest usefulness fi'om action and thoroughness of organization. The value of a veteran consists as much of his habitual expertness in the routine of camp and march, as of coolness and confidence under fire. Two principal causes rendered the advance very slow. The first was the want of practice in marching. " They stopped every moment to pick blackberries or get water," says McDowell ; " they would not keep in the ranks, order as much as you pleased ; when they came where water was fresh, they would pour the old water out of theii- can- teens, and fill them with fresh water ; they were not used to denying themselves much ; they were not used to journeys on foot." The second cause was, j)erhaps, yet more potent. " The affair of Big Bethel and Vienna had created a great outcry against rushing into places that people did not know anything about. I think the idea of every one was that we were to go into no such things as that — that we were to feel our way," again says McDowell. Precaution on this point was j)articularly emphasized in his instructions. " The three following things," says his marching order, " will not be par- donable in any commander : 1st, to come upon a battery or breastwork without a knowledge of its position; 2d, to be surprised; 3d, to fall back." Moving forward with such isainful wariness, a surpiise of the enemy was, of course, equally out of the question. In obedience to Beauregard's orders, his outposts everywhere retired, though, in several instances, with such precipitation as to leave their tents, knapsacks, and even their freshly cooked rations behind. Manassas Junction lies thirty-five miles southwest of Washington, on a high, open jjlateau ; there the rebels had some slight field-works, armed with fourteen or fifteen heavy guns, and garrisoned by about two thousand men. 176 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. Bull Pwun flows iu a southeasterly direction, some three miles east of Manassas, with wooded heights coming gen- erally close up to its west bank. The stream is winding and sluggish, and, though here and there it has steep, sometimes precipitous and rocky banks, it is fordable in many places. Beauregard's main army, increased now to over twenty thou- sand, was posted at the various fords of Bull Run, in a line some eight miles long, and extending from the Manassa*: Kaih'oad to the Stone Bridge on the WaiTenton turnpike.* * At Union iti'.ls Ford, E'veU's brigade of thre? reRiraents : at McLean's Ford, Jones' brigade of three regiments; at B'.actburn's Ford, Longstreet's brigade of five regiments ; above MilcJielCx Ford, Bonham's brigade of Ave regiments ; at LewiH' Fcrd, Cocke's brigade of portions of six regiments ; at Stone Bi idge, Evans' demi-brigade of a regiment and a half ; Early's brigade of four regiments was posted as a reserve in reur and support of Longstrcet and Jones. All the above, together with some seven other regiments and portions, not brigaded, con- stituted Beauregard's "Army of the Potomac." His official report states the total effective, on the morning of the battle (July 21st), to have been 21,S33, and 29 guns. Holmes' brigade, an independent command ordered up from Acquia Creek, consisted of two regiments, reported by Beauregard at a total of l,o55, and 6 guns. It was posted as a support for Ewell. Johnston's ''Army of the Shenandoah" consisted of Jackson's brigade of five regiments, posted as a support for Bonham ; and Bee's brigade of four regiments, posted as a support for Cocke. These had arrived and were in camp on the morning of the battle (July 21st). Beauregard reports their round number?, ready for action, at 6,000 men and 20 guns. In addition, there arrived at Manassas about noon, and on the battle-field between two and four o'clock, Fisher's Sixth North Carolina, Ki4, and Kirby Smith's brigade (afterward led by Elzey), of 1,700 men and 2 guns ; and also Hill's Virginia Regiment, 550. Men. Guns. Recapitulation: Beauregard's array 21.S.33 29 Johnston's army 8,884 22 Holmes' brigade 1,355 6 32,073 57 To which may be added sundry detachments, the numbers of which are not given in official reports. MANASSAS. 177 It was McDowell's intention to turn this position on tlie South. To conceal his pui-pose, and create the impression of a contemplated attack in front, he directed his march upon Centreville on the Warrenton turninke. On Thursday morn- /' '^^ — f i i \ I % ykudley % \ Ford /— '^ ^\ \ / ) p\ j ^^^^^^^s^-V^P'^" \ ^K, / '^\ 4^^^^/^^^^^y. \ BATTLE U ^ 1 / ^^ _,,.=^^^\FI EL D ^- I y / \ f» ..b / 1 \ V^ / /~^ 1 A^^" V 'ti /•x^ "^z W^^ - "^ jri^^ ny McLean's ><3 1 ^5*/'"'/ ^"'''^ V \. ,,^'^S^( Mills \ y\^ ^>\Ford \ V ^J- '^ r^ ^ y^ ---V" Manassas In Bull Run— The Field of Strategy. ing, July 18th, Tyler moved upon Centreville, but, arriving there at nine o'clock, he found that it, too, had been evacu- ated, and that Beauregard's entire amiy was behind Bull Eun. Centreville being situated on a hill, Tyler could see the whole valley spread out before him, with Manassas on 13 178 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. the high jJateau beyond. The main body of the enemy, ho learned, had retired down the road i-uuniug dii-ectly toward that jjoint, crossing the stream at Mitchell's and Blackbuni'^ fords. Tyler's unopi^osed advance had jaerhaps inspii*ed him and his offieei"s with an over-confidence or undue elation ; per- haps it suggested the belief that the enemy did not feel strong enough to make a stand. Under instnictions to " obsen'e well the roads," but to biing on no engagement, it occurred to him to make a reconnoissance in the direction of the retreat. As often hapjjens under such circumstances, the spiiit of combat overcame discretion. Accompanied by Bichardson, one of his brigade commanders, Tyler fii-st went out with a squadron of cavalry and two companies of light infantry. Finding a favorable situation to try artillery, they sent back for a batteiy, and EicharcLson's brigade to support it. Aboub noon of the 18th they were within a mile of Blackburn's ford. Then followed the ever-recuning experience of such aifuirs. First, an exiDeiimental cannonade fi'om a couple of field- pieces, before which the enemy's giuis retii'ed; next the advance of a skii-mish-line, before which the enemy's skir- mishers retired ; then an advance of some of the field-pieces and the planting of a stronger battery ; the posting of a regiment to support the skirmishers, and, soon after, the posting of the eutu-e brigade to support the regiment, fol- lowed by calling up a resei-ve brigade to supjiort the first. Thus the afternoon's work drifted quickly from a reconnois- sance to a skiimish, and from a skiimish to a preliminaiy battle. It was not until some sixty men had fallen, until the two exposed field-pieces were with ililliculty extricated, until one regiment had retreated in confusion and the other MANASSAS. 179 three were deployed iu line of battle to make a new cliarge, that Tyler heeded his instructions, and withdrew his reluc- tant officers and men from the fight, partly demoralized and generally exasperated, and returned to Centreville. In point of fact, the loss, the damage, the demoralization, had been eqiial on both sides. The rebel reports show that three regi- ments of Longstreet's brigade, which bore the first assault, were so much shaken that Early's reserve brigade of three fresh regiments was called uj) and relieved them, that one of these regiments was thrown into confusion, and that the rebel loss was sixty-three killed and wounded. Undecisive as it was, the battle of Blackburn's Ford had an important effect. It confirmed Beauregard in his previous impression that the Ijrincipal Union attack would be made at that point on the centre of his long line. On the other hand, McDowell, receiv- ing from his officers reports of rifle-pits and breastworks, be- came convinced that a direct assault was unwise. The affair of Blackburn's Ford thus proved something more than a pre- liminary defeat ; it augmented the causes of a gi-eat disaster. Upon hearing the cannonade, McDowell had immediately ordered all the divisions forward to Centreville. He had already in his own mind given up the plan of turning the enemy's right, because of the unfavorable nature of the ground and roads. The necessity of finding an unfortified crossing seemed now also demonstrated. Meeting his division com- manders at Centreville, that same night of Thursday, July 18th, McDowell informed them confidentially that he had abandoned his original plan, and had resolved to make the attack by marching northward and turning Beauregard's left flank instead of his right. As an incident of this resolve, however, it was even more essential than before to contiaue to threaten the enemy's 180 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. centre ; and thus Eichardson's brigade was once more posted in the direction of Blackbnm's Ford. Meanwliile the engi- neers were busy all of Friday and Saturday in efforts to find an unfortified ford over Bull Run. They were not success- ful till a late hour on Saturday ; and this delay deferred the main battle till Sunday, July 21st. Could a similar attack have been made a day earlier, the result would probably have been altogether different. CHAPTEE XV. BULL RUX. At CentreTille, on Satiu'dav niglit, McDowell called his officers together and announced to them his jDlan of battle for the following day. The Wai-renton turnpike i-an almost dii'ectly west fi-om Centre-s-ille to Gaines\dlle station on the railroad. He was yet unaware that Johnston had joined Beaiu'egard, and sought to prevent such junction by seizing Gainesville. Beauregard's army lay in detachments behind Bull Run, at five different fords, along a line of eight miles. His left and northernmost flank was at the stone bridge where Wan-enton turnpike crosses Bull Eun, though Mc- Dowell supj)osed it to extend to the first ford above. The bridge was a solid stone stmcture of two arches, of consider- able size and height, connecting the precipitous and rocky eastern bank of the stream with a broad jiiece of level bottom- land on the west. The bridge was thought to be defended in force, and said to be prej)ared for blovring up. The en- gineers had infonnation, however, that Sudley Ford, two or three miles above, could be readily earned and crossed by an attacking column. McDowell therefore ordered that Tyler, with the heaviest division, should advance fi'om Cen- treville directly to Stone Bridge, thi-ee and a haK miles dis- tant, and make a feigned attack ; while Hunter and Heintzel- man should make a secret and circuitous night march north- 182 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. ward, cross Suclley Ford, and, rapidly descending on the enemy's side of Bull Eiin, should clear away the batteries at the stone bridge by a rear attack, and thus enable Tylei-'s di^'ision to cross and join in the combined march on Gaines- ville, or continue the attack on Beauregard's left. If the stone bridge were blown up, the engineers had timbers ready to repair it. The di%-ision of Miles should remain in reserve at Centreville, and the brigade of Eichardson con- tinue to threaten Blackburn's Ford. In the rebel camji, the Confederate commanders were at the same time equally intent on a scheme of their own to attack and surprise McDowell. No sooner had Johnston arrived at Manassas with the second detachment of the Ai-my of the Shenandoah, about noon of Satiu-day, July 20th, than Beauregard explained to him the character and course of Bull Eun, and the situation of the five principal fords be- hind which his various brigades were posted ; and since a l^racticable road from each of these five fords converged upon Centreville, he i^roposed a simultaneous advance and attack on the Union army, in its camj^s, early Sunday morning, Johnston, who now as ranking officer assumed command, adopted Beauregard's plan. Part of the Ai-my of the Shen- andoah had anived before and with him ; the remainder was expected that night. He had every reason to sujjpose that Patterson would promptly follow him to join McDowell. To secure the fniit of his own movement, he miist therefore crush McDowell before Patterson could arrive. The orders for such an advance and attack were duly MTitten out, and Johnston signed his approval of them in the gi'ay twilight of Sunday morning. An hour or two, however, revealed to him the uselessness of these orders, on which the ink was scarcely dry. At sun- rise he heai'd Tyler's signal-guns, and soon received notice BULL RUN. 183 that McDowell had taken the offensive. The remainder of his Army of the Shenandoah had not arrived, as he hoped. Under these circumstances his plan of attack must be aban- doned. Beauregard thereupon proposed a modification of the plan — to attack with theii* right from the region of Blackburn's Ford, and to stand on the defensive with their left in the neighborhood of the stone bridge. This sugges- tion, again, Johnston adopted and ordered to be carried out. But the Union forces had already taken the initiative. A little past midnight McDowell's army was astii-, and the three designated divisions started. Unluckily, at the very outset, Hunter and Heintzelman were delayed two or three hours by the first division not getting out of its camps in time, and failing to clear the road for them. The route proved unexpectedly long ; it was nine o'elbck when the ad- vance reached Sudley Ford. The crossing, however, was not opiDOsed, and was easily efiected. From the ford the Sudley road ran south toward Manassas, crossing the "War- renton turnpike at right angles about a mile and a quarter west of the stone bridge. A little stream, called Young's Branch, also crosses both roads at this intersection, makes a circle to the northeast, and, returning, flows to the southeast into Bull Eun. This was the destined battle-field. It happened that the stone bridge was but slenderly de- fended. The timber had been felled to form a hea'vy abattis behind the bridge ; but Evans, the rebel officer in charge, had only a regiment and a half, with foiir guns, for his en- tii-e guard. Tyler api^eared in force before the bridge, and began his demonstration ; but made it so feebly that Evans soon became convinced no real assault was intended ; and haidng learned the actual crossing at Sudley Ford, he at about nine o'clock withdrew all but foiu- companies and two guns from the bridge, and hastened to the rear to throw 184 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. liimself across Hunter's path. The Union ajjproach having become plainly discernible, Evans posted his eleven com- panies on the ridge immediately north of the Warrenton turni^ike and Young's Branch, his left resting on the Sud- ley road, with one gun at his left, and the other some dis- BuU Run — Battle of the Forenoon.* tance behind his right, on the point of a hill south of Young's Branch. * In these maps the topographical features are copied from the accurate ofHcial maps published by the Engineer Bureau of the War Department. The position of the troops is of course only conjectural, but based on the defecriptions and inferences in the official reports of both armies. BULL RUN. 185 At ten o'clock Hunter's advance emerged from tlie woods into open fields, abont a mile north of the Wan'enton turn- pike, the scattering shots of the skirmishers ha\TJig already opened the conflict. On both sides evei-ything was raw and awkward — officers and men, staft' and line. There was undue excitement and impetuosity, mixed with unnecessaiy confusion and delay. None of the reports specify how the battle began ; the mere momentum of the march seems to have carried the advance regiments under the first shower of rebel shells and bullets at distances varying from five hun- dred to one thousand yards. A preliminary artillery duel sjjrang up, under which Burnside led his four regiments after his battery into the fields to the left of the Sudley road. With a little more deliberation and a united onset, these would easily have brushed away Evans' thin line ; but, in the delay incident to the first actual exiDeriment of battle, the rebels gained opportunity to bring up substantial rein- forcements. Four regiments and two companies of John- ston's Ai'my of the Shenandoah, under General Bee, hurried up and formed to the right and a little in advance of Evans' original line, while Imboden's battery of four guns took l^osition on a hill in the rear, south of the Warrenton turn- j)ike. Thus disi^osed, with little disparity in strength be- tween attack and defence, the first stubborn contest of the day appears to have taken place, lasting perhaps from eleven o'clock till noon. The Union troojjs pressed foi-ward with determined courage ; the rebels resisted with such spirit that Burnside became aj^prehensive for his Rhode Island battery, and Sykes' battalion of regulars was sent to strengthen his left. By this time Hunter had sent Porter's brigade into the fields to the right of the Sudley road, where Griffin's battery could engage the rebel field-pieces ; Heintzelman was hurrying uj) with an advance regiment and 186 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. Kicketts' battery. Under this combined pressure the Con- federate line wavered, yielded, and finally broke. Their left retreated stubbornly down the hill, and, rallying again, endeavored to make a stand behind a stone house at the intersection of the two roads ; but a vigorous Union charge down the Sudley road completed their dispei-sion. The whole first formation of the enemy was swept southward more than half a mile, entirely across and out of the valley of Young's Branch. But the advantage was not won with- out considerable damage to the Union troops, the demoraliza- tion of several regiments, and the serious loss of valuable offi- cers. General Hunter himself was wounded by a shell at the veiy beginning of the action, compelling his retirement from the front, and devohTJig the command of his di\"ision on Porter. McDowell, who came upon the field by way of Sudley Ford as the battle began, had already sent back word to Tyler to press his attack at the stone bridge. Such an attack, ho-n'^ ever, was now no longer necessaiy. We have seen how Evans had withdrawn to oppose Hunter ; and the four companies he left behind had also retired southward. Avoiding the bridge with its abattis, Tyler led Sherman's and Keyes' bri- gades across Bull Run half a mile above, where the stream "was fordable for infantiy, and, marching over a mile of level bottom-land, so directed their course by the filling that they efi'ected a safe junction with Hunter's division, Keyes remain- ing on the extreme left. They approached the morning's bat- tle-field from the northeast ; Sherman reported to McDowell, and joined the general pursuit, directing his march to the right. Keyes remained on the left, and under Tyler's personal orders ; and thus it turned out that this single brigade became and re- mained an indejiendent detachment during the whole day, sep- amted by a wide intei-val from the main battle in the afternoon, and not being in a position to receive orders from McDowell. BULL RUN. 187 It has been explained that the first rebel line was com- posed mainly of Johnston's troops. As they retreated np the hill south of Young's Branch, Jackson's brigade of five regiments, also of Johnston's army, 'svas just arriving there on its Avay to guard the stone bridge, and only at that mo- ment learning the tme state of afi'airs. This hill south of Young's Branch was a higher and stronger position than that from which Evans and Bee had been driven. Its crest ran in a westerly cui-ve from the Robinson house, near the Wan-enton turnpike, past the Henry house near the Sudley road, both being within the southeastern angle of the inter- section. The two roads cross in the valley at Young's Branch, and from their crossing ascend gently to the east, west, north, and south. On this crest, Jackson, with the ready instinct of combat, formed a new line. His five regiments and two batteiies, stretched from the Bobinson to the Heniy houses, formed a solid-looking protection, behind which some of the flying rebels gathered coui'age and rallied in little driblets. Bee's five regiments had shiTink to about foui" companies, and the remaining fugitives were moving in hoj^eless panic down the Sudley road toward Manassas, spreading dii-eful tidings of disaster. Jackson's line was rendered yet stronger by hav- ing Hampton's battalion — that morning an-ived fi-om Rich- mond— on its extreme right in the turnpike before the Robinson house ; and behind these, Bee's fragments were gathered into a sheltering ra\Tne. At this period of the day, a little after noon, the advan- cing Union columns had theii' best co-operation and strong- est momentum. Keyes' brigade was advancing on the left toward the Robinson hill. Sherman was moving diagonally across the centre of the morning's field. Porter's still aggressive brigade was j)ushing down the Sudley road. 188 THE OUTBREAK OP REBELLION. The compact bi-igades of Franklin and "Wilcox were coming to the fi-out on the right. Moreover, Griffin's and Ricketts' batteries had obtained favorable positions near the Dogan house, with an enfilading fii'e against Hampton. Toward two o'clock two regiments of Keyes' brigade made a charge UY) the Eobinson hill and drove Hampton out of the tangle of fences and hedges about the Robinson House, though newly planted rebel batteries farther to the rear made it impossible to hold the i^osition. The whole Union line swung forward to the Warrenton tui-npike ; and while the rebel reports pass it over with the merest allusions, it seems probable that, like Hamilton, other portions of Jackson's line were moved somewhat farther back, to find better shelter from the annoying fire of the Union batteries. This mid- day Union success seemed, and was, sweeping and complete ; but it proved seriously deceptive in the further operations of the afternoon, which it natui'ally suggested and provoked. A little before this time the Confederate commanders woke U15 to the true nature of the conflict. Beauregard was yet waiting im^iatiently to hear that his right was advancing on Centreville, when, toward eleven o'clock, word came that, through a miscarriage of orders, that enterprise was just being commenced. Realizing now that McDowell's attack was not a mere feint, they countermanded the Centreville movement, ordered all available reserves forward to the main battle, and themselves huniedly galloped to the front. Here they now put their personal exertions, encoui'agement, and example, into the somewhat unpromising task of miti- gating a disastrous defeat, rather than •with even remote hope of turning the scale to victory. The Confederates had been literally driven into the woods, the edge of which formed a sort of semicircle on the second ridge south of Warrenton turnpike and east of the Sudley BULL RUN. 189 road. But this reverse brought certain important advan- tages. Their retreat not only concentrated their regiments ; it also, for the first time during the day, concentrated their artillery, thirteen pieces of which were posted near together to the centre and right, so as to give a partial cross-fire at Bull Run — Battle of the Afternoon. a distance of three hundred to six hundred yards over the whole open plateau or hill about the Henry house and to- ward the Robinson house. Under the personal directions of Johnston and Beauregard, they now formed their line along this semicircular edge of woods, with the advantage of a fiinge of second-gi'owth pines in their fi-ont to afford 100 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. lliem almost perfect concealment. Their right extended to where the hill descends to Young's Branch ; their left reached nearly to the Sudley road. It is needless to specify the several corps in detail ; the nearest reinforcements were already aniving ; Johnston's report sums up the strength of this completed line at twelve regiments, twenty-two giins, and two companies of cavaliy. The formation well begun, Beauregard took j^ersonal command, while Johnston, as chief, returned to the rebel headquai'ters to keep his eye on the entire field. Eeduced by losses, McDowell's numbers were now little, if auy, superior to the enemy ; for the brigade of Keyes was separated from him, working its way southward along Young's Branch in the hope to make a flank attack on the rebel right ; in reality it rendered no further sxibstautial helji. Howard's brigade, held back as a reserve, was not yet at hand. McDowell's effective force consisted of the brigades of Porter, Franklin, Wilcox, and Sherman, a total of fourteen regiments, but several of which were akeady seriously demoralized ; these were massed in sheltered situ- ations in the valley along the turnpike and Young's Branch, mainly west of the intersection of the roads. All the advan- tages of position diiring the day had been with McDowell ; now they were suddenly tiu'ued against him by the very success he had gained. The enemy was on the height, he at the foot of the hill. The enemy needed only to defend a stationary line ; he must move forward under a prepared fire. They were concealed in chosen jjositions ; he must mount into open view. They could repel in combination ; he must risk successive assaults. His men had been under anns since midnight — most of them had made a march of ten miles tlu-ough the swelteiing July heat. They were flushed with vietoiy, but also lulled thereby into the false BULL RUN. 191 seciuity of thinking tlieir work accomi^lished, when in reality its sternest effort was merely about to begin. The situation naturally dictated an attack on the rebel centre and left flank, and, had this been unitedly and solidly made, it must unquestionably have succeeded even against the disadvantage ah-eady mentioned. But right here the want of proiDer staff organization and discipline, and the rawness of the troo^is in manoeuvi-e, i:)roved a fatal defect ; and the severe conflict of the next hour and a half resolved itself into a somewhat spasmodic and intermittent struggle on both sides. ^Tien, at about half-jiast two o'clock, the batteries of Eicketts and Giifiin were ordered to move forward fi'om the Dogan heights across the valley to the top of the Heruy hill, they did so with the feeling that the two regiments ordered to follow and supi^ori them were tardy, inadequate, and un- reliable. Other regiments, moving forward to the flank at- tack, could not well be observed, because of the uneven ground and the intervening woods and bushes. The rebels had disappeared ; there was a complete lull in the battle. But danger was no less at hand. Hardly had Ricketts taken his post before his cannoneers and horses began to fall under the accurate fij-e of near and well-concealed rebel shai-jishooters. Death j)uffed from bushes, fences, build- ings ; and yet the jets of flame and wreaths of smoke were the only visible enemy to assail. Ofiicers and cannoneers held on with a desperate courage ; some moved to new po- sitions to foil the rebel range. Giiflin's battery came and took place alongside ; eleven Union guns and thirteen Con- federate guns were confronted at short range in a stubborn and exciting duel. But now the rebel regiments, seeing the dangerous exposiu-e of the Union batteries, were tempted to swarm out of theii* cover. They pressed cautiously but 192 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. tenaciously upon Eicketts. Griffin, absorbed in directing the fire of two of his guns against tlie rebel battei-ies, was suddenly startled at seeing a regiment advancing boldly on bis riglit, in open view. Their vei"y audacity puzzled him. They could hardly be friends, he thought ; yet was it pos- sible that foes were so near and would take such a risk ? Instinctively he ordered his guns to be charged with canister and trained upon them. Yet at the di-eadful thought of pouring such a volley upon a Union regiment, he once more hesitated, and held a brief colloquy with Major Bany, chief of artilleiy. " Captain," said Barry, " they are your battery support." " They are Confedei-ates," rejilied Griffin, in in- tense excitement ; " as certain as the world, they are Confed- erates." " No," answered BaiTy ; " I know they are your batteiT support." Giiffin spurred forward, and told his officer not to fire. The mistake proved fatal. During this intei-val of doubt the Confederate regiment had approached to point-blank range, and levelled theii- muskets just as Griffin gave his order to desist. Griffin's canister would have annihilated the regiment ; but now the tables were turned, and in an instant the regiment's volley had annihi- lated Griffin's and Eicketts' batteries. Officers and men fell smitten with death and wounds, and horses and caissons went tearing in wild disorder down the hill, brealdng and scatteiing the ascending line of battle. Under this sudden catastrophe the supporting regiment stood a while spell- bound with mingled astonishment and terror. They were urged forward to repel the advance on the guns ; but the un- expected disaster ovemwed them ; under the continued and still advancing volleys of the same rebel regiment, they fired their muskets, turned, and fled. These disabled batteries, visible to both aimies, now be- came the centre and coveted prize of an iiTegular contest, BULL RUN. 193 wliicli surged back and forth over tlie plateau of tlie Henry hill ; but, whether because of confusion of ordei"s, or the broken surface of the ground, or more probably the mere reciprocal eagerness of captui-e and rescue, the contest was carried on, not by the whole line, biit by single regiments, or at most by two or three regiments moving accidentally rather than designedly in concert. Several times the fight raged past and over the ^jrostrate body of Ricketts, lying wounded among his guns, and who was finally carried away a prisoner to Richmond. The rebels would dash forward, capture the batteries, and endeavor to turn the pieces on the Union lines ; then a Union regiment would sweep up the hill, drive them back, and essay to drag the guns down into safe ijossession. And a similar shifting and intennitting fight went on, not merely on this single spot, but also among the low concealing pines of the middle groxind in front, as well as in the oak-woods on the Union right, where at times friend became intermingled with foe, and where both sides took occasional ijrisoners near the same place. In this prolonged and wasteful stmggle the Union strength was slowly and steadily consumed. Ai'nold's battery crossed the valley to the support of Griffin and Ricketts, but found itself obliged to again withdraw. The Rhode Island battery took part in the contest as well as it might from the hill north of Young's Branch. Brigade after brigade — Sher- man's, Franklin's, Wilcox's, and finally Howard's reserve, jwere brought forward — regiment after regiment was sent up the hill — three times the batteries were recovered and again lost. It speaks volumes for the courage of the raw, undisciplined volunteers, that, in the face of these rejDeated failures, they continued to go perseveringly against what seemed to them a hidden and unattainable banier, until a stronger wav^ of rebel bullets or bayonets, surging suddenly 13 194 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. forward in the pine thicket, would meet and force them back. In the endeavor to outflank and envelop the rebel left, the Union right had become so strongly turned southward that it was nearly parallel to the Sudley road. Near the beginning of this final contest, Johnston received notice that the long-expected remainder of his Ai'my of the Shenan- doah had at length come ; and before it was half over, Elzey, "with Kirby Smith's brigade of three regiments, arrived near the battle-field fi'om Manassas by the Sudley road. By this time, too, four other regiments, two from Cocke's and two from Bonham's brigades, also came up from the nearer fords. These seven fresh regiments, thi'own opportunely by the rebel commander into the woods west of the Sudley road, directly against the exposed Union right flank, created a numerical overweight, which affords sufficient explanation of the Union repulse at that point. But now, at half -past foui- in the afternoon, when the Union reinforcements were exhausted, the rebel accessions still continued : Early with thi'ee regiments arrived from the lower fords ; Holmes with two regiments, and Ewell with three others, were rapidly approaching. Before the anival of these last the battle was ali-eady decided. Early's brigade was sent cautiously thi-ough the woods, still farther to the rebel left, and suddenly ajipeared with Beckham's battery on the heights near the Chinn house, three-quarters of a mile west of the Sudley road, and entirely beyond and in the rear of the Union right. The Union troops, having approached the second stage of the battle in such a flush of success, and with such an appar- ent assurance of victoiy, could not for a time realize the stem fact that the contest was turning against them. Offi- cers of experience and sagacity, indeed, became seriously BULL RUN. 195 alarmed for tlie fimal result, when Griffin's and Ricketts' batteries were destroyed ; but for the greater part it was looked upon as an untoward accident, and operated rather to inspire the already related eiforts for their recovery. The feeling of course gradually changed with the successive fail- ures to gain and permanently hold the hill. As brigade after brigade melted away in the rejjeated efforts, even the men in the ranks could not omit to note the rapid dimiiiu- tion of the available strength. Some of the repulsed regi- ments kept their organization and returned heroically to the charge. Others, on the contrary, not having that slowly acquired force of discipline which makes cohesion a second nature of the soldier and creates an instinctive reliance on mutual support as the surest means of safety, considered theii' duty done with a single charge, and, once diiven back, went to pieces like the adjournment of a mass meeting. In this shortcoming, officers were as culpable as the men, for war combines art with science, and the superior work of the veteran comes through long years of ju-aetice. It must be remembered that these were only tlu-ee months volunteers, and besides, as such, the most impulsive and independent men in their several communities, whose innate promptness of thought and action had brought them- to the very fore- front of the civil war. Lacking long di-ill and discipline, they acted uijon individual judgment and impulse, rather than as organized bodies merely executing the orders of their officers. This explains to us the remarkable statement of CaiJtain Woodbury, that ,"at four o'clock, on the 21st, there were more than twelve thousand vohmteers on the battle-field of Bull Run who had entirely lost their regi- mental organization. They could no longer be handled as troops, for the officers and men were not together. Men and officers mingled together liromiscuously ; and it is 196 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. worthy of remark that this disorganization did not result from defeat or fear." One other fact miist be remembered in extenuation : that with the long night march, the burning heat of the day, and the new and intense excitements of the battle-field, the men, famished with hunger and thii-st, were becoming physically exhausted. When, therefore, at half-past four o'clock, the two fresi Confederate brigades had repulsed the Union flank attack west of the Sudley road, and Early's rebel brigade with Beckham's battery suddenly burst through the woods near the Chinn house, still farther to the west, with a vigorous and startling attack on the Union flank and rear, thi'owing into quick confusion and retreat a detachment of Union cavalry stationed in apparent retirement and safety, the battle came to a speedy termination by a sori of universal consent ; a realization and acknowledgment of coming de- feat pervaded the whole army, and found instant expression in increased disorganization and immediate movement to- ward a general retreat. Whatever may have been the other discouragements, the main impulse of this movement came from the universal belief that Johnston's anny had now anived, and that success had thereby become hopeless. The question of Johnston's possible presence in the battle had mn thi'oiigh the Centreville camj^s, and there were rumors of his coming on Saturday night; but the ai-my ai:)15arently had no suspicion that it was fighting him all day Sunday, till the moment of the attack on the extreme left by one of Beauregard's brigades. That attack from an unexpected quarter seemed convincing proof of the j^resence^ of a new and additional force, and therefore roused the quick instinct of retreat, not so much in acknowledgment of actual defeat, as in prudent avoidance of iiTesistible slaugh- ter or capture by overwhelming numbei"s. CHAPTEE XVI. THE RETREAT. The suddenness of tlieir victory vraa entii-ely unexpected by tlie rebels. Signs of disaster to themselves were as strong as to the Federals to the very last. Intense curiosity and solicitude had brought Jefferson Davis from Richmond. It is related that, as he was riding to the battle-field from Manassas, at about four o'clock that afternoon, he met such a stream of panic-stricken rebel soldiers, and heard such direful tidings from the front, that his companions were thoroughly con-sdneed the Confederates had lost the day, and implored him to turn back for j^ersonal safety. He went on, against their advice, to find that the conflict was ah'eady over, and to learn, with mingled amazement and joy, that the Union army had, by a sudden and unexplained impulse, ceased fighting, and half marched, half run from the field. McDowell was no less astounded at his own overwhelming reverse. A little before Elzey and Early appeared on his right to outflank him, there had been a lull in the Confed- erate firing that led him to hope the enemy was giving way. At the very worst there seemed no doubt of his ability to "hold the Warrenton turnpike and stone bridge and. main- tain free communication with Centreville. For this abun- dant resources were yet available. Biu-nside's brigade had remained in reserve on the morning's battle-field, and, after 103 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. four hours' rest, was vet capable of effective service. Keyes' brigade beyond the hiU, on his left, was substantially un- hamied. Schenck had an almost fresh brigade at the stone bridge. Miles had a brigade at Centre\ille, which could be replaced from Eunyon's division near Vienna. The engi- neei-s had cleared away the ahattis at the stone bridge. The hills north of the TVarrenton turnpike were excellent defen- sive positions. It needed but morale among the troops to hold the battle-gi'ound, and holding this would have com- l^elled the enemy to retreat. Unfortunately the Union army had lost its morale. The mere disorder of the final repulse was slight ; but the de- moi-alization and loss of discipline had been growing during tho whole afternoon, until, of a sudden, the army was half- dissolved. The impulse of retreat once started, there was no checking or controlling it. Despite the efforts and ap- peals of McDowell and his officei-s, the various detachments began moving from the field. The commander yielded to necessity, made the best dispositions he could to cover the retreat, and passed the word to reassemble in the old camps at Centre^'ille, not doubting that he could there make a i-ally. The way thither by the Wanenton turnpike was open and straight ; the distance four and a half miles. But, through the perversity of fate, each detachment now retreated by the same road over which it had come. Thus the bulk of the anny — the brigades of Porter, Burnside, Franklin, Wilcox, and Howard — went back over the long detoiir of ten miles round by Sudley Ford; these had with them, as yet, two batteries — a total of ten field-pieces ; for only the batteries of Ricketts and Griffin were lost in the main battle. Sher- man's brigade, on the other hand, marched eastward, over the ground of the morning's conflict, and recrossed Bull THE RETREAT. 199 Bun at the ford, half a mile above the stone bxidge, by which they had approached. Keyes' brigade, becoming aware of the general retreat, also returned by that route. These two, with Schenck's brigade, soon reached the War- renton road, making a comparatively easy march to Centre- vUle. It also becomes necessary to mention here that, while the main battle of the afternoon was going on, a second engage- ment had been fought at Blackburn's Ford. The brigades of Bichardson and of Davies were sent there in the morning, to make such demonstrations as would mask McDowell's real movement. In the afternoon, however, their pui'pose became ajiparent ; and to relieve the stress of the main bat- tle, the Confederate commander sent orders to Jones' bri- gade to cross Bull Bun and make a demonstration. At about four o'clock, Jones, with his three regiments, crossed at McLean's Ford, and endeavored, by a flank movement, to capture Hunt's battery stationed with Davies' brigade. Da- vies quietly watched the oncoming rebel regiments, rear- ranged his lines, and held his fire in resei-ve till the enemy were deploying to form line of battle. They had advanced within five hundred yards, only, however, to fijid themselves emban-assed by woods and broken ground. In this situa- tion and dilemma Davies ordered Hunt's battery of six guns to open upon them with grape and canister. The rebel of- ficial report characteiizes it as a " murderous shower," and, no doubt, correctly. It scattered the attacldng column as if by enchantment ; in thirty minutes there was not a soldier of them to be seen, and Jones modestly reports a loss in the affair of fourteen killed and sixty-two wounded. It was now near sundown. Miles, commanding at Centre- ville, either through illness or drunkermess, had become in- capable of duty — a situation whose serious consequences 200 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. were averted by the prudence and good behavior of the three brigade commanders. But, from this cause, prema- ture orders were received by the two brigades of Dalies and Richardson to fall back on Centre\Tlle ; while to Blenker the more judicious order was given to advance his brigade toward Stone Bridge, which he did, deploying it in line of battle across the "Warrenton turnpike, half-way between Centreville and Cub Run. As soon as Jolinston and Beauregard had suflBciently re- covered from their astonishment at seeing the Union army in unmistakable retreat, they ordered pui-suit to be made, but, as it would seem, with the greatest caution. In tnith, McDowell's vanquished brigades marched from the imme- diate battle-field only half -disbanded ; there remained, in most instances, a little nucleus at least of each organization, which yet, for a time, held together, while several of the brigades were nearly intact. Thus it happened that, while the battalion of rebel cavalry under Sttiait was ordered to piirsue along the Sudley road, they found the Union forces generally so compact, and the rear so well protected, that they could only dash in here and there and pick up or scat- ter isolated squads of stragglers. Another resei-ve battalion of rebel cavalry under Radford was sent in jiursuit from the vicinity of Ball's Ford up toward the turnpike ; while John- ston also sent orders to Bonham to take the remainder of liis own and Longstreet's brigades, and move against the line of retreat at Centreville. Radford, like Stuai-t, saw that the retreating brigades of Sherman, Keyes, and Schenck were too formidable to attack ; and Bonham, on nearing Centre- \'ille, found the brigades of Blenker, Richardson, and Davies so well posted, and so superior in numbers, that he was quite content to stop with a mere reconnoissance, and at nightfall returned to his camps behind Mitchell's and Blackburn's THE RETREAT. 201 Fords. Meanwhile, though the Confederate pursuit coukl nowhere venture a serious assault, an accident served to greatly enlarge their harvest of trophies. The business of war was such a novelty, that McDowell's army accumulated an extraordinary number of camp-fol- lowers and non-combatants. The vigilant newspapers of the chief cities sent a cloud of correspondents to chronicle the incidents of the march and conflict. The volunteer regi- ments carried with them j)ersonal sympathies and compan- ionships unknown to regular armies. Congress had met in special session ; and senators and representatives, full of the patriotic hope and i^ride of their several States, no less than their own eager political solicitude, in several instances joined in what many rashly assumed would be a mere tri- umphal parade. McDowell's unoi^posed and api^arently ir- resistible advance through the enemy's outposts lured them on to Centreville in a false security ; and the unifonnly favorable reports w^hich went back to Washington even brought out a fresh accession of the same material on Sun- day morning of the battle. By that time, however, the situation had become more serious, and generally made the non-combatants somewhat circiimsj)ect. Only a few of hardier courage followed to the battle-field ; most of them remained at Centreville until the cannonade announced the beginning of the fight, and then drifted gradually down the turnjoike toward the stone bridge, not nearer than a mile and a half to the actual fight- ing, but where they could hear the volleys, see the smoke and dust, and perhaps the occasional mancEuvres of Schenck's and Keyes' brigades. In a certain sense they were under fire, because the long-range shells of the field-pieces ren- dered even that locality somewhat dangerous. From this situation were wiitten many highly sensational, but purely C02 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. iinaginarr and most gi'otesquelv confused accounts of the battle, first publislied in the newsjiapers. A famous corre- spondent of the London Times, who earned the sobriquet of "Bull Eun Eussell," WTote his description of the affair for Euroj^ean readers, after a leism-ely lunch at Centrevilie, and a stroll of perhaps a mile toward Stone Bridge, taking his departure with the earliest fugitives. It also happened that on the afternoon of the battle a considerable number of provision, baggage, and ammuni- tion wagons, together with some private vehicles of the non-combatants heretofore mentioned, had been sent down the Warrenton turnpike from Centrevilie, toward the stone bridge. When finallv the fii'st wave of fugitives brought unfavorable news from the front, these began a general movement in return, which unavoidably produced quick confusion and blockade ; and it was chiefly among these that the disgracefvd panic and flight, which has furnished the nearly universal theme of criticism of the battle, first broke out. Naturally the tide of disaster rose qiiick and high ; the retreating brigades, and nearer approach of can- nonade and musketiy, soon confirmed the worst fears of overwhelming defeat and pressing pursuit, and started a veritable scramble and stampede for safety. Ai-ms and clothing were thrown away by those on foot ; wagons were abandoned, and even ambulances with wounded soldiers left standing in the road, while the frightened teamstera rode away at headlong speed, on horses unhitched or cut out of their harness. It would seem that things had already come to this pass before the columns which were retreating around the long detour by way of Sudley Springs and Ford once more came in sight of the WaiTenton turnpike, at a point between Stone Bridge and Cub Bun. Cub Eun seems to have been THE RETREAT. 203 a difficult little stream, ijrovided with a " suspension bridge" of some kind where the turnpike crosses it. Radford's cav- alry had not only been hovering along and occasionally dash- ing in on the turnpike, but a rebel light battery succeeded in establishing itself where it commanded the " suspension bridge." When the retreating column from Sudley Ford came in sight, they found to their consternation that it was necessary to iim the gauntlet of this artillery fii-e. " The enemy opened fire," says Bumside's report, "upon the re- treating mass of men. Upon the bridge crossing Cub Run, a shot took effect upon the horses of a team that was cross- ing. The wagon was overiurned directly in the centre of the bridge, and the i^assage was completely obstructed. The enemy continued to play his ariilleiy upon the train, can'iages, ambulances, and artillery wagons that filled up the road, and these were reduced to ruin. The artillery could not possibly pass, and five pieces of the Rhode Island battery, which had been safely brought off the field, were here lost." The four pieces of Ar'nold's battery were also abandoned here from this cause. Four pieces of Carlisle's batteiy were apjjarently lost in the same neighborhood, though from a charge of Radford's cavalry. This " suspen- sion bridge " over Cub Run was distant some three miles from the main battle-field, and it was here that the enemy made his largest caj^ture of guns and wagons. It may ba imagined that at Confederate headc[uarters that night the measure of satisfaction was well-nigh lull. Yet that their rejoicing was tempered with a serious alloy of rebel danger and losses, is also clearly enough revealed in Jefferson Da\ds' telegraphic bulletins. " A terrible battle is ragmg," said his first. "We have won a glorious," though dear-bought victory," was the language of his second. In his third he repeated, "Night has closed upon a hard- 204 TirE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION fought field. Our forces have won a glorious ^'ictory." He forbore to add, what the oflScial reports and correspondence afterward developed, namely : that not only was the field "hard-fought" and the victorj^ "dear-bought," but they were by no means confident it was final. On the conti-ary, the rebel headquartei*s was in serious api^rehension lest McDowell should turn from Centre\ille and once more assail the Confedei-ate right flank at or below Blackburn's Ford. To meet this reported danger, Ewell and Holmes were that night ordered jjost-haste back to Union Mills. "You will not fail to remember," afterward wTote Jefferson Da\'is to Beauregard, "that, so far fi-om knowing the enemy was routed, a large part of om* forces was moved by you, in the night of the 21st, to repel a supposed attack u^^on our right, and the next day's operations did not fully reveal what lias since been reported of the enemy's panic." "When McDowell left the battle-field his intention and orders were to rally at Centreville. But, alTi^-ing there, he found the conditions less favorable than he anticipated. It had been designed that Blenker's brigade should, during the day, throw up intrenchnients ; this was not done, because the necessary tools did not get forward as expected. Next he found that DaWes and Bichardson had left their stations at Blackbiu'u's Ford and were falling back. " Great God ! Richardson," exclaimed IMcDowell, on meeting that officer, "why didn't you hold on to the position at Blackburn's Ford?" "Colonel Miles ordered me to retreat to Centre- \-ille, and I obeyed the order ; Colonel Miles is continually iuterfeiing with me, and he is drunk, and is not fit to com- mand," was the reply. The officer stood justified, for Mc- Dowell had ah-eady susi^ended Miles from command. The retrogi-ade movement was stopi)ed, the biigades were faced about and put in the best possible line of defence, with THE RETREAT. 205 orders to hold the position. Repairing again to Centreville, McDowell found still further discouragement in the loss of the thirteen guns at Cub Rim and the increased disorder among the trooj)s. When, toward nine o'clock — just about night-fall for that season — the last brigade reached Centre- ville, and the various commanders were called together, it was generally agreed that it was unwise to undertake to make a stand, as contemi)lated. " The condition of our artillery and its ammunition," says McDowell's report, " and the want of food for the men, who had generally abandoned or thrown away all that had been issued the day before, and the utter disorganization and consequent de- moralization of the mass of the army, seemed to all who were near enough to be consulted — division and brigade commanders and staff — -to admit of no alternative but to fall back." If these reasons might be questioned, there was still another absolutely conclusive. The enlistment of the thi'ee months men was exijiring. The Pennsylvania Fourth, which had insisted upon and received its discharge that very mornhig, while the army was advancing to battle, " moved to the rear to the sound of the enemy's cannon." "In the next few days," continues McDowell, " day by day I should have lost ten thousand of the best armed, drilled, officered, and disciplined troops in the army." The i^ractical logic of war is stern and swift. Even while the officers were deliberating, the disorganized fugitives, in a contagious and increasing panic, were already on the march. Toward ten o'clock Mc- Dowell began to distribute his orders to retire from Centre- ville ; and a little after midnight Richardson's and Blenker's brigades marched away from that village in a deliberate and orderly retreat, maintaining their organization as a steady and effective rear-guard till they once more reached the Potomac camps. CHAPTER XVn. CONCLUSION. The official reports show a loss to the Union side in the battle of Bull Run of 25 guns (the Confederates claim 28), 4S1 men killed, 1,011 men wounded, and 1,460 wounded and o';her Union soldiers sent as jirisoners to Eichmond. On the Confederate side the loss was 387 killed, 1,582 wounded," and a few prisoners taken. These simple figures prove the engagement to have been well contested and fought with equal courage and persist- ence by both sides. Greatly ridiculed and denounced when it occurred, the battle of Bull Run is gradually find- ing its vindication. General Sherman says ib was " one of the best-planned battles of the war, but one of the worst- fought," and that " both armies were fairly defeated." Gen- eral Johnston says : " If the tactics of the Federals had been equal to their strategy, we should have been beaten." To the military student, Bull Run, with its extended field of strategy, its quick changes of plan, its fl.uctuating chances and combinations, and i':s rapidly shifting incidents and ac- cidents, is a most interesting, and likely to become a typical, " game of war " between volunteer armies. The loyal people in Washington were rejoicing over a ^'ic- toiy, steadily reported during the greater part of the day, when suddenly, at about five o'clock, came the stai'tling tele- CONCLUSION. 207 gram : " Genei-al McDowell's army in hill retreat through Centreville. The day is lost. Save Washington and the remnants of this army." General Scott refused to credit the astounding and unwelcome intelligence. Nevertheless he jnit the Alexandria and Arlington camps into actiWty, sent confidential notice to Baltimore, called reinforcements from Harrisburg and New York, and suggested to McClellan to " come down to the Shenandoah Valley with such troops as can be spared from Western Virginia." By midnight, officers and civilians who were lucky enough to have retained horses began to arrive, and the api^arent proportions of the defeat to increase. It was a gloomy night, but yet gloomier days followed. Next day, Monday, the rain commenced falling in torrents, and continued for thii-ty-six hours with but slight intermission. Thi'ough this rain the disbanded soldiers began to pour into Washington City, fagged out, himgry, and dejected, and ha^-ing literally nowhere to turn their feet or lay their head. Histoiy owes a page of honor- able mention to the Federal cajiital for its unselfish gener- osity on this occasion. The rich and poor, the high and low of her loyal people, with one quick and entirely unprompted impulse opened their doors and dealt out food and refresh- ment to the footsore, haggard, and half-starved men, whom ill-luck rather than their own delinquency had so unexpect- edly reduced to tramps and fugitives. The evil was, however, quickly remedied. By Monday noon the full extent of the disaster, though not yet certainly known, could be reasonably estimated, since indications be- gan to show that the enemy had not pressed their pursuit in force. But, in due preparation for the worst, and in addi- tion to all possible precautions for local defence. General McClellan was called to Washington to take command, Mc- Dowell being continued in charge of the defenses on the 208 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. Virginia side of the Potomac. Patterson's time having ex- pired, he was mnstered out of the service ; Banks was sent to Harper's Ferry, Dix put in command at Baltimore, and Bosecrans in West Virginia. Coming to Washington under the favoi-able acquaintance- ship and estimate of General Scott, and with the prestige of his recent success in "West Virginia, McClellan's arrival was hailed by officials and citizens with something more than ordinary waimth and satisfaction. This good opinion was 'greatly augmented by the General's own personal conduct. He exhibited at once a promising energy and industry in repaiiing the shattered anny organization ; cleared "Wash- ington City of stragglers ; established a more perfect military discipline than had hitherto been maintained ; displayed great tact in his first intercourse with both junior and senior officers ; was free, aflfable, kind, patient, and attentive to all ; manifested great talent and unceasing watchfulness in the details of military admioisti-ation ; and being young, vigi- lant, cheerful, intelligent, and apparently possessed of gi-eat professional skill, he reaped, almost at a single hanest, a well-nigh universal popularity. It is in its political aspects that BuD Run becomes a gi-eat historical landmark. To say that the hope and enthusiasm of the North received a painful shock of humiliation and disappointment, is to use but a mild description of the popu- lar feeling. This fii-st experience of defeat — or recognition of even the possibility of defeat — was inexpressibly bitter. Stifling the shaii^ son-ow, however, the great public of the Free States sent up its prompt and united demand that the contest should be continued and the disgrace wiped out. Impatience and over eagerness were chastened and repressed ; and the North reconciled itself to the painful prospect of a tedious civil war all the more readily because of the necessity CONCLUSION. 209 of bending every energy to immediate preparation on a •widely extended scale. If the North was cast down by the result of Bull Eun, the South was in even a gi-eater ratio encouraged and strength- ened. Vanity of pei-sonal prowess is a weakness of Southern character ; and Bull Eun became to the unthinking a demon- stration of Southern invincibility. To the more cautious leadei-s the event was yet sufficiently flattering to inspire them with full confidence in ultimate success. Perhaps the most jjotent influence of the battle was upon foreign nations, who now looked upon the Confedei-ate States as a belligerent of " great expectations ; " while sijeculative foreign capital turned somewhat eagerly to this promising new field of con- traband trade. An important event, so silent in its operation that the public was scarcely conscious it was occunlng, now became the pivot and controlling force of militaiy operations. This was the disbandment of the thiee months volunteers. Within a few weeks almost the whole seventy-five thou- sand men were mustered out and returned to their homes. Only a few regiments re-enlisted with organizations even approximately unbroken ; but out of the whole number of troops thus suddenly dissolved a considerable proportion immediately entered the three years service as individuals, and in many instances theii- drill and experience seciu-ed them election or appointment as officers in the new regi- ments. Thus the disappearance of an army brought a cer- tain compensation ; it not only fiu-nished the new volunteers a quickening leaven, but that portion which went home to every Free State, and to some of the Border Slave States, served to greatly strengthen and correct public opinion in their several localities. The three years quota, and the increase of the regular 14 210 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. army, called by President Lincoln in advance of strict au- thority of law at the beginning of May, had so far progressed that garrisons and camps suffered no serious diminution. Congi-ess, being convened in special session, now legalized their enlistment, perfected their organization, and made libei*al jjrovision for their equipment and supply. It author- ized an amiy of tive hundi-ed thousand men, and a national loan of two hundred and fifty millions of dollars ; it pro- vided an increase of the navy to render the blockade vigi- lant and rigorous ; and enforcement, revenue, confiscation, and piracy laws were enacted or amended to meet the exi- gencies of active rebellion. Pending the change and transfonnation of the volunteer forces from the three months to the thi-ee yeai's service, military operations necessarily came to a general cessation. Washington City, especially, and the fortified strip of terri- toiy held by the Union armies on the Virginia side of the Potomac, once more became a gi-eat military camp. Here, under McClellan's personal supei-vision, grew up that famous Army of the Potomac, about which future volumes of this series will have much to say. But in its formation, organi- zation, comi)lete equipment, and thorough drill the second half of the year 1861 jiassed away. A few intensely exciting incidents occuiTed, of which the Ball's Bluff disaster wa.s, perhaps, the chief; but their consideration in detail does not fall wdthin the scope of the present volume. In the rebel camps, also, inaction was both a policy and a necessity during the remainder of the year. The trophies of Bull Run ha^dng been gathered up, and its glorj' vaunted in Southern newspajjers and stump speeches, the rebel com- mander once more advanced his outposts to the positions held before the battle, while the bulk of his army turned Manassas into a fortified camp. Some of the earliest rea- CONCLUSION. 211 sons for this course are explained by Johnston with bhmt frankness. " The Confederate army," he -writes, " was more disorganized by victory than that of the United States by defeat. The Southern volunteers believed that the objects of the war had been accomplished by their victory, and that they had achieved all that their country required of them. Many, therefore, in ignorance of theii- military obligations, left the army, not to return. Some hastened home to exhibit the troi^hies picked up on the field ; others left their regi- ments without ceremony to attend to wounded friends, fre- quently accompanying them to hospitals in distant towns. Such were the rejiorts of general and staff officers and rail- road officials. Exaggerated ideas of victory prevailing among our troops cost us more men than the Federal army lost by defeat." It would ajjpear that, about a month after the battle of Bull Eun, the rebel commanders in\dted Jefferson Da\T[s to Manassas to discuss a plan of active operations for the autumn. Generals Johnston, Beauregard, and G. W. Smith proposed "the concentration there of all the available forces of the Confederate States, crossing the Potomac ii^to Mary- land at the nearest ford with this army, and jilacing it in rear of Washington. This," wi-ites Johnston, " we thoixght would compel McClellan to fight with the chances of battle against him. Success would bring Marshland into the Confederacy, we thought, and enable us to transfer the war to the north- em border of that State, where the defensive should be re- sumed." Da^ds' conclusive re^Dly was, " that the whole coun- try was applying for arms and troops ; that he could take none from other points for that army." Of the larger aspects of the civil war during the fall and winter of 1861, this volume does not afford further room to give even a summary. Starting with a series of favorable 212 THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. accidents in the spring, the rebellion had confidently ex- pected to hold every slave-holding State. So far from real- izing this hope, the end of the year witnessed the substantial loss to the conspiracy of the foiu- imijoilant Border States of Maryland, West Virginia, Kentucky, and ^Missouri. This, together with the effective blockade instituted on the sea- board, and the lodgment gained by the brilliant naval vic- tories at Hatteras and Port Koyal, already presaged the fate of disunion. In a rough and hasty measurement of strength and unity, political and military, the relative proportions of population, wealth, and skill, and the no less potent elements of devotion to fi-eedom, justice, and humanity, had ali-eady so far turned the scale as to foreshadow, with unening cer- tainty, that the seceding States would ultimately fail in their desperate appeal from the ballot to the bullet. For the present, however, both the contestants remained confident, determined, and unceasingly active in gatheiing the huge annies destined, in the coming spring, to renew the mighty conflict. END. INDEX. Aberckombie, Colonel, 166 Alabama, attitude of with regard to secession, 2, 8 ; secession of, 14 Alexandria, Va., 103 ; fortified, 167 Alleghany Mountains, 126, 137 Anderson, Major Robert, 22 ; transfers his forces to Fort Surnter, 28 et seq. ; his letter to Governor Pickens, 35 ; his reply to President Lincoln's letter, 58 ; his reply to Con- federate authorities, 61, 131, 135 Annapolis, 100, 102 et seq.; route by, to the capital, 106 et seq. Arkansas, 80, 121 Arlington Heights, Va., occupied by Union forces, 110 ; forti- fied, 169 Ashby's Gap, 1G8 Baker, Edward D.,76 Ball's Bluff, engagement at, 210 Baltimore, 83 ; attack on the Mas- sachusetts soldiers in, 85 et seq., 98 ; authorities burn R.R. bridges, 89 Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 1-11 Bates, Attorney-General, 122 Banks, General N. P., 208 Barrancas, Fort, 38 Beauregard, General G. T., 56 ; di- rects operations against Fort Sumter, 57, 59 ; placed in com- mand at Manassas, 170 ; his first measures, 170, 171 ; his plan for the battle of Bull Run, 176 et seq. ; composition of his army, 176, note Beckham, Captain, 198 Bee, General, 185 Bell, adherents of, 8 Benham, Captain, 153 Beverly, 142, 146, 151 Black, Secretary, 26, 33 Blackburn's Ford, 176, note ; en- gagement at, 178 Blair, Francis P. , 109 Blair, Frank P., Jr., 116 et seq., 122 Blair, Montgomery, 123 Blair's Home Guards, 118 Blenker, General L., 174 Boonville, battle of, 133 Border Slave States, 80 Breckenridge, John C, Southern electoral votes cast for, 4, 8 Breckenridge party, character of, 8 Brown, John, 158 2U INDEX. Brown, Governor, of Georgia, 13 Brown, Mayor, of Baltimore, 86, 8'.) et seq. Buchanan, James, President, char- acter of, 17 et seq.. Southern sympathy of, IS ; his message to Congress, 19, 23 et seq. ; in- terview with the South Caro- lina Commissioner.s, 28, 30, ol ; correspondence with the Wash- ington Cabal, o7 ; justifies the revolution of the South, 69 ; his Union sentiment as ex- president, 76 Buckhannon, 147 Buckner, Simon B., 130, 133, ia5 Bull Run, Ui3 ; position and course of, 176; battle of, 181 et seq. ; its effects, 2(6, 208 Burnside, General A. E., 174 Bunker Hill, Va., 163 Butler, General B. P., 93 et seq , 108 Cabinet, decision of, with regard to Fort Sumter, 51 Cadwalader, General, 157 Cairo. 128, 182, 134 Campbell, Justice, 54 ; his treach- ery, 3."), 57, 69 Carrick's Ford, 152 et seq. Cass, General, Secretary of State, 24; resigns, 26; supports the Union cause, 76 Centre ville, Va., 177 Charleston, S. C, situation of, 30, 79 Cheat River, 146, 153 Chinn House, the, 194 Chanibersbnrg, Pa., 156 Cincinnati, 132, 140 Clay, Henry, 127 Cobb, Secretary Howell, 13, 17, 20, 26,43 Cockeys ville, 90 Columbia, District of, 83 Columbus, 134 et seq. Confederacy, Southern, first for- mal proposal of, 26 ; estab- lished, 41 ; military resources of, 79 ; sends diplomatic agent3 to Europe, 79 ; natural resour- ces of, 81 Confederates resolve to begin the war, 60 Constitution of the Confederate States adopted, 41 Cox, General J. D., 1.54 Crawford, Commissioner, 57 Crittenden, John J. , 70 Cub Hun, 200 Cumberland, Department of the, 135 Cumberland Gap, 135 Cummings Point, 63 et seq. Gushing, Caleb, 76 Davies, General T. A., 174 Davis, Jefferson, 25 et seq. , 40 ; elected President of the Con- federacy, 41 ; opposes the at- tack on Fort Sumter, 50 ; be- lief of Northern aid, 71 ; offers letters of marque and reprisal, 78 ; call for volunteers, 79 ; his message to Governor Letcher, 92 ; letter to Governor Jackson, 117, 158; speech of, at Rich- mond, 169 " Declaration of Causes " by South Carolina, 5 et seq. Dennison, Governor, 140 Dix, Secretary John A., 33, 76, 208 INDEX. 215 Doubleday, Captain (afterward General) Abner, 29, 64 Douglas, Stephen A., adherents of, 8 ; his interview with Presi- dent Lincoln, 76 Dogan Heights, 191 Drake, Captain, 117 Dumont, Colonel, 143, 153 Ellsworth, Col. E. E., 110 et Beq. ; shot at Alexandria, 1 13 ; buried from the White House, 114 Ellsworth's Zouaves, 110 Elzey, General, 194 Evans, Colonel, 183 Evarts, Wm. M., 76 Everett, Edward, 76 Falling Waters, W. Va., skir- ruish at, 103 Federal Hill, Baltimore, 108 Field, David Dudley, 76 Fitzpatrick, Senator, 37 Florida, attitude of, with regard to secession, 2, 8 ; secession of, 14 Floyd, Secretary, 6, 17, 20, 23 et seq., 20, 30; his malfeasance in office, 31 ; resigns, 33 Pollansbee, Captain, 80 et seq. Foster, Captain, 28, 03 Fox, Captain G. V., .51 ; sails in command of expedition for re- lief of Fort Sumter, 59 Franklin, General W. B., 174 Fremont, General J. C, 133 Frost, D. M., 117 et seq. Gainesville, Va., 181 Gamble, Hamilton R., 125 Gamett, General, 146, 154 Georgia, attitude of, with regard to secession, 2, 8, 12 ; seces- sion of, 13 et seq. Gist, Governor of South Carolina, his circular letter, 1, 8, 27 Gosport Navy Yard, destruction of, 96 et seq. Grafton, 142 et seq., 146 Grant, General U. S., 134 Great Bethel, Va., engagement at, 173 Green, Captain, 117 Griffin, Captain, 188, 191, 192 Guthrie, Colonel, 131 Hagerstown, Md., 157 Hamlin, Hannibal, 76 Harney, General, 119 et seq. Harper's Ferry, United States Ar- mory at, 83 ; capture of, by rebels, 95, 98 ; retaken from the rebels, 157; weakness of, 158 ; destroyed by Johnston, 161 Harrisburg, 100 Hayne, I. W., 35, 37 Heintzelman, General S. P., com- mands Third Division on ad- vance to Manassas, 174 Henry House, the, 187 Hickman, Ky., l.'J4 Hicks, Governor, 83, 88 et seq. , 94 Houston, Governor, his scheme of independent sovereignty for Texas, 13 ; deposed from office, 14 Holt, Secretary, .33, 37, 84 Howard, General O. O.. 174 Hughes, Archbishop, 76 Hunter, General David, 25 ; com- mands Second Division in the advance oa Manassas, 174 216 INDEX. Huttonaville, 147 Illinois, 127 Imboden, General, 185 Indiana, 127 ; volunteers, 128 Iverson, Secretary, 12 Jackson, Camp, 117; captured by General Lyon, 118 et seq. : Jackson, Fort, 79 j Jackson, General T. J. ("Stone- wall"). 187 i Jackson, Governor, llo ct seq., 119, 121 et seq., 124 Jackson, murderer of Ellsworth, 113 Jefferson City, 1 23 Jefferson, Fort, on Tortugas Island, 16 Johnston, General Joseph E., re- i signs from Federal army, 108 ; in command at Harper's Ferry, 158 ; destroys Harper's FeiTy, ; 161; movements of, before Pat- ' terson, in the Shenandoah Val- j ley, 1(52 et seq. ; his march to ' Manassas, 108 ; in command at Bull Run, 182 et seq. ; opinion of, on the battle of Bull Run, 211 Jones, Colonel (of the Massachu- setts Sixth), 84 Jones. Lieuteuant, 95 Kan.\wha, proposed State of, 146 Kanawha River, the Great, 141 ; valley, 140 Kane, Marshal, 87, 88 et seq. Kelly, Colonel, 142 et seq. Kentucky, 80 ; attitude of, with regard to secession, 52, 129 ct seq. ; Union Legislature of, 130 et seq., UU Keyes, General E. D., 174 Key's Ferry, Va., 103 Laukel Hill, 147, 151 et seq. Lee, General Robert E. , 108 ; ap- pointed to command of Vir- ginia forces, lot); his plans in W. Va., 146; plans of, 109, 170 Leedsville, 151 Leesburg, Va., 103 Lefferts, Colonel, {^2 et seq. Letcher, Governor, 82. 91, 109, 141 Lewis' Ford, 17(5, note Liberty. Mo., United States Arse- nal at, 117 Lincoln, Abraham, election of, 4; his progress to Washington, 45 et seq.; his early career, 4(5 ; his character and per- son, 47 et seq. ; his speeches before inauguration, 48 ; in- auguration of, 49 ; anxiety about Fort Sumter, .50 et seq. ; orders the relief of Forts Sum- ter and Pickens, 53 ; his final resolution with regard to Fort Sumter, 55 ; his letter to Ma- jor Anderson, 58 ; communi- cation to Gov. Pickens, 59 his first war proclamation. 73 interviews with Douglas, 70 blockades the insurgent ports, 78 ; interview with Baltimore committee, 100 ; issues a sec- ond call for volunteers. 100; his orders to P. F. Blair, Jr. , 122 ; his measures to sive the Border States. 131 Liverpool cotton merchants, 79 Longstreet, General, 179 INDEX. 217 Louisiana, attitude of, with regard to secession, 3, 8 ; secession of, 14 Louisville, 135 Lyon, Captain Nathaniel, 116 et seq., 123 et seq., 123 Lyons, Lord, 94 Magoffix, Governor, 126 et seq., 132, 184 et seq. Mallory, Senator, 37 et seq., 40 Manassas, first movement against, 162 et seq. ; description of, 175 et seq. Manchester, Eng., cotton opera- tors of, 79 Martinsburg, W. Va.. 163, 163 Maryland, attitude of, with regard to secession, 53, S3, 80 ; rebel conspiracies to gain, 107, 108 ; Union enlistments in, 131 Mason, Senator, 25, 91, 143 Massachusetts Eighth Infantry, 92, 103 Massachusetts Sixth Infantrj', 84 ; attack upon, in Baltimore, 85 et seq. ; map of its route through Baltimore, 85, 99 McCauley, Commandant, 96 McClellan, Gen. George B. , placed in command of Dept. of the Ohio, 140; in West Va., 143, 146 et seq., 1.53 et seq. ; ap- pointed to command the army of the Potomac, 207, 208 McDowell, General Irvin, in com- mand at Arlington Heights, 173 ; his plan and movements, 173 et seq. ; his report cited, 175 ; plan of battle at Bull Run, 177 ; change in his plans, 179, 181 ; his action during and after the battle, 181-205 ; in charge of the Virginia de- fences, 208 McLane's Ford, 176, note McRee, Fort, 38 Memphis, 133 MUes, General D. S., commands Fifth Division on advance to Manassas, 174 ; misconduct and suspension of, 199, 204 Militia, first call for, 73 et seq. Milroj% Colonel, 153 et seq. Milvale, 90 Mississippi, attitude of, with re- gard to secession, 2, 8 ; seces- sion of, 14 Missouri, attitude of, with regard to secession, 52, 80, 115 ; Unionists of, 120 ; without lo- cal government, 124 ; rescued from secessionists, 135, 131, 133 Mitchell's Ford, 176, note Montgomery, 93 Morgan, Fort, 79 Morris, General, 143, 147, 151 Morton, Governor, 129 Moultrie, Fort, 31 et seq., 28; seizure of, 33 National property in the South- ern States, 15 ; seizure of, by secessionists, 16 ; S. Carolina Commissioners treat for deliv- ery of, 27 Nelson, Lieutenant WUliam, 131 et seq. New York City, proposition for secession of, 71 ; war meeting in, 92 New York Seventh Infantr}', 103 Norfolk Navy Yard, 83 ; destroyed, 96 218 INDEX. North Carolina, attitude of, with Provincial Congress of the rebel regard to secession, 1, 80 States, 37, o'J et seq. North, its misapprehension of Pulaski, Fort, 80 Southern opinion, 71 et seq. Pierpont, F. H., Governor, 145 Ohio levies, 128 Ohio, Military Department of the, 140 Ohio River, 127 Paducah, 134 Palmetto flag, 32 Parkersburg, 142 Patterson, General Robert, 155 ; map of his campaign, 1.59; indecision of, 101 ; Scott's or- ders to, 103 et seq. Pawnee, the, 110 Pegram, Colonel, 147 Pensacola, 38, 79 Pennsylvania, Military Depart- ment of, 155 Philippa, 143 et seq. ; battle of, 144, 140 et seq. Phillips, Wendell, 76 Pickens, Fort, at Pensacola, 16, 38, 51, 53 Pickens, Francis W., Governor of South Carolina, 5, 32 ; de- mands surrender of Fort Sum- ter, 35, .50 et seq. , 59 Pierce, ex-President, 7G PUlow, General, 133, 134 Pinckney, Castle, 20 ; seizure of, 32 Polk, General Leonidas, 134 et seq. Porter, General Andrew, 174 Porter, General Fitz-John, 157, 166 Porterfield, Colonel, 142 et seq., 146 Potomac River, 126 Price, Sterling, 121 et seq., 124 Rebellion, the beginning of, 1 ; first formal proposal of, 26 Relay House, 90 Richardson, Generjl J. B., 174, 178 Richmond, 92; Confederate seat of government transferred to, 169 Rich Mountain, 147, 151, 153 Ricketts, Captain, 188, 191, 192 Roaring Creek, 149 Robinson, Camp Dick, 132 Robinson House, the, 187 Rosecrans, General W. S., 149, 154, 208 Rxmyon, General Theodore, com- mands Fourth Division in ad- vance to Manassas, 174 Russell, Dr. W. H., 202 Sandford, General. 1C3 Santa Rosa Island, 38 Schenck, General R. C, 74 Scott, General Winfield, at Wash- ington, 24, 49 ; views on the relief of Fort Sumlier, 51 ; or- ders the reinforcement of Har- per's Ferry, 95 et seq.; concen- trates troops in Washington, 99 et seq.; protects St. Louis, 110 ; orders and suggestions to Patterson, 162 et seq. ; his campaign plans, 171, 173 St. George, W. Va., 151 St. Louis, 1 10 St. Philip, Fort, 79 INDEX. 219 Secession, causes of, 1 et seq. ; passage of ordinance of, in Soutli Carolina, 5 et seq., 14 ; true character of, 8 ; cabal in Washington, 17, 23, 36 Seventh Regiment of New York, 9"2 et seq. Seward, Secretary, opposes reliev- ing Fort Sumter, 51 ; his idea of the conspiracy, 52 ; his re- ply to the rebel commission- ers, 54 ; interview with Judge Campbell, 54, 94 Shepherdstown, IGO Sherman, General W. T., 174 Slavery, false assumption of the South with regard to, 7 ; the corner-stone of the Confeder- acy, 43 Slidell, Senator. 37, 40 Slemmer, Lieutenant, 38 Small's Pennsylvania Brigade, 88 Smith, General G. W., 211 Smith, General Kirby, 194 South Carolina, attitude of, with regard to secession, 1 ; seces- sion of, 5, 14 South Carolina Commissioners have an interview with Presi- dent Buchanan, 30 ; their blindness to their opportunity, 31 Southern States, their differences of territory, etc., 10 et seq. Stanton, Edwin M., 26, 33 " Star of the West," 33 State supremacy, doctrine of, 6 Staunton, Va., 142, 146 Steedman, Colonel, 152 Stephens. Alexander H. , 12; elected Vice-President of the Confederacy, 42 Stone Bridge, the, over Bull Run, 176 and note Stone, General, 163 Strasburg, Va. , 163 Sudley Ford, Bull Run, 183 Sudley road, the, 187 Sullivan's Island, 21 et seq. Sumter, Fort, 21 et seq. ; expedi- tion for the relief of, 53 ; Pres- • ident Lincoln's decision with regard to, 55 ; preparations for the siege of, 56 ; its evacua- tion demanded, 60 ; siege be- gun, 62 ; strength of, 63 ; its disadvantages in the siege, 65 ; surrender of, 68 ; the effect at the North of the attack on, 72 Taylor, Fort, at Key West, 16 Tennessee, 80, 133 et seq. ; East, 135 Texas, course of the conspirators in, 13 ; ordinance of secession submitted to popular vote, 13 ; attitude of, with regard to se- cession, 13 et seq. ; secession of, 14 Thomas, Secretary, 26 Thomas, Colonel, 166 Thompson, Jeff., 118 Thompson, Secretary, 17, 20, 30, 33 Toombs, Senator, 12, 43 Toucey, Secretary, ^ Townsend, Colonel, 153 Twiggs, General, treachery of, 14 Tyler, General Daniel, commands First Division in the advance on Manassas, 174 ; his advance, 177, 178 Union Mills Ford, 176, note 220 INDEX. Vakian, Captain, 174 Vernon, Mount, Va., 103 Vienna Station, Va., ambush at, 173 Virginia, attitude of, with regard to secession, 51 et seq., 80; seces- sion, 98 ; extent and character of, 137 et seq., 109 Virginia, East, 137 ; vote on Seces- sion Ordinance, 143 Virginia, West, 131, 133, 137, 141 ; vote on Secession Ordinance, 143 ; organized as separate State, 144 et seq. ; map of West Virginia battles, 148 ; admitted into the Union, 154 Volnnteers, first enlistment of, 75 ; new, called for, 106 Walker, Secretary, 57, 91 Walker, Robert J., 76 Ward, Captain, 38 Warrenton Turnpike, the, 176 Washington, 83 ; character of, 97 ; defence of, 98 et seq. ; threat- ened, 101 ; arrival of the Mas- sachusetts Sixth and New York Seventh regiments at, 103 et seq. ; becomes a camp, 106 et seq. Washington, Fort, 103 West Union, W. Va., 151 Wheeling, 139, 143 et seq. Wigfall, Senator, 08 Wilcox, General O. B., 174 Williamsport, Pa., 157 Williamsport, W. Va., 163 Winchester, Va., 157, 160 Wise, ex-Governor Henry A., 146, 154 Wood, Mayor Fernando, 71, 76 Woodbury, Captain, cited, 195 Woodruff, Colonel, 131 Young's Branch, 183 ZoLLicOFFER, General, 135 Zouaves, Ellsworth's, 110 MESSRS. CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS have much pleasure in announcing that an undertaking which they have had in progress for several years is now completed ; and that they have begun the publication of a work which they believe will prove the most important of recent contributions to American History. Under the general title of the Campaigns of the Civil War, they will issue a series of volumes, contributed at their soli- ciation by a number of leading actors in and students of the great conflict of i86i-6^, with a view to bringing together, for the first time, a full and authoritative military history of the suppression of the Rebellion. The final and exhaustive form of this great narrative, in which every doubt shall be settled and every detail covered, may be a possibility only of the future. But it is a matter for surprise that twenty years after the beginning of the Rebellion, and when a whole generation lias grown up needing such knowledge, there is no authority which is at the same time of the highest rank, intelligible and trustworthy, and to which a reader can turn for any general view of the field — for a strong, vivid, concise but truly proportioned stoiy of the great salient events. The many reports, regimental histories, memoirs, and other materi- als of value for special passages, require, for their intelligent reading, an ability to combine and proportion them which the ordinary reader does not possess. There have been no attempts at general histories which have supplied this satisfactorily to any large part of the public. Undoubtedly there has been no such narrative as would be especially welcome to men of the new generation, and would be valued by a very great class of readers; — and there has seemed to be great danger that the time would be allowed to jiass when it would be possible to give to such a work the vividness and accuracy that come from personal recollection. These facts led to the conception of the present work. Its possi- bility depended first of all on the consent of the circle of authors to whom, only, the publishers could look to carry it out worthily : — but the cordial reception which the suggestion at once received from them and from all others consulted, speedily removed all doubt upon this subject. From every department of the Government, from the officers of the army, and from a great number of custodians of records and special information everywhere, both authors and publishers have received every aid that could be asked in this undertaking; and in announcing the issue of the work the publishers take this occasion to convey the thanks which the authors have had individual opportunities to express elsewhere. The volumes of the series will be duodecimos of about 250 pages each, illustrated by maps and plans prepared under the direction of the authors. They will appear, as far as possible, in the chronological order of the Campaigns of which they treat; and by their preliminary and concluding chapters will be so far connected that the completed work will practically cover the entire field of the war. The price of each volume will be $1.00. The followmg voltwics are now ready, or far advanced in preparation, and will appear at short intervals : I.— THE OUTBREAK OF REBELLION. By JOH>r G. NicoLAY, Esq., Private Secretary to Picsident Lincoln; late Consul-General to France, etc. A'ozv ready, A preliminary volume, describing the opening of the war, and rovcring the period Item the election of Lincoln to the end of the first Uattle of Bull Run. II.— FROM FORT HENRY TO CORINTH. By the Hon. M. F. Force, Justice of the Superior Court, Cincinnati ; late Brigadier-General and Bvt. Maj. Gen'l, U.S.V., commanding First Division, 17th Corps : in 1862, Lieut. Colonel of the 20th Ohio, commanding the regiment at Shiloh ; Treasurer of the Society of the Army of the Tennessee. Now ready. The narrative of events in the West from the Summer of 1861 to May, 1862 ; covering the capture of Fts. Henry and Donelson, the Battle of Shiloh, etc., etc. III.— THE PENINSULA. By Alexander S. Webb, LL.D., President of the College of the City of New York; Assistant Chief of Artillery, Army of the Potomac, i86i-'62; Inspector General Fifth Army Corps; General Commanding 2d Div., 2d Corps ; Major-General Assigned, and Chief of Staff, Army of the Potomac. Ready November 20. The history of McCIellan's Peninsula Campaign, from his appointment to the end of the Seven Days' Fight. IV.— THE ARMY UNDER POPE. By Johx C. Ropes, Esq., of the Military Society of Massachusetts, the Massa- chusetts Historical Society, etc. Ready November 20. From the appointment of Pope, to command the Army of Virginia, to the appoint- ment of McClellan to the general command in September, 1S62. v.— THE ANTIETAM AND FREDERICKSBURG. By Francis Winthrop Palfrey, late Colonel 20th Mass. In- fantry, and Bvt. Brigadier Gen'l U.S.V. ; Lieut. Col. of the 20th Massachusetts at the battle of the Antietam ; Member of Military Society of Massachusetts, of the Massachusetts His- torical Society, etc. From the appointment of McClellan to the general command, Sept. 1862, to the end of the Battle of Fredericksburg. VI.— CHANCELLORSVILLE AND GETTYSBURG. By Abner DoubledaY, late Bvt. Maj. Gen'l, U.S.A. ; and Major Gen'l, U.S. v.; commanding the First Corps at Gettysburg, etc. From the appointment of Hooker, throuah the campaigns of Chancellorsville and Gettysburg, to the retreat of Lee after the latter battle. VII.— THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND. By Henry M. Cist, Brevet Brig Gen'l U.S.V.; A.A.G. on the staff of Major Gen'l Rosecrans, and afterward on that of Major Gen'l Thomas, Corresponding Secretary of the, Society of the Army of the Cumberland. From the formation of the Army of the Cumberland to the end of the battles at Chattanooga, November, 1863. IX.— THE CAMPAIGN OF ATLANTA. By the Hon. Jacob D. Cox, Ex-(jovernor of Ohio ; late Secretary of the Interior of the United States; Major General U.S. V., com- manding Twenty-third Corps during the campaigns of Atlanta and the Carolinas, etc., etc. From Sherman's first advance into Georgia in May, 1864, to' the beginning of the March to the Sea. X.— THE MARCH TO THE SEA— FRANKLIN AND NASHVILLE. By the Hon. Jacob D. Cox. From the beginning of the March to the Sea to the Surrender of Johnston — including also the operaiions of Thomas in Tennessee. XI.— THE CAMPAIGNS OF GRANT IN VIRGINIA. By Andrew A. Humphreys, Brigadier General and Bvt. Major-General, U.S.A.; late Chief of Engineers; Chief of Staff, Army of the Potomac, i863-'64; commanding Second Corps, i864-'65, etc., etc. Covering the Virginia Campaigns of 1S64 and '65, to Lee's surrender. VIII.— THE MISSISSIPPI, and one otiier volume, completing the series, are in course of preparation, and their contents and authors will be announced in a short time. *if* The above hooks for sale by all booksellers, or ivillbe sent, f>ost-/>aiii, uf>on receipt 0/ price by CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS, 743 AND 745 Broadway, New York.