DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES IN THREE VOLUMES VOLUME I Digitized by tine Internet Archive in 2011 with funding from The Institute of Museum and Library Services through an Indiana State Library LSTA Grant http://www.archive.org/details/diaryofgideonwelv1well I DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES SECRETARY OP THE NAVY UNDER LINCOLN AND JOHNSON WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY JOHN T. MORSE, JR. AND WITH ILLUSTRATIONS VOLUME I 1861 — MARCH 30, 1864 BOSTON AND NEW YORK HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY ^ht 0itoeri^ibe l^it^^ Cambribge 1911 COPYRIGHT, 1909, AND I9IO, BY EDGAR T. WELLES COPYRIGHT, 191 1, BY EDGAR T, WELLES AND HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY ALL RIGHTS RESERVED Published October iqit i . PREFACE It was the custom of my father all his life to keep a diary. He was a prolific writer on political subjects and his even- ings were generally spent with his pen in his hand. When in Washington, it was his habit in the evening, after the family had retired, to devote his time to writing in the diary. His public duties at that period gave him no time to devote to the miscellaneous writings to which he had been accustomed. But in the diary are expressed his views on public men and measures, not only of the day but also those gathered throughout his public life. It was a relaxa- tion to him to write ; in fact, being thoroughly accustomed to it, it was a pleasure. The question of the publication of this diary has caused me much serious reflection. It is an unreserved expres- sion of what was from day to day in the mind of the writer. He probably thought that it would be useful as a record of the events of the time. Certainly he did not think it would be wholly unheeded. But his expressions were not shaped by the considera- tion that it would be given to the world or would not be; the decision of that question he left to me. Accordingly, I have taken the advice of those in whom I know my father would have the most implicit confidence, submitting the material for consideration and review. Without exception, I believe, the decision has been that duty requires of me the publication, and the truth of history demands that under no circumstances must I fail to make this record public. It had seemed to me that the free criticism and personal allusions should have been in some degree elim- VI PREFACE inated, but the advice of the most eminent authorities has been adverse to any omission. I should have much pre- ferred it otherwise, but have yielded to those to whose judgment I should defer. A few strong expressions, purely personal and private, have been omitted, but the omis- sion has always been indicated and the reader may have full confidence that the text of the diary has been in no way mutilated or revised. I desire to express my obligations to the publishers for their careful and painstaking work. Too much credit can- not be given them for their labors and the result. Edgar T. Welles. CONTENTS INTRODUCTION John T. Morse xvli I THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR The Expedition for the Relief of Sumter — Mr. Seward's Interference — Porter and Barron — The Relief of Fort Pickens — Conversation with Senator Douglas — Mr. Seward's Intrigues — The Loss of the Norfolk Navy Yard — The Appointment of Stanton as Secretary of War — The Relations of Seward and Stanton — Fear of the Merri- mac in Washington — " Stanton's Navy " 3 II JULY AND AUGUST, 1862 The President broaches the Subject of Emancipation — Navy Depart- ment Worries — Commodore Wilkes — Disappointed OflScers — Seward's Assumption of Authority — How Lincoln chose his Cabi- net — The Army's Failure to cooperate — The Military Theory of Frontiers ^— Promotion of W. D. Porter — Proposed Line of Gun- boats on the Ohio — The Cabal against McClellan — Stanton on McClellan — The Need of Better Generals 70 III SEPTEMBER, 1862 After the Second Battle of Bull Run — Another Anti-McClellan Paper — The Opinion about General Pope — Wilkes and McClellan — McClellan's Remarks about South Carolina and Massachusetts — The Bickerings of the Generals — The President's Opinion of McClellan and Pope — Rumors of a Proposed Revolution — An Estimate of Halleck — Panic-Stricken New York — A Scheme to de- port Slaves to Chiriqui — The " West Point " Policy — An Estimate of Stanton — Lincoln's Deference to Seward — The Administration of the Departments — The Want of a Military Policy — Lincoln and Seward — How Cabinet-Meetings were conducted — The Rivalry of Seward and Chase — News of Antietam — Dismissal of Com- mander Preble — The Emancipation Proclamation read to the Cabinet — Senator John P. Hale — Chase's Financial Policy — • viii CONTENTS Chase's Opinion of Stanton — The Chiriqui Scheme — New York Politics — European Efforts to break the Blockade 100 IV OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER, 1862 D. D. Porter appointed to the Western Flotilla — Porter, Davis, and Dahlgren — The Cabinet on Emancipation — Admiral Du Pont — Stanton's Threat to resign — Dahlgren's Ambitions — The Norfolk Blockade — The Currency Question — Stuart's Raid — Spanish Claims as to Maritime Jurisdiction — The Case of the Steamer Bermuda — General Scott's Influence at the Beginning of the War — The Question of raising the Norfolk Blockade — A Hoax on Seward — Transfer of the Mississippi Fleet to the Navy — Seward and the Mails captured on Blockade-Runners 157 DECEMBER, 1862 A Private Grief — Burnside succeeds McClellan in Command of the Army of the Potomac — The Modification of the Norfolk Blockade — The Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy — The Question of New Navy Yards — Count Gurowski and his Book — Com- mander Preble's Case — The Division of Virginia — A Roundabout Proceeding of Seward's — Seward's Resignation and the Discussion in Regard to it — Chase tenders his Resignation and the President sees a Way out — Cabinet Rivalries — Seward and Chase requested to withdraw their Resignations — Depredations of the Alabama — Cabinet Discussion of the West Virginia Question — Butler super- seded by Banks at New Orleans — The Party Spirit 182 VI JANUARY AND FEBRUARY, 1863 The Emancipation Proclamation — The Battle of Murfreesborough — Loss of the Monitor — Criticisms of the Navy Department — Hal- leck's Deficiencies — The Employment of the Contrabands — John Covode's Gubernatorial Aspirations — The Pernicious Party Spirit — McClernand and Vicksburg — The Court Martial on Fitz John Porter — The New London Navy Yard Question — Confederate Letters — Fitz John Porter's Conviction — A Call from F. A. Conkling — The Gauge of the Pacific Railroad — Hooker placed in Command of the Army of the Potomac — An Estimate of Farragut — "Weed is Seward, and Seward is Weed " — Governor Morgan elected Senator from New York — Reported Pressure for Mediation on the CONTENTS ix Part of the French Government — Proposed Attack on Charleston — Chase's Bank Bill — The Senate rejects the Reappointment of Collector Howard — Irregular Acts of the President — Scene be- tween Scott, McClellan, and Seward 212 VII MARCH AND APRIL, 1863 Closing Hours of Congress — A Call from Senator Dixon — Proposed Issue of Letters of Marque — Delay in the Attack on Charleston — Impending War with England — Conversations with Sumner about the Letters of Marque — Conversation with the President on the Subject of Letters of Marque and the Attitude of England — Talk with Seward on the Relation of the Navy Department to the Letters of Marque — The First Application for Letters of Marque — The Expected Attack on Charleston — News of Repulse at Charleston — The Peterhoff 's Mails — Commander Rhind and the Ironclads at Charleston — The Elletts and the Ram Fleet — Du Font's Fail- ure at Charleston — The President takes a Hand in the Peterhoff Contention — Blockade-Runners on the Rio Grande — Du Font's Vanity and Weakness — Sumner's Conversation with Lord Lyons on the Peterhoff Matter 244 VIII MAY, 1863 Conversation with Attorney-General Bates on the Captured Mails — John Laird's Statement in Parliament — Waiting for News from Hooker — Rumors of the Battle of Chancellorsville — Disappoint- ment at the News — Stonewall Jackson's Death — Recall of Wilkes from the West India Squadron — Earl Russell's Speech on Ameri- can Affairs — Sumner's Talk with Seward about Mr. Adams and the Secretary of Legation at London — Conversation with the Pre- sident on the Subject of Captured Mails — Du Font's Charges against Chief Engineer Stimers — Du Pont before Charleston — His Shortcomings and the Question of superseding him — Deplor- able Conditions in the South — Foote succeeds Du Pont in Com- mand of the South Atlantic Squadron — Dahlgren declines to be Second in Command 290 IX JUNE, 1863 The Arrest of Vallandigham and the Case of the Chicago Times — The Removal of Wilkes — Count Gurowski on Welles's Appointment X CONTENTS to the Cabinet — General Milroy at Winchester — The President and the Cabinet kept in Ignorance of Army Movements — Lack of Confidence in Hooker — Alarm at Rumors of Confederate Advance into Pennsylvania — The President calls for 100,000 Volunteers — The President's Opinion of " Orpheus C. Kerr" — Illness of Admiral Foote — The Secretary of State and the Matamoras Situation — Sumner's Opinion of Hooker — Appointment of Dahlgren to the South Atlantic Squadron in Foote's Place — The French Tobacco in Richmond — Estimate of Dahlgren — The Monitors and the Fifteen-Inch Guns — Founding of the Army and Navy Gazette — — Congratulations to Commodore Rodgers on the Capture of the Fingal — The President betrays Doubts of Hooker — Blair on the Presidential Aspirations of Chase and McClellan — Death of Admiral Foote — His Lifelong Friendship with Welles — Needless Alarm for the Safety of New York — Meade succeeds Hooker — Rumors of Confederate Raids near Washington — Lee's Advance Into Pennsylvania 319 X JULY, 1863 First Reports of the Battle of Gettysburg — Stanton accused by McClel- lan of sacrificing the Army — F. P. Blair on Stanton's Early Seces- sionist Sympathies — Stanton's Treachery toward the Buchanan Administration — Seward's Intrigues — His Misconception of the War — Later News from Gettysburg — Vice-President Stephens's Proposed Mission to Washington — Intercepted Confederate Dis- patches — Cabinet-Meeting on Stephens's Mission — Meade linger- ing at Gettysburg — The Fall of Vicksburg — Lincoln's Receipt of the News — Rejoicings over Gettysburg and Vicksburg — Vice- President Hamlin's Request for a Prize Court at Portland — Some of the Generals Content to have the War continue — Draft Riots — The President's Dejection at the Failure of Meade to capture Lee's Army — The Draft Riots in New York — Lee recrosses the Poto- mac — Prospects of an Early Ending to the War — An Estimate of Jefferson Davis — ■ Calhoun and Nullification — Senator Hale's Hostility — Downfall of the Mexican Republic — Impressions of Colonel Rawlins of Grant's Staff — Grant's Dissatisfaction with McClernand 354 XI AUGUST, 1863 Refutation of Laird's Statement as to an Application from the Navy Department — The President refuses to postpone the Draft — Connection of Howard of Brooklyn with the Laird Matter — The CONTENTS xi Provisions of the Draft Act discussed in Cabinet — General Halleck and the Almaden Mines — The President adopts Seward's Views as to Instructions to Naval Officers — The President's Letter-Writ- ing — The Ironclads not to leave England — A Confidential Com- munication from Seward — Assistant-Secretary Fox and the Howard Affair — Conversation with Chase on the Subject of Slavery — General Meade meets the Cabinet — Suggestions from Boston — General F. P. Blair's Account of the Vicksburg Campaign — Injustice of the Draft Act — A Letter from North Carolina — Solicitor Whiting's Schemes for dealing with Slavery — Death of Governor Gurley of Arizona — Conversation with Chase on the Reconstruction of the Union — Secession of the States not to be recognized — Death of Commander George W. Rodgers — The Case of the Mont Blanc — Toombs on Southern Conditions — The Sec- I retary of the Navy placed by Seward in a False Position as to Move- ments against the English Cruisers — The Subject of Reunion . . 393 XII SEPTEMBER, 1863 Return from a Tour among the Navy Yards — Abuse of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in Connection with the Draft — The President sus- pends the Writ on Military Questions — Newspaper Alarm over the Ironclads building in England — Seward communicates the Assurances of the British Ministry in regard to the Rams — The News of Chickamauga — The President laments the Inefficiency of the Generals — The President's Opinion of Farragut — The Fail- ure at Sabine Pass — The English Government prevents the Laird Ram from coming out — The Russian Fleet arrives at New York — Reinforcing Rosecrans — An Irregular Proceeding of Seward's — The Conduct of the Generals at Chickamauga — A Report about the Laird Ram 431 XIII OCTOBER, 1863 Slow Progress at Charleston — Letter to the President in Reference to Instructions to Naval Officers — Seward refers the Spanish Claim of Maritime Jurisdiction to the King of Belgium — Conversation with Admiral Milne of the British Navy — A Political Letter of McClellan's — The Ohio and Pennsylvania Elections — Lincoln's Magnanimity to Meade — General Sickles's Account of Gettysburg — Meade's ''Strategy" — The Unaccredited Minister from Vene- zuela desires to purchase a Naval Vessel — General Terry and Colonel Hawley on Dahlgren — An Unjust Complaint from Admiral Du Pont 449 xii CONTENTS XIV DECEMBER, 1863 The Writing of the Secretary's Annual Report — The Russian Fleets sent into American Waters for the Winter — Entertaining the Rus- sian Officers — Colfax elected Speaker of the House over Wash- burne — Senatorial Opposition to John P. Hale as Chairman of the Naval Committee — Brandegee's Appointment to the House Naval Committee — Plain Speech with Senator Hale — Insubordination of Commodore Wilkes — Rebel Letters captured on Board the Ceres — The Plot of Trowbridge, Briggs, Lamar, and Cavnach — Louis Napoleon's Attitude — The Turret Vessels gaining Friends — The Department's Policy in Regard to Ships — Conversation with Senator Doolittle on Trade-Permits and Presidential Candidates — Sailors enticed into the Army — The Year closes more satisfactorily than it began 479 XV JANUARY, 1864 An Estimate of Sumner — The Charges against Engineer-in-Chief Isherwood — Lincoln and Seward on Clay and Webster — Conver- sation with the Elder Blair and Governor Dennison — Discussion in the Cabinet as to opening Additional Ports in the South — Criti- cism of the Navy Department — Moses H. Grinnell and his Rela- tions with the Department — The Finding of the Court of In- quiry on Wilkes's Letter — John P. Hale tells of Charges of Mis- management in Connection with the Cherokee and R. B. Forbes . 501 XVI FEBRUARY, 1864 Donald McKay compliments the Navy Department — The War De- partment suspected of instigating Attacks on the Navy Department — The President on the Dominican Question — A Talk with Chase on Financial Matters and the Charleston Situation — The Pre- sident as a Politician — A Pleasant Half -Hour with Preston King — An Estimate of the Man — Chase's Use of the Treasury Machinery to further his Presidential Aspirations — The Departmental Char- acter of the Administration — Carpenter's Picture of President Lincoln and his Cabinet — The President greets an Admirer — Chase's Electioneering — A Secret Expedition to Florida — Move- ment on Behalf of Retired Naval Officers 518 CONTENTS xiii XVII MARCH, 1864 General Blair attacks Chase in the House — Solicitation for Political Subscriptions — Urging the Promotion of Colonel Hawley — Good News of Colonel Dahlgren — Chase's Attitude as to Permits and Trade Regulations — News of Ulric Dahlgren's Death — Grant at the President's Reception — Grant receives his Commission as Lieutenant-General — An Impression of Grant — The Exposure of Contract Frauds — The New Draft for 200,000 Men discussed in the Cabinet — A Call from Solicitor Whiting — The Scarcity of Seamen for the Navy — Conversation with Admiral Dahlgren on General Gillmore — Conversation between Seward and the Artist Carpenter on the Great Events of the Administration .... 533 ILLUSTRATIONS Gideon Welles Photogravure frontispiece William H. Seward 8 George B. McClellan 94 Henry W. Halleck 120 President Lincoln and Cabinet at the Signing of the Eman- cipation Proclamation 142 From the Painting by Francis Bicknell Carpenter. John A. Dahlgren 164 Edwin D. Morgan 232 Charles Sumner 286 Andrew Hull Foote 346 Hannibal Hamlin 366 George G. Meade ... 404 Charles Wilkes 490 INTRODUCTION Mr. Welles was in his fifty-eighth year at the time of his entry into the Cabinet of President Lincoln, at which point these volumes take up the story of his life. A brief account of what he had done during these preceding years will have at least the interest of displaying what prepara- tion and equipment he brought to the important office whieh he was called upon to fill. His earliest American ancestor escaped the distinction of being one of the Mayflower band by only a very few years; he arrived, however, in time to take part in the settling of Hartford, becoming ^^ identified with its fortunes as early as 1636'^; and serving as Treasurer, and later as Governor, of the Colony. Upon an estate in Glastonbury, bought by this ancestor from the Indians, Gideon Welles was born July 1, 1802. He was educated at the Protestant Episcopal Academy at Cheshire, and at Norwich Univers- ity. Afterward he studied law, and the mental influence of this training was plainly perceptible throughout his active life, though he left the profession so early as Janu- ary, 1826. He then took charge of the Hartford Times, a Democratic sheet, which soon afterward gave its influence in behalf of Andrew Jackson for the Presidency. This act of political friendship, and the prominence of Mr. Welles in party politics in Connecticut naturally led to his becom- ing Jackson's chief adviser in the local affairs of that State. He continued his editorial labors so long as his leader remained in the White House; also occupying collater- ally the position of Representative from Glastonbury in the State legislature from 1827 to 1835. We are told that in matters political his ^^ sagacity seemed to be almost unfailing.'' Certainly his views were liberal and progress- ive, in evidence whereof is the fact that, when the Supreme xviii INTRODUCTION Court of the State held that a disbehever in a future state of rewards and punishments was incompetent as a witness, Mr. Welles led a persistent and at last successful struggle for legislation which reduced this requirement of faith in heaven and hell as a basis of credibility to the more mod- erate dimension of belief in a God. He further aided in effecting the abolition of imprisonment for mere debt. Under Van Buren, from 1836 to 1841, he was Postmaster at Hartford, which was then the central office for the dis- tribution of the mail throughout New England. In 1842, he was elected by popular vote to the office of State Comp- troller, and in 1843 was reelected. In 1846 he was ap- pointed by Polk to be Chief of the Bureau of Provisions and Clothing for the Navy, and held the place till the sum- mer of 1849. With the administration of Polk and the annexation of territory as a result of the Mexican War, the slavery question became predominant in national politics. Thus far Mr. Welles had been a Democrat and a democrat, alike with the capital D and with the small letter. There is a very material difference between these two words, Demo- crat and democrat, though proof-readers have not always been awake to the important distinction. The party of that name has adopted President Jefferson as at least the most distinguished expounder, if not the founder of the American variety of their political creed. Yet Jefferson was democratic only with very large reservations; he excited Hamilton to frenzy by his extravagant preach- ments about the rule of the masses, but in fact he never had a suspicion that the ruling masses could be so wrong- headed as not to take their doctrines from gentlemen of intelligence like himself, and he assumed as basic matter of course that the common people would have the common sense to select presidents, governors, and rulers generally from that class of the community whose superior fitness for these functions Mr. Jefferson regarded as a postulate. Genuine democracy found its way into the Presidency with INTRODUCTION xix Andrew Jackson. But when, later on, the Democracy, as a pohtical party, became the party of the Southern slavo- cracy, it certainly had no longer any right to use the adjec- tive with the little d; on the contrary it had the honesty, or the pride, to boast itself to be the party of aristocracy. At the same time, however, it retained, because it found very useful, the old Democratic doctrines of State rights and of strict construction of the Constitution. A practical concrete problem, however, was now coming into entire possession of men's minds to the exclusion of all else. There were no survivals of old questions, and political theories and principles had either to prove themselves malleable or to be rejected by their old-time followers, when the perpetuation and therefore the extension of Slavery came to the front. There was a new alignment throughout the Northern half of the country, and at once multitudes of independent men, refusing to be controlled by a political misnomer, crossed over from the slavocratic and aristocratic Democracy to the new, humanitarian, and democratic Republicanism. There was no use in raising the cry of apostasy; for the apostates were too numerous and too respectable to be described by so discreditable a name; and, moreover, it was quite obvious that no political consistency compelled a Democrat under Jackson and Van Buren to remain a Democrat under Pierce or Buchanan. There was certainly no continuity or succession between the destruction of the Bank of the United States, for ex- ample, and the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. The infusion of a great moral issue into politics, which ordinarily have little enough to do with the moralities, inevitably changed the point of view for any man who felt the old Puritan conscience strong within him. In the cus- tomary run of public business, the average man embarks on board his party as on board a ship for a long voyage, and does not get off at the first port because he has not always been entirely delighted with all the arrangements; if, however, he wants to go north and he finds that the XX INTRODUCTION captain is sailing south, he is likely to take the first oppor- tunity of parting company. Thus it very naturally came about that the democratic Gideon Welles, being a clear- headed, independent, and conscientious person, ceased to be a Democrat, and became a Republican. Moreover, in a certain way it might be argued that consistency itself led him to this action, for the theory of State rights, always advocated by him, involved the repudiation of the Demo- cratic move for the establishment of slavery in the Terri- tories under cover of the national authority, this being the sure basis and prejudgment for its establishment in the later development of the State. The change of political allegiance induced no change of occupation, and Mr. Welles now became a contributor to the Hartford Evening Press, which was designed to be the organ of Republicanism in the State. In 1856 he had the courage, as Republican candidate for Governor, to face sure defeat in a cause in which he believed. About the same time, by choice of the Republican Convention which assembled in Philadelphia, he entered upon what proved to be an eight years' term of service as a member of the Republican National Committee; also he was chairman of the delegation from his State to the Convention at Chicago which nominated Abraham Lincoln. President Lincoln's courteous patience in Hstening to advice, and his desire always by consultation to get the benefit of suggestions, obscured for a while in the public eye his underlying self-reliance and the independence of his ultimate judgment. The suspicion that his course was often steered by another hand than his own has only died slowly, as careful study of his career and the accumulation of much evidence have enforced quite the contrary convic- tion. Yet a shrewd observer might have forecast the truth at the outset, from the formation of his Cabinet ; for in no other matter are political bargaining, wire-pulling, and pressure more vigorously exercised than in Cabinet-mak- ing ; yet of the seven men who constituted his ministry, his INTRODUCTION xxi hand was forced only in the selection of Cameron, and even there the forcing was perhaps not oppressive. Certainly the other six represented his personal choice, and no other among them represented it more than did Mr. Welles, whose career up to this point had given him no controlling prestige such as that which would have made the omission of Seward or Chase a matter of criticism. So far as is known, no pressure, either political or personal, was brought to bear; and it was Mr. Welles's record, as it has been narrated above, which led Mr. Lincoln to invite him into the Cabinet. The Diary has the story of the selection in conclusive shape. Wanting a man from New England, Lincoln took an ex-Democrat, trained in public business, who had manifested his courage and the earnestness of his conviction by casting loose from his old associates on the question of slavery; and who also, it maybe noted, had shown a natural aptitude for politics, a quality which Mr. Lincoln, possessing it himself in a high degree, did not undervalue in others. Precisely why the Navy Department was allotted to Mr. Welles is not clear. Perhaps the citizen of an inland State, who probably enough had never seen an ocean-going ship, was influenced by the flavor of maritime commerce and prowess which still in 1860 hung faintly about the wharves of New England, and Mr. Lincoln may have thought that any New Englander must be amphibious ; or he may have been affected by memory of the office held by Mr. Welles under Mr. Polk, slight as had been the nautical flavor of those commercial functions. When, how- ever, Mr. Welles suggests that Secretary Chase, though having a ^^good deal of ability,'' yet ^'has never made fin- ance his study,'' and again when he shoots at his favorite target. Senator Hale, Chairman of the Naval Committee, the slurring words ^'embarrassed by no military or naval teaching," the reader may smile at the obvious ^^tu quo- que^^ retort, which certainly lay ready at the hand of each of these gentlemen. Neither of them used it, for xxii INTRODUCTION neither of them had the privilege of looking over Mr. Welles's shoulder as he poured his feelings over the confi- dential pages of his Diary. But when, later on in his ad- ministration, other persons, sundry ^'disappointed men," suggested that some one with more real salt-sea experience than Mr. Welles had would fill the place better, Mr. Welles writes that there ''is a set of factious fools who think it wise to be censorious, and it is almost as amusing as it is vexatious to hear and read the remarks of these Solomons," these "officious blockheads," who have the simplicity to allege that the Secretary of the Navy should have had per- sonal experience on shipboard. One of these critics, he records, has been a shipowner, another has been a ship- master; "successful business men, but egotistical and vainly weak. Neither is competent to administer the Navy Department." Comforting reflections, and very possibly altogether true, yet it may be permitted to remark, ohiteTy that the layman does not, by familiarity with the spectacle, cease to feel bewilderment at the utter indifference nearly always shown as to preparatory training or specialist knowledge in the allotment of cabinet places. It is sur- prising to see that a system which might a priori be re- garded as of dubious promise has so often worked fairly well. At the same time, one cannot but wish that on some occasion, when there is one of those temporary lulls which occur from time to time in party struggles, when partisan considerations might without grave peril give good sense a passing chance, an incoming President would have the orig- inality and courage to compose a Cabinet of men able and thoroughly versed in the Departments which they are called to administer. It is possible that the results might be very satisfactory; at least, the experiment would be interesting and instructive. Of course it was not tried by Mr. Lincoln anymore than it has been by other Presidents, his predecessors and successors. He made a journalist Secretary of the Navy, and let us admit that the journalist proved to be a very good Secretary and rejoice that he INTRODUCTION xxiii approved himself also a first-rate Diarist. In fact, if he had been a much worse Secretary, we should readily have par- doned his shortcomings on the ground of his eminent suc- cess in a matter which now and for us is of much more interest. Certain it is that in this Diary we have the best ^'Cabi- net Interior^' which hangs upon the walls of the American room in the world's Gallery of History. It at once recalls and provokes comparison with that other famous and more bulky diary in which John Quincy Adams confided to posterity his appreciation of his own good qualities and the failings of his contemporaries. Between the two there are interesting points, both of resemblance and of contrast. Both diarists were fine examples of the moral and intel- lectual civilization of the New England of their times. Though not quite contemporaries, they were types of a ra- cial development which became complete during the period of their joint lifetimes. They were intelligent descendants of the old Pilgrim stock, untiring seekers of knowledge, clear thinkers amid their surroundings, with little wit or humor and no imagination. They had the solid moralities, but were somewhat deficient in the gentler ones. They estab- lished high standards as much for themselves as for others; and to ordinary mortals, who seemed to fall below these standards they doled out Christian charity with much economy; yet the reflection that the delinquents, thus scored by our diarists, were largely professional politicians may lead us to a like economy of sympathy for them. Both men manifest a consciousness of perfect rectitude of inten- tion, which undoubtedly they both had; for more upright men never lived; neither could have been induced by any possible temptation to do a selfish or mean or in any way unworthy act. It should be said, however, that Mr. Welles is not beset by that self-admiration which from matins to vespers ceaselessly worried Mr. Adams, so that he seems forever sitting to himself for his own portrait, whereas Mr. Welles's portrayal of himself, such as it is, was made with- xxiv INTRODUCTION out intention ; for which reason his pages are not rendered wearisome by vanity, or by disingenuous depreciation of his own merit. Both men are censorious, but Mr. Welles is almost never acrid; his judgments are severe, but not unfair, not malicious, not often ill-tempered and perhaps never really vindictive. They would seem less scathing at times, if they were tempered with humor; but, in the ab- sence of this, we have the next most enlivening quality on the occasions when he indulges in honest and hearty sar- casm. This he could do very well, as, for example, when he speaks of one Alden as ''patriotic when there was no dan- ger,'' actually, though erroneously, believing himself to be courageous, and ''really anxious to do something without encountering enemies." When he cuts, he does it trench- antly, and when he abuses, he strikes hard and straight. He is a fair fighter, and does not grumble too much at the like treatment when dealt to himself, although it must seem to him undeserved and at times proceeding from un- worthy motives. If he is not witty, he has more really valu- able merits : he is very fair and just ; he is frank and manly; he is intelligent, alert, and well-informed, with the result that no more trustworthy material than his pages can come to the table of the historian or the hands of the reader. It is of some interest to establish what is the correct value of diaries in historical literature. When a politician sees to his dismay that a fickle and ill-advised public is giving itself over to be led astray by his perfidious oppon- ent, he is prone to seek somewhat juiceless consolation in references to the "verdict of history" or the "verdict of posterity." Both verdicts are much the same, for both dig- nified phrases signify only that vague general impression which has been sent filtering through the public mind by those historians who can write sufficiently pleasingly to secure readers. These writers are really counsel, or advo- cates, unpaid for the most part, and therefore reasonably honest; and who generally mean to examine the evidence with an open mind, and to take their volunteer brief for the INTRODUCTION xxv man or cause whom or which, upon that evidence, they beheve to be right. Not long ago, the task of editing the private writings of any deceased pubhc man was taken to imply the duty of excision and amendment so as to bring the printed pages into accord with supposed proprieties. It was not unlike grooming a horse for exhibition. Now, however, it is understood that such editorial action is in point of morality much the same thing as tampering with a witness or perverting his testimony. Suppress diaries or letters if you cannot print them as they were written ; but know that you are dishonest if, without avowal, you pub- lish under a man's name mutilated excerpts of what he really wrote. No other evidence can be more sacred than a diary, which the world accepts as confidential truth. Be- fore a judge or jurors the viva voce testimony of a witness in presence outweighs in real influence a dozen depositions of absent deponents, and for the historian a diary or a letter takes the place of this best and most trustworthy of all possible evidence, and is to be respected accord- ingly. In this point of view, this Diary of Mr. Welles is among the most valuable documents within reach of our historical writers. As between the two, a diary should be accorded greater value than letters,, for it is apt to be more ingenuous, more honest. Thus it is not possible to imagine that any historian can possibly have access to better evidence than this Diary of Mr. Welles. Of course, either letters or diaries, if written with an eye to post- humous publication, may be intentionally miscolored; but it is much harder to be consistently disingenuous in a diary than in correspondence; the diary written in the evening is united to the day as a limb to the body; the same life-blood gives the vital heat and spirit to both ; the palpitation of the day's actings and talkings still throbs in the evening's ac- count of them. It is almost a part of the res gestce. The diary is written to one's self ; the letter is written to a person whose own individuality of character, opinions, and temper often unconsciously react upon the writer; the letter may have xxvi INTRODUCTION an exterior object, which the diary never can have, since it can have no other value for its writer than that of a correct record. The ^ ^personal equation, '' as it is called, signifying the moral, mental, and temperamental qualities and idiosyn- cracies of the diarist, must of course be studied and allowed for, just as the navigator must study the dip and variation of the compass; otherwise historian and navigator may both go wrong. But the observant reader cannot long rest in the intimacy of the diarist without getting at least what may be called a good average knowledge of his character. If these views as to diaries are correct, it is certainly difficult to exaggerate the value and interest which attach to this Diary of Mr. Welles; that he wrote it is most fortunate; its suppression would properly have been regarded as a national disaster, as its faithful presentation is of inestimable ad- vantage. The true function of the diary is to talk to us about individuals, not to instruct us as to events, — and how much more interesting this is! In fact, the historian may well be better informed as to events and facts than the diarist can be, for the historian has access to immense ac- cumulations of evidence which the diarist never knew, but which through the long years have come slowly leaking into light from desks and attics and hiding-places innumerable. On the other hand, history is comparatively weak in the matter of individual character, which posterity can rarely know as contemporaries do. They see and hear the living man ; they know not only his conspicuous acts but also all the little ones; they hear of him from the men who deal with him, and they know more or less of those men also; they get and sift the gossip, good and bad. If a man's con- temporaries fail to find out what he is, posterity rarely will do better; though this latter case may befall through strange belated discoveries, and, in fact, has befallen pre- cisely within the region of this Welles Diary; for President Lincoln is unquestionably better estimated to-day than he was during his lifetime, and is in some respects more ac- INTRODUCTION xxvii curately known to us than he was to his own Ministers. The patience with which he could wait while causes slowly produced results, his remarkable combination of respect for the opinion of others with absolute reliance upon his own opinion, his forbearance, tact, shrewdness, foresight, and fairness, are all qualities which could not be fairly seen at short range and as they were at work, but which, by reason of careful study and the ever-growing accumulation of facts, we have come to know as our fathers could not know them. Generally, however, more is lost than gained by distance in the estimation of character, and the most vivid and attractive biographies are probably far from photographic. We may read lives of Washington till our eyes ache, but are they all worth a few hours of chat about him with Lafayette, or Hamilton, or even with Jefferson? These are the witnesses we want to hear, and the nearest approach to such witnesses, where all are silent in death, we find in the diarist. As, therefore, was naturally to be expected, this Diary contributes little new knowledge concerning events, and settles few of those many discussions to which the Civil War gave rise. On the other hand, it presents an invaluable row of portraits ; so that there are indeed no other records which can at all be brought into even remote comparison with it for that interesting period. Mr. Welles had ex- traordinary insight into men, and a very happy skill in depicting them; at least we are bound to think so, for there is a remarkable agreement between what he wrote in those days when our past was his present, and what our histo- rians and biographers are now setting forth as the dispas- sionate valuations of posterity. Such harmony is agreeably reassuring as to the accuracy of the judgments which we are to-day accepting. So far as Mr. Welles is concerned, his even- mindedness is a very unique quality; as a rule, the climate of the contemporary writings during our Civil War had no temperate zone; whether beneath the sunshine of hero- worship or amid cyclones of denunciation, there was always xxviii INTRODUCTION equatorial fervor. It is only Mr. Welles who, so far as we know, was at once shrewd and judicial. Perhaps he was a little Rhadaman thine. If, however, there seems a ten- dency to severity, it is not due to unkindness of dispo- sition, but rather to the intensity of the times and the tre- mendous stress of feeling. Those were not ordinary days when selfish ambition and incompetence could be passed over as ordinary sins; the men who were guilty of them were to be branded, and Mr. Welles branded them; it was a time for Hebraic wrath rather than for Christian charity; moreover, Mr. Welles was as exacting towards himself as towards others, and gave a devotion as unselfish as that which he demanded. Be this as it may, whether he was severe or not, how strong and vivid is his portraiture even in his minor characters ! Thus a page or two depicts Banks with perfect accuracy; a few scattered paragraphs present Du Pont to the life; and so on through many instances. Herein is proof of the real artist ; this making every minor character as lifelike an individuality as are the leaders is the Shakespearian quality. Naturall}^, however, it is the sketches of the leaders which have the most interest, and which best illustrate the shrewd and just perception of Mr. Welles. Take, for example, McClellan. In the proces- sion of admirers which heralded the advent of this military savior none blew a more confident trumpet than did Secre- tary Chase. Later when the savior had lamentably failed to save, Mr. Chase not less vehemently denounced him, calling him ^^an imbecile, a coward, and a traitor," and summoning Mr. Welles to cry Amen. But that gentleman recalled that he had set an interrogation mark against the name of the hero at the time of his first introduction, and said that, having afterward avoided the error of exaltation, he would not now fall into the injustice of damnation. During the time when Chase was lauding McClellan, nine- teen out of every twenty loyal Northerners were of the like mind; later at least seventeen out of every twenty sympa- thized in some measure with the condemnation. All the INTRODUCTION xxix while Mr. Welles is from time to time setting down in his Diary such an average and temperate valuation as may be found in almost any modern history. But the name of McClellan has become wearisome, and most readers will get more entertainment in Mr. Welles's picture of another of the failures, a picture which is aston- ishingly lifelike, considering how little life there was in the subject. One may read much about the Civil War without often happening upon the name of Halleck, yet for a very long while that harmless professor of the arts of slaughter and destruction was showing how peacefully he could con- duct these processes, as he sat, obscurely sluggish and silent, at his desk in Washington, officially superintending the entire strategy of all the Northern forces, chewing his cigar, and rubbing his elbows. How that habitual gesture of his exasperated Mr. Welles! When the rubbing began, the friction seemed to spread from the Halleck coat-sleeve to the whole Welles system. All that Mr. Welles says about Halleck is at once amusing, severe, and just; and to the irritating influence which the General exercised upon the Secretary we owe some lively pictures, among pages whereon picturesque liveliness yields somewhat too much room to careful accuracy. ^^ Called this morning," says the Diary in one instance, ^^on General Halleck, who had for- gotten, or was not aware, there was a naval force in the James River, cooperating with the army!" Mr. Welles assured the great chieftain that such was indeed the fact; then the General, perplexed as to whether the vessels should be retained or withdrawn, went to work upon his elbows, and rubbed out the conclusion that they might as well be withdrawn. Then Mr. Welles suggested that they might as well stay, and the General immediately thought so too. It was a fair specimen of Halleck's inefficiency, and in those critical days inefficiency might be as harmful as treason. Mr. Welles chafed impatiently, while others tardily learned what he so well knew; and meantime he confided to his Diary that Halleck "is heavy-headed," XXX INTRODUCTION *^may have some talent as a writer or critic," but '4n all military matters seems destitute of resources, skill, or capacity,'^ is ^'more tardy and irresolute than McClellan,^^ with much more to the like disrespectful purport. It is all just what any writer would say to-day; Mr. Welles was only writing the ^^ verdict of history'^ in advance. Another victim furnished for the especial gratification of those imperfect Christians who derive a pleasurable sensa- tion at the spectacle of a sound drubbing administered with whole-hearted thoroughness, is the Honorable John P. Hale, of the Senate, Chairman of the Naval Committee. For a while, Mr. Hale was mistaken for a man of some con- sequence on the alleged ground of character and ability, and before this view had been fully corrected he was able to make trouble for the Secretary, with the amusing result of calling forth many vivacious comments. Thus, Mr. Welles tells us that Hale, having at the outset defied, scorned, and derided secession, ^^ was one of the first to flee from Washington when the storm was about to burst"; but later, the Capital being ^^ garrisoned and shielded by a large army, this burning and eloquent patriot returned, overflowing with courage," and '4n the exuberance of his zeal" set on foot an inquiry as to the loss of the Norfolk Navy Yard. In a ^^patronizing way" he offered to hear any explanation which the Secretary of the Navy might offer concerning this painful incident. If he could have read what the world can now read, he would have neglected the defense of Norfolk for the defense of Hale! Later we learn and sympathetically believe that he was ^4azy, noisy," a ^^ harlequin" and '^demagogue," a '^Senatorial buffoon," without '^ application or fidelity," who is '^ nei- ther honest nor sincere"; and in later pages the charges become even more serious. In the improbable event that there are any persons who will care to object to the erasure of Mr. Hale^s name from the roll of the country's great men, certainly ample provocation is now given to them for making themselves heard. , INTRODUCTION xxxi Of course, not many pages can be turned without en- countering the names of Seward, Chase, and Stanton. Of these, Stanton, the friendless one, evidently affected Mr. Welles as he affected pretty much everyone else who came much into contact with him. No one liked him living; scarcely anyone has wished to say much for him dead. An advocate biographer has indeed presented a sort of brief for him, and Mr. Rhodes, kindliest of historians, has men- tioned his virtues; for, in fact, he had virtues, — devotion to the cause, a very greed for hard work, financial integ- rity, and merciless energy against the rascal contractors. But it cannot be forgotten that he had the odious faults of a bully; he was violent and insolent, but only when violence and insolence were safe ; he was supposed to be personally timid; he could be mean and unjust; above all he repeat- edly outraged the magnanimous forbearance of Mr. Lin- coln in a way which no American can forgive. Substan- tially every writer's pen is against him; or, at least, no writer's pen is for him. Mr. Welles rends him and tears him without mercy and returns to mangle and to toss again, nor even so provokes the reader to interfere to save the prey; we can all read the sentences with equa- nimity; many of us will read them with cheerful sym- pathy. The two men, after a few tentative feints and clashes, had inevitably to try out their comparative strength in a conclusive bout. It took place, and there- after Mr. Stanton rarely ventured into Mr. Welles's path. He had learned that the Navy Department was not a province or subdivision of the War Department and that cooperation of vessels with land forces did not imply subor- dination of the Navy to the Army. Delightfully spirited and vivid perhaps beyond all others in the Diary are the pages which narrate the conferences of President and Min- isters when first the startling foray of the Merrimac car- ried consternation, and then very soon the achievement of the beslurred Monitor, the ^^ cheese-box'^ of the sarcastic critics, restored triumphant cheerfulness at the North. xxxii INTRODUCTION There are few such sketches in history as that which Mr. Welles furnishes upon this occasion, availing splendidly of a splendid opportunity. Alas, poor Yorick! If Mr. Stanton could only have known that Mr. Welles was keeping a diary, and therein depicting this scene in vivid, undying colors, would not he at once have set about keep- ing one also? And how posterity might then have been entertained ! At present it is too much like sitting at the prize-ring and seeing only one pugilist. It is an odd fact that Mr. C. F. Adams was beset by an incapacity for appreciating Mr. Lincoln, which at once calls to mind the like incapacity of his grandfather for appreciating Washington. John Adams lived and died under the firm conviction that Washington was a vexa- tiously over-rated man; Mr. C. F. Adams carried to his grave a like certainty concerning Lincoln. He even had the imprudence to make public declaration of his unfortun- ate views, by delivering in 1873 a memorial address on Mr. Seward, wherein he said that from the birth of our government no other ^'experiment so rash had ever been made as that of elevating to the head of affairs a man with so little previous preparation for his task'' as Mr. Lincoln had. Now it may be admitted that this allegation, construed with such literal narrowness as Jeffersonians would have used for construing the Constitution, was not grossly extravagant. The fact that the ''experiment^' turned out so wonderfully well that many devout persons have even seen in it the direct hand of God, of course does not prove that in the outset it was not "rash." It was only needlessly unkind on Mr. Adams's part to say that it was more "rash" than had been the selection of certain other persons who had been elevated to the same office, not only in spite of the fact that they had had little "previous prepa- ration," but in spite of the even more disqualifying fact that they had given no reason for a belief in their fitness, and some reason to fear their unfitness. Apart from his then unproved qualities of combined character and intel- INTRODUCTION xxxiii lect, Mr. Lincoln's ''preparation'' had certainly been con- fined to a thorough study of the problem presented by slavery. It so happened, however, that slavery was at this critical moment so all-important as to be practically the only problem, and it also so happened that Mr. Lincoln understood it far better than any other man then living, not excepting Jefferson Davis, or Charles Sumner, or Mr. Adams himself. But though the above cited assertion, literally taken, was not so very depreciatory to Mr. Lin- coln, the same could not be said of the general tone of the address, which stripped President Lincoln of credit and praise and conferred generously upon Mr. Seward all that was thus filched from his chief. If Mr. Adams's view of the situation was correct, the nation had been burning incense before the wrong altar. Mr. Welles was stirred with indignation, so stirred that he came to the rescue of his great leader's reputation by writing and publishing a loyal little volume, which he called ''Lincoln and Seward." What he said in this book has, in substance, been absorbed into our history, which has accepted Mr. Welles's views and has rejected, forgotten, and forever buried the contrary opinions of Mr. Adams. For this reason, because it has done its work, the book is not now very familiar to ordinary readers ; but one finds a certain entertainment in comparing it with the Diary, and the comparison plainly indicates the superior value of an intimate daily outpouring of feelings, fresh and hot, as against the later expression of those feelings cooled and prepared for publication. In the book Mr. Welles civilly writes that he "enjoyed uninterruptedly pleasant social and ojfficial intercourse" with Mr. Seward. If the signifi- cation of these words be not trimmed to close literalness, they are likely to convey an impression of friendly har- mony between the two men which is quite astonishing to the reader of the Diary. Further, the book alleges a rela- tionship of "confidence and mutual frankness on public affairs . . . among all the members" of the Cabinet, sub- xxxiv INTRODUCTION ject only to such occasional interruptions of perfect cordial- ity as might be provoked by Mr. Seward's pretensions to superiority. Amid the many interpretations which may possibly be put upon the word '^confidence'' in this pass- age there can perhaps be suggested some one which may justify its use. Neither are there wanting sporadic in- stances of the presence of '^ frankness," that most ticklish of good qualities, the porcupine in the menagerie of virtues. For example, when Seward humbly admitted to Mr. Welles that he had learned that for the future he had "better attend to his own business," Mr. Welles hastened to meet him with a '' cordial assent." No one will deny that on this occasion Mr. Welles evinced frankness. There are other cases also of plain speaking; yet the fact remains that he who reads the Diary will not be able to accept some of the statements which in later years found utterance in the book save as conventionalities or as spoken ''in a Pickwickian sense," or perhaps in that spirit of serene magnanimity which is supposed to prevail in making preparation for a Christian death-bed. As matter of plain fact, the Diary is thickly sprinkled with criticisms of Mr. Seward because of his pretentious bearing, his assumption of the role of a premier in the Cabinet, his airs of mystery and his affectation of special information and of private knowledge in affairs, above all else by reason of his passion for meddling and his irritating forays into the inde- pendent Departments of his associates. The most note- worthy instance of this was the disastrous occult interfer- ence of Mr. Seward in the matter of relieving Fort Sumter. The error had to be admitted by him and ostensibly forgiven by Mr. Welles, but it was never forgotten and never ceased to rankle. Soon afterward came the long and serious dispute as to the disposition to be made of foreign mails captured on blockade-runners. Here again Seward undertook to settle the whole business autocratically in his own office. Mr. Welles resented and resisted, and was clearly in the right ; but Mr. Seward had committed himself to the English gov- INTRODUCTION xxxv ernment and the embarrassment was grave. All the strict- ures made by Mr. Welles concerning Seward have been made by others, and none of them lacks foundation; yet it must be said that of all the pictures in these volumes that of Seward is the most open to the criticism of doing scant jus- tice, if not actual injustice, to the subject. Probably Mr. Seward was rated more highly by his own generation than he will be by posterity; but probably also he will beheld in better esteem than would be possible if there were no other evidence concerning him than what could be drawn from this Diary. He was at once an able man and a frequent blunderer. On the whole, one feels that when speaking of him Mr. Welles is certainly less well balanced than usual. Possibly this is due to the fact that they clashed frequently, since maritime matters and foreign relations inevitably crossed in many complications. In such Mr. Welles was more apt to have sound as well as courageous views than was his associate minister. While thus, day by day, Mr. Welles is consciously draw- ing for us the portraits of his colleagues, he is also day by day, but quite unconsciously, giving us the lines, the lights, and the shadows for his own portrait. While we are learn- ing what he thinks of others and why, we are likewise deciding what we think of him upon evidence of a kind that is next best to personal acquaintance. In the main, the conclusions are much to his credit. When we see that all his brains, his heart, his strength were strenuously engaged in the cause, we know that the same can be said of many others; when we see that he was more than respectfully obedient, that he was always nobly loyal and wisely sus- taining towards his chief, we admit that some others were the same; but when we see that he was absolutely devoid of any ulterior ambition or personal motives or any form of self-seeking, that he was almost indifferent concerning his own reputation so long as he was conscious of having done his duty with all his might and all his intelligence, then at length we say that in some respects he was very xxxvi INTRODUCTION near to being singular. He had strong opinions as to men as well as measures, and expressed them; but he was a clear thinker, and, being by nature fair-minded, he further took pains not to permit either passion or prejudice to divert the movement of his reasoning. When his mind was made up, however, he did not easily change his opinion; and one would not be surprised if it should appear that Seward and Stanton thought him obstinate, or opinionated, or even contentious. Yet he made fewer errors than they did. He made some, of course, and if this Diary had been ex- purgated with a view to exhibiting him as infallible, a few passages which appear therein would have been suppressed. For example, he was one of those who deprecated the difficult task of blockading the Southern ports, on the ground that it was a needless recognition of belligerency involving injurious consequences; nor does it seem that he ever came to see how academic and impracticable would have been a closure by proclamation. Again he had a dis-, trust of 'Hhe West Point idea," as it was called, which would have been unfortunate if his Department had been concerned with operations on the land instead of on the water. He shared the too prevalent faith in the possibility of making generals out of any sort of civilian material, just as it was assumed that military coats might be made at any mill. It took a sad amount of experience and many poor soldiers had to shiver before it was well recognized that a shoddy mill turned out poor stuff for hard service, and that extemporized commanders, made out of politi- cians or lawyers, were generally out of place at the top, however well they might do halfway up. He protested much against the establishment of a '^military frontier," with the general grouping of all residents south of it as Rebels. He said that this was the fallacious notion of technical military theorists; whereas the truth was that the shifting line of the frontier was simply the expression in military phraseology of an actual condition; not a manoeuvre was ever affected by the language; and the INTRODUCTION xxxvii attribution of rebellion to the Southern population en hloc was simply a necessity and was not far wrong either. Disaffection was a germ disease which rapidly spread among residents in the unwholesome district. Another matter concerning which Mr. Welles expressed disappro- bation was the issue of legal-tender notes. This affected him personally, or rather the administration of his Depart- ment, in a very embarrassing manner; for the sums at his disposal, voted in dollars but obtained sometimes by bills of exchange, were subject to large discount. Thus the shoe pinched. But while this was vexatious, it was not the fundamental cause of his criticism of the policy recom- mended by the Treasury Department and adopted by Congress, and which he conceived to be unnecessary and mischievous. Whether or not he was right no one can say; for while we know that the country struggled along under the incubus of those financial measures, we can only specu- late as to whether or not it could have fared better or even at all without them. Suffice it to say that some students of the subject have very stoutly maintained the same opinion which Mr. Welles expressed. These views relating to matters outside Mr. Welles^s own Department, and so finding no expression in action, did not diminish his reputation. Nearly or quite every great reputation gained at that period survived as many or more, as bad or worse, misconceptions; and inevitably so, for amid such novel problems and unprecedented events the lamp of experience burned very dim and no man could walk always wisely amid strange surroundings. The only criticism of Mr. Welles which has retained some vitality is to the general effect that he showed some lack of what we have lately been taught to call the strenuous quality. Certainly he came less before the public than did the Secretary of State who aspired to be the power behind the President, or than the Secretary of the Treasury who desired to succeed the President, or than the Secretary of War whose functions as well as his methods of performing xxxviii INTRODUCTION them were almost preposterously spectacular and despotic. Mr. Welles had no political aspirations, was not courting popularity with any eye to the future, and made no effort to render his Department conspicuous or to have his admin- istration of it lauded. Yet a comparison of the achieve- ments of the Navy Department with the achievements of other departments is greatly in its favor. Neither Mr. Stanton in arming, clothing, and feeding the men gathered by the President's calls, nor Mr. Chase in printing green- backs and selling bonds at the buyer's price, encountered a more novel task or found less material ready at hand for it than Mr. Welles met when he had rapidly to create a great blockading fleet, an efficient fighting fleet, and a fleet adapted for the peculiar service on the great rivers. It is a matter of regret that the Diary does not contain more on the subject of the Navy; and if this is due to lack of egotism, we would rather that he had not been so free from that rather petty blemish. Judgment of his admin- istrative efficiency must still be made up about as it would have been before the publication of these volumes. For some reason, or without reason, people generally have paid insufficient attention to the naval side of the civil conflict, and are still slow to appreciate the fact which our historical writers begin of late to insist upon, that it was because the blockade strangled the Confederacy that the armies were able to slay it; nor is there even now, and perhaps there never will be, any adequate appreciation of the magnitude of that great enterprise or of the infinite difficulty in the details of its prolonged and perilous maintenance. A steady pressure to weaken its effectiveness came not only from selfish or knavish traders anxious to make money and backed by politicians, but also too often from the Foreign Department. Mr. Welles had to take a resolute stand not only against the ignoble money power with its political '^pull," but occasionally even against Seward himself. It was Seward's inclination and to some extent his duty to regard conciliation somewhat more highly than firmness, INTRODUCTION xxxix whereas Mr. Welles had to set achievement far above con- cession. Mr. Welles, early in his experience, noted irrit- ably that Mr. Seward would probably get the better in a dispute of this kind because he would alarm the President by the ''bugaboo" of a foreign war. It soon appeared, however, that Mr. Lincoln was little disturbed by buga- boos, and as force is the naturally powerful element in times of war, Mr. Welles was generally able to prevail over the more pacific and temporizing Secretary. If the blockade lacked somewhat in the spectacular quality and in the condensation of the single great event, one need only turn to New Orleans and Vicksburg and above all to Mobile Bay, to have these defects abundantly supplied. Military strategy encountered no such novelty as the Merrimac, nor devised any such greater novelty as the Monitor, revolutionizing the practice of the world. Mr. Welles, of course, did not invent the Monitor, but he gave it a trial in spite of strenuous opposition on the part of '^ practical seamen." He did not command at Mobile Bay or elsewhere, any more than Mr. Stanton commanded at Gettysburg. It was not the business of these gentle- men to command; but it was their business to choose commanders, and in this Mr. Welles showed an ability in which the rival Department was sadly lacking; for, in the language of the turf, he was apt to ''pick the win- ner," the most useful faculty which a Secretary of War or a Secretary of the Navy can have in time of war. He had singular sagacity in judging men; for he was observant, and could see the moral, mental, and temperamental ma- terial which lay stored away in one man or another. He had a like shrewdness in estimating situations, and in sifting the news and rumors of events ; so that his forecasts were singularly accurate. For these reasons it was natural that, while the War Department was painfully learning on many a lost and bloody battlefield who could not com- mand victory, the Navy Department sent well chosen captains from one success to another. For this it would be xl INTRODUCTION unfair not to give the credit to Mr. Welles; and his Diary, without self-praise, indicates that he deserved it. Like silver streaks through the somewhat rumpled and disordered surface of this Cabinet story run the reminis- cences of Lincoln. Written of events presently occurring, or repeating words just spoken, the Diary tells such truth as the instantaneous photograph would tell before any re- touching had been done by the artful photographer. There- fore no allowance has to be made for the influence of a pres- tige which was then only in the making and indeed was as yet somewhat dubious. Mr. Lincoln's ministers had no idea that he towered above them, and no one of them was at all overawed by him in those days. Presiding over them at the Cabinet, casually meeting them, chatting with them or lounging as was his habit in Stanton's room, Mr. Lincoln seemed only officially superior to them. One of them had expected to be President, and another meant to be, a third dared to be insolent and unruly; it seemed to be only by a chance of politics that these men stood to him as junior part- ners to a senior, or like a board of directors to the president of a corporation. Apotheosis had not taken place; Lincoln was not yet the victim of the commonplace orator, the favor- ite model for the Sunday-school teacher. Deification is a post-mortuary process, and efforts to bring it about prema- turely are ill advised; a dead idol may be made secure upon a pedestal, but a living one is sure to slip off, lucky if it escapes with mutilation only, and not irreparable breakage. At the time of the writing of this Diary, Lincoln was not yet divus; when Mr. Chase said that to argue with him was as useless as to pour water on a duck's back, it was not blasphemy, as it would be to-day. When Mr. Seward posed as his tutor, it seemed to many persons not so much presumptu- ous as possibly fortunate; when Mr. Stanton was defiant, not a few were ready to say that it was lucky for the coun- try that a too easy-going President had a masterful Secre- tary. The council of state was at least a heterogeneous, if not quite an ill-assorted, assemblage. Mr. Seward pro- INTRODUCTION xli nounced it a ^'compound Cabinet/' and did not mean to imply commendation. This Diary presents almost glar- ingly the wide difference between the conduct of public business and that of private business. A partnership wherein the partners should sustain to each other such re- lations as did these members of the national administra- tion, a corporation with a board of directors so discordant and so jealous, would be in the bankruptcy court within a year or two. But in these vast competitions of the coun- tries, results come slowly; nations have no relief in bank- ruptcy; their managers may snatch and squabble and blunder, according to their measure of brains and charac- ter, but all the while the people must keep on doing each day its daily business for its daily bread as best it can, paying the bills and facing the consequences, sure that it must always be governed somehow, and not over confident that a change would install a better set of governors. No one who has studied the history of our Civil War, and who is willing to speak plain truth will pretend that high and generous cooperation, honest dealing, and economic effi- ciency reached an epidemic prevalence. The splendid skill with which Lincoln held together and made useful the members of this '^compound Cabinet ought to be better appreciated hereafter, by reason of the divulgements by Mr. Welles. Washington tried the like experiment, but was not able to make it work permanently. He could not han- dle Hamilton and Jefferson in double harness. Lincoln, having a much harder task, succeeded with it. In a meas- ure his success was due to the different character of the subordinate material; for of course there was not in Lin- coln's Cabinet anyone approaching the ability of Hamilton as a statesman or that of Jefferson as a politician. It was, however, much more due to a difference between the chiefs themselves, between Washington and Lincoln. Washing- ton's power lay in a certain high and dignified attitude of supremacy; Lincoln's influence lay in patience, sagacity, tact, knowledge of human nature, and skill with the indi- xlii INTRODUCTION vidual. For example, history has no instance of a situation more difficult or of an extrication more brilliant than was presented when, in December, 1862, the committee of Republican Senators waited upon Mr. Lincoln with a demand for Mr. Seward's removal. Seward, forewarned, had already hastened to resign; a day or two later Lincoln, with a deftness like the feat of a juggler, secured Chase's resignation also. ^^Now I can ride,'' said the President; and he did ride. It was characteristic that in this critical hour Stanton, unhampered by loyalty, was on the point of making the confusion worse by adding his resignation; but Mr. Welles rebuked him and stood gallantly by the Pre- sident. Nor was it the only instance when, in time of stress, the Secretary of the Navy was found a clear-headed, firm, and trustworthy supporter of his harassed principal. He played a like part in the matter of the occult move for dis- placing McClellan, when what was perhaps the right thing was undertaken in what was certainly the wrong way. At that time it was largely by reason of the refusal of Mr. Welles to participate that the President was saved from being placed in a very annoying position. This loyalty and trustworthiness of the Secretary Mr. Lincoln well appre- ciated, and in his turn upheld Mr. Welles in times of need or controversy; notably when Mr. Stanton arrogantly claimed the right to dominate the Navy Department and insisted that commanders of vessels on the rivers should take orders from commanders of the army on land. Mr. Lincoln made short work of this theory. It is reassuring to find these two shrewd judges of character entertaining such reciprocal esteem; and the opinion of each was a compli-* ment to the other. If this Diary had not covered the period of the Civil War, it would probably never have been published. Yet so far as furnishing valuable matter for the historian goes, it is even more useful for the four succeeding years; and the reason is not far to seek. From the exciting times of war X INTRODUCTION xliii under Mr. Lincoln, to the wearisome days of Reconstruc- tion under Mr. Johnson, was a transition at once swift and striking. If no other administration since the birth of the United States has made history which has been read with such absorbing interest as that of the earUer of these two administrations, so probably no other period has been so shunned as has the second by all readers who are not quite students; and there is abundant explanation why this should be so. Wranglings carried on by politicians in Con- gress, sometimes with legal arguments and always with extravagant abuse, were not very exhilarating after the intense days of mortal conflict by land and sea. The new scene seemed rather ignoble by contrast with that which had passed. During the War there had been certainly a painful display of corruption, self-seeking, inefficiency, and disloyalty on the part of a much too numerous minority; but these were faults in the superstructure; the basic mul- titude of the people, and a large proportion of their civilian leaders, had made a very fine and inspiring exhibition of enduring resolution and honest patriotism. To what events and to how many persons can one turn, during Johnson's regime, with any other feelings than dismay, humiliation, and disgust? To no events, and to only a few persons, in good truth ! For a little while after Mr. Johnson became President there was promise of reasonably harmonious, intelligent, and even creditable action in the matter of Reconstruction. But differences of opinion and purpose, which were pro- found, soon developed, and thereupon the outcry of dis- pute, which was not prevented from being tedious because it was acrimonious, became such that for the American of to-day the narration of those angry discussions seems the arid Sahara in our national history. A condition never contemplated by the f ramers of the Constitution had to be disposed of in pretended accordance with an instrument which had not a word to say concerning such problems. It followed that every one was at liberty to assert the law in K^ xliv INTRODUCTION the premises according to his own view of what was de- sirable; and advantage of this privilege was liberally taken. On the one hand there was the theory that the Southern area was no longer an aggregation of sovereign States, but had become conquered territory to be reorganized, geo- graphically and politically, as the victors might choose. On the other hand, it seemed severely logical to say that the North had fought to prove, and by success had proved, that States could never withdraw from the Union ; where- fore they continued to be States after Lee's surrender just as much as they had been before invalid votes had under- taken to effect an unlawful secession. Upon these trunk views there sprouted many variations, big and little, like branches and twigs upon two great trees. The unfortunate part of it was the influence upon popular feeling, in some degree at the North, and in a greater degree at the South. For the contestants worked themselves into a mad fury about the business; and many who had remained at a safe distance from battlefields now indulged a rage which made up in savageness of feeling for the absence of danger. Ev- idently men could become much more excited when they were shouting adjectives than when they were shooting bullets, and Congress, impelled by the demagogues, took action which brought law-making into temporary dis- repute. Apart from the technical disputations of would-be jur- ists, really important considerations were advanced upon both sides. Arguments for rubbing out the old State lines, with their dangerous allegiances, faced arguments for re- taining traditional sentiment and familiar obligations; demands, too natural to be called vindictive, for requiring formal avowals of error and penitence were met by sugges- tions of the wisdom as well as the generosity of concilia- tion. Who could say which would prove the better way in the greater number of cases, when treatment which would be effective with one individual would be ineffective with his neighbor? One thing only can now be surely alleged, INTRODUCTION xlv and that is that a prompt and decisive adoption of any plan would have been better than the prolonged wrang- lings which wearied, discouraged, and above all embittered nearly every man in the land. President Johnson and Mr. Welles were naturally led by both intellectual and temperamental influences to re- solve in much the same way those political questions which had now to be answered. So far as there is mate- rial for inferring what would have been Mr. Lincoln's posi- tion, there seems a strong probability that he would have ranged himself with them, or at least not far apart from them. Of late, also, as passion has very slowly cooled and personal prejudices have at last almost ceased to con- trol judgment, students of a later generation are finding much to commend in the policy of Andrew Johnson. Com- mendation of his policy, however, is not apt to be accom- panied with any moderation of the condemnatory attitude towards himself. On the contrary, his personal unpopu- larity and his abundant indiscretions are charged with the responsibility of aggravating the seriousness of the situa- tion far beyond what was necessary. Yet, in fact, the clash was inevitable, the opposite opinions had their foundation in the two great divisions which send one half of mankind into the radical camp and the other half into the conserv- ative ; and in the situation and the problem then at hand there were present in an exceptional degree precisely those elements which rouse into activity alike the radical and the conservative spirit. In fact the conflict of parties at the North after the War could have been just as surely predicted as the preliminary conflict between the North and the South. In Mr. Welles there was nothing of the radical; his sound good sense held him at a safe distance from extremism; therefore, so soon as we find him applying the word ^^ rad- ical'' to a section of the Republican Party, we know that a schism betwixt them and him is at hand. Such was the case, and when Mr. Welles, like all the rest of the coun- xlvi INTRODUCTION try, was swept into the fray, he no longer found at his side many with whom during recent years he had main- tained a hearty poUtical aUiance. What had happened before the War was about to happen after it; that is to say, new questions were bringing about a new ahgnment. The Repubhcan Party could not keep the allegiance of all those who had adhered to it faithfully during and even before the War. But the prestige of the party name was so great that whichever section could hold possession of that name and preserve an appearance of political continuity was sure to prevail. As was altogether natural in days of such ex- citement, this advantage fell into the scale of the extrem- ists, who conducted their campaign with a violence that has never been surpassed, rarely has been equalled, in political struggles. Erelong the situation was that Thad- deus Stevens and Benjamin F. Butler gave orders to the Radicals, that the Radicals controlled the Republican Party, and the Republican Party governed the country. Against these forces a President and Cabinet, Republican also, but outnumbered and outshouted in their own camp, were reduced to obstructing, thwarting, and delaying measures which were sure ultimately to be carried. By all precedents such a conflict in the political family was sure to be most bitter, and such it soon became, and the spirit which thus painfully characterized it soon makes itself felt in the changed note of the Diary. Thus far there has been strong, pungent, decisive writing, but never immoderate; now we drift into that somewhat rotund and dignified style of denunciation, which already in those days was getting the flavor known as ^^of the old school.^' With alarming adjectives and damnatory phraseology the most villainous motives are suggested, wicked schemes are shadowed forth, and awful consequences are foretold. Reading these things, we should despair of the Republic, did we not happily know that it is still doing quite well, though how it escaped from such a pirates' cave we can- not quite see. Since, however, we have the comforting INTRODUCTION xlvii knowledge that the escape has been successfully effected, we feel free to give a large measure of approval and sym- pathy, at least to the substance of what we read. When Mr. Welles assumed the role of a constitutional jurist he was far sounder than were his antagonists; it is true that the practical efficiency of the policies which he would have approved was not brought to the test of trial, but on the other hand it is certain that the policies which he disap- proved made no gratifying record; moreover, the lash of his castigation fell generally upon backs which we are willing to see wince. It has been remarked that it is especially the light thrown by this Diary upon individuals which we find interesting, and in this respect this second part, so to designate it, is even better than the first. The picture of Andrew John- son is altogether the most favorable which has ever been given, at least with any authority, of that unfortunate man. It deserves to be studied with great interest, for, as has been said, Mr. Welles was a very shrewd and very fair judge of men. He had a high esteem for Johnson, which was not only the loyalty of an office-holder towards his chief, but was also a sincere esteem and genuine personal liking. It is safe to assume that the excited partisanship of the times somewhat stimulated these sentiments; yet he was not thus prevented from often criticizing his leader, and he seems in the main even-minded and judicious. It may be that the publication of these volumes will lead to at least a partial revision of popular opinion concerning our only impeached President. Very much is said of General Grant and this also will be read eagerly, and is of the greatest value. Not often is any one man great in war and great in peace, and the reader of these pages will see plainly enough that there was no real reason for expecting General Grant to achieve better than the imperfect success which he did in the Presidency. Nowhere else has it been more clearly shown how little there was of the politician in his nature, and how easily he xlviii INTRODUCTION could be ensnarled by unworthy schemers. The incidents narrated in the Diary, while showing n^^ny of his fine qualities, also betray his limitations and his failings; and there is one scene, between Grant and Johnson, which cer- tainly ought not to have been suppressed, yet which can- not be read without great regret and pain. On the whole, it is probable that most readers will find Grant not much fallen in their esteem, though he was far from conducting himself to Mr. Welles^s satisfaction. It is only statues which are made wholly of marble; the original hero is usu- ally more or less patched with clay. Charles Sumner and Mr. Welles, honest and earnest men of New England, coevals, and accustomed alike to the conflicts and to the self-control of public life, were able to meet, seem indeed to have liked to meet, in these anxious days, and discuss their widely divergent views. The Diary contains some very interesting reports of their talkings in the earlier stages when the different positions were being established. Agreeing in little, they came most directly into opposition upon the matter of giving to ex-slaves the right of suffrage. History would have no higher function than the mere gratification of curiosity if it did not show to us the more remote as well as the proximate results of human action, and so enable us to draw those far-reaching conclusions which are as oil for the lamp of experience. Now by what history shows as resulting from the gift of the suffrage made to the negro after the War, it would appear that no more evil donation was ever made by men. A useless teaching this, it may be said, since it cannot be imagined that any question at all resembling that one will ever again demand settlement. Perhaps this is true; but a far broader lesson, which is very old yet not antiquated, very familiar yet not needless, receives hereby a striking illustration, to wit: that when short-sighted mortals un- dertake to bring about a good thing by doing a wrong one, they easily make sure of the wrong, and very often lose the good. If a negro leader could then have arisen INTRODUCTION xlix to speak for his race and say: ''No, we decline this tempt- ing, dangerous gift until we shall be able to use it wisely and hold it firmly,^' he would have been the most far- seeing mortal of whom we have any knowledge. The kind- ness was as if one should put money in the hands of a little child and bid him fare forth to care for himself in the crowds of city streets. Will he not promptly be de- coyed, beaten, robbed, and subjected to pains such as he never would have known had he not been so foolishly endowed? There were many motives for the act. Some persons were vindictive; what a bitter dose they would make the Southerner take ! Some were really negrophiles, and honestly, though shortsightedly , fancied that the negro would have, in his vote, a weapon of self-defense and a means of making himself respected. But of course the politicians, who really carried the measure through, did so because it would insure a South as solidly Republican for some years to come — for as many years as they person- ally cared about — as it had been solidly Democratic in years past. Just here Mr. Welles saw, and Mr. Sumner could not see, the moral wrong. Was it not just as immoral and dishonest to obtain a majority by calling these poor ignorant field hands ''voters" and then counting their so-called " votes " as by counting knavish fellows whose ballots were marketable like apples? Was the "worker" who led these benighted creatures from the rice swamp or the cotton field to the polls and bid them put a certain slip of paper into the box really entitled to a clearer con- science than the "heeler" who slipped a dollar bill into an itching palm in a factory or a bar-room ? To what greater strain was it possible to subject American "free institu- tions" than to pour into them this awful flood of unfitness? And how great was the responsibility to the country, even to mankind, in risking the bringing of such discredit upon the new American experiment ! Mr. Welles had the intel- ligence and foresight to condemn the mischievous scheme;- he declared it to be at once unconstitutional and ill-ad- 1 INTRODUCTION vised; but Mr. Sumner, with the courage of fanaticism, was ready for the responsibiUty, while Stevens and Butler hardly knew what the word responsibiUty meant. As the immediate outcome of Republican success in this business, there ensued the two or three years of negro su- premacy in the Southern States and the riot of ignorant and vicious legislation. The spectacle was so shocking that historians rarely draw it with vivid or minute accuracy; it has been hidden away out of sight, and constitutes the only really suppressed chapter in American history. The only relief was that excesses which would soon have put an end to government itself were transitory; to-day, however, we are still living among the deferred but more serious and permanent conditions which enable us to judge whether the Secretary or the Senator was arguing on the right side of the controversy. Of course it can never be known what results would have been worked out by such measures as President Johnson and Mr. Welles would have devised. That is necessarily mere matter of speculation, and when we write the word IF, we open the door through which imagination can pass into anarchic freedom. We have, however, Mr. Welles's word for it that he would by no means have withheld the vote from negroes as such ; that he thought them as fit for the franchise as were the immi- grant hordes; but that taken in bulk he did not think either the one or the other mass was fit for it. Now, tak- ing the privilege of the word, if the franchise had been offered to each individual negro so soon as, but only so soon as, he should give fair evidence of his competency to exercise it intelligently, would there not probably have been a steady advancement, yet so gradual that the ^^ negro question" would not be the difficult and cruel problem which it is to-day? The truth was that the Rad- icals of the Johnson days were really thinking of votes, and were only talking of negroes. Mr. Welles set aside temporary political expediency, and stood for good sense and sound morality. INTRODUCTION K Of course in the Andrew Johnson drama the spectacular act is the impeachment. Americans who so lately had been holding their breath as they watched the great struggle waged by Grant and Sherman against Robert E. Lee, now had to watch with more painful feelings the assault of Benjamin F. Butler and Thaddeus Stevens against the President of the United States. It is indeed to ^' look here upon this picture, and on this!" Fain would all cit- izens of this land bury out of sight and memory the shame of that endeavor, so discreditable in conception and pur- pose, so disgraceful in conduct and conclusion. But the chapter got itself written and every one must read it. This Diary furnishes us our best, practically our only, opportunity to see the interior of the defendant's council- chamber; and it is interesting to do so. By this time Mr. Welles had become pessimistic ; to him evil and destruction seemed to pervade the air ; darkness was around him, and apprehension, while the fate of his country was trembling in the balance not less dubiously and much more ignobly than when triumphant Southern troops were marching into Pennsylvania. He considers what is to be done in the anticipated event of an attempt to arrest the Presid- ent before trial, or even of an effort to depose him. Is Gen- eral Grant to be trusted? Would it be possible to turn to Sherman to oppose Grant, in case of the ultimate emerg- ency? Wild fancies and improbable terrors perturbed the staunch little band of the President's friends. To us now these seem the phantoms of panic ; but we know not the unrealized possibilities of those days. Even for us, merely reading a bit of history, there is not much gratifi- cation in thinking that in the end the nation was saved from the infinite disgrace of a verdict of conviction only because in the great body of her legislators a corporal's guard of Republicans could be found with the courage and the honesty to assert their political independence. That we are obliged to rejoice over so narrow a salvation of the national honor is in itself hardly honorable. lii INTRODUCTION After this great struggle passed, lassitude ensued; there was not much for either side to do now save to wait, to drag through the tedious months which yet remained of John- son's term. The end came of course at noon on March 4, 1869, when General Grant advanced to take his turn at the difficult task, then so exceptionally difficult, of ruling the country, healing the still stinging wounds, and pleasing the people. With all his popularity and prestige he did not find that his plough was set for an easy furrow. On March 17, 1869, Mr. Welles ''parted with ex-President Johnson and family," and he writes in his Diary that ''no better per- sons have occupied the Executive Mansion, and I part from them, socially and personally, with sincere regret.'' A month later he took his own departure with "reluct- ance." At his age the change signified, of course, that activ- ities were over, and that during his remaining years he must watch rather than share in the interesting toil and struggle of life. Apart from this reflection the removal from the capital brought also the curtailment of pleasures which had meant much to him. He had an inborn taste for what we call "Society," and he was well fitted to play a prominent and effective part in it. In point of personal ap- pearance Nature had dealt kindly by him. Mr. Seward's intellectual greatness was certainly inadequately expressed by his wizened face and ordinary form. Mr. Chase's stately deportment, on the other hand, was such an exaggeration of Jovian grandeur as seemed to outrun severe good taste. Mr. Stanton was the incarnation of the bourgeoisie in its American type. From much better endowed rivals Mr. Welles would easily have carried off the honors of the dig- nified and handsome gentleman of the official circle. He was complacently aware of these advantages of features, form, and manner, and did not neglect their due cultiva- tion. At that time, it is true, Washington was by no means the beautiful city which the lavish profusion of "boss" Shepherd soon afterward made it, and it was only begin- ning to attract the rich and varied throng which now fills it INTRODUCTION liii every winter. It was then only the place where the nation's business was done; yet even thus it had a numerous and ever changing society of able, interesting, noteworthy men with whom it was most agreeable to mingle. All this life Mr. Welles had thoroughly appreciated, and it could hardly be altogether gratifying to pack his household goods and gods for flight to a Connecticut town. It was natural that on the eve of this flitting he should write gravely, al- most sadly. Yet one would think that there must have been some sense of relief at closing such a service as that which he had been rendering to Mr. Johnson. It would have been bad enough to be engaged in conducting even a successful grapple with men who fought after the fashion adopted by Stevens and Butler and their followers; but to have been constantly forced backward, kept upon the defensive, harried and assailed by such men had been a severe test of temper and constancy. It must have been courage and honor and duty that had made Mr. Welles endure to the end, as he did with unflinching spirit, and he was well entitled to write that his duties had been '^ honestly and fearlessly discharged''; posterity will add also ^^ honorably and efficiently." However his feelings may have been mingled between a consciousness of loss and of relief, his sound good sense told him that it was ^'best that the brief span of life that remains to me should be passed in the land of my nativity. ' ' Thither accordingly he went, man fashion, without repining, and found such occupation as he could in literary work, chiefly for maga- zines. He died at Hartford, February 11, 1878. We bid him farewell with respect for him as a distinguished public servant and with good will towards him as an upright man; neither can we neglect to say that all the good serv- ice which he rendered to his contemporaries was not of greater value than the legacy which he left to posterity in this invaluable Diary. John T. Morse, Jr. DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES VOLUME I 18G1 — MARCH 30, 1864 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES 1861 — MARCH 30, 1864 I THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR' The Expedition for the Relief of Sumter — Mr. Seward's Interference — Porter and Barron — The ReHef of Fort Pickens — Conversation with Senator Douglas — Mr. Seward's Intrigues — The Loss of the Norfolk Navy Yard — The Appointment of Stanton as Secretary of War — The Relations of Seward and Stanton — Fear of the Merrimac in Wash- ington — *' Stanton's Navy." On the 6th of March, 1861, two days after the inaugura- tion of President Lincoln, Secretary Holt, who continued to discharge the duties of Secretary of War, Mr. Cameron not being prepared to enter at once upon the duties, called at the Navy Department with the compliments of General Scott and requested my attendance at the War Depart- ment on matters of special importance. I went immedi- ately with him to the office of the Secretary of War, where were Generals Scott and Totten, and I think Secretary Cameron, and perhaps one or two others. General Scott commenced with a statement of the peril- ous condition of the country and of the difficulties and embarrassments he had experienced for months past; re- lated the measures and precautions he had taken for the public safety, the advice and admonitions he had given ^ This first chapter is not a part of Mr. Welles's diary, having been writ- ten several years after the events narrated, but since it gives a vivid first- hand account of these events, which occurred before the actual diary was begun, it may properly be considered a part of the record. 4 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES President Buchanan, which, however, had been disregarded, and, finally, his apprehensions, perhaps convictions, that hostilities were imminent and, he feared, inevitable. He had, with the knowledge of Secretary Holt, taken the re- sponsibility of ordering a small military force to Washing- ton for the protection of the government and the public property and archives, and other troops were on their way from the West. His statement was full, clear in its details, and of absorbing interest to those of us who were to meet and provide for the conflict now at hand. Among other matters, and that for which he had especially requested our attendance that morning, was certain intelhgence of a distressing character from Major Anderson at Fort Sum- ter, stating that his supplies were almost exhausted, that he could get no provisions in Charleston, and that he with his small command would be wholly destitute in about six weeks. Under these circumstances it became a question what action should be taken, and for that purpose, as well as to advise us of the condition of affairs, he had convened the gentlemen present. The information was to most of us unexpected and astounding, and there was, on the part of such of us as had no previous intimation of the condition of things at Sumter, an earnest determination to take immediate and efficient measures to relieve and reinforce the garrison. But General Scott, without opposing this spontaneous resolution, related the difficulties which had already taken place, and stated the formidable obstacles which were to be encountered from the numerous and well-manned batteries that were erected in Charleston Harbor. Any successful attempt to reinforce or relieve the garrison by sea he sup- posed impracticable. An attempt had already been made and failed. The question was, however, one for naval authorities to decide, for the army could do nothing. Com- mander Ward, a gallant officer, had tendered his services on a former occasion when the subject was considered, and was ready at any time to take command of an expedition, PLANS FOR THE RELIEF OF SUMTER 6 if one were ordered. General Scott said he did not expect any conclusion would be arrived at, at this meeting. He had called the gentlemen together by direction of the Pre- sident to communicate what information he had, and was glad to have his mind relieved of overburthened care and responsibility with which it had been loaded for months. He especially requested me to consult with naval men, and had thought it advisable that Commander Ward, then on the receiving-ship at Brooklyn, should come to Wash- ington, as he had already been made somewhat familiar with the subject. The meeting adjourned with an understanding that we would come together on the following day at the Execu- tive Mansion. In the mean time the gentlemen were to give the subject earnest consideration. When we met on the succeeding day, the same gentle- men, with the exception of Judge Holt, were present, and there were two or three others, beside the President. Many of the naval officers then in Washington and about the Navy Department were of questionable fidelity. A number had already resigned and most of those who were tainted with secession soon left the service ; but some of them, on a further consideration of the subject, aided perhaps by adventitious circumstances, determined to abide by the flag and the Union. Whilst there were doubts and uncertainty on every hand as to who could be trusted, I knew Commodore Stringham to be faithful, and there- fore had, with the concurrence of the President, selected him to assist me in matters of detail. With him I commun- icated freely and fully in regard to the condition of Sum- ter and the ability of the Navy to throw in supplies for its relief. Both he and Commander Ward were confident that the Navy could reinforce the garrison and furnish it with men and provisions. The President had been apprised of the condition of things at Sumter, on the 4th of March, and had referred the subject to General Scott for advice, with directions to consult the Secretaries of War and Navy. 6 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES Some, but not a very lengthened, discussion took place at this first interview at the Executive Mansion. There was a very general and very determined opinion expressed that Fort Sumter ought to be and should be reinforced. Major Anderson and all the officers of the garrison expressed in a measure the professional opinion that reinforcements could not be thrown into the fort in time for their relief with a force of less than twenty thousand good and well- disciplined men. Generals Scott and Totten declared it was impracticable, and Mr. Seward, who made many sug- gestions and inquiries, had doubts, and was evidently wholly opposed to any attempt at relief. No conclusion was required or expected at this inter- view. The President then, and until decisive steps were finally taken, was averse to offensive measures, and anxious to avoid them. In council, and in personal interviews with myself and others, he enjoined upon each and all to for- bear giving any cause of offense; and as regarded party changes consequent upon a change of administration, while they would necessarily be made elsewhere, he wished no removal for political causes to be made in the Southern States, and especially not in Virginia. Although disturbed by the fact that the supplies of the garrison at Sumter were so limited, he was disinclined to hasty action, and wished time for the Administration to get in working order and its policy to be understood. He desired, I think on the suggestion of Mr. Seward, that General Scott should pre- pare a statement of the position of Sumter, and of the other batteries, and of preparations in Charleston and Charles- ton Harbor, — the strength of each, how far and long could the garrison maintain itself and repel an attack if made, what force would be necessary to overcome any rebel force or organized military of the State of South Carolina, should she bid defiance to and resist the Federal authorities. No regular Cabinet-meetings were held in these days, nor for several weeks subsequently, but the heads of De- partments were frequently convened, always by special CABINET-MEETINGS 7 summons through the Secretary of State. Sometimes there was not a full attendance, but on such occasions when there was an omission to invite any members, the absentees were considered not particularly interested in the questions submitted, or the questions did not affect the unrepresented Departments. The Secretary of State was, of course, apprised of every meeting and never failed in his attendance, whatever was the subject-matter, and though entirely out of his official province. He was vigilantly attentive to every measure and movement in other Departments, however trivial, — as much so as to his own, — watched and scrutinized every appointment that was made or proposed to be made, but was not communicative in regard to the transactions of the State Department. Other members began to inter- change views on these proceedings by which one of the heads of Departments was exclusively apprised on all measures, and at length Mr. Chase, as the second in rank and by request of his associates, inquired at one of the special meetings, whether it had not been usual in past administrations to have regular Cabinet-meetings on stated days of each week, and if it would not be conducive to unity and efficiency were the Administration to conform to past usage in that respect, Mr. Seward very promptly replied that it was not ad- visable to consume the time of all the gentlemen on stated days and when perhaps it would be unnecessary. The President had only to send word to the State Department, at any time, day or night, when he wanted to call his Cabi- net together, or any portion of them, and he, Seward, would take upon himself to have every member notified whose attendance was required. The times were such, he remarked, that the President might find it necessary to call them, or portions of them, frequently, perhaps daily, and even oftener, together, for consultation. It was said on the other hand, by all the members except Mr. Seward, that the stated meetings need not prevent 8 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES special calls whenever the President deemed proper, and that it was advisable, for the sake of unity and efficacy, that all the members should attend these meetings and share in the responsibility, instead of having partial gatherings. The President concurred in these views of the majority, and it was decided that thereafter the Cabinet should assemble at meridian on Tuesdays and Fridays. Commander Ward, who was summoned to Washington, expressed his readiness to receive orders and to carry supplies to Sumter. He had volunteered to perform this service to the late administration, but his offer was then declined. There was a belief at that time that the garrison could not be reinforced by the Navy, and to attempt it would. President Buchanan feared, bring on hostilities. This in substance was the report of Commander Ward to me. I called with him on General Scott, who I then per- ceived was now decidedly opposed to any attempt to re- lieve Major Anderson. The Navy he was confident could not do it, and an army of at least twenty thousand men would be necessary, he said, to effect it. We had no such army, and the Government could not collect and arm one, to say nothing of the discipline and training, before the garrison would starve. Commander Ward and also Com- modore Stringham at first thought that a supply of pro- visions and a small number of men might be thrown into the fort by means of two small fast tugs, which could run in in the night. Even if one of the tugs was lost, which they did not believe would be the case, the other could relieve the garrison. Of course, the tugs would be abandoned after landing the men, each one of whom was to have his sack of provisions if they could land no more. The crews of the tugs as well as the small additional military force would join the garrison and share its fate. In subsequent interviews with Generals Scott and Totten, Commander Ward became less confident and was finally convinced that relief was impracticable. He advised WILLIAM H. SEWARD SEWARD OPPOSES RELIEF PLANS 9 me that the scheme should be abandoned. Commodore Stringham came ultimately but reluctantly to the same conclusion, after the elaborate report of the two generals, who maintained that if supplies could be furnished the garrison, the fort itself could not hold out against the at- tack of the surrounding batteries which the Secessionists had been allowed to erect and fortify for the reduction of Sumter. Mr. Seward, who from the first had viewed with no favor any attempt to relieve Sumter, soon became a very decisive and emphatic opponent of any proposition that was made; said he had entertained doubts, and the opin- ions and arguments of Major Anderson and his officers, confirmed by the distinguished military officers who were consulted, had fully convinced him that it would be abort- ive and useless. It was a duty to defer to these military gentlemen, whose profession and study made them experts, who had by long and faithful service justly acquired the positions they held, and who possessed the confidence of the country. It was, he was satisfied, impossible to relieve and reinforce the garrison ; the attempt would provoke im- mediate hostilities, and if hostilities could not be avoided, he deemed it important that the Administration should not strike the first blow. The President, though much distressed with the conclu- sions of the military officers, and the decisive concurrence of the Secretary of State in those conclusions, appeared to acquiesce in what seemed to be a military necessity, but was not disposed to yield until the last moment, and when there was no hope of accomplishing the work if at- tempted. In the mean time, he sent Mr. Lamon, his late law-partner, to Charleston and others also to make in- quiries, among them Mr. Fox, who, like Commander Ward, had been a volunteer under the late administration to relieve Sumter and who never abandoned the idea of its practicability. Commander Ward was so fully convinced by the argu- 10 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES ments of General Scott and General Totten and the opin- ions of the officers of the garrison, so dissuaded by the opposition of Mr. Seward and the general current of views which prevailed, that he wholly abandoned the project, stating, however, that he held himself in readiness to obey orders and take charge of an expedition, if the Government should at any time deem it expedient that an effort should be made. On the 11th of March he left Washington, and returned to New York. A strange state of things existed at that time in Wash- ington. The atmosphere was thick with treason. Party spirit and old party differences prevailed, however, amidst these accumulating dangers. Secession was considered by most persons as a political party question, not as rebellion. Democrats to a large extent sympathized with the Rebels more than with the Administration, which they opposed, not that they wished secession to be successful and the Union divided, but they hoped that President Lincoln and the Republicans would, overwhelmed by obstacles and embarrassments, prove failures. The Republicans, on the other hand, were scarcely less partisan and unreasonable. Crowds of them at this period, when the storm of civil war was about bursting on the country, thronged the ante- rooms of the President and Secretaries, clamorous for the removal of all Democrats, indiscriminately, from office. Patriotism was with them no test, no shield from party malevolence. They demanded the proscription and ex- clusion of such Democrats as opposed the Rebel move- ments and clung to the Union, with the same vehemence that they demanded the removal of the worst Rebels who advocated a dissolution of the Union. Neither party appeared to be apprehensive of or to real- ize the gathering storm. There was a general belief, in- dulged in by most persons, that an adjustment would in some way be brought about, without any extensive resort to extreme measures. It seemed probable there might be some outbreak in South Carolina, and perhaps in one or SEWARD'S UNFORTUNATE PROPHECIES 11 two other places, but such would, it was beHeved, be soon and easily suppressed. The threatened violence which the nullifiers had thundered for thirty years in the ears of the people had caused their threats to be considered as the harmless ebullitions of excited demagogues throughout the North, while at the South those utterances had so trained the Southern mind, and fired the Southern heart, as to cause them to be received as truthful. The South were, therefore, more united and earnest at this crisis, more determined on seceding, than either the Democrats or Republicans supposed. But, while the great body of the people and most of their leaders in the Northern States, listening to the ninety-day prophecies of Mr. Seward, were incredulous as to any extensive, serious disturbance, there were not a few whose forebodings were grave and sad. All the calamities which soon befell the country these men anticipated. Yet such as were in positions of responsibility would not permit themselves to despond, or despair of the Republic. Mr. Seward possessed a hopeful and buoyant spirit which did not fail him in that dark period, and at no time were his party feelings more decided than during the spring of 1861. Old Whig associates he clung to and strove to retain. All Democrats he distrusted, unless they became identified with the Republican Party. He had probably overestimated his own power and ability to allay the rising storm, and had not the personal influence he supposed. He had prophesied during the winter peace and harmony, within a very brief period after the change of administra- tion was to be effected. These unfortunate prophecies, which became a matter of mirth with many of his friends and of ridicule among his opponents, were not entirely vain imaginings or without some foundation. In the confident belief that he could, if once in place and power, effect con- ciliation and peace, it had been an object with him to tide the difficulties past the 4th of March. He therefore had operated to that end, and so had Mr. Buchanan, though for different reasons. 12 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES Through Mr. Stanton, after that gentleman entered Mr. Buchanan's Cabinet, Mr. Seward and others were secretly advised in regard to the important measures of the Buchanan Administration, and in the course of the winter Mr. Seward came to an understanding, as was alleged and as events and circumstances indicated, with certain of the leading Secessionists. Among other things it was asserted that an agreement had been entered into that no assault should be made on Fort Sumter, provided the garrison should not be reinforced. Mr. Buchanan was to observe the status thus understood during the short remaining pe- riod of his administration, and Mr. Seward, as the coming premier, was, on the change of administration, to carry forward the policy of non-reinforcement of Sumter. If not supplied or reinforced, famine would certainly effect the downfall of the fortress without bloodshed on either side. Until blood was spilled, there was hope of conciliation. In fulfillment of this arrangement, Mr. Seward opposed any and every scheme to reinforce Sumter, and General Scott, who was old and much under his influence, if not a party to the understanding, seconded or took a leading part in that opposition. On the 5th of March commissioners from the Rebel Government arrived in ¥/"ashington and soon put them- selves in communication with the Secretary of State, but the specific object which they had in view, and the nego- tiations or understanding between him and the parties were not immediately detailed to the Cabinet. They un- doubtedly influenced the mind and course of Mr. Seward, who did not relinquish the hope of a peaceful adjustment of difficulties, and he in conversation continued to allure his friends with the belief that he should be able to effect a reconciliation. In the many, almost daily, discussions which for a time were held in regard to Sumter, the opposition to forward- ing supplies gathered strength. Commodore Stringham, as well as Commander Ward, on a final application which THE PRESIDENT AROUSED 13 I made to him, by request of the President, and finally by the President himself, said he was compelled to advise against it. The time had gone by. It was too late. The mil- itary gentlemen had satisfied him it was impossible, that nothing could be gained by it, were the attempt made, that it would be attended with a useless sacrifice of blood and treasure, and he felt constrained to state his belief of the inability of the Navy to give relief. Postmaster-General Blair, who had been a close and near observer of what had taken place through the winter and spring, took an opposite view from Mr. Seward and General Scott. To some extent he was aware of the un- derstanding which Mr. Seward had with the members of Buchanan's Administration, or was suspicious of it, and his indignation that any idea of abandoning Sumter should be entertained or thought of was unbounded. With the exception of Mr. Seward, all his colleagues concurred with Mr. Blair at the commencement, but as the subject was discussed, and the impossibility and inutility of the scheme was urged, with assurance from the first military men in the country, whose advice was sought and given, that it was a military necessity to leave Sumter to its fate, the opinions of men changed, or they began at least to waver. Mr. Blair saw these misgivings, in which he did not at all participate, and finally, observing that the President, with the acquiescence of the Cabinet, was about adopting the Seward and Scott policy, he wrote his resignation, de- termined not to continue in the Cabinet if no attempt were made to relieve Fort Sumter. Before handing in his resignation, a delay was made at the request of his father. The elder Blair sought an interview with the President, to whom he entered his protest against non-action, which he denounced as the offspring of intrigue. His earnestness and indignation aroused and electrified the President ; and when, in his zeal, Blair warned the President that the aban- donment of Sumter would be justly considered by the people, by the world, by history, as treason to the country, 14 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES he touched a chord that responded to his invocation. The President decided from that moment that an attempt should be made to convey supphes to Major Anderson, and that he would reinforce Sumter. This determination he communicated to the members of the Cabinet as he saw them, without a general announcement in Cabinet-meet- ing. The resolve inspired all the members with hope and courage, except Mr. Seward, who was evidently disap- pointed. He said it was of vastly more importance to turn our attention to Fort Pickens. I told him this had been done and how; that we had a considerable naval force there, almost the whole of the Home Squadron, and we had sent, a fortnight before, orders to land the troops under Captain Vogdes from the Brooklyn. He said that still more should, in his opinion, be done; that it was practicable to save Fort Pickens, but it was confessedly impossible to retain Sumter. One would be a waste of effort and energy and life, would extinguish all hope of peace, and compel the Government to take the initiative in hostile demonstra- tions, while the other would be an effective and peace- able movement. Although, as already mentioned, stated Cabinet-meetings were not then established, the members were in those early days of the Administration frequently together, and the President had every day more or less interviews with them, individually or collectively. The Secretary of State spent much of each day at the Execu- tive Mansion and was vigilant to possess himself of every act, move, and intention of the President and of each of his associates. Perhaps there was an equal desire on their part to be informed of the proceedings of the Administra- tion in full, but less was known of the transactions of the State Department than of any other. The President, after his interview with the elder Blair, asked me if a naval expedition could be promptly fitted out to relieve Sumter. Mr. Fox,^ who had in February proposed to the Buchanan Administration a plan for the ^ Gustavus V. Fox, subsequently Assistant Secretary of the Navy. FOX UNDERTAKES THE EXPEDITION 15 relief of Sumter, again volunteered for the service, and was accepted by Mr. Lincoln. On the 19th of March he received the following communication from General Scott : Headquarters op the Army, Washington, March 19, 1861. Dear Sir : In accordance with the request contained in a note from the Secretary of War to me, of which I annex a copy, I re- quest that you will have the goodness to proceed to Charleston, S. C, and obtain permission, if necessary, to visit Fort Sumter, in order to enable you to comply with the wish expressed in the Secretary's note. Please, on your return, to report accordingly. I remain, with high consideration, your most obedient serv- ant, WiNFiELD Scott. G. V. Fox, Esq. Mr. Fox visited the fort and saw Major Anderson, and was confident he could reinforce the garrison with men and supply it with provisions. Commodore Stringham was tendered the command of the naval part of the expe- dition, but doubted the practicability of succeeding. The President, notwithstanding Stringham's reluctance, de- termined to accept the volunteer services of Mr. Fox, who, though then in no way connected with the Government, had formerly been an officer of the Navy. The object being the relief of a military garrison and the supplies and troops for reinforcement being from the army, the expe- dition was made a military and not a naval one, but with naval aid and cooperation. The transports which the War Department was to charter were to rendezvous off Charles- ton with the naval vessels, which would act as convoy, and render such assistance as would be required of them. The steam frigate Powhatan, which had returned from service in the West Indies and needed considerable repairs, had just arrived and been ordered out of commission, and the crew discharged the day before the final decision of the President was communicated. Dispatches were forthwith 16 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES sent revoking the orders which had been issued, directing that the Powhatan be again put in commission, and to fit her without delay for brief service. The Pawnee and one or two other vessels, including the Harriet Lane, a revenue cutter transferred to the Navy for the occasion, there^not being sufficient naval vessels available for the expedition, were ordered to be in readiness for sea service on or before the 6th of April with one month's stores on board. These preparatory orders were given on the 30th of March. On the 1st of April, while at my dinner at Willard's, where I then boarded, Mr. Nicolay, the private secretary of the President, brought to me and laid upon the table a large package from the President. It was between five and six o'clock in the afternoon when I received this package, which I immediately examined and found it contained several papers of a singular character, in the nature of in- structions, or orders from the Executive in relation to naval matters, and one in reference to the government of the Navy Department more singular and remarkable than either of the others. This extraordinary document was as follows : — (Confidential) Executive Mansion, April 1, 1861. To the Secretary of the Navy. Dear Sir: You will issue instructions to Captain Pendergrast, commanding the home squadron, to remain in observation at Vera Cruz — important complications in our foreign relations rendering the presence of an officer of rank there of great import- ance. Captain Stringham will be directed to proceed to Pensacola with all possible despatch, and assume command of that portion of the home squadron stationed off Pensacola. He will have con- fidential instructions to cooperate in every way with the com- manders of the land forces of the United States in that neighbor- hood. The instructions to the army officers, which are strictly con- fidential, will be communicated to Captain Stringham after he arrives at Pensacola. SEWARD'S INTERFERENCE 17 Captain Samuel Barron will relieve Captain Stringham in charge of the Bureau of Detail. Abraham Lincoln. P. S. As it is very necessary at this time to have a perfect know- ledge of the personal of the navy, and to be able to detail such officers for special purposes as the exigencies of the service may require, I request that you will instruct Captain Barron to pro- ceed and organize the Bureau of Detail in the manner best adapted to meet the wants of the navy, taking cognizance of the discipline of the navy generally, detailing all officers for duty, taking charge of the recruiting of seamen, supervising charges made against officers, and all matters relating to duties whieh must be best understood by a sea officer. You will please afford Captain Barron any facility for accomplishing this duty, trans- ferring to his department the clerical force heretofore used for the purposes specified. It is to be understood that this officer will act by authority of the Secretary of the Navy, who will exercise such supervision as he may deem necessary. Abraham Lincoln. Without a moment's delay I went to the President with the package in my hand. He was alone in his office and, raising his head from the table at which he was writing, inquired, ^'What have I done wrong f^^ I informed him I had received with surprise the package containing his in- structions respecting the Navy and the Navy Department, and I desired some explanation. I then called his atten- tion particularly to the foregoing document, which I read to him. This letter was in the handwriting of Captain Meigs of the army, then Quartermaster-General; the post- script in that of David D. Porter, since made Vice- Ad- miral. The President expressed as much surprise as I felt, that he had sent me such a document. He said Mr. Seward, with two or three young men, had been there through the day on a subject which he (Seward) had in hand, and which he had been some time maturing ; that it was Sew- ard's specialty, to which he, the President, had yielded, but as it involved considerable details, he had left Mr. Seward 18 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES to prepare the necessary papers. These papers he had signed, many of them without reading, — for he had not time, and if he could not trust the Secretary of State, he knew not whom he could trust. I asked who were asso- ciated with Mr. Seward. ''No one," said the President, ''but these young men were here as clerks to write down his plans and orders." Most of the work was done, he said, in the other room. I then asked if he knew the young men. He said one was Captain Meigs, another was a naval officer named Porter. I informed the President that I was not prepared to trust Captain Barron, who was by this singular pro- ceeding, issued in his name, to be forced into personal and official intimacy with me. He said he knew nothing of Barron except he had a general recollection that there was such an officer in the Navy. The detailing officer of the Department, I said to him, ought to have the implicit confidence of the Secretary, and should be selected by him. This the President assented to most fully. I then told him that Barron, though a pliant gentleman, had not my confidence, and I thought him not entitled to that of the President in these times; that his associations, feelings, and views, so far as I had ascertained them, were with the Secessionists; that he belonged to a clique of exclusives, most of whom were tainted with secession notions; that, though I was not prepared to say he would desert us when the crisis came on, I was apprehensive of it, and while I would treat him kindly, considerately, and hoped he would not prove false like most others of his set, I could not give him the trust which the instructions imposed. The President reiterated they were not his instructions, though signed by him, that the paper was an improper one, that he wished me to give it no more consideration than I thought proper, to treat it as canceled, or as if it had never been written. He said he remembered that both Seward and Porter had something to say about Barron, as if he was a superior officer, and in some respects, perhaps, with- DEFECTION AMONG NAVAL OFFICERS 19 out any equal in the Navy, but he certainly never would have assigned him or any other man knowingly the posi- tion without consulting me. Barron was a courtier, of mild and affable manners, a prominent and influential officer, especially influential with the clique which recognized him as a leader. He and D. D. Porter were intimate friends, and both were favor- ites of Jefferson Davis, Slidell, and other Secessionists, who, I had learned, paid them assiduous attention. When I took charge of the Navy Department, I found great demoralization and defection among the naval of- ficers. It was difficult to ascertain who among those that lingered about Washington could and who were not to be trusted. Some belonging to the Barron clique had already sent in their resignations. Others, it was well understood, were prepared to do so as soon as a blow was struck. Some were hesitating, undecided what step to take. Barron, Buchanan, Maury, Porter, and Magruder were in Wash- ington, and each and all were, during that unhappy winter, courted and caressed by the Secessionists, who desired to win them to their cause. I was by reliable friends put on my guard as respected each of them. Buchanan, Maury, and Magruder were each holding prominent place and on duty. Barron was familiar with civil and naval matters, was prepared for any service, ready to be called to dis- charge such duties as are constantly arising in the Depart- ment, requiring the talents of an intelligent officer. Porter had some of the qualities of Barron, with more dash and energy, was less plausible, more audacious, and careless in his statements, but like him was given to in- trigues. His associations, as well as Barron's, during the winter of 1861, had been intimate with the Secessionists. He sought and obtained orders for Coast Survey service in the Pacific, which indicated an intention to avoid active participation in the approaching controversy. That class of officers who at such a time sought duties in the Pacific and on foreign stations were considered, prima facie j as in v20 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES sympathy with the Secessionists, but yet not prepared to give up their commissions and abandon the Government. No men were more fully aware that a conflict was impend- ing, and that, if hostilities commenced and they were within the call of the Department, they would be required to participate. Hence a disposition to evade an unpleasant dilemma by going away was not misunderstood. Barron and Porter occupied in the month of March an equivocal position. They were intimate, they were popu- lar, and the eye of the Department was necessarily upon them, as it was, indeed, upon all in the service. In two or three interviews with me, Barron deprecated the unfor- tunate condition of the country, expressed his hopes that extreme measures would not be resorted to, avowed his love for the profession with which from early childhood he had been identified and in which so many of his family had distinguished connection. There were suavity in his manner and kindly sentiments in his remarks, but not that earnest, devoted patriotism which the times demanded, and which broke forth from others of his profession, in denunciation of treason and infidelity to the flag. Porter had presented himself but once to the Department, and that was to make some inquiries in relation to his orders to the Pacific, but there was no allusion to the impending difficulties nor any proffer of service if difficulties ensued. As with many others, some of whom abandoned the Gov- ernment, while some remained and rendered valuable service, the Department was in doubt what course these two officers would pursue. This was the state of the case when the instructions of the 1st of April were sent me. On learning from the Pre- sident who were Mr. Seward^s associates, I was satisfied that Porter had through him proposed and urged the substitution of Barron for Stringham as the detailing and confidential officer of the Secretary of the Navy. I was unwilling to believe that my colleague Mr. Seward could connive at, or be party to, so improper and gross an affair THE BAERON INTRIGUE 21 as to interfere with the organization of my Department, and jeopardize its operations at such a juncture. What, then, were the contrivances which he was maturing with two young officers, one of the army and the other of the Navy, without consulting the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy ? What had he, the Secretary of State, to do with these officers in any respect? I could get no satis- factory explanation from the President of the origin of this strange interference, which mystified him, and which he censured and condemned more severely than myself. He assured me it would never occur again. Although very much disturbed by the disclosure, he was anxious to avoid difficulty, and, to shield Mr. Seward, took to himself the whole blame and repeatedly said that I must pay no more attention to the papers sent me than I thought advisable. He gave me, however, at that time no information of the scheme which Mr. Seward had promoted, farther than that it was a specialty, which Mr. Seward wished should be kept secret. I therefore pressed for no further disclos- ures. The instructions in relation to Barron I treated as null- ities. My first conclusions were that Mr. Seward had been made a victim to an intrigue, artfully contrived by those who favored and were promoting the Rebellion, and that the paper had been in some way surreptitiously introduced with others in the hurry and confusion of that busy day without his knowledge. That he would commit the discour- tesy of imposing on me such instructions I was unwilling'to believe, and that he should be instrumental in placing, or attempting to place, a person more than suspected, and who was occupying so equivocal a position as Barron, in so responsible a position in the Navy Department, and commit to him all the information of that branch of the Government, seemed to me impossible. The preparations for the Sumter expedition were carried forward with all the energy which the Department could command, for we were notified the provisions of the garri- 22 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES son would be exhausted on the 15th of April. It was ar- ranged by the War and Navy Departments that their forces — the naval vessels and transports — should meet and rendezvous ten miles due east of Charleston lighthouse on the morning of the 11th of April. Each of the vessels was to report to Capt. Samuel Mercer, commanding the Powhatan, and the following final instructions were sent to that officer: — (Confidential) Navy Department, April 5, 1861. Captain Samuel Mercer, commanding U. S. Steamer Pow- hatan, N. Y. The United States Steamers Powhatan, Pawnee, Pocahontas, and Harriet Lane will compose a naval force under your com- mand, to be sent to the vicinity of Charleston, S. C, for the pur- pose of aiding in carrying out the objects of an expedition of which the War Department has charge. The primary object of the expedition is to provision Fort Sumter, for which purpose the War Department will furnish the necessary transports. Should the authorities of Charleston per- mit the fort to be supplied, no further particular service will be required of the force under your command; and after being satis- fied that supplies have been received at the fort, the Powhatan, Pocahontas, and Harriet Lane will return to New York, and the Pawnee to Washington. Should the authorities at Charleston, however, refuse to per- mit, or attempt to prevent the vessel or vessels having supplies on board from entering the harbor, or from peaceably proceeding to Fort Sumter, you will protect the transports or boats of the expedition in the object of their mission, disposing of your force in such manner as to open the way for their ingress, and afford as far as practicable security to the men and boats, and repelling by force if necessary all obstructions toward provisioning the fort and reinforcing it; for in case of a resistance to the peaceable primary object of the expedition, a reinforcement of the garri- son will also be attempted. These purposes will be under the supervision of the War Department, which has charge of the expedition. The expedition has been intrusted to Captain G. V. Fox, with whom you will put yourself in communication, and CAPTAIN MERGER'S ORDERS 23 cooperate with him to accomplish and carry into effect its object. You will leave New York with the Powhatan in time to be off Charleston bar, ten miles distant from and due east of the light-house, on the morning of the 11th instant, there to await the arrival of the transport or transports with troops and stores. The Pawnee and Pocahontas will be ordered to join you there at the time mentioned, and also the Harriet Lane, which latter vessel has been placed under the control of this Department for this service. On the termination of the expedition, whether it be peaceable or otherwise, the several vessels under your command will re- turn to the respective ports as above directed, unless some un- foreseen circumstance should prevent. I am, respectfully. Your Obd't Serv't, Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy. Sealed orders were given to Commander Rowan of the Pawnee, Commander Gillis of the Pocahontas, and Cap- tain Tanner of the Harriet Lane, to report to Captain Mercer on the 11th of April, and the entire military and naval expedition was to be under the command of Mr. Fox, who was specially commissioned by the President and received his instructions from the Secretary of War. My instructions to Captain Mercer were read to the Pre- sident on the 5th of April, who approved them. Although but brief time had been permitted us to fit out the expedi- tion, I congratulated myself, when I went to my room at Willard's on the evening of the 6th of April, that it had been accomplished within the time given us, and that the force had probably sailed. Between eleven and twelve that night, Mr. Seward and his son Frederick came to my rooms at Willard's with a telegram from Captain Meigs at New York, stating in effect that the movements were retarded and embarrassed by conflicting orders from the Secretary of the Navy. I asked an explanation, for I could not understand the nature 24 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES of the telegram or its object. Mr. Seward said he sup- posed it related to the Powhatan and Porter's command. I assured him he was mistaken, that Porter had no com- mand, and that the Powhatan was the flagship, as he was aware, of the Sumter expedition. He thought there must be some mistake, and after a few moments' conversation, with some excitement on my part, it was suggested that we had better call on the President. Before doing this, I sent for Commodore Stringham, who was boarding at Willard's and had retired for the night. When he came, my statement was confirmed by him, and he went with us, as did Mr. Frederick Seward, to the President. On our way thither Mr. Seward remarked that, old as he was, he had learned a lesson from this affair, and that was, he had bet- ter attend to his own business and confine his labors to his own Department. To this I cordially assented. The President had not retired when we reached the Executive Mansion, although it was nearly midnight. On seeing us he was surprised, and his surprise was not dimin- ished on learning our errand. He looked first at one and then the other, and declared there was some mistake, but after again hearing the facts stated, and again looking at the telegram, he asked if I was not in error in regard to the Powhatan, — if some other vessel was not the flagship of the Sumter expedition. I assured him there was no mis- take on my part; reminded him that I had read to him my confidential instructions to Captain Mercer. He said he remembered that fact, and that he approved of them, but he could not remember that the Powhatan was the vessel. Commodore Stringham confirmed my statement, but to make the matter perfectly clear to the President, I went to the Navy Department and brought and read to him the instructions. He then remembered distinctly all the facts, and, turning promptly to Mr. Seward, said the Powhatan must be restored to Mercer, that on no account must the Sumter expedition fail or be interfered with. Mr. Seward hesitated, remonstrated, asked if the other expedi- SEWARD'S INTERFERENCE 25 tion was not quite as important, and whether that would not be defeated if the Powhatan was detached. The Pre- sident said the other had time and could wait, but no time was to be lost as regarded Sumter, and he directed Mr. Seward to telegraph and return the Powhatan to Mercer without delay. Mr. Seward suggested the difficulty of getting a dispatch through and to the Navy Yard at so late an hour, but the President was imperative that it should be done. The President then, and subsequently, informed me that Mr. Seward had his heart set on reinforcing Fort Pickens, and that between them, on Mr. Seward's suggestion, they had arranged for supplies and reinforcements to be sent out at the same time we were fitting out vessels for Sumter, but with no intention whatever of interfering with the latter expedition. He took upon himself the whole blame, said it was carelessness, heedlessness on his part, he ought to have been more careful and attentive. President Lin- coln never shunned any responsibility and often declared that he, and not his Cabinet, was in fault for errors im- puted to them, when I sometimes thought otherwise. Mr. Seward never attempted any explanation. He was not communicative on that night, nor afterwards, though there were occasional allusions, by myself, to that singular transaction. Mr. Cameron was greatly incensed; com- plained that Mr. Seward was trying to run the War De- partment, had caused Captain Meigs to desert; said he would have Meigs arrested and tried by court martial, that he was absent without leave, was expending the mili- tary appropriations without authority from the Secretary of War. My grievance was somewhat similar. Although Lieutenant Porter had gone with the Powhatan to Pensa- cola, there was no order or record in the Navy Department of the facts. He was absent without leave; the last sailing- orders to the Powhatan were [sent to] Mercer. The whole proceeding was irregular and could admit of no justifica- tion without impeaching the integrity or abifity of the 26 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES Secretaries of War and Navy. No one was more aware of this than the President, and, soHcitous that there should be no disagreement or cause for disagreement in his Cabinet, he was not comforted by any reflection or examination of the subject. A large portion of the Home Squadron was off Pensacola, and no additional vessels were required nor could well be spared for that station whilst we were want- ing them and many more this side of Key West. I had, moreover, on the earnest application of Lieutenant-General Scott, sent the Crusader and Mohawk already into the Gulf with orders to Captain Adams, the senior officer off Pensacola, to land the troops in order to reinforce Fort Pickens. No additional frigate like the Powhatan was needed there, while she was indispensable here. That ves- sel gave no greater security to Pickens. The troops, with the naval force already there, were abundantly able to de- fend it, as results proved. Besides, the defense was mili- tary, not naval, and could easily have been reinforced. Hence the reinforcements were stolen away from Sumter and sent to Pickens. When at a later date I saw the communication of the Rebel commissioners of the 9th of April to Mr. Seward and also Judge Campbell's letter of the 13th of that month, I had one of the keys to the mystery and movements of Mr. Seward. The commissioners state that ^'on the 15th of March Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford were assured by a person occupying a high official position in the Government, and who, as they believed, was speaking by authority, that Fort Sumter would be evacuated within a very few days, and that no measure changing the existing status prejudicially to the Confederate States as respects Fort Pickens was then contemplated; and these assurances were subsequently repeated, with the addition that any contemplated change as respects Pickens [= Sumter] would be notified to us. On the 1st of April we were again informed that there might be an attempt to supply Fort Sumter with provisions, but that Gov. Pickens should SEWARD AND THE COMMISSIONERS 27 have previous notice of this attempt. There was no sug- gestion of any reenforcements.'^ Judge Campbell and Judge Nelson of the Supreme Court were the high officials alluded to, and the former in his letter of the 13th of April to Mr. Seward says, "On the 1st of April I received from you the statement in writ- ing: I am satisfied the govt, will not undertake to supply Fort Sumter without giving notice to Gov. P.'^ The 1st of April was the day on which Mr. Seward, assisted by Meigs and Porter, prepared the strange series of instruc- tions to me which President Lincoln signed without read- ing, directing that Captain Barron should be made the confidential detailing officer of the Department with ex- traordinary powers. It was on the 1st of April that carte blanche was given to the two young officers, investing them with full governmental powers and authorizing them to act independently of their superiors and of the heads of their respective departments, by which a military expedi- tion was sent out without the knowledge of the Secretary of War and a naval ship under orders was taken from her destination, her commander displaced, and her cruise broken up without the knowledge of the Secretary of the Navy, whereby the whole plan of sending supplies and re- inforcements to Fort Sumter was defeated. The Secretary of State writes the Rebel commission he is satisfied the Government will not undertake to supply Fort Sumter without giving notice to Governor P., when at the very moment he knew the whole energies of the War and Navy Departments were engaged by order of the President in preparations to forward supplies and reinforcements to Sumter. All was rendered abortive, however, by secretly detaching the Powhatan, the flagship to which the squad- ron was to report and which had the supplies. On the night of the 6th of April, Secretary Seward was ordered by the President to send a telegram to Porter to restore the Powhatan to Mercer and the expedition to Sumter. But the vessel was not so restored, and on the 28 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES following day Mr. Seward writes Judge Campbell, ''Faith as to Sumter fully kept; wait and see/' I make no com- ments on these proceedings, by which I, and the Pre- sident, and others, as well as the Rebel commissioners, were deceived. These letters of Judge Campbell and the commissioners were not disclosed to me by Mr. Seward, nor do I think the President saw them when received. Porter's instructions, recommended by Seward and signed by Abraham Lincoln, placed that officer in inde- pendent command at Pensacola, where his senior, Captain Adams, was in command of the squadron, and the latter was to cooperate with and be subject to the request of his junior in the great object and purpose of the force on that station. The strange and irregular proceeding embar- rassed Captain Adams and became uncomfortable to Lieu- tenant Porter as well as embarrassing to the Secretary of State. Captain Adams could not receive or recognize the Powhatan as a part of his squadron; he had received no orders from the Secretary of the Navy in relation to the vessel or to Lieutenant Porter; and while he could not dis- regard the strange instructions to which the Secretary of State had persuaded the President to affix his signature, there was nothing requiring his action as commander of the naval forces. Porter could not report or write to the Navy Department, for he was off Pensacola, when by naval re- cord he should have been in the Pacific, and [as he was] in command of the Powhatan by no order from the Secretary of the Navy, — was without orders or instructions from the proper Department, — the officer in command would not receive and forward his letters. Officers are required to send their letters to the Navy Department through their senior officers. The Secretary of State had therefore to correspond with that branch of the Navy, and awkwardly passed over the letters of the officer who was in command of a vessel surreptitiously detached and withdrawn from her legitimate duties. I may here state that, as early as the 11th of March, RELIEF OF FORT PICKENS 29 I had, on the application of General Scott, who feared to trust the mails, and was unwilling to send a messenger through the infected region lest he should be arrested, de- tailed the Crusader to carry an officer with instructions to Captain Vogdes to land his forces and strengthen the gar- rison at Fort Pickens. When the vessel was ready to sail. General Scott concluded not to send his messenger, but dispatched written orders to Captain Vogdes, which he entrusted to the naval officer to deliver. But Captain Adams, the senior naval officer, would not recognize the orders of General Scott, nor permit Captain Vogdes and his command to land. His justification was an armistice, which had been entered into by Secretaries Holt and Toucey with prominent Rebels, not to reinforce the garrison at Fort Pickens, provided the Rebels would not attack it. Captain Adams was not entirely satisfied with his own decision. Though technically he might be justified in adhering to the armistice or order of the Secretary of the Navy, rather than obey the order of General Scott, the emergency was one when a faithful and patriotic officer would have been justified in taking a reasonable respon- sibility. To relieve himself from embarrassment, he im- mediately dispatched Lieutenant Gwathmey with a secret confidential communication to me, dated the 1st of April, stating the facts and asking instructions. Lieutenant G., although a Secessionist, was faithful to his trust. He trav- elled night and day, not even stopping in Richmond, where he belonged, and reached Washington on the 6th of April. He came to me on his arrival before he went to his hotel, and took from a belt that was strapped around his body under his shirt, the letter of Captain Adams, which he de- livered into my hands. A day or two after this affair, he tendered his resignation, which, however, was not accepted, but he was dismissed from the service. I went immediately to the President with Captain Adams's communication, and we both deemed it abso- lutely essential that a special messenger should be forth- 30 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES with sent overland with orders to immediately land the troops. Prompt action was all-important, for the Rebellion was rapidly culminating, and the hesitancy of Captain Adams had caused a delay which endangered the possession of Santa Rosa Island and the safety of Fort Pickens. But, in the general demoralization and suspicion which per- vaded Washington, who was to be trusted with this im- portant mission? It was then three o'clock in the after- noon, and the messenger must depart by the mail train which left that evening. Paymaster Etting was in Wash- ington, and I sent for him to convey the message. Al- though not well, he prepared to obey orders, but had my consent to make inquiry for another officer, whose fidelity and energy were unquestioned, to perform the service. About five o'clock he reported to me that Lieut. John Worden had just arrived in Washington, that he would vouch for him as untainted by treason, and as possessed of the necessary qualifications for the mission. I directed that Lieutenant W. should immediately report to me, and in a brief interview I informed him of my purpose to dis- patch him on a secret, responsible, and somewhat danger- ous duty through the South, and that he must leave in about two hours. He expressed his readiness to obey orders, and, though the time was short and he indifferently pre- pared, he would be ready at the time designated. I di- rected him to make no mention of his orders or his journey to any one, not even to his wife, but to call on me as soon as ready and I would in the mean time prepare the docu- ment that was to be confided to him. The fact that he was an officer of the Navy passing South to Pensacola, and yet not a Secessionist or in sympathy with them, would be likely to cause him to be challenged and perhaps searched. I therefore wrote a brief dispatch to Captain Adams, which I read to him when he called, and gave it into his hands open, advising that he should commit it to memory, and then, if he thought best, he could destroy the paper. When he saw Captain Adams he could from recollection make RELIEF OF FORT PICKENS 31 a certified copy to that officer, stating the reasons why he did not produce the original. Everything was successful, for, though he was questioned at one or two points and asked if he was carrying a message, he managed to escape detection, and I beUeve was not searched. He reached Pensacola and was put on board the Brook- lyn on the 12th of April. That night the troops under command of Captain Vogdes with [a battalion of] marines were landed and Fort Pickens was reinforced. Instead of remaining with the squadron and improving the first opportunity to reach the North by steamer, Lieutenant Worden preferred to land as soon as his message was delivered, and commenced his return, going to Washington by the same route he had taken in going to Pensacola. It was not surprising that the Rebels, when they learned next day that the troops had been landed and were in Fort Pickens, connected the mission of that officer with the movement. Although he had been gone some hours on his homeward journey, the facts were telegraphed to the Rebel leaders at Montgomery, who had him arrested and confined in the prison at that place, where he remained several months until late in the fall, when an exchange was effected, and he reached the North in season to take com- mand of the ironclad and turreted Monitor, the first ves- sel of that class, and fight the Merrimac in Hampton Roads. He was among the first, if not the very first, prisoners-of- war captured by the Rebels. The order to Captain Adams to land the troops was re- ceived by him, as stated, on the 12th, and the fort was reinforced that night. Lieutenant Porter and the Powhatan did not reach Pensacola until the 17th, five days after Cap- tain Vogdes and his command with the marines were in the fort, — a force sufficient for its defense. In detaching the Powhatan from the Sumter expedition, no important or necessary aid was furnished by her or by Lieutenant Porter to Pickens. Had the frigate remained under Cap- tain Mercer, the attempt to reheve Major Anderson 32 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES probably would not have succeeded, for the Rebels of Charleston were strangely prepared and warned of the intended expedition, and there were other movements which precipitated Rebel action. Soon after President Lincoln had formed the resolu- tion to attempt the relief of Sumter, and whilst it was yet a secret, a young man connected with the telegraph office in Washington, with whom I was acquainted, a native of the same town with myself, brought to me successively two telegrams, conveying to the Rebel authorities informa- tion of the purpose and decision of the Administration. One of these telegrams was from Mr. Harvey, a newspaper correspondent, who was soon after, and with a full know- ledge of his having communicated to the Rebels the move- ments of the Government, appointed minister to Lisbon. I had, on receiving these copies, handed them to the Pre- sident. Mr. Blair, who had also obtained a copy of one, perhaps both, of these telegrams from another source, like- wise informed him of the treachery. The subject was once or twice alluded to in Cabinet without eliciting any action, and when the nomination of Mr. Harvey to the Portuguese mission was announced, — a nomination made without the knowledge of any member of the Cabinet but the Secretary of State, and made at his special request, — there was general disapprobation, except by the President (who avoided the expression of any opinion) and by Mr. Seward. The latter defended and justified the selection, which he admitted was recommended by himself, but the President was silent in regard to it. Two days preceding the attack on Sumter, I met Sena- tor Douglas in front of the Treasury Building. He was in a carriage with Mrs. Douglas, driving rapidly up the street. When he saw me he checked his driver, jumped from the carriage, and came to me on the sidewalk, and in a very earnest and emphatic manner said the Rebels were deter- mined on war and were about to make an assault on Sum- DOUGLAS'S OPINION OF SEWARD 33 ter. He thought immediate and decisive measures should be taken; considered it a mistake that there had not al- ready been more energetic action; said the dilatory pro- ceedings of the Government would bring on a terrible civil war, that the whole South was united and in earnest. Although he had differed with the Administration on important questions, and would never be in accord with some of its members on measures and principles that were fundamental, yet he had no fellowship with traitors or disunionists. He was for the Union and would stand by the Administration and all others in its defense, regardless of party. I proposed that we should step into the State Depart- ment, near which we were, and consult with Mr. Seward. The look of mingled astonishment and incredulity which came over him I can never forget. '^Then you/' said he, *^have faith in Seward. Have you made yourself acquainted with what has been going on here all winter? Seward has had an understanding with these men. If he has influence with them, why don't he use it?" I said Seward was a member of the Administration, and nothing could be done without the knowledge of himself and associates, that to meet him frankly and give him con- fidence was probably the best course under the circum- stances. He said perhaps it was. He could now see no alterna- tive. ^^ Lincoln is honest and means well. He will do well if counseled right. You and I are old Democrats," he con- tinued, '^and I have confidence in you, though we have differed of late. I was glad when I learned you were to be one of the Cabinet, and have told Lincoln he could safely trust you. Seward has too much influence with him." This is the substance of the conversation, the result of which was that he consented to go with me to the State Department and see Mr. Seward if still there. It was late in the afternoon. He, Douglas, said we must take his word for the information he gave, for he could make no 34 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES disclosure of names. He knew what he stated to be true, — that the fire-eaters were going to fire on Sumter. He requested Mrs. Douglas to remain in the carriage. As we ascended the steps of the old State Department, he said he was going to see Seward because I advised it, and because there was no other course, for he was a part of the Administration, but it was unfortunate for the coun- try that he was so, because Seward did not realize the ca- lamities that were before us, and deceived himself with the belief he had influence at the South when he had none. Mr. Seward received us cordially, heard the statement of Mr. Douglas calmly, took a pinch of snuff, said he would see the President on the subject. He knew there were wild and reckless men at Charleston and we should have dif- ficulty with them, but he knew of no way to prevent an assault if they were resolved to make one. Douglas told me subsequently he was not disappointed at the interview. Seward, he said, was not earnest, had no heart in this matter, could not believe the storm was be- yond his ability and power to control, but he would soon enough learn that no mere party management or cunning would answer in such an emergency as this. Alluding to his hesitancy in going to Seward, he said he knew it was useless to make any appeal to him. Seward had no idea of the necessities of the case, and was, at that moment, as he, Douglas, knew, carrying on an intrigue with the Rebel leaders, who were deceiving him, whilst he flattered him- self that he was using and could control them. Douglas said he had witnessed what had been going on for months without being able to do anything effectively, for he found himself in the confidence of neither party. He had tried to rally the Democracy, but the party was broken up. Slidell, Cobb, Breckenridge, and others were determined to break up the Union also. He could do nothing with them; others, like myself, had taken the opposite course, and got mixed up with old Whigs, and he had as little influence with us. Buchanan was feeble and DOUGLAS'S OPINION OF SEWARD 35 incompetent. The great point with him and his Cabinet since the election had been to drift over the fourth of March. Seward had thought that he could then take the reins and manage things as he pleased, had all along treated this mighty gathering tempest as a mere party contest, which he and Thurlow Weed could dispose of as easily as some of their political strifes in New York. When he spoke to me it was, he said, with a vague hope or idea that Mr. Lincoln might be induced to act independ- ent of Seward. He had thought of seeing me and having a confidential conversation for some time, and ought to have done so, but it had been postponed till the Sumter news gave him a start, and it was then too late. When I invited him to go to Seward, the man he wished to avoid, — for he considered Seward's mistaken notions, unintentional errors, refined party management, as calamitous as the open treason of Rhett, or Toombs, or Jefferson Davis, — my invitation and remarks awakened him to the actual facts, — that Seward was a part of the Government, and that nothing could be done without him. He had little expectation that anything could be accomplished with him. He had not, Douglas thought, risen to the occasion, nor was he adapted to the times before us. In detaching the Powhatan from the Sumter expedition and giving the command to Porter, Mr. Seward extricated that officer from Secession influences, and committed him at once, and decisively, to the Union cause. My own im- pression is that he would have come into that channel as the difficulties progressed, for his energetic, restless, and aspiring nature would not have permitted him to occupy a neutral or passive position, and I never have believed that when the trial test reached him, he would have proved re- creant to the flag, whatever were his personal attachments to, and friendships for, the Rebel leaders. As a lieutenant he was entitled to no such command as the Powhatan, a fact of which Mr. Seward, who had little knowledge of 36 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES details, was ignorant, but the trust flattered and gratified the ambition of Porter. Finding himself taken into the confidence of the President and Secretary of State, and perceiving that in the matter before them the Secretary giving orders was acting as principal, he presumed to go farther, and was prompted by his audacity to present his friend Barron, between whom and himself there was a common sympathy, for a commanding position in the Navy Department. Mr. Seward, who, with all his shrewdness and talent, was sometimes the victim of his own vanity and conceit, was flattered by Porter's suggestion that he could give Barron a position; it showed that he was considered by Porter, and he hoped by others, the premier, the controlling mind of the Administration, and it was a wish to confirm this impression, rather than sympathy with any Secession views of Barron, which led him into the otherwise unwarrantable and inexcusable step that was taken. President Lincoln believed the attempt to thrust Barron on the Navy Department was the fault of Porter rather than Seward, and he never thereafter reposed full confidence in Porter, though not insensible to his professional ability. Often during the four eventful years which followed, when from time to time I availed myself of Porter's qualities and gave him commands and promotion, the President expressed his gratification that I retained no resentment, but sacrificed personal wrongs and injustice for the good of the country. In about two weeks from the time when I was instructed to take Barron into my confidence, he deserted the Govern- ment, went to Richmond, received a commission in the Rebel service, and was taken prisoner in the August fol- lowing, when Fort Hatteras was captured by Rear-Ad- miral Stringham, whom he was to have displaced. He was the first of the faithless naval officers who abandoned the Government and took up arms against it that was made prisoner, and, singularly enough, surrendered his sword to PORTER AND BARRON 37 the man whom he was, by Porter's arrangement or Seward's order, to have superseded. Whether Porter was prompted by any of his Rebel associates to intrigue for Barron, or whether they concerted with him to that end, I never as- certained. The facts will probably never be known. There is no doubt that Mr. Seward was in communication with the Rebel leaders, or some of them; not that he was im- plicated in, or a party to, their rebellious schemes, but he tampered with them, felt confident, as Douglas stated, that when he obtained power he could shape events and control them. He overrated his own powers always, and under- estimated others. When he was sworn in to the office of Secretary, he expected and intended to occupy the place of premier, and undoubtedly supposed he could direct the Administration in every Department. Mr. Lincoln had, he knew, little administrative experience. Mr. Seward, there- fore, kindly and as a matter of course, assumed that he was to be the master mind of the Government. But whilst he always had the regards and friendly wishes of Mr. Lincoln, to whom he made himself useful, and who was impressed with the belief that his Secretary of State had shrewdness, knowledge, political experience, and capability far greater than he actually possessed, the President in a gentle man- ner gradually let it be understood that Abraham Lincoln was chief. The incidents which I have detailed — the de- tachment of the Powhatan, the irregular command given to Porter — were improper proceedings which the President soon comprehended, and the order in relation to Barron convinced him that he must not give implicit trust to any one, but depend on his own judgment in matters of importance. The supervising control which Mr. Seward at the com- mencement undertook to assume over all the Depart- ments except that of the Treasury, and the Treasury to an extent, was checked, so far as the Navy Department was concerned; yet, without informing himself of usage, or international, or statute laws, he frequently involved 38 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES the Government in difficulty by inconsistently surrender- ing national rights. Mr. Cameron sometimes complained of interference with the War Department and army mat- ters by the Secretary of State, and on one occasion, when the latter was commending Meigs, as he often did, for great ability, Cameron proposed to transfer that officer to the State Department, where his talents were most used and highest appreciated. The extraordinary powers and authority with which Captain Meigs and Lieutenant Porter were invested in the spring of 1861 would have alarmed the country and weak- ened the public confidence in the administrative capacity of the Executive had the facts been known. Mr. Aspin- wall and other gentlemen informed me that when Cap- tain Meigs applied to them for assistance and submitted the letters of the President and Secretary of State, cloth- ing him and Porter with unlimited authority over the mili- tary and naval service, — confessedly without the know- ledge of the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy, — they were alarmed for the safety and welfare of the Government. It betrayed weakness in the executive head. Much had been said and was then uttered by partisans of the incompetency of Mr. Lincoln and his unfitness. He had not been tried, and the period was portentous. But, whatever doubts existed in regard to Mr. Lincoln, they had been in a great measure dispelled when his Cabinet was appointed. Apprehension, however, revived on the arrival of Meigs and Porter in New York, and when their powers were made known. Such as saw those documents — and amongst them was Mr. Aspinwall — were astonished and almost in despair. At the best it was misgovernment and indicated want of confidence, of unity, of energy, and of proper administrative ability at Washington. They were disposed to impute the strange orders and carte hlanche to the sub-officers as a blunder or mistake of the President, who was taking to himself departmental duties, and issu- ing direct to officers and subordinates commands and MEIGS AND PORTER'S CARTE BLANCHE 39 instructions instead of passing them through the legitimate channels; but the name of Mr. Seward appeared on most of the papers, showing that he was cognizant of and recom- mended what was doing. One gentleman, more sagacious than the rest, in conversation with me some months later, imputed the whole to a contrivance of Mr. Seward, and the only unaccountable thing to him was the non-appear- ance of Thurlow Weed in the affair. There is no doubt that the President was induced to take whatever steps he did, knowingly, in the matters referred to, through the instrumentality and by the advice of Mr. Seward, but he was not knowing to some of the important matters herein stated, and as soon as he was made acquainted with them, he at once disavowed and annulled them. It was a misfortune of Mr. Seward, and one of his characteristics, that he delighted in oblique and indirect movements ; he also prided himself in his skill and management, had a craving desire that the world should consider him the great and controlling mind of his party, of the Administration, and of the country. He was in- tensely anxious to control and direct the War and Navy movements, although he had neither the knowledge nor aptitude that was essential for either. For more than a month after his inauguration President Lincoln indulged the hope, I may say felt a strong con- fidence, that Virginia would not, when the decisive stand had finally to be taken, secede, but adhere to the Union. There were among her politicians some able and influential men who favored the Nullification or Secession party, disciples of Calhoun, but it was notorious that a great majority of the people were opposed to all disunion senti- ments. These last, though vastly more numerous than the fire-eaters, were passive and calm in their movements, while the Secession element was positive, violent, and active. As is usually the case, the energetic and factious element seized the reins of power, while the more deliberate 40 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES were submissive, hesitating and hoping that extreme measures might be avoided. That there should be no cause of offense, no step that would precipitate or justify secession, the President, al- most daily, enjoined forbearance from all unnecessary exercise of political party authority. It was, he believed, important that the Administration should exert its power to conciliate the people and strengthen their attachment to the Government. Whether, in the excited and disturbed condition of the country, when frantic sectional appeals were made in the cause of treason and disunion, the policy pursued was the best, may be a question. Probably a more energetic and decisive course would have been adopted, had events culminated at a later period; but the Admin- istration was just entering upon its duties, and was met at the threshold by an organized and powerful party oppo- sition, at the very time it was encountering and struggling with the Secessionists and before it was possessed of and could fully exercise its rightful authority. The traffic in slaves was great in Virginia, and embodied more capital than any other product of the State. The traders who were engaged in this nefarious business were reckless and unprincipled men. Nevertheless, wealth even in their hands had its influence, and, coupled with daring and violence, became irresistible. Slaves were the great staple of the State; their sale brought annually a greater return of money to the State than tobacco or any other product, perhaps than all others; their bondsmen found a market in the States of the South, and nowhere else in Christendom. It was natural, and to be expected, that all the ferocious and brutal instincts of the slave-trader should be in opposition to the Administration, and to those States which would not tolerate slavery within their borders. A heavy hand, could it have been placed on these wretches who advocated treason and urged disunion, thronged Rich- mond, and spent of their ill-gotten wealth profusely to promote secession, would have been better than attempts at NORFOLK NAVY YARD IN DANGER 41 conciliation. The times were revolutionary, and the gentle and persuasive arguments and measures of the Admin- istration were treated as cowardly, while the violent and denunciatory anathemas and avowed hate of the Yankees by the slave-traders, captivated the idle, the vicious, and adventurers, and bore away those with whom they came in contact. Norfolk was the principal commercial port of the State, and sentiment there gave tone and opinion to lower Vir- ginia. The navy yard at Norfolk afforded employment to many, and the government patronage in party times had been supposed important. Aware of this, the Pre- sident early made special request that no important or extensive changes should be made in the navy yard at present, or without consulting him. I soon became satisfied that the large amount of public property there was in a precarious condition. As a preventive, or matter of cau- tion, it seemed to me advisable that a military force should be placed there to protect the yard, and to serve as a rally- ing point for Union men in case of emergency. But Gen- eral Scott, to whom I applied for troops, said he had none to spare, that he had not sufficient force to guard the Capitol or to garrison Fortress Monroe and Harper's Ferry, which were endangered, and that Norfolk was wholly indefensible. When, after two or three interviews with him, I appealed to the President, he not only con- curred with General Scott, but thought it would be inex- pedient and would tend to irritate and promote a conflict, were a military force to be sent to Norfolk. Any extraor- dinary efforts to repair the ships with a view of removing them and the public property would, in his opinion, ex- hibit a want of confidence and betray apprehensions that should be avoided. I had as early as the 14th of March ordered the Pocahon- tas, one of the Home Squadron, which arrived in Hampton Roads, to proceed to Norfolk. This was no unusual order, and could create no apprehension or distrust. 42 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES The frigate Cumberland, the flagship of Commodore Pendergrast, commanding the West Indian and Gulf Squadron, arrived in Hampton Roads on the 23d of March, where she was purposely detained, and on the 29th of March I gave orders for her to proceed up Elizabeth River to the navy yard and take the place of the Pocahontas, ordered to join the Sumter expedition. There were several old-class ships, some of them valu- able but dismantled, laid up, which would require a good deal of time and labor to be put in a condition to be removed. The Merrimac, the most valuable vessel at the yard, was wholly dismantled, but the Germantown, the Plymouth, and the Dolphin, all sailing-vessels, could soon and with very little difficulty be got ready for removal or for service. We had, however, few or no seamen to man them, nor oould we procure them at Norfolk, but were compelled to enlist and order them from New York or one of the North- ern yards. Notwithstanding the sensitive feeling that existed on the part of the people of Virginia, as well as of the Government, I felt that we might with propriety order a sufficient force there to man at least two of the smaller vessels without creating alarm, as it would be legitimate in the ordinary course of things. The Plymouth was de- signated as the practice ship for the midshipmen, and the Germantown was nearly ready for her armament and crew. No exception could be taken to orders to man them. If the seamen reached Norfolk, and an exigency should arise rendering it expedient to move the Merrimac, they could be made available for that purpose. The Powhatan had just reached New York and was ordered out of commis- sion, but those of her crew whose time had not expired could be made available for valuable service at Norfolk, and such was the first intention of the Department, but important events for the relief of Fort Sumter rendered it necessary to detain the seamen on the Powhatan for the Sumter expedition, and to add to them the recruits from the receiving-ship. These orders took almost all the re- NORFOLK NAVY YARD DISASTER 43 emits who were intended for Norfolk, as soon as two hun- dred and fifty were enUsted. Orders were given to Paymas- ter Etting to proceed to New York and charter a vessel to take the men to Norfolk, and also to Commander Rowan, but the orders could not be fulfilled. The order for two hundred men was sent to Brooklyn on the 11th of April. The fidelity and patriotism of Commodore McCauley, who was in command of the yard, were questioned by no one, and his reputation as a good and faithful officer all admitted (though not particularly eflftcient). I had not seen him for several years, but the inquiries which I made in regard to him were satisfactorily answered. Subsequent events proved him faithful but feeble and incompetent for the crisis. His energy and decision had left him, and, what- ever skill or ability he may have had in earlier years in regular routine duty, he proved unequal in almost every respect to the present occasion. He made no report or suggestion to me of disaffection or doubt on the part of any officer, and in answer to inquiries which I made of him as to the time which would be necessary to put the engines or machinery of the Merrimac in order, so that she could be moved, he sent me word that it would require at least a month. On receiving this answer, I became apprehensive that I could not depend upon him if the emergency should demand prompt action, and I at once directed the en- gineer-in-chief, Mr. Isherwood, to proceed, with whatever assistance he needed, to Norfolk, and, without creating a sensation, but in a quiet manner, to put the machinery in working condition with the least possible delay. To do this, he was directed to call to his assistance whatever force was necessary, and to work without cessation day and night until it was accomplished. Instead of a month, the work was completed within less than four days. On the 11th of April, I issued orders to Commander Al- den, then in Washington, to proceed to Norfolk and report to Commodore McCauley to take charge of the Merrimac and deliver her over to the commanding officer of the 44 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES Philadelphia station. Many of the instructions in those days were given orally, for what became a matter of record was too often, in some mysterious way, made known to the insurgents. No more than was absolutely necessary was put upon paper for any of the officers who were sent to Norfolk. Engineer Isherwood had the machinery in working order by the 16th, and Commodore McCauley wrote me on that day that the Merrimac would be ready for service by the following evening, the 17th. Chief Engineer Isher- wood returned and reported to me on the 18th that Com- modore McCauley had defeated the plans and purposes of the Department; that he would not permit the Merrimac to leave; was, he thought, under the influence of liquor and bad men. In company with the President, I saw General Scott again the following day, when he repeated the same opinions, but on the 19th [sic] he promised that General Delafield or a good engineer should be detailed who would cause some defenses to be thrown up. My impressions are that Commander Alden called and made report on the same day with Mr. Isherwood, but he states it was on the 19th and that he returned to Norfolk on the same evening on the Pawnee under Commodore Paulding. Alden was timid, but patriotic when there was no danger, for he was not endowed with great moral or physical courage, yet believed himself possessed of both, and was no doubt really anxious to do something without encountering enemies or taking upon himself much re- sponsibility. At Norfolk all his heroic drawing-room reso- lution and good intentions failed him. He had not the audacity nor the moral courage to meet his professional brethren who had those qualities and were determined to sustain the Secession cause. A man of energy and greater will and force, with the orders of the Secretary, would have inspired and influenced McCauley, whose heart was right, and carried out these orders. While in Cabinet-meeting, I was called out by Com- NORFOLK NAVY YARD DISASTER 45 mander Alden, who informed me, with emotion which he could not entirely suppress, that Commodore McCauley had refused to let him have the Merrimac, that after the fires had been kindled they had been drawn by the Com- modore's command, that the vessel was at the wharf, and that the deportment and remarks of some of the younger officers left no doubt in his mind that they had control of the Commodore and of the yard. The old man, he said, seemed stupefied, bewildered, and wholly unable to act. Instead of inspiring the well-intentioned but infirm old man, Alden had struck away from the yard and had im- mediately returned to report to the Department. I took him forthwith to the President, and the Cabinet, which was then in session, when he related what had occurred. At the consultation which took place as soon as he with- drew, I advised that immediate steps should be taken for the defense of the navy yard, stated the large amount of public property there, in ships, material, ordnance, ma- chinery, tools, and stores of every description, the neces- sity, in a naval and military point of view, of retaining possession of the yard, and the disastrous consequences to the Government of permitting such a station to be wrested from its possession, or of abandoning it to the insurgents. The President and Cabinet concurred in these views, and when I informed them of the opposition of General Scott to sending a military force to protect the yard, it was thought advisable that the President and myself should see him on the subject. I went from the Executive Mansion to military head- quarters and saw General Scott, to whom I communicated the condition of affairs and the necessity of a military force without delay at Norfolk. But the General was still decisive and emphatic against sending troops to defend the place, said it was an impossibility to furnish the troops, or to defend the navy yard if we had them; that any force he could send there would certainly be captured; the Navy and marines might, if on shipboard, escape, but 46 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES the troops could not; repeating continually it was enemy *s country. All this and more he repeated to the President and myself at the interview, but he finally consented that a battalion of Massachusetts volunteers, which he supposed might be at Fortress Monroe, from information just re- ceived, should accompany an expedition under Commo- dore Paulding, to withdraw the vessels and as much of the public property as could be secured, and that he would send Colonel Delafield — subsequently Captain Wright, an intelligent officer, instead of Delafield — with them. I had previously, on the 16th, after hearing from Com- modore McCauley that a month was required to put the Merrimac in condition to be removed, dispatched Commodore Paulding, who was then attached to the De- partment as detailing officer, to Norfolk, to inquire into and inform himself of the actual state of things at the yard, the reliability of officers and men, and to satisfy himself fully in regard to Commodore McCauley. If he had any doubts of the safety of the yard after examination, he was to advise me, and was to act for me in all particulars, pro- vided danger was imminent, having plenary powers for the purpose. On the morning of the 18th, Commodore Pauld- ing unexpectedly returned and made a satisfactory verbal report or statement concerning Commodores McCauley and Pendergrast and the condition of the yard. Some of the younger officers, who belonged in Virginia or the South, had expressed a wish to be relieved from duty at the yard in anticipation of difficulty with the insurgents, among whom were their kinsmen and neighbors, with whom they preferred not to come in collision; but all were, he said, patriotic, deprecated hostility, and were governed by honorable motives. Commodore McCauley he indorsed as faithful, competent, and to be trusted. He was seconded by Commodore Pendergrast, commanding the Home Squadron, who had arrived in Hampton Roads a few days previous with his flagship, the Cumberland, and had orders to proceed with the frigate up the Elizabeth River NORFOLK NAVY YARD DISASTER 47 to the vicinity of the navy yard. Commodore Pendergrast said he had consulted freely and fully with both those of- ficers, had made some suggestions and assented to others made by them, and was so well satisfied that the workmen were reliable and that the public property was in good and trustworthy hands, that he thought it unnecessary he should remain, but that it was best he should return to Washington and make report in person. Although this report was more favorable than I had expected, I greatly regretted he did not remain and act for the Department, and so informed him. I also blamed myself for not having given him explicit written orders to that effect.^ My preliminary orders and inquiries were oral and not matters of record ; my first written orders were on the 29th of March; Virginia did not pass the ordinance of secession until the 17th April. Until then it was hoped and believed by many, including the President and Secretary of State, that Virginia would not secede. It will be borne in mind that Congress, which had just adjourned, put forth no preparation for the coming crisis, had made no extra appropriations, had not authorized the enlistment of any additional seamen; almost all our naval force was abroad; most of the small Home Squadron was in the Gulf or West Indies, nearly as remote and inaccess- ible as the European Squadron; and the whole available force north of the Chesapeake had been dispatched to the ^ [Mr, Welles in his manuscript here cited such orders and portions of the correspondence as became a matter of record : — "See Order of March 29th to Pendergrast to proceed with Cumberland to Norfolk. "Order to Breese 31st of March for seamen — also order of 11th April for seamen. "Order of 11th April to Alden. "Orders of 11th April to McCauley to prepare the Merrimac and Ply- mouth. "Orders of 11th April to Isherwood to proceed to Norfolk. "Letter 16th April to McCauley. "McCauley's letter of 16th April to me. "Order to Paulding of 18th April. ' "Isherwood's report 18th April."] 48 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES relief of Fort Sumter and secretly and surreptitiously, without the knowledge of the Navy Department, sent to Fort Pickens. Without men, without funds, without legis- lative authority, without advice, suggestion, or intimation of any kind from Congress, from the Senators on the Naval Committee, who remained in Washington through the month of March, while rebellion was gathering strength, the Secretary was compelled to take the whole responsibility and to act in that great emergency. Fore- most among the men who had defied the South and treated with scorn and derision the secession theory and move- ment, was Senator John P. Hale, Chairman of the Naval Committee of the Senate : one of the first to flee from Wash- ington, when the storm which had gathered was about to burst, was the same distinguished Senator. When, how- ever. Congress convened in special session in July, and Washington was garrisoned and shielded by a large army, this burning and eloquent patriot returned, and, over- flowing with courage, was moved in the exuberance of his zeal to introduce a resolution to inquire into the circum- stances attending the destruction of the property of the United States at the navy yard at Norfolk, and espe- cially if there was any default on the part of any officer. Pensacola and Harper's Ferry were included in the inquiry, but the virtuous indignation of the Chairman of the Naval Committee was chiefly exercised and wholly exhausted in regard to Norfolk. His wrath was less against the Rebels than somebody else, he did not care to mention whom. When notified by Mr. Hale that his committee was in ses- sion, that certain information was wanted by them, and I was told in a patronizing way that any explanation by way of justification of the Department would be received, I directed that the whole transactions in relation to Norfolk should be thrown open for his examination, that, so far as the Department could furnish them, answers should be given to all specific inquiries, and that every facility should be extended to the Committee; but for myself I declined NORFOLK NAVY YARD DISASTER 49 any appearance or explanation. My time, I assured the honorable chairman, was too much occupied in attending to necessary public duties to detail narratives or enter into explanations that were personal. It was my intention they should have all the facts, and I wished them fully and fairly reported, but I certainly should volunteer no attendance. In his report as Chairman of the Committee, Mr. Hale manifests his patriotic fervor, military skill, and intelli- gence, and all the candor and fairness within him. There was a wide difference between him and General vScott in regard to the defense of Norfolk, for while the old hero said no troops could be had, and insisted that the yard could not be defended, that the place was without fortifications or defenses of any kind, that troops placed there would inevitably be captured, the chairman of the committee of investigation, Mr. John P. Hale, represented otherwise, and asserted in his report that '^ Captain McCauley was abundantly able to defend the yard,'' which was ^'encom- passed on two sides by a wall ten or twelve feet high, and eighteen inches thick," that there was an available force of at least one hundred and fifty marines and sailors with two howitzers ''and the crew of the Cumberland of three hundred and fifty men." The report enumerates other means also, none of which appear to have convinced General Scott, or either of the three commodores who were there with full powers, and who commanded the forces and were entrusted with the defense. There is this difference between the military and naval officers on one side, and the Senatorial Commit- tee on the other: the naval and military gentlemen were compelled to take the responsibility and act promptly according to their best judgment in the line of their profes- sion, and the performance of duty to which they had been trained. They may have erred in some respects; it would be strange if they did not under the extraordinary circum- stances of the case. Mr. Hale had no responsibiUty, was 60 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES embarrassed by no military or naval teaching, was beyond danger, and made his report, criticizing and condemn- ing their conduct, twelve months after the event took place. Mr. Horace Greeley, in his ^^ American Conflict,'' eluci- dates and illuminates the report of Mr. Hale, which he assumes to be non-partisan and correct, by saying '^Capt. Paulding might have held his position a week, and that week would have brought at least 30,000 men to his aid.'' Not thirty thousand men reached imperiled Washington in one week, in response to the call of the President by proclamation, aided by all the State authorities, and of- ficial and individual effort, zeal, and influence; and such as came in obedience to that national call were indifferently provided with arms, munitions, and supplies, backed though they were by the Federal and State governments. If the historian is to be believed, a larger army would have gathered on an appeal from the Commodore to save the navy yard, than came to defend the National Capital on the official call of the President. What thirty thousand men could have done, had they gathered at Norfolk in a week, towards defending a place in the enemy's country, without batteries or shore defenses of any kind, without engineers to construct them, without resources, with no commissariat or quartermaster's supplies, are matters not clearly explained in the ^^ American Conflict." It is doubted if Mr. Greeley could have got that number of men at Nor- folk, to say nothing of their equipment and supplies, when the President, with all the power and energies of the country, gathered no such number in that brief time at Washington to defend the capital of the nation. In closing his chapter on ^'the national disgrace at Nor- folk," in his ^'American Conflict," Mr. Greeley, who read- ily, oracularly, and dogmatically, without investigation, adopted the statements of the factious, partisan, untruth- ful, unjust, and iniquitous report of Mr. Hale, says: ''Thus ended the most shameful, cowardly, disastrous NORFOLK NAVY YARD DISASTER 51 performance that stains the annals of the American Navy.'^ Such is contemporary history. In the hght of subsequent events the performance may be condemned. It was certainly unfortunate and disas- trous. There were feebleness and incapacity in McCauley, and treachery and infidelity on the part of some, in fact most, of his subordinates, — matters shameful indeed, but I am aware of no evidence of cowardice, even in the pusillanimous commander. He and his associates were astounded by the defection of Virginia, and overwhelmed with the magnitude of the rebellion, for which Mr. Sena- tor Hale had, neither in Congress nor out of it, suggested preparations, and Congress had made but feeble or no pro- vision. Mr. Greeley had in his organ, the Tribune, said if the States wished to secede, let them go. Until the storm burst. Congress had not believed that the overthrow of the government or a division of the Union was intended, nor could the members realize that such a tornado was then upon them. At the commencement they would not be aggressive; they hesitated to be the first to imbrue their hands in the blood of their countrymen. Mr. John P. Hale and Mr. Horace Greeley might have done differently from those officers and saved the navy yard and public property at Norfolk by tactics of their own, when military and naval men could not. The misfortune was bad enough when truly and fairly stated, but aggravated by the misrepresentations and ex- aggerations of reckless and unscrupulous men in Congress, like Hale, and by the partisan fictions and imaginary de- lusions of journalists such as Greeley, great injustice was done to officers of courage and undoubted patriotism, as well as to the Department and Administration. It is easy to be seen that had a younger and more vigorous officer than McCauley been in command of the yard, or a more daring and energetic officer than Alden sent there, a different course might and probably would have been adopted, and some of the vessels and public property been saved. But 52 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES at the time no officer in the service had a more unexcep- tionable record than McCauley. Not a word, not a sus- picion, was breathed of any want of abihty, courage, or fidehty in that officer. Nor was there any want of con- fidence in Paulding, or Pendergrast, who were younger and more vigorous men, nor were the heroic and gallant juniors who participated with them in that disastrous performance destitute of true heroism or devoted patriotism. In scut- tling the ships, McCauley and Pendergrast committed a lamentable mistake. They were deceived without doubt, and in that terrible crisis were not equal to the emergency. They were not partisan politicians, and could not believe that so wanton, causeless, and extensive a conspiracy ex- isted; and when the crisis came, they were confounded and not prepared to act. When they did act, it was in bewil- derment and error. Whether different officers would have had better success cannot be known. They might have rescued the Merrimac and some other vessels, though that is uncertain, for the Rebels had been long preparing for the event, and were the positive element; the Union men were passive. The Rebels were resolute and acted on the offens- ive; our officers were incredulous and on the defensive. They were anxious to strike and fight, while the others merely deprecated and repelled. When Greeley says that one week would have brought thirty thousand men to Norfolk to aid Commodore Pauld- ing, he betrays weakness and his unfitness as a historian. General Scott knew better. He would have sent no thirty thousand troops there, had the men been in Washington. WTiat could thirty thousand undisciplined, unofficered men have accomplished, but their own destruction? Like the heedless and senseless cry from the same vicious source, ''On to Richmond, '* the assertion that Norfolk could have rallied to its defense thirty thousand men is the essence of partisan folly. Senator Hale, who hurried to introduce a resolution to investigate and report in July, 1861, but delayed and lin- NORFOLK NAVY YARD DISASTER 53 gered in communicating his invidious and unjust document until April, 1862, had an object in his movement. He desired to embarrass and assail the Navy Department, of which he was the Senatorial organ, and to which he should have given his earnest, honest, and zealous support. No- thing would have afforded him higher gratification than to have found the Secretary, who had mildly dispensed with his proffered agency, remiss and delinquent, and it would have delighted him had I subjected myself to his criticism and rebuke, or attempted to defend or explain to him and his committee the proceedings and errors of naval officers. I neither sought nor shunned him. The records of the Department were thrown open to him, and they were a defense and justification. He slurs over the orders, oral and written, in March and early April, preced- ing the occurrence, and says the first steps taken for the defense of Norfolk were on the 10th of April, thirty-seven days after the inauguration. Were that the fact, it would not have been, under the circumstances, when Congress had been delinquent, tardy action. But I had on the 29th of March changed the destination of the frigate Cumber- land, which, by special direction of the President, on re- quest of the Secretary of State, was about proceeding to the Gulf, and ordered her from Hampton Roads to Norfolk to check disorderly proceedings, should any appear. In repeated verbal applications to General Scott for a mili- tary force in the months of March and April, as a precau- tionary measure, I met a refusal, on the ground of military necessity and inability to comply. He had not, he said, troops to defend Harper's Ferry, a military station, which was actually captured by the Rebels simultaneously with the destruction of Norfolk, As there was not a soldier to defend the place and we had no sailors to man the vessels, I sent, on the 31st of March, to New York, general and special orders for two hundred and fifty men to be dis- patched to Norfolk, and, if there were not that number on hand, to enlist and forward them as soon as possible. All 64 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES the steamers, and almost the whole limited naval force in all the Atlantic ports, had been sent to the relief of Forts Sumter and Pickens. These facts were well known to Senator Hale, Chairman of the Naval Committee of the Senate and of the special committee to investigate the destruction of property at Norfolk, — many of them, and others, were not matters of record, — but he was careful to suppress and make no allusion to them; some that were mentioned were greatly perverted and distorted. The report was his own. Sena- tor Grimes, who was associated with him on the commit- tee, took especial pains on more than one occasion to as- sure me that he had no hand in drawing it up, that he never gave it his approval, and I think he said he never read it until after it was presented to the Senate and published. I should have been better pleased had he made this state- ment and disclaimer publicly and in open Senate. But I would not ask it. I knew I had done my duty faithfully, honestly, and as well as I knew how. I knew that the President, to whom I was immediately accountable, approved of my course, and was fully satisfied with it. Congress, under all the mis- representations and intrigues of the malcontents, while re- gretting in common with the Administration and the whole country the loss of the navy yard and property, were convinced that the Department acquitted itself faithfully and well. I was introduced to Mr. Stanton by President Lincoln at the Executive Mansion in January, 1862. It was at the first Cabinet-meeting which he attended after receiving the appointment of Secretary of War. I had not previously met him, although I had then been ten months in Mr. Lin- coln's Cabinet. The period was trying; true and patriotic friends had come forward to encourage us, but Mr. Stan- ton, who was a resident of Washington, avoided the Presi- dent and most of his Cabinet. The times were such as to STANTON BEFORE HIS APPOINTMENT 55 interrupt social intercourse in the District between Union- ists and Secessionists, and the Hues between them were marked. Old associations were broken up, and it was dif- ficult to form new ones, even when persons had leisure, which members of the Administration had not. A major- ity of the resident population, and particularly of those who formed the resident elite of society, were Secessionists, or in sympathy with Secessionists. A feeling of bitterness pervaded the whole community, and the members of the Court Circle, which had been in the fashionable ascendant during the administrations of Pierce and Buchanan, did not conceal their dislike, detestation, and hate of the Black Republicans, intensified among the masses in the District. Mr. Stanton had not been counted as a Republican, al- though there was an impression he had, as a member of Mr. Buchanan's Cabinet, approved the policy of that ad- ministration in the winter of 1861, and acted with Dix and Holt. This impression did not obtain with Mr. Black ^ and the intimate friends and supporters of Buchanan. Although not fond of the gayeties and parties of Wash- ington, he could at times make himself companionable and entertaining; but from the day he left Mr. Buchanan's Cabinet until he entered that of Mr. Lincoln, he mingled little in society, and none with the men in authority. It was represented that he eschewed the new administra- tion, ridiculed the President, and freely expressed his opposition to the measures adopted and course pursued by the Government. The Secessionists distrusted him, and neither of the parties confided in him in the early days of the War. The Administration did not consider him one of its supporters, though he was on friendly terms with Seward. He had the reputation of being an Anti-Secession Democrat, who nevertheless wished to preserve his rela- tionship with the Democratic Party, and as having no fellowship with Republicans. 1 Jeremiah S. Black, first Attorney-General, then Secretary of State, in Buchanan's Cabinet. 56 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES When the appointment of District Attorney for Wash- ington was under consideration in the spring of 1861, Mr. Stanton and Mr. Carrington were the rival candidates. Some diversity of opinion was entertained by the members of the Cabinet in regard to them. Mr. Seward earnestly pressed Mr. Stanton, vouched for his loyal sentiments, and claimed that he had in a confidential way rendered great service to the Union cause while in Mr. Buchanan's Cabi- net. Mr. Bates, the Attorney-General, desired the appoint- ment of Mr. Carrington, who was, I believe, not only an intimate friend, but kinsman. Himself a man of courteous manners, Mr. Bates could not, he thought, have the unre- served freedom with or repose the same confidence in Mr. Stanton that he could in Mr. Carrington, and the times were such that there should be implicit confidence between the Attorney-General and the District Attorney in the discharge of their frequently delicate and always highly responsible duties. The subject was several times before the Cabinet, but as I knew neither of the gentlemen personally, I expressed no opinion, for I had none in regard to either. Mr. Chase seconded the views of Mr. Seward for Stanton, but no other one interested himself in the case, or seemed disposed to interfere in the question. At length the President de- clared the subject must be disposed of, and wished each one present to communicate whatever knowledge he pos- sessed of either. He appealed particularly to Mr. Blair, who resided in Washington, was a member of the bar, and knew both the gentlemen well. Mr. Blair said that he had not for that reason wished to say much, but thus called upon he should speak the truth. In point of ability, he said, Mr. Stanton was undoubtedly the superior of Mr. Carrington. He doubted, however, Stanton's integrity, and stated a damaging fact which was within his own personal knowledge, but which it is not necessary here to repeat. The statement astonished the President and disconcerted both Seward and Chase, each STANTON MADE SECRETARY OF WAR 57 of whom questioned whether there might not be some mis- take in this matter, but Blair said there could be none, and farther that he (Stanton) was a prot^g6 of Black, Buch- anan's Secretary of State, and in feeling with him. The President remarked he thought it judicious to conciliate and draw in as much of the Democratic element as pos- sible, and he was willing to try Stanton, though personally he had no special reason to regard him favorably; but the office came within the province of the Attorney-General, and he would turn the question over to him. The Attor- ney-General thanked the President, and said he would on returning to his office send over the appointment of Mr. Carrington. From current rumors I was not very favorably impressed in regard to Mr. Stanton. His remarks on the personal appearance of the President were coarse, and his freely expressed judgment on public measures unjust. He may have felt chagrined at the preference of Carrington. In the fall and winter of 1861, when murmurs began to be heard against General McClellan, it was said, and I suppose correctly, that Stanton was his friend and adviser. Until appointed Secretary of War, there was no intimacy between him and the members of the Administration, with the exception of Mr. Seward. I have reason to know that he was engaged with discontented and mischievous persons in petty intrigues to impair confidence in the Administration. When it was determined that Mr. Cameron should re- tire from the office of Secretary of War, — not wholly for the reason that was given out, but for certain loose matters of contracts, and because he had not the grasp, power, energy, comprehension, and important quaUties essential to the administration of the War Department of that period, to say nothing of his affiliation with Chase, — it was a surprise, not only to the country but to every member of the Administration but the Secretary of State, that Stanton was selected. He was doubtless the choice of 58 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES Mr. Seward, who influenced the President and secured the appointment. Seward and Stanton had been brought into fellowship in the winter of 1861, when the latter was a member of Buchanan's Cabinet, and confided to the former the opera- tions and purposes of the Administration. It was this com- munion between the two, who had been of opposing politics and parties, — one at the time a member of the outgoing, the other of the incoming Executive Council, — which led to that political and personal intimacy which eventuated in the induction of Stanton to the War Department. Mr. Seward always looked upon Stanton as his protege, and Stanton, who, with all his frankness, real and assumed, had, towards his superiors in position or intellect, some of the weaker qualities of a courtier, was studious to continue the inpression that he was dependent upon and a follower of the Secretary of State. It gratified Mr. Seward, who felt his own consequence when a member of Buchanan's Cabi- net sought the opportunity and gave him his confidence, and gave Stanton an influence and hold upon his acknow- ledged leader that remained during the whole of the lat- ter's official career. ... Others claimed and have been given some portion of the credit of Stanton's appointment, but it belonged exclus- ively to Mr. Seward, and this Mr. Stanton well knew. It has been stated that Mr. Cameron selected his successor, and, to soften his exit from a position that he was reluctant to leave, the change was permitted to assume that shape; but Mr. Seward was the engineer and manager, and he it was who selected Edwin M. Stanton to be Secretary of War. There was reluctance on the part of the President to re- move Mr. Cameron, and only a conviction of its absolute necessity and the unauthorized assumption of executive power in his Annual Report would have led the President to take the step. From the 4th of March, 1861, to the day he was selected, a period of darkness and struggle for national existence, STANTON SELECTED BY SEWARD 59 when the Rebels had the Government by the throat, and true friends were wanted, no word of encouragement, no outspoken support of the Administration, was heard from Mr. Stanton. He may in private interviews with Mr. Sew- ard, or in incidental conversations with Mr. Chase, have modified his expressions, but the Administration did not know him as an open, fearless, outspoken friend. It has been said that all the members of the Cabinet but Mr. Blair heartily concurred in the appointment. No member of the Cabinet was aware of his selection until after it was determined upon, except Mr. Seward, and the machinery of having Mr. Cameron name his successor was an after arrangement. Then Mr. Chase was called in and consulted on a predetermined question, but without a full knowledge of all the facts, and no other member was advised in regard to it. Mr. Chase was peculiarly sensitive in matters where Mr. Seward was operating, and, to preserve harmony, he was led to believe that he was- early consulted and one of the original prime movers in effecting the change. He had, however, known little of the retirement of Cameron, who had at the beginning been attached to the State rather than the Treasury Department, but latterly Cameron leaned to Chase, who sought the association. Mr. Blair's opinion of Stanton was well understood, and to have con- sulted him when it was known he could not, with the facts in his possession, give the selection his approval, would have been trifling; and the other members of the Cabinet, having little knowledge of and no intimacy with Stanton, could furnish nothing to influence or guide the President. He, therefore, deemed it best, after yielding to Seward's urgent representations, to act without consulting a major- ity of the Cabinet, who, he knew, could give him no light on the subject. The course adopted soothed Mr. Blair, gratified Mr. Chase, and, the scheme being one of Mr. Seward's contrivance, he could not be otherwise than satisfied. 60 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES Mr. Black says that Stanton went into Buchanan's Cab- inet under his auspices, and no one has ever questioned it. He further asserts that Mr. Stanton ^^said, many times, that he was there only that I [Black] might have two voices instead of one," that ^'he would resign if I did." The same professions and the same expressions were made by the same individual to Mr. Seward when he entered the Lincoln Cabinet, and subsequently, as I heard Mr. Seward say; and I doubt not with equal sincerity to each, though Black and Seward were entirely antagonistic in their political views and principles. When introduced to Mr. Stanton, I met him frankly, friendly, and sincerely, as an associate and colleague with whom I was to hold intimate personal and official relations in a responsible position and in a trying period. There was, however, no immediate cordiality between us, but there was formal courtesy. I was at that time furiously attacked by many newspapers and active partisans, as well as by disappointed speculators and contractors, and Mr. Stanton may have received unfavorable impressions from them. I knew that he had been in consultation with, and given improper and hostile advice to, some of the dis- affected. He was not, however, aware that I was possessed of that information, and I am certain it did not influence my action or deportment towards him. The New Orleans expedition, which was far under way when Stanton was appointed, but all knowledge of which had been studiously withheld from the War Department and all others, firgt brought us together. A force had been gathered in the Gulf, ostensibly to attack Mobile or Gal- veston, but really destined for the Mississippi. The latter fact had not been communicated to the War Department, because secrets could not then be kept but inevitably leaked out, contractors became importunate, and the Rebels often were forewarned. Shortly after Mr. Stanton's appointment, Mr. Fox, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, inadvertently and incautiously made known to General THE WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS 61 Butler and to Mr. Stanton the great object which had occupied the attention of the Navy Department for several months. Mr. Stanton seized hold of the information with avidity, and gave a hearty support to the movement — the more acceptable because General McClellan, who had known our object and was by express direction of President Lincoln to cooperate with the Navy, appeared indifferent and had little confidence in our success. Mr. Stanton also united with us in the necessity of driving the Rebels from the right banks of the Potomac, taking possession of their batteries, and opening the river to uninterrupted naviga- tion, a work in which General McClellan had frequently disappointed us. The expectations and hopes that some- thing effective might be done in opening the navigation of that important avenue to Washington had been so delusive that we united in requesting President Lincoln to issue his celebrated order of the 27th of January for a forward move- ment, which was ordered to take place on the 22d of Feb- ruary. Such an order had been suggested, before Mr. Stanton's appointment, by the Navy Department, which had become wearied with the delays and tardy action of the General-in-Chief. These and other matters had brought the War and Navy Departments into harmonious action, but with no cordial intimacy between the Secretaries. Indeed, no member of the Cabinet but Mr. Seward enjoyed intimate relations with the new Secretary of War, although Mr. Chase paid him assiduous attention, and was in return treated with due respect and courtesy. To Mr. Chase he may have been more communicative than to others, because the former was almost daily at the War Department, while the rest of us seldom went there save on business, and were less attentive. When intelligence reached Washington on Sunday morn- ing, the 9th of March, that the Merrimac had come down from Norfolk and attacked and destroyed the Cumberland and Congress, I called at once on the President, who had sent 62 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES for me. Several members of the Cabinet soon gathered. Stanton was already there, and there was general excite- ment and alarm. Although my Department and the branch of the Government entrusted to me were most interested and most responsible, the President ever after gave me the credit of being, on that occasion, the most calm and self- possessed of any member of the Government. The Pre- sident himself was so excited that he could not deliberate or be satisfied with the opinions of non-professional men, but ordered his carriage and drove to the navy yard to see and consult with Admiral Dahlgren and other naval officers, who might be there. Dahlgren, always attentive and much of a courtier, had, to a great extent, the Pre- sident's regard and confidence; but in this instance Dahl- gren, who knew not of the preparation or what had been the purposes of the Department, could give the President no advice or opinion, but referred him to me. The inabil- ity of Dahlgren to advise seemed to increase the panic. General Meigs, who was of much the same temperament with Dahlgren, was also sent for by the President, Stan- ton, or Seward. The latter had great confidence in Meigs on all occasions, and deferred to him more than to his superior, in all matters of a military character. Dahlgren and Meigs were both intelligent officers and in their specialties among the first of their respective profes- sions, but neither of them was endowed with the fighting qualities of Farragut or Sheridan, and in that time of gen- eral alarm, without information or facts, they were not the men to allay panic or tranquillize the government officials. They were prudent, cautious men, careful to avoid danger, and provide the means to escape from it. But the most frightened man on that gloomy day, the most so I think of any during the Rebellion, was the Sec- retary of War. He was at times almost frantic, and as he walked the room with his eyes fixed on me, I saw well the estimation in which he held me with my unmoved and unexcited manner and conversation. STANTON'S FEAR OF THE MERRIMAC 63 The Merrimac, he said, would destroy every vessel in the service, could lay every city on the coast under contribu- tion, could take Fortress Monroe; McClellan's mistaken purpose to advance by the Peninsula must be abandoned, and Burnside would inevitably be captured. Likely the first movement of the Merrimac would be to come up the Potomac and disperse Congress, destroy the Capitol and public buildings; or she might go to New York and Boston and destroy those cities, or levy from them con- tributions sufficient to carry on the War. He asked what vessel or means we had to resist or prevent her from doing whatever she pleased. I stated our vessels were not as powerful or in numbers as extensive as I wished. It was certain, however, the Mer- rimac could not come to Washington and go to New York at the same time. I had no apprehension of her visiting either, and wished she were then in the Potomac, for if so we could take efficient measures to dispose of her. That Burnside and the force in the Sounds were safe from her, because her draft of water was such she could not approach them. That the Monitor was in Hampton Roads, and I had confidence in her power to resist, and, I hoped, to overcome, the Merrimac. She should have been there sooner to have destroyed the Merrimac, but the contractors had disappointed us. Mr. Seward, who had been desponding, contrary to his usual temperament and custom, rendered more timid by the opinion and alarm of Stanton, said my remark in rela- tion to the draft of water of the Merrimac gave him the first moment's relief he had experienced. Stanton made some sneering inquiry about this new vessel the Monitor, of which he admitted he knew little or nothing. I described her, and [said] that it had been our intention, had she been completed within contract time, to have sent her up to Norfolk to destroy the Merrimac before she came out of the dry dock. Stanton asked about her armament, and when I mentioned she had two guns, 64 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES his mingled look of incredulity and contempt cannot be described; and the tone of his voice, as he asked if my reliance was on that craft with her two guns, is equally indescribable. Others mingled in the conversation with anxiety and concern, but on the part of Stanton there was censure, bitterness, and a breaking-out of pent-up male- volence that I could not misunderstand. Others, alarmed by the destruction which had taken place and dreading further disaster, had their fears increased by his harsh manner; but, though unsupported and unassisted, I was not appalled or affected by his terror and bluster. I more correctly read and understood his character in that crisis than he mine. It was the first, and, save a repetition on the following day, the only, occasion when he attempted to exercise towards me that rude and offensive insolence for which he became notorious in the discharge of his official duties. That day and its incidents were among the most un- pleasant and uncomfortable of my life. The events were momentous and portentous to the nation, the responsibil- ity and the consequence of the disaster were heavier on me than on any other individual; there was no one to encour- age and sustain me. Admiral Smith, always self-possessed and intelligent, who would have stood by me, was over- whelmed with the tidings, for his son was on the Congress, and, as his father predicted when tidings reached him of the fate of that vessel, had fallen a victim. My Assistant, Fox, was absent at Hampton Roads in anticipation of the arrival of the Monitor, whither he had gone before these occurrences to meet her. Dahlgren and Meigs, by nature and training cautious, not to say timid, who had been called in, were powerless, and in full sympathy with Stanton in all his fears and predictions. In all that painful time my composure was not disturbed, so that I did not perhaps as fully realize and comprehend the whole impending calamity as others, and yet to me there was throughout the whole day something inexpress- STANTON'S FEAR OF THE MERRIMAC 65 ibly ludicrous in the wild, frantic talk, action, and rage of Stanton as he ran from room to room, sat down and jumped up after writing a few words, swung his arms, scolded, and raved. He could not fail to see and feel my opinion of him and his bluster, — that I was calm and unmoved by his rant, spoke deliberately, and was not excited by his violence. The President, though as uncomfortable as any of us, and having his alarm increased by the fears and scary apprehensions of Stanton, manifested much sympathy and consideration for me. My composure and the suggestions and views I presented were evidently a relief to him, but Stanton's wailings and woeful predictions disturbed him. Both he and Stanton went repeatedly to the window and looked down the Potomac — the view being uninterrupted for miles — to see if the Merrimac was not coming to Wash- ington. It was asked what we could do if she were now in sight. I told the President she could not, if in the river, with her heavy armor, cross the Kettle Bottom Shoals. This was a relief. Dahlgren was consulted. He thought it doubtful if she could reach Washington, if she entered the river. Stanton asked what we could do for the defense and pro- tection of New York and other cities. I knew of nothing. Our information of the Merrimac — for we had had every few days report of her condition — was that she could not, with her heavy and ill-adjusted armor, penetrate the river nor venture outside, and was to be used in Hampton Roads and the Chesapeake. I stated these facts, and they with other matters had a good effect upon the President. But Stanton in his terror telegraphed to the governors of the Northern States and the mayors of some of the cities, warning them of the danger, and advising, as I was told, that rafts of timber and other obstructions should be placed at the mouths of the harbors. These occurrences took place at different interviews which we had through the day and evening, for it was one of the many exciting Sundays which we had during the 66 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES Civil War. I received that evening a telegram from Dahl- gren at the navy yard, stating he had secured a large number of boats and had a full force loading them with stone and gravel, and asking if he was acting in conform- ity with my wishes. I answered no, and that I had given no orders to sanction his proceedings. On the following morning we met at the President's, and Stanton, with affected calmness but his voice trembling with emotion, inquired if I had given orders to prevent the boats which he had provided from being prepared and loaded. I replied that I had given no orders to prepare and load any boats, nor did I intend to; that I had received a singular note from Dahlgren to which I had given this reply: that he had no authority from me for such work. Stanton said he had given the order to Meigs and Dahlgren, and had done it to protect Washington and with the approval of the President, to whom he turned. The President confirmed his statement, or remarked that Mr. Stanton had thought it imperative that something should immediately be done for our security; that those officers, Meigs and Dahlgren, one or both, were present, and he thought no harm would come of it, if it did no good. The purpose was to load fifty or sixty canal-boats and other craft with stone and sink them at Kettle Bottom Shoals, or some other place in the channel. I stated that I was very sorry to hear it, that for five or six months we had labored with General McClellan and the War Department to keep this important avenue open to unrestricted navigation, and that, the Rebels having left, we ourselves were now to shut ourselves off by these obstructions. As the President had authorized the proceeding, I had nothing to say except to express my dissent the moment Admiral Dahlgren was told he might go forward with the work he had commenced under the War Department, and at its expense. Mr. Stanton said the War Department would bear both the expense and the responsibility. STANTON'S NAVY 67 The passages were sharp and pungent, and they were the last of that description which he ever used towards me. The occasion, the termination, and subsequent events ap- peared to have satisfied him that he had in some respects mistaken my true character. No member of the Cabinet did he thenceforward treat with more courtesy and con- sideration, and the roughness and something worse which he manifested towards some of our colleagues he never extended to me. The result was he procured a fleet of some sixty canal- boats, which were laden, but Mr. Lincoln had forbidden, after our interview, that they should be sunk in the chan- nel until it was known the Merrimac was approaching. Some weeks later, when the President, with Stanton and some others, was going down the river in a steamer, the long line of boats on the Maryland side near the Kettle Bottom Shoals attracted attention, and some one inquired concerning them. ^'Oh,^' said the President, ^Hhat is Stan- ton^s navy. That is the fleet concerning which he and Mr. Welles became so excited in my room. Welles was incensed and opposed the scheme, and it has proved that Neptune was right. Stanton's navy is as useless as the paps of a man to a sucking child. There may be some show to amuse the child, but they are good for nothing for service." I have narrated, at some length, what took place on an occasion of great interest to the country, and which brought out in strong light the traits of Mr. Stanton in a crisis, when he thought he had me at disadvantage and could exercise towards me his imperious nature. He saw that even under the excitement and alarm I treated his bluster with indifference, that the impression which each made upon the President was by no means to his advan- tage; and I have supposed was admonished to that effect by the President himself. Mr. Stanton was fond of power and of its exercise. It was more precious to him than pecuniary gain to dominate over his fellow man. He took pleasure in being ungracious 68 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES and rough towards those who were under his control, and when he thought his bearish manner would terrify or humiliate those who were subject to him. To his superiors or those who were his equals in position, and who neither heeded nor cared for his violence, he was complacent, sometimes obsequious. From long association and close observation I am convinced he had but little moral courage nor much self-reliance when in trouble. It never struck me that he was mercenary or that he made use of his position to add to his private fortune, but he was reckless and re- gardless of public expenditure, and the war expenses were greater by hundreds of millions than was necessary, or than they would have been had the Department been in other hands. Of his zeal, devotion, and great labor in his office there can be no question by those who were at all familiar with him as Secretary, although there are differences as to the wisdom of many of his measures and the value of his serv- ices. He was vigilant, often efficient, and his friend and patron Mr. Seward styled him the ''Carnot of the War,'' ^^ Stanton the Divine." But this was mere fulsome adula- tion from an old pohtician. With the resources of a nation in men and money at his command, and each used without stint or scruple, he might well be efficient and powerful, and no one better knew this than Stanton himself. He was an adept in intrigue and knew how to meet and move the leading spirits in Congress, and for that matter always had a little Congress of his own. No one courted the members with more assiduous attention, or, in an adroit way, flat- tered and pandered to them with more success. He did not, like Mr. Seward, to whom he was indebted for his greatness, entertain and feed them, yet Seward's parties were made subservient to Stanton and his views, and no one contributed more to it than Seward himself. The Sec- retary of State supposed, as did his predecessor Black, that Stanton was an appendage to him in the Administration, and they each, though diametrically opposed in their prin- STANTON'S CLAIM TO GREATNESS 69 ciples and views of government, had a common interest in all that took place. If an expenditure of the public money exceeding that of any minister in all history, either of our own or of any other country, makes one a great war minister, then Stanton may lay claim to greatness. A willing Congress, lavish of public money, readily granted all that he asked, and he was willing to ask all they would give. For a time the President was alarmed at his headlong career, but, finding that Stanton was sustained and glorified in his extravagance, he interposed no obstacles to the military measures and movements of the War Department. When Mr. Stanton came into the War Department, for several months he assumed that the Navy was secondary and subject to the control and direction of the military branch of the Government. These pretensions, which had agitated each branch of the service, I never recognized, but stated that we were equal and would be ready at all times to cooperate with the armies in any demonstration, but it must not be under orders. If a movement originated in Washington, I claimed, if the Navy was to participate, I must be cognizant of it; if an expedition was undertaken by any general who needed the aid of the Navy, the admiral or senior naval officer on the station must be consulted and cooperation asked. Stanton claimed that, instead of consulting and asking, the military could order naval assistance, and that it was the duty of the Secretary of the Navy and of naval officers to render it. President Lincoln would not, however, lend himself to this view of the subject. II The President broaches the Subject of Emancipation — Navy Department Worries — Commodore Wilkes — Disappointed Officers — Seward's Assumption of Authority — How Lincoln chose his Cabinet — The Army's Failure to cooperate — The Military Theory of Frontiers — Promotion of W. D. Porter — Proposed Line of Gunboats on the Ohio — The Cabal against McClellan — Stanton on McClellan — The Need of Better Generals. On Sunday, the 13th of July, 1862, President Lincoln in- vited me to accompany him in his carriage to the funeral of an infant child of Mr. Stanton. Secretary Seward and Mrs. Frederick Seward were also in the carriage. Mr. Stanton occupied at that time for a summer residence the house of a naval officer, I think Hazard, some two or three miles west, or northwest, of Georgetown. It was on this occasion and on this ride that he first mentioned to Mr. Seward and myself the subject of emancipating the slaves by proclamation in case the Rebels did not cease to persist in their war on the Government and the Union, of which he saw no evidence. He dwelt earnestly on the gravity, im- portance, and delicacy of the movement, said he had given it much thought and had about come to the conclusion that it was a military necessity absolutely essential for the salvation of the Union, that we must free the slaves or be ourselves subdued, etc., etc. This was, he said, the first occasion when he had men- tioned the subject to any one, and wished us to frankly state how the proposition struck us. Mr. Seward said the subject involved consequences so vast and momentous that he should wish to bestow on it mature reflection be- fore giving a decisive answer, but his present opinion in- clined to the measure as justifiable, and perhaps he might say expedient and necessary. These were also my views. Two or three times on that ride the subject, which was of 1862] EMANCIPATION BROACHED 71 course an absorbing one for each and all, was adverted to, and before separating the President desired us to give the question special and deliberate attention, for he was earnest in the conviction that something must be done. It was a new departure for the President, for until this time, in all our previous interviews, whenever the question of eman- cipation or the mitigation of slavery had been in any way alluded to, he had been prompt and emphatic in denounc- ing any interference by the General Government with the subject. This was, I think, the sentiment of every mem- ber of the Cabinet, all of whom, including the President, considered it a local, domestic question appertaining to the States respectively, who had never parted with their authority over it. But the reverses before Richmond, and the formidable power and dimensions of the insurrection, which extended through all the Slave States, and had com- bined most of them in a confederacy to destroy the Union, impelled the Administration to adopt extraordinary meas- ures to preserve the national existence. The slaves, if not armed and disciplined, were in the service of those who were, not only as field laborers and producers, but thou- sands of them were in attendance upon the armies in the field, employed as waiters and teamsters, and the fortifica- tions and intrenchments were constructed by them. August 10, 1862, Sunday. The last two days have been excessively warm. Thermometer on the north porch at 100 on each day. A slight breeze from the west makes this day somewhat more comfortable. News unimportant from the army, and but little from the Navy. Shall have some- thing exciting within a few days. Sensation items are the favorite ones of the press. Alarming predictions delight their readers. Am sorry that better progress is not made in the war upon the Rebels. Our squadrons are paralyzed everywhere by the inactive and dilatory movements of the army. Vicksburg should have been taken by the first of June, but no adequate cooperating military force was 72 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [aug. lo furnished, and as a consequence our largest squadron in the Gulf and our flotilla in the Mississippi have been de- tained and injured. The most disreputable naval affair of the War was the descent of the steam ram Arkansas through both squadrons till she hauled in under the bat- teries of Vicksburg, and there the two flag officers aban- doned the place and the ironclad ram, Farragut and his force going down to New Orleans, and Davis proceeding with his flotilla up the river. I have written them both, briefly but expressively, on the subject of the ram Arkan- sas. I do not blame them in regard to Vicksburg, though had Farragut obeyed his original orders and gone up the river at once after the capture of New Orleans, I think things might have been different. Butler would not, I pre- sume, give sufficient support from the army, for he has proved prompt as well as fearless. We have sensation articles in yesterday^s New York papers that the steamer Fingal at Savannah has been clad with iron and threatens our army and vessels. Have no word from Admiral Du Pont, who is watchful but slow to express apprehension. Am inclined to believe there is truth in the rumor that the boat has been clad with armor, but have my doubts if there is any immediate intention to attempt to pass outside. She is probably designed for river defense of the city against our gunboats; but may, if there is opportunity, assume the offensive. In the mean time the sensationalists will get up exciting alarms and terrify the public into distrust and denunciation of the Navy Department. We have similar sensations every few days in regard to Merrimac No. 2, an armored boat at Richmond. As yet she has made no attempt to pass below the obstructions, though two or three times a week we are assured they are in sight, — ^^ Smoke from half a dozen steam-stacks vis- ible.'^ Wilkes writes he is fully prepared for her and her associates at any time, and Rodgers ^ writes to the same * Captain, afterwards Rear-Admiral, John Rodgers. 1862] COMMODORE WILKES 78 effect. But in a day or two some changes will take place that may affect operations on James River. Have had to write Wilkes pretty decisively. He is very exacting towards others, but is not himself as obedient as he should be. Interposes his own authority to interrupt the execution of the orders of the Department. Wrote him that this was not permissible, that I expected his command to obey him, and it was no less imperative that he should obey the orders of the Department. He wrote for permis- sion to dismiss from service a class of officers if they did not suit him, and as he thought them inefficient. I told him the suggestion could not be entertained, that the Depart- ment must retain the administrative control of the Navy. I have not heard from him in reply, or explanation. It is pretty evident that he will be likely to cause trouble to the Department. He has abilities but not good judgment in all respects. Will be likely to rashly assume authority, and do things that may involve himself and the country in difficulty, and hence I was glad that not I but the Pre- sident and Secretary of State suggested him for that com- mand. It is the first time that either has proposed a candi- date for a command, since taking Stringham from the office of detail in 1861 to go to Pensacola. Seward's intrigue. It was almost a necessity that something should be done for Wilkes. His act, in taking Mason and Slidell from the Trent, had given him eclat, — it was popular with the coun- try, was considered right by the people, even if rash and irregular; but when and how to dispose of Wilkes was an embarrassment to me, until the command of the James River Flotilla was suggested. He was, however, unwilling to report to Goldsborough, and to have done so would have caused delay. But giving him an independent command caused Goldsborough to take offense, and he asked to resign the command of the squadron. To this I had no objection, for he was proving himself inefficient, — had done nothing effective since the frigates were sunk by the Merrimac, nor of himself much before. 74 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [aug. lo The State Department is in constant trepidation, fear- ing our naval officers do not know their duties, or that they will transcend them. Both points are marked weaknesses in the management of our foreign affairs. We are insulted, wronged, and badly treated by the British authorities, especially at Nassau, and I have called the attention of the Secretary of State repeatedly to the facts, but he fears to meet them. After degrading ourselves, we shall be com- pelled to meet them. I am for no rash means, but I am clearly and decidedly for maintaining our rights. Almost all the aid which the Rebels have received in arms, munitions, and articles contraband have gone to them through the professedly neutral British port of Nassau. From them the Rebels have derived constant encouragement and sup- port, from the commencement of hostilities. Our officers and people are treated with superciliousness and contempt by the authorities and inhabitants, and scarcely a favor or courtesy is extended to them while they are showered upon the Rebels. It is there that vessels are prepared to run the blockade and violate our laws, by the connivance and with the knowledge of the Colonial, and, I apprehend, the parent, government. In reorganizing the Department there are some difficul- ties. I am assailed for continuing Lenthall as Naval Con- structor at the head of the bureau. He has not much pha- bility or affability, but, though attacked and denounced as corrupt and dishonest, I have never detected any obliquity or wrong in him. His sternness and uprightness disap- pointed the jobbers and the corrupt, and his unaffected manner has offended others. There is an intrigue to pre- vent his confirmation, in which very great rogues and some honest and good men are strangely mixed up, the last being the dupes, almost the willing victims, of the former. Admiral Foote reported for duty on Thursday, but his rooms were not prepared, and I advised him, as he was yet lame and on crutches, to delay active duty for a month or 18621 DISAPPOINTED OFFICERS 76 so. It is some forty years since we were school-boys to- gether in the quiet town of Cheshire, and it has been a pleasant opportunity to me to bring out the qualities of my early friend. He left yesterday for a few weeks. Mr. Faxon, Chief Clerk, is absent, and I am somewhat embarrassed in relation to the true disposition of the cler- ical force. It seems not to have occurred to Admiral Foote that he could not appoint whom he pleased in his bureau, regardless of the claims and capabilities of older and more experienced clerks on less pay. I told him I wished him to have the selection of his chief or at least one confidential clerk, but that I could not displace old and worthy em- ployees. This he said he did not wish, though he was, I think, a little disappointed. Davis continues in command of the flotilla on the Missis- sippi. Had he captured the Arkansas, I would have had him come on immediately and take charge of the Bureau of Navigation. In reorganizing the Navy under the late act, there were nine admirals to be appointed on the retired list. The names of nine were presented, but the Senate failed to con- firm or act upon them. After the adjournment of Congress, commissions were sent them under executive appoint- ment. Of course the men superseded were dissatisfied. Aulick was the first who called, complaining that injust- ice was done, and desiring to know wherein his record was defective and why he had been set aside. I told him that had it been the intention of Congress that the nine senior officers should be the admirals, the act would doubt- less have so stated; that as regarded himself, while, per- sonally, our relations had been pleasant if not intimate, he had not made himself known or felt by the Depart- ment or the Government in the hour of peril; that he had, just as the Rebellion commenced, applied for six months' leave to visit Europe, on account of alleged illness of his daughter; that he left about the time of the assault on Sumter; that he remained abroad until notified that his 76 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [aug. lO leave would not be extended, and never had made a sug- gestion for the country, or expressed any sympathy for the cause. Under these circumstances I had felt justified in advising the President to omit his name. He said he had supposed it was other influences than mine which had done him this injustice, that we had been long and well acquainted. I told him I shunned no responsibility in the case, and yet it was due to candor to say that I never had heard a word in his behalf from any one. Commodore Mervine writes me of his disappointment, feels hurt and slighted. By the advice of Paulding, chiefly, I gave the command of the Gulf Squadron to Mervine in the spring of 1861 ; but he proved an utter failure. He is not wanting in patriotism, but in executive and admin- istrative ability; is quite as great on little things as on great ones. He was long in getting out to his station, and accomplished nothing after he got there. When I detached him and appointed McKean, he was indignant and ap- plied for a court of inquiry; but I replied that we had not the time nor men to spare, that I had called him to pro- mote the public interest, and recalled him for the same purpose. He is a man of correct deportment and habits, and in ordinary times would float along the stream with others, but such periods as these bring out the stronger points of an officer, if he has them. I had no personal, or political, or general, feeling against him, but as there were other officers of mark and merit superior to him, they were selected. Yet I felt there could not be otherwise than a sense of slight that must be felt by himself and friends, which I could not but regret. Yet any person with whom I consulted commended the course I pursued in regard to him. Commodore Samuel Breese was a more marked case than Mervine's, but of much the same character. Nothing good, nothing bad, in him as an officer. A gentleman of some scholarly pretensions, some literary acquirements, but not of much vigor of mind. Paulding was his junior, 1862] DISAPPOINTED OFFICERS 77 and the slight, as he conceived it, almost broke poor Breese's heart. He came immediately to Washington, accompanied by his wife, a pleasant woman, and called on me, sad and heartsore, his pride wounded, his vanity humiliated to the dust. For three nights he assured me he had not closed his eyes; morning and evening the flag of Paulding was always before him. He said Read would not live long and implored that he might have the place. Charles Stewart, first on the list and the oldest officer in the service, wrote, requesting the permission of the President to decline the appointment. It is a singular letter, and required a singular answer, which I sent him, leaving the subject in his hands. The Advisory Board, which had to pass on subordinate active appointments, have completed their labors the past week. I am not altogether satisfied with their action, and perhaps should not be with any board, when so much was to be done, and so many men to pass under revision. The omission of Self ridge and Porter (W. D.) were perhaps the most marked cases, and the promotion of Fleming and Poor the most objectionable. In the action of this board I have taken no part, but scrupulously abstained from any conversation with its members, directly or indirectly. I did say to Assistant Secretary Fox that I regretted the action in the case of the elder Selfridge and Walke, and I think he must have intimated these views in regard to W., for the action of the board was subsequently reversed. But I know not how this may have been. Had a letter last evening from Lieutenant Budd, stating that he presented me with a chair rumored to have be- longed to General Washington, which was captured on the Steamer Memphis, and asking me to accept it. Admiral Paulding had written me there was such a chair, which he had carried to his house, and asking what should be done with it. The chair was private property and sent by a lady to some one abroad, for friendly feeling to the Rebels. 78 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [aug. lo I sent word to Admiral P. that the captors could donate it or it might be sold with the other parts of the cargo. It is, I apprehend, of little intrinsic value. If it really be- longed to Washington, it seemed to me impolitic to sell it at auction as a Rebel capture; if not Washington's, there should be no humbug. My impressions were that it might be given to Admiral P. or to the Commandant's House at the navy yard, and I am inclined to think I will let it take the latter course, at least for the present. Governor Buckingham was here last week, and among other matters had in view the selection of Collectors and Assessors for our State. There was great competition. The State ticket was headed by Howard, and the Congress ticket headed by Goodman. While personally friendly to all, my convictions were for the State ticket, which was moreover much the ablest. The Secretary of the Treasury gave it the preference but made three alterations. I met Senator Dixon the next day at the Executive Man- sion, he having come on to Washington with express refer- ence to these appointments. He has written me several letters indicating much caution, but I saw at once that he was strongly committed and exceedingly disappointed. He promised to see me again, but left that p.m. to get counter support. Intelligence reaches us this evening that the Rebel iron- clad ram Arkansas has been destroyed. We have also news of a fight yesterday on the Rapidan by forces under Gen- eral Pope, the Rebels commanded by Stonewall Jackson. Was told confidentially to-day that a treaty had been brought about between Thurlow Weed and Bennett of the Herald^ after a bitterness of twenty years. A letter was read to me giving the particulars. Weed had word conveyed to Bennett that he would like to make up. Ben- nett thereupon invited Weed to Fort Washington. Weed was shy; sent word that he was engaged the evening named, which was untrue. Bennett then sent a second invitation, which was accepted; and Weed dined and stayed for the 1862] SEWARD'S ASSUMPTION 79 night at Fort Washington, and the Herald directly changed its tune. August 11, Monday. A busy day, reading and preparing dispatches. State Department is sensitively apprehensive that our naval officers will not be sufficiently forbearing towards Englishmen. The old error, running back to the commencement of difficulties, when the Rebels were re- cognized as belligerents, and a blockade was ordered instead of closing the ports. We are not, it is true, in a condition for war with Great Britain just at this time, but England is in scarcely a better condition for a war with us. At all events, continued and degrading submission to aggressive insolence will not promote harmony nor self-respect. It is a gratification to me that our naval officers assert our rights. I have no fears they will trespass on the rights of others. Full dispatches received from Admiral Farragut, who has got his larger vessels down the river to New Or- leans. I had been under apprehensions that the Mississippi was getting so low he would experience difficulty. August 12, Tuesday, I called early this morning on the Secretary of State touching a communication of his of the 8th inst. which I received yesterday, in which I am directed in the name of the President to give instructions of an extraordinary character to our naval officers, instruc- tions which I do not approve, and which in one or two points conflict with law and usage. Though the direction was in the President's name, I learned he knew nothing of the proceeding. Mr. Seward has a passion to be thought a master spirit in the Administration, and to parade before others an exhibition of authority which if permitted is not always exercised wisely or intelligently. Englishmen have com- plained that their vessels were detained and searched, and that they have experienced great inconvenience by the delay in the transmission of letters by blockade-runners. 80 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [aug. 12 These matters having been brought before the Secretary of State, he on the instant, without consultation with any- one, without investigation, without being aware he was disregarding law and long-settled principles, volunteered to say he would mitigate or remedy the grievance, would put the matter right; and, under the impulse of the mo- ment and with an ostentatious show of authority which he did not possess, yielded all that was asked and more than the Englishmen had anticipated or than the Secretary was authorized to give. I saw that he had acted precip- itately and inconsiderately, and was soon aware that the President, in whose name he assumed to act, was unin- formed on the subject. But Seward is committed and can- not humiliate himself to retrace his steps. I gave him to understand, however, I would send out no such instruc- tions as he had sent me in the President's name; that we had, under the belligerent right of search, authority to stop any suspected vessel, and if she had contraband on board to capture her; that no blockade-runner ever cleared for a Rebel port, like Charleston, though that might be its actual destination, but for Halifax, Nassau, or some neu- tral port; that the idea of surrendering mails and letters captured on blockade-runners to foreign consuls, officers, and legations, instead of delivering them, as the law ex- plicitly directs, to the courts, could not be entertained for a moment. Seward suggested that I could so modify the proposed instructions as to make them conform to the law, which he admitted he had not examined. Said it would relieve him and do much to conciliate the English- men, who were troublesome, and willing to get into dif- ficulty with us. It will be useless to see the President, who will be alarmed with the bugaboo of a foreign war, a bug- bear which Seward well knows how to use. These absurd instructions do not originate with the President, yet, relating to foreign matters, he will endorse them, I have no doubt, under the appeals which Seward will make. Nothing of special interest to-day in the Cabinet. Some 1862] HOW LINCOLN CHOSE HIS CABINET 81 gentlemen — Roseleas, Coltman, and Bullitt of Louisiana — were with the President when I called. He was reading some printed letters as to the policy which the Union men of Louisiana, for whom they appeared, should pursue. He did not think it wise or expedient for them to shrink from an honest and open avowal of their principles and pur- pose, assured them that rallying earnestly for the Govern- ment and the service would be the surest way to restore tranquillity. Had a long private letter from Commodore Wilkes, who deplores recent orders in regard to the army under Mc- Clellan; thinks it suicidal. I fear there is truth in his apprehensions. August 15, Friday, Received yesterday a note from Chase that the President proposed to change two of the nominees under the new tax law in Connecticut. Called on the President, and stated to him I did it as a duty, that duty alone impelled me. He said he fully believed it, and was glad to do me the justice to say that in matters of ap- pointments, patronage, I had never given him any trouble. Having an appointment this Friday morning at 9 with the President, I met there Babcock ^ and Piatt ^ of Connecti- cut. They had called and stated their case, which was ex- tremely unjust to Mr. Howard, and, turning to me, Mr. B. said H. claimed he had procured or secured my appoint- ment. The President said he had a slight acquaintance with Mr. H. himself. Had met him in Illinois and knew him as a friend of mine. Had received letters from him ex- pressing regard for me, and one signed jointly by H. and Senator Dixon. But these gentlemen did not originate his action in relation to my appointment. ^^The truth is," said he, — ^^and I may as well state the facts to you, for others know them, — on the day of the Presidential elec- ^ James F. Babcock, editor of the New Haven Palladium, Lincoln appointed him Collector at New Haven. * O. H. Piatt, subsequently United States Senator. 82 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [aug. 15 tion, the operator of the telegraph in Springfield placed his instrument at my disposal. I was there without leaving, after the returns began to come in, until we had enough to satisfy us how the election had gone. This was about two in the morning of Wednesday. I went home, but not to get much sleep, for I then felt, as I never had before, the responsibility that was upon me. I began at once to feel that I needed support, — others to share with me the bur- den. This was on Wednesday morning, and before the sun went down I had made up my Cabinet. It was almost the same that I finally appointed. One or two changes were made, and the particular position of one or two was unsettled. My mind was fixed on Mr. Welles as the mem- ber from New England on that Wednesday. Some other names passed through my thoughts, and some persons were afterwards pressed upon me, but the man and the place were fixed in my mind then, as it now is. My choice was confirmed by Mr. H., by Senator Dixon, Preston King, Vice-President Hamlin, Governor Morgan, and others, but the selection was my own, and not theirs, and Mr. H. is under a mistake in what he says." August 16, Saturday. With the President an hour or two this A.M., selecting candidates from a large number recom- mended for midshipmen at the naval school. Finished a set of instructions for our naval officers in matters relating to prize captures and enforcing the block- ade. Mr. Seward sent me a few days since in the name of the President some restraining points on which he wished the officers to be instructed, but I was convinced they would work injury. Have toned down and modified his paper, relieved it of its illegal features, added one or two precautionary points and sent the document to the State Department for criticism and suggestions. Mem, It may be well, if I can find time, to get up a com- plete set of instructions, defining the points of international and statute law which are disputed or not well understood. 1862] COOPERATION OF ARMY AND NAVY 83 Have a long telegram from Wilkes, who informs me that the army has left, and asking for instructions what to do now that^ji^cClellan has gone. I have not been advised of army movements by either the Secretary of War or General Halleck. Both are ready at all times to call for naval aid, but are almost wholly neglectful of the Navy and of their own duties in regard to it, as in this instance. August 17, Sunday. Called this morning on General Halleck, who had forgotten or was not aware there was a naval force in the James River cooperating with the army. He said the army was withdrawn and there was no neces- sity for the naval vessels to remain. I remarked that I took a different view of the question, and, had I been con- sulted, I should have advised that the naval and some army forces should hold on and menace Richmond, in order to compel the Rebels to retain part of their army there while our forces in front of Washington were getting in position. He began to rub his elbows, and, without thanking me or acknowledgment of any kind, said he wished the vessels could remain. Telegraphed Wilkes to that effect. Strange that this change of military operations should have been made without Cabinet consultation, and especially with- out communicating the fact to the Secretary of the Navy, who had established a naval flotilla on the James River by special request to cooperate with and assist the army. But Stanton is so absorbed in his scheme to get rid of McClellan that other and more important matters are neglected. A difficulty has existed from the beginning in the mili- tary, and I may say general, management of the War. At a very early day, before even the firing on Sumter and the abandonment of Norfolk, I made repeated applications to General Scott for one or two regiments to be stationed there. Anticipating the trouble that subsequently took place, and confident that, with one regiment well com- manded and a good engineer to construct batteries, with 84 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [aug. 17 the cooperation of the frigate Cumberland and such small additional naval force as we could collect, the place might be held at least until the public property and ships could be removed, I urged the importance of such aid. The reply on each occasion was that he not only had no troops to spare from Washington or Fortress Monroe, both of which places he considered in great danger, but that if he had, he would not send a detachment in what he con- sidered enemy's country, especially as there were no intrenchments. I deferred to his military character and position, but remonstrated against this view of the case, for I was assured, and, I believe, truly, that a majority of the people in the navy yard and in the vicinity of Norfolk were loyal, friends of the Union and opposed to Secession. He said that might be the political, but was not the mili- tary, aspect, and he must be governed by military consid- erations in disposing of his troops. There was but one way of overcoming these objections and that was by peremptory orders, which I could not, and the President would not, give, in opposition to the opinions of General Scott. The consequence was the loss of the navy yard and of Norfolk, and the almost total extinguishment of the Union sentiment in that quarter. Our friends there became cool and were soon alienated by our abandonment. While I received no assistance from the military in that emergency, I was thwarted and embar- rassed by the secret interference of the Secretary of State in my operations. General Scott was for a defensive policy, and the same causes which influenced him in that matter, and the line of policy which he marked out, have governed the educated officers of the army and to a great extent shaped the war measures of the Government. '^We must erect our batteries on the eminences in the vicinity of Washington, '' said General Mansfield to me, ^^and estab- lish our military lines; frontiers between the belligerents, as between the countries of Continental Europe, are requisite. '^ They were necessary in order to adapt and 1862] MILITARY THEORY OF FRONTIERS 85 reconcile the theory and instruction of West Point to the war that was being prosecuted. We should, however, by this process become rapidly two hostile nations. All beyond the frontiers must be considered and treated as enemies, although large sections, and in some instances whole States, have a Union majority, occasionally in some sections approximating unanimity. Instead of halting on the borders, building intrench- ments, and repelling indiscriminately and treating as Rebels — enemies — all. Union as well as disunion, men in the insurrectionary region, we should, I thought, pene- trate their territory, nourish and protect the Union senti- ment, and create and strengthen a national feeling counter to Secession. This we might have done in North Carolina, western Virginia, northern Alabama and Georgia, Arkan- sas, Texas, and in fact in large sections of nearly every seceding State. Instead of holding back, we should be ag- gressive and enter their territory. Our generals act on the defensive. It is not and has not been the policy of the coun- try to be aggressive towards others, therefore defensive tactics, rather than offensive have been taught, and the effect upon our educated commanders in this civil war is perceptible. The best material for commanders in this civil strife may have never seen West Point. There is some- thing in the remark that a good general is ^'born to com- mand.'' We have experienced that some of our best-edu- cated officers have no faculty to govern, control, and direct an army in offensive warfare. We have many talented and capable engineers, good officers in some respects, but without audacity, desire for fierce encounter, and in that respect almost utterly deficient as commanders. Courage and learning are essential, but something more is wanted for a good general, — talent, intuition, magnetic power, which West Point cannot give. Men who would have made the best generals and who possess innately the best and high- est qualities to command may not have been so fortunate as to be selected by a Member of Congress to be a cadet. 86 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [aug. 17 Jackson and Taylor were excellent generals, but they were not educated engineers, nor were they what would be con- sidered in these days accomplished and educated military men. They detailed and availed themselves of engineers, and searched out and found the needed qualities in others. We were unused to war when these present difficulties commenced, and have often permitted men of the army to decide questions that were more political than military. There is still the same misfortune, — for I deem it such. From the beginning there was a persistent determination to treat the Rebels as alien belligerents, — as a hostile and distinct people, — to blockade, instead of closing, their ports. The men *^duly accredited by the Confederate States of America" held back-door intercourse with the Secretary of State, and lived and moved in ostentatious style in Washington for some weeks. Thus commencing, other governments had reason to claim that we had in- itiated them into the belief that the Federal Government and its opponents were two nations; and the Union peo- ple of the South were, by this policy of our Government and that of the army, driven, compelled against their wishes, to be our antagonists. No man in the South could avow himself a friend of the Union without forfeiting his estate, his liberty, and per- haps his life under State laws of the Confederates. The Federal Government not only afforded him no protection, but under the military system of frontiers he was treated as a public enemy because he resided in his own home at the South. August 18, Monday, Had a call to-day from an old schoolmate at Cheshire, now a chaplain in the army, Joseph H. Nichols. Invited and had him to tea with me and talked over school-boy days. It is thirty-five years or over since we have met, though not unfrequently in the same place. Sent Commodore Wilkes a dispatch to hold his ground 1862] WILKES A TROUBLESOME OFFICER 87 and await events. Will send him specific orders when de- velopments justify. He is a troublesome officer in many- respects, unpopular in the Navy and never on good terms with the Department, yet I have thus far got along with him very well, though in constant apprehension that he will commit some rash act. He is ambitious, self-con- ceited, and self-willed. The withdrawal of the army from before Richmond disconcerts him, and to make his mark he may do some indiscreet, rash, and indefensible act. But I trust not. He has abilities but not sound judg- ment, and is not always subordinate, though he is himself severe and exacting towards his subordinates. Had a letter from Fox at Portsmouth. Says there are traitors even there. It will be necessary that the Govern- ment should be felt as a power before this Rebellion can be suppressed. The armored boats, to which he was to give some attention, are progressing as well as can be expected. . . . August 20, Wednesday, Memo, Soon after hostilities commenced, in the spring or summer of 1861, a letter from William D. Porter to his son was published. The son had joined the Rebels, and so informed his father, who wrote him he thought he had committed a mistake. But, having taken this step, he advised him to adhere and do his duty. At that time W. D. P. was on duty in the Pacific. I im- mediately detached and ordered him home. He reported to me in great distress; disavowed the letter; said it was a forgery, that his son and himself were on bad terms and the letter had been written and pubfished to injure him. There was, he informed me, much disagreement in the family; his son had been alienated from him, and, like David, sympathized with the Secessionists, while he (W.) had taken the opposite course. David, he remarked, was the intimate friend of Jefferson Davis and the Rebel conspirators, and he had expected that he would act with them, and he had no doubt that David^s course had 88 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES Iaug.20 injured him; confounding him with D., he was made ac- countable for D/s acts. David said he had no doubt that Bill wrote the letter, and I was of that opinion.^ William had, not without reason, the reputation of being very untruthful, — a failing of the Porters, for David was not always reliable on unimportant matters, but amplified and colored transactions, where he was personally inter- ested especially, but he had not the bad reputation of William. I did not always consider David to be depended upon if he had an end to attain, and he had no hesitation in trampling down a brother officer if it would benefit him- self. He had less heart than William. Had a conversation with the President in relation to W. D. Porter, who was the efficient officer that attacked and destroyed the Rebel armored ram Arkansas. Porter is a bold, brave man, but reckless in many respects, and unpopular, perhaps not without reason, in the service. He has been earnest and vigorous on the Mississippi, and made himself. The Advisory Board under the late law omitted to recommend him for promotion. It was one of the few omissions that I regretted, for whatever the infirmities of the man I recognize his merits as an officer. His courage in destroying the Arkansas was manifest. Both the flag officers were delinquent in the matter of that vessel at Vicksburg, and I so wrote each of them. Ad- miral Farragut cannot conceal his joy that she is destroyed, but is not ready to do full justice to Porter. I canvassed the whole question, — the law, the proceed- ings, the difficulties, the man, the officer, the responsibil- ity of promoting him and of my advising it, — yet I felt it a duty, if service rendered in battle and under fire were to govern. The President conversed with me most fully, and said, ^ ' I am so satisfied that you are right generally, and * I some years later, and after William's death, learned from Admiral Farragut and Mrs. Farragut that they knew the letter to be a forgery and that it was got up for mischievous purposes. — G. W,^ 1862] PROMOTION OF W. D. PORTER 89 in this case particularly, that I say to you, Go ahead, give Porter as you propose a Commodore's appointment, and I will stand by you, come what may." Sent a letter of reproof to Colonel Harris and also one to Lieutenant-Colonel Reynolds of the Marine Corps, between whom there is a bitter feud. Almost all the elder officers are at loggerheads and ought to be retired. Rey- nolds had been tried by court martial on charges pre- ferred by Harris, and acquitted, though by confessions made to me personally guilty. But a majority of the anti-Harris faction constituted the court, and partisan- ship, not merit, governed the decision. I refused to ap- prove the finding. In his turn, Reynolds brought charges against Harris, and of such a character as to implicate others. To have gone forward would have been to plunge into a series of courts martial for a year to come. McClellan's forces have left the banks of James River several days since. Their exodus I think was not anti- cipated at Richmond, nor believed until after all had left and crossed the Chickahominy. We are beginning to hear of the arrival of the advance guard at Acquia Creek, Alex- andria, and Fredericksburg. In the mean time Pope is being heavily pressed at Culpeper by Stonewall Jackson and the whole accumulated forces from Richmond, which has compelled him to fall back on the left bank of the Rapidan, his policy being to keep the enemy in check until McClellan's forces can unite with him. August 22, Friday. The President tells me he has a list of the number of new recruits which have reached Wash- ington under the late call. Over 18,000 have arrived in just one week. There is wonderful and increasing enthu- siasm and determination to put down this Rebellion and sustain the integrity of the Union. It is confined to no class or party or description: rich and poor, the edu- cated and ignorant, the gentle and refined as well as the stout, coarse, and athletic, the Democrats generally as 90 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [aug.22 well as the Republicans, are offering themselves to the country. Governor Dennison and Judge Swayne ^ of Ohio, with others, are urging in person the establishment of a line of armed and armored steamers on the Ohio River. The plan has been elaborated with much care, and has been before presented and pressed with some zeal. Distrust, no doubt, in regard to army management leads these men to seek naval protection. The Blairs are quoted to me as favoring the movement, and Fox has given them encouragement. It has not found favor with me at any time. It is now brought to my attention in such a way that I am compelled to take it up. I find that great names and entire com- munities in Ohio and Indiana, led on by the authorities of those States, are engaged in it. I told the principal agent, who, with Governor D., had a long interview with me, that my judgment and convictions were against it, for: First : I had no faith that light-draft gunboats would be a safe and reliable means of frontier river-defense. They might be auxiliary and essential aids to the army, but they cannot carry heavy armament, are frail, and in low stages of the water, with high banks which overlook the river, would not be effective and could hardly take care of them- selves, though in certain cases, and especially in high water, they might greatly aid the army. Secondly: As a matter of policy it would be injudicious and positively harmful to establish a frontier line between Ohio and Kentucky, making the river the military boundary, — it would be conceding too much. If a line of boats could assist in pro- tecting the northern banks of the Ohio they could afford little security to the southern banks, where, as in Ohio, there is, except in locaHties, a majority for the Union. I added that I should be opposed to any plan which pro- posed to establish frontier lines, therein differing from some of our best army officers; that I thought neither Ohio nor Indiana could, on deliberate consideration, wish the * Noah H. Swayne, of the United States Supreme Court. 1862] BURNSIDE ASKS FOR GUNBOATS 91 line of separation from hostile forces should be the north- ern boundary of Kentucky. It appeared to me the true course was to make their interest in this war identical with that of Kentucky, and if there were to be a line of de- marcation it should be as far south as the southern bound- ary of Tennessee, and not the banks of the Ohio. The gentlemen seemed to be impressed with these general views. August 24, Sunday. Have a dispatch from General Burn- side at Falmouth, calling earnestly for five or six gunboats in the Potomac at Acquia Creek. Mentions having made a personal application at the Navy Department. Nothing has been said to me by him or any one, nor has any re- quisition been made. I find, however, on inquiry, that in a general conversation in the room of the Chief Clerk he expressed something of the kind. The General feels that a heavy responsibility is upon him, and in case of disaster desires like others the protection of the gunboats. It is honorable to him that, unlike some other generals, he willingly gives credit to the Navy. The protection he now seeks is a wise precaution, perhaps, but, I apprehend, wholly unnecessary. I have, however, ordered Wilkes to send round five gunboats from James River. The War Department sends me a letter from Major-General Curtis to General Halleck, requesting more gunboats on the Western rivers. Wrote Admiral Davis that the navigation of the Mississippi should be kept unobstructed, not only between Memphis and Arkansas River but elsewhere, and to cooperate with and assist the army. August 25, Monday, Wrote Wilkes, preparatory to dis- continuing the organization of the James River Flotilla as a distinct organization. Received from him, after it was written, an unofficial letter communicating a plan of offensive operations. Directed him in reply to engage in no scheme whereby the gunboats would be detained in James River longer than the army absolutely needed them 92 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [aug. 25 to divert the attention of the Rebels and prevent them from sending their whole force against General Pope before General McClellan could reach him. The change of the plan of operations is a military movement, suggested and pushed by Chase and Stanton. It will be a great dis- appointment to Wilkes as well as others, but there is no remedy. As soon as the gunboats can be released we want them elsewhere. They have been locked up in James River for two months, when they should have been on other duty. McClellan' s tardy policy has been unfortun- ate for himself and the country. It has strengthened the combination against him. Faxon ^ showed me a letter from Admiral Foote which I was sorry to read, evincing a petulance that is unworthy of him, and proposing to relinquish his bureau appointment, if he cannot control the selection of certain clerks. August 27, Tuesday, Called on the Attorney-General in relation to the appointment of a chaplain, — a singular case. When the Cumberland was sunk in March last, and a considerable portion of her crew, it was supposed the chap- lain was lost. This fact brought a large flock of clerical gentlemen to Washington for the place. The first who reached here was Rev. K. of Germantown, and the Pre- sident in the kindness of his heart wrote a note requesting that Mr. K. might, if there was nothing to prevent, have the place of the supposed drowned. It was not certain, however, that there was a vacancy, — we were daily hear- ing of escaped victims who were preserved, — and duty forbade an immediate appointment. Congress, before ad- journing, enacted a law that no person should be appointed chaplain who was over thirty-five. Mr. K. is forty-eight, but, unwilling to relinquish the place, he pressed the Presi- dent with his friends and procured from him another letter, directing the appointment to be made now, if it was one that could have been made then. On bringing this to me, 1 William Faxon, Chief Clerk of the Navy Department. 1862] CABAL AGAINST McCLELLAN 93 I told the reverend gentleman it was in disregard of the law, and could not be made in my opinion ; that I must at all events see the President before any steps were taken and advise him of the facts. This I did, and by his request called on the Attorney- General. That gentleman, as I expected, requests a written application for his opinion. Have a letter from Admiral Foote, who has thought a second time of his conclusions in his letter to Mr. Faxon, expresses regret, and very handsomely apologizes. I had expected this ; should have been disappointed in the man if he had not made it. August 31, Sunday. For the last two or three days there has been fighting at the front and army movements of interest. McClellan with most of his army arrived at Alex- andria a week or more ago, but inertness, inactivity, and sluggishness seem to prevail. The army officers do not engage in this move of the War Department with zeal. Some of the troops have gone forward to join Pope, who has been beyond Manassas, where he has encountered Stone- wall Jackson and the Rebel forces for the last three days in a severe struggle. The energy and rapid movements of the Rebels are in such striking contrast to those of our own officers that I shall not be seriously surprised at any sud- den dash from them. The War Department — Stanton and Halleck — are alarmed. By request, and in anticipation of the worst, though not expecting it, I have ordered Wilkes and a force of fourteen gunboats, including the five light-draft asked for by Burnside, to come round into the Potomac, and have put W. in command of the flotilla here, disbanding the flotilla on the James. Yesterday, Saturday, p.m., when about leaving the De- partment, Chase called on me with a protest addressed to the President, signed by himself and Stanton, against con- tinuing McClellan in command and demanding his immedi- ate dismissal. Certain grave offenses were enumerated. 94 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [aug. 31 Chase said that Smith had seen and would sign it in turn, but as my name preceded his in order, he desired mine to appear in its place. I told him I was not prepared to sign the document; that I preferred a different method of meeting the question; that if asked by the President, and even if not asked, I was prepared to express my opin- ion, which, as he knew, had long been averse to McClellan's dilatory course, and was much aggravated from what I had recently learned at the War Department; that I did not choose to denounce McC. for incapacity, or to pro- nounce him a traitor, as declared in this paper, but I would say, and perhaps it was my duty to say, that I believed his removal from command was demanded by public sentiment and the best interest of the country. Chase said that was not sufficient, that the time had ar- rived when the Cabinet must act with energy and prompti- tude, for either the Government or McClellan must go down. He then proceeded to expose certain acts, some of which were partially known to me, and others, more start- ling, which were new to me. I said to C. that he and Stanton were familiar with facts of which I was ignorant, and there might therefore be propriety in their stating what they knew, though in a different way, — facts which I could not indorse because I had no knowledge of them. I pro- posed as a preferable course that there should be a gen- eral consultation with the President. He objected to this until the document was signed, which, he said, should be done at once. This method of getting signatures without an inter- change of views with those who are associated in council was repugnant to my ideas of duty and right. When I asked if the Attorney-General and Postmaster-General had seen the paper or been consulted, he replied not yet, their turn had not come. I informed C. that I should de- sire to advise with them in so important a matter ; that I was disinclined to sign the paper ; did not like the proceed- ing; that I could not, though I wished McClellan removed GEORGE B. McCLELLAN 1862] STANTON ON McCLELLAN 95 after what I had heard, and should have no hesitation in saying so at the proper time and place and in what I con- sidered the right way. While we were talking, Blair came in. Chase was alarmed, for the paper was in my hand and he evidently feared I should address B. on the subject. This, after witnessing his agitation, I could not do with- out his consent. Blair remained but a few moments ; did not even take a seat. After he left, I asked Chase if we should not call him back and consult him. C. said in great haste, ''No, not now; it is best he should for the present know nothing of it.'' I took a different view; said that there was no one of the Cabinet whom I would sooner consult on this subject, that I thought Blair's opinion, especially on military matters, he having had a military education, very correct. Chase said this was not the time to bring him in. After Chase left me, he returned to make a special request that I would make no allusion concerning the paper to Blair or any one else. Met, by invitation, a few friends last evening at Baron Gerolt's.^ My call was early, and, feeling anxious concern- ing affairs in front, I soon excused myself to go to the War Department for tidings. Found Stanton and Caleb Smith alone in the Secretary's room. The conduct of McClellan was soon taken up; it had, I inferred, been under discus- sion before I came in. Stanton began with a statement of his entrance into the Cabinet in January last, when he found everything in confusion, with unpaid bills on his table to the amount of over $20,000,000 against the Department; his inability, then or since, to procure any satisfactory information from McClellan, who had no plan nor any system. Said this vague, indefinite uncertainty was oppressive; that near the close of January he pressed this subject on the President, who issued the order to him and myself for an advance on the 22d of February. McClellan began at once to interpose objections, yet did nothing, but talked always ^ The Prussian Minister. 96 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [aug. 31 vaguely and indefinitely and of various matters except those immediately in hand. The President insisted on, and ordered, a forward movement. Then McClellan stated he intended a demonstration on the upper waters of the Potomac, and boats for a bridge were prepared with great labor and expense. He went up there and telegraphed back that two or three officers — his favorites — had done admirably in preparing the bridge and he wished them to be brevetted. The whole thing was absurd, eventuated in nothing, and he was ordered back. The President then commanded that the army should proceed to Richmond. McClellan delayed, hesitated, said he must go by way of the Peninsula, would take transports at Annapolis. In order that he should have no excuse, but without any faith in his plan, Stanton said he ordered transports and supplies to Annapolis. The President, in the mean time, urged and pressed a forward movement towards Manassas. Spoke of its results, — the wooden guns, the evacuation by the Rebels, who fled before the General came, and he did not pursue them but came back to Washington. The transports were then ordered round to the Potomac, where the troops were shipped to Fortress Monroe. The plans, the number of troops to proceed, the number that was to remain, Stanton recounted. These arrangements were somewhat deranged by the sudden raid of Jackson towards Winchester, which withdrew Banks from Manassas, leaving no force between Washington and the Rebel army at Gordonsville. He then ordered McDow- ell and his division, also Franklin's command, to remain, to the great grief of McDowell, who believed glory and fighting were all to be with the grand army. McClellan had made the withholding of this necessary force to pro- tect the seat of government his excuse for not being more rapid and effective; was constantly complaining. The President wrote him how, by his arrangement, only 18,000 troops, remnants and odd parcels, were left to protect the Capital. Still McClellan was complaining and underrating 1862] STANTON ON McCLELLAN 97 his forces; said he had but 96,000, when his own returns showed he had 123,000. But, to stop his complaints and drive him forward, the President finally, on the 10th of June, sent him McCall and his division, with which he promised to proceed at once to Richmond, but did not, lingered along until finally attacked. McClellan's excuse for going by way of the Peninsula was that he might have good roads and dry ground, but his complaints were un- ceasing, after he got there, of bad roads, water, and swamps. When finally ordered, after his blunders and reverses, to withdraw from James River, he delayed obeying the order for thirteen days, and never did comply until Gen- eral Burnside was sent to supersede him if he did not move. Since his arrival at Alexandria, Stanton says, only delay and embarrassment had governed him. General Halleck had, among other things, ordered General Franklin^s divi- sion to go forward promptly to support Pope at Manassas. When Franklin got as far as Annandale he was stopped by McClellan, against orders from Headquarters. McClel- lan's excuse was he thought Franklin might be in danger if he proceeded farther. For twenty-four hours that large force remained stationary, hearing the whole time the guns of the battle that was raging in front. In consequence of this delay by command of McClellan, against specific or- ders, he apprehended our army would be compelled to fall back. Smith left whilst we were conversing after this detailed narrative, and Stanton, dropping his voice, though no one was present, said he understood from Chase that I de- clined to sign the protest which he had drawn up against McClellan's continuance in command, and asked if I did not think we ought to get rid of him. I told him I might not differ with him on that point, especially after what I had heard in addition to what I had previously known, but that I disliked the method and manner of proceeding, that it appeared to me an unwise and injudicious pro- ceeding, and was discoiu-teous and disrespectful to the 98 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [aug. 31 President, were there nothing else. Stanton said, with some excitement, he knew of no particular obligations he was under to the President, who had called him to a difficult position and imposed upon him labors and responsibilities which no man could carry, and which were greatly in- creased by fastening upon him a commander who was con- stantly striving to embarrass him in his administration of the Department. He could not and would not submit to a continuance of this state of things. I admitted they were bad, severe on him, and he could and had stated his case strongly, but I could not from facts within my own knowledge indorse them, nor did I like the manner in which it was proposed to bring about a dismissal. He said among other things General Pope telegraphed to McClel- lan for supplies; the latter informed P. they were at Alex- andria, and if P. would send an escort he could have them. A general fighting, on the field of battle, to send to a gen- eral in the rear and in repose an escort! Watson, Assistant Secretary of War, repeated to me this last fact this morning, and reaffirmed others. He in- forms me that my course on a certain occasion had offended McClellan and was not approved by others; but that both the President and Stanton had since, and now, in their private conversation, admitted I was right, and that my letter in answer to a curt and improper demand of Mc- Clellan last spring was proper and correct. Watson says he always told the President and Stanton I was right, and he complimented me on several subjects, which, though grati- fjdng, others can speak of and judge better than myself. We hear, this Sunday morning, that our army has fallen back to Centreville.^ Pope writes in pretty good spirits that we have lost no guns, etc. The Rebels were largely reinforced, while our troops, detained at Annan- dale by McClellan's orders, did not arrive to support our wearied and exhausted men. McClellan telegraphs that he hears ^'Pope is badly cut up.'' Schenck, who had a wound 1 After the defeat in the Second Battle of Bull Run. 1862] NEED OF BETTER GENERALS 99 in his arm, left the battle-field, bringing with him for com- pany an Ohio captain. Both arrived safe at Willard's. They met McCall on the other side of Centreville and Sumner on this side. Late! late! Up to this hour, 1 p.m., Sunday, no specific intelligence beyond the general facts above stated. There is consid- erable uneasiness in this city, which is mere panic. I see no cause for alarm. It is impossible to feel otherwise than sorrowful and sad over the waste of life and treasure and energies of the nation, the misplaced confidence in certain men, the errors of some, perhaps the crimes of others, who have been trusted. But my faith in present security and of ultimate success is unshaken. We need better generals but can have no better army. There is much latent disloyal feeling in Washington which should be expelled. And oh, there is great want of capacity and will among our military leaders. I hear that all the churches not heretofore seized are now taken for hospital purposes; private dwellings are taken to be thus used, among others my next neighbor Corcoran's^ fine house and grounds. There is malice in this. I told General Halleck it was vandalism. He admitted it would be wrong. Halleck walked over with me from the War Department as far as my house, and is, I perceive, quite alarmed for the safety of the city; says that we overrate our own strength and underestimate the Rebels^ — a fatal error in Halleck. This has been the talk of McClellan, which none of us have believed. * William W. Corcoran, the banker, who among other public benefac- tions gave the city of Washington the art gallery which bears his name. Ill After the Second Battle of Bull Run — Another Anti-McClellan Paper — The Opinion about General Pope — Wilkes and McClellan — McClel- lan's Remarks about South Carolina and Massachusetts — The Bicker- ings of the Generals — The President's Opinion of McClellan and Pope — Rumors of a Proposed Revolution — An Estimate of Halleck — Panic-stricken New York — A Scheme to deport Slaves to Chiriqui — The "West Point" PoHcy — An Estimate of Stanton — Lincoln's Deference to Seward — The Administration of the Departments — The Want of a Military Policy — Lincoln and Seward — How Cabinet- Meetings were conducted — The Rivalry of Seward and Chase — News of Antietam — Dismissal of Commander Preble — The Emancipation Proclamation read to the Cabinet — Senator John P. Hale — Chase's Financial Policy — Chase's Opinion of Stanton — The Chiriqui Scheme — New York Politics — European Efforts to break the Blockade. September 1, Monday, The wounded have been com- ing in to-day in large numbers. From what I can learn, General Pope^s estimate of the killed and wounded greatly exceeds the actual number. He should, however, be best informed, but he feels distressed and depressed and is greatly given to exaggeration. Chase tells me that McClellan sends word that there are twenty thousand stragglers on the road between Alex- andria and Centreville, which C. says is infamously false and sent out for infamous purposes. He called on me to- day with a more carefully prepared, and less exceptionable, address to the President, stating the signers did not deem it safe that McClellan should be intrusted with an army, etc., and that, if required, the signers would give their rea- sons for the protest against continuing him in command. This paper was in the handwriting of Attorney-General Bates. The former was in Stanton's. This was signed by Stanton, Chase, Smith, and Bates. A space was left be- tween the two last for Blair and myself; Seward is not in town, and, if I am not mistaken, is purposely absent to be 1862] ANOTHER ANTI-McCLELLAN PAPER 101 relieved from participation in this movement, which origin- ates with Stanton, who is mad — perhaps with reason — and determined to destroy McClellan. Seward and Stanton act in concert, but Seward has opposed or dechned being a party to the removal of McClellan, until since Halleck was brought here, when Stanton became more fierce and determined. Seward then gave way and went away. Chase, who has become hostile to McClellan, is credulous, and sometimes the victim of intrigue; was taken into Stanton's confidence, made to believe that the opportunity of Sew- ard's absence should be improved to shake off McClel- lan, whom they both disliked, by a combined Cabinet movement to control the President, who, until recently, has clung to that officer. It was not difficult, under the prevailing feeling of indignation against McClellan, to en- list Smith. I am a little surprised that they got Mr. Bates, though he has for some time openly urged the removal of McClellan. Chase took upon himself to get my name, and then, if possible, Blair was to be brought in. In all this, Chase flatters himself that he is attaching Stanton to his interest ; not but that he is himself sincere in his opposition to McClellan, who was once his favorite, but whom he considers a deserter from his faction and whom he now detests. I told Chase I thought this paper an improvement on the document of Saturday; was less exceptionable; but I did not like, and could not unite in, the movement; that in a conference with the President I should have no hesi- tation in saying or agreeing mainly in what was there ex- pressed; for I am satisfied the earnest men of the country would not be willing McClellan should hereafter have com- mand of our forces in the field, though I could not say what is the feefing of the soldiers. Reflection had more fully satisfied me that this method of conspiring to influence or control the President was repugnant to my feelings and was not right; it was unusual, would be disrespectful, and would justly be deemed offensive; that the President had 102 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [sept, i called us around him as friends and advisers, with whom he might counsel and consult on all matters affecting the public welfare, not to enter into combinations to control him. Nothing of this kind had hitherto taken place in our intercourse. That we had not been sufficiently intimate, impressive, or formal perhaps, and perhaps not sufficiently explicit and decisive in expressing our views on some subjects. Chase disclaimed any movement against the President and thought the manner was respectful and correct. Said it was designed to tell the President that the Administra- tion must be broken up, or McC. dismissed. The course he said was unusual, but the case was imusual. We had, it was true, been too informal in our meeting. I had, he said, been too reserved in the expression of my views, which he did me the compliment to say were sound, etc. Conversa- tions, he said, amounted to but little with the President on subjects of this importance. Argument was useless. It was like throwing water on a duck's back. A more decisive expression must be made and that in writing. It was evident there was a fixed determination to re- move, and if possible to disgrace, McClellan. Chase frankly stated he desired it, that he deliberately believed McClel- lan ought to be shot, and should, were he President, be brought to summary punishment. I told him he was aware my faith in McClellan^s energy and reliability was shaken nine months ago; that as early as last December I had, as he would recollect, expressed my disappointment in the man and stated to him specially, as the friend and in- dorser of McClellan, my misgivings, in order that he might remove my doubts or confirm them. McClellan's hesitat- ing course last fall, his indifference and neglect of my many applications to cooperate with the Navy, his failure in many instances to fulfill his promises, when the Rebels were erecting batteries on the west bank of the Potomac, that they might close the navigation of the river, had shaken my confidence in his efficiency and reliability, for 1862] ANOTHER ANTI-McCLELLAN PAPER 103 he was not deficient in sagacity or intelligence. But at that time McClellan was a general favorite, and neither he (Chase) nor any one heeded my doubts and appre- hensions. A few weeks after the navigation of the river was first interrupted by the Rebel batteries last November, I made known to the President and Cabinet how I had been put off by General McClellan with broken promises and frivol- ous and unsatisfactory answers, until I ceased convers- ing with him on the subject. To me it seemed he had no plan or policy of his own, or any realizing sense of the true condition of affairs, — the Rebels in sight of us, almost within cannon-range, Washington beleaguered, only a sin- gle railroad track to Baltimore, the Potomac about to be closed. He was occupied with reviews and dress-parades, perhaps with drills and discipline, but was regardless of the necessities of the case, — the political aspect of the question, the effect of the closing of the only avenue from the National Capital to the ocean, and the embarrassment which would follow to the Government itself were the river blockaded. Though deprecating his course and call- ing his attention to it, I did not think, as Chase now says he does, and as I hear others say they do, that he was im- becile, a coward, a traitor; but it was notorious that he hesitated, doubted, had not self-reliance, any definite and determined plan, or audacity to act. He was wanting, in my opinion, in several of the essential requisites of a gen- eral in chief command; in short, he was not a fighting general. These are my present convictions. Some state- ments of Stanton and some recent acts indicate failings, delinquencies of a more serious character. The country is greatly incensed against him, but he has the confidence of the army, I think. Chase was disappointed, and I think a little chagrined, because I would not unite in the written demand to the President. He said he had not yet asked Blair and did not propose to till the others had been consulted. This does 104 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [sept, i not look well. It appears as if there was a combination by- two to get their associates committed, seriatim, in detail, by a skillful ex parte movement without general consulta- tion. McClellan was first invited to Washington under the auspices of Chase, more than of any one else, though all approved, for Scott was old, infirm, and changeable. Seward soon had greater intimacy with McClellan than Chase. Blair, informed in regard to the qualities of army officers, acquiesced in McClellan's selection ; thought him intelligent and capable, but dilatory. In the winter, when Chase began to get alienated from McC. in consequence of his hesitancy and reticence, or both, if not because of greater intimacy with Seward, Blair seemed to confide more in the General, yet I do not think McC. was a favor- ite, or that he grew in favor. September 2, Tuesday, At Cabinet-meeting all but Seward were present. I think there was design in his absence. It was stated that Pope, without consultation or advice, was falling back, intending to retreat within the Washington intrenchments. No one seems to have had any knowledge of his movements, or plans, if he had any. Those who have favored Pope are disturbed and disap- pointed. Blair, who has known him intimately, says he is a braggart and a liar, with some courage, perhaps, but not much capacity. The general conviction is that he is a fail- ure here, and there is a belief and admission on all hands that he has not been seconded and sustained as he should have been by McClellan, Franklin, Fitz John Porter, and perhaps some others. Personal jealousies and professional rivalries, the bane and curse of all armies, have entered deeply into ours. Stanton said, in a suppressed voice, trembling with excitement, he was informed McClellan had been ordered to take command of the forces in Washington. General surprise was expressed. When the President came in and 1862] THE OPINION OF POPE 105 heard the subject-matter of our conversation, he said he had done what seemed to him best and would be re- sponsible for what he had done to the country. Halleck had agreed to it. McClellan knows this whole ground; his specialty is to defend; he is a good engineer, all admit; there is no better organizer; he can be trusted to act on the defensive; but he is troubled with the '^ slows'' and good for nothing for an onward movement. Much was said. There was a more disturbed and desponding feeling than I have ever witnessed in council ; the President was greatly distressed. There was a general conversation as regarded the infirmities of McClellan, but it was claimed, by Blair and the President, he had beyond any officer the confidence of the army. Though deficient in the positive qualities which are necessary for an energetic commander, his or- ganizing powers could be made temporarily available till the troops were rallied. These, the President said, were General Halleck's views, as well as his own, and some who were dissatisfied with his action, and had thought H. was the man for General-in- Chief, felt that there was nothing to do but to acquiesce, yet Chase earnestly and emphatically stated his convic- tion that it would prove a national calamity. Pope himself had great influence in bringing Halleck here, and the two, with Stanton and Chase, got possession of McC.'s army and withdrew it from before Richmond. It has been an unfortunate movement. Pope is denounced as a braggart, unequal to the position assigned him. Stanton and Halleck are apprehensive that Washington is in danger. Am sorry to see this fear, for I do not believe it among remote possibilities. Undoubtedly, after the orders of Pope to fall back, and the discontent and con- tentions of the generals, there will be serious trouble, but not such as to endanger the Capital. The military believe a great and decisive battle is to be fought in front of the city, but I do not anticipate it. It may be that, retreating within the intrenchments, our own generals and managers 106 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [sept. 2 have inspired the Rebels to be more daring; perhaps they may venture to cross the upper Potomac and strike at Baltimore, our railroad conmiunication, or both, but they will not venture to come here, where we are prepared and fortified with both army and navy to meet them. In a conversation with Commodore Wilkes, who came up yesterday from Norfolk to take command of the Poto- mac Flotilla, consisting now of twenty-five vessels, he took occasion to express his high appreciation of McClellan as an officer. This can be accounted for in more ways than one. The two have been associated together in a severe disappointment, and persuade themselves they should have accomplished something important if they had not been interrupted. I have no doubt Wilkes, who has au- dacity, would have dashed on, and perhaps have compelled McClellan to do so, but with what prudence and discretion I am not assured. They both believe they would have taken Richmond. I apprehend they would have disagreed before getting there, even if McClellan could have been brought to the attempt. An adverse result has made them friends in belief, and they condemn the decision which led to their recall. I had no part in that decision. Probably should not have advised the order had I been consulted, although it may have been the proper military step. But whether recalled or not, McC. would never have struck a blow for Richmond, even under the impulsive urging of Wilkes, who is often inconsiderate; and so strife would have arisen between them. Wilkes says they would have captured Richmond on the 1st inst., had there been no recall. His last letter to me, about the 27th, said they would have made an attempt by the 12th if let alone. I have no doubt that, could he have had the cooperation of the army, Wilkes would have struck a blow; perhaps he would alone. September 3, Wednesday, Washington is full of exciting, vague, and absurd rumors. There is some cause for it. Our 1862] BITTER REMARK OF McCLELLAN'S 107 great army comes retreating to the banks of the Potomac, driven back to the intrenchments by Rebels. The army has no head. Halleck is here in the Depart- ment, a mihtary director, not a general, a man of some scholastic attainments, but without soldierly capacity. McClellan is an intelligent engineer and officer, but not a commander to head a great army in the field. To attack or advance with energy and power is not in him; to fight is not his forte. I sometimes fear his heart is not earnest in the cause, yet I do not entertain the thought that he is unfaithful. The study of military operations interests and amuses him. It flatters him to have on his staff French princes and men of wealth and position ; he likes show, parade, and power. Wishes to outgeneral the Rebels, but not to kill and destroy them. In a conversation which I had with him in May last at Cumberland on the Pamunkey, he said he desired of all things to capture Charleston; he would demolish and annihilate the city. He detested, he said, both South Carolina and Massachusetts, and should rejoice to see both States extinguished. Both were and al- ways had been ultra and mischievous, and he could not tell which he hated most. These were the remarks of the Gen- eral-in-Chief at the head of our armies then in the field, and when as large a proportion of his troops were from Massa- chusetts as from any State in the Union, while as large a proportion of those opposed, who were fighting the Union, were from South Carolina as from any State. He was lead- ing the men of Massachusetts against the men of South Carolina, yet he, the General, detests them alike. I cannot relieve my mind from the belief that to him, in a great degree, and to his example, influence, and conduct are to be attributed some portion of our late reverses, more than to any other person on either side. His reluctance to move or have others move, his inactivity, his detention of Franklin, his omission to send forward supplies unless Pope would send a cavalry escort from the battle-field, and the tone of his conversation and dispatches, all show a moody 108 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [sept. 3 state of feeling. The slight upon him and the generals asso- ciated with him, in the selection of Pope, was injudicious, impolitic, wrong perhaps, but is no justification for their withholding one tithe of strength in a great emergency, where the lives of their countrymen and the welfare of the country were in danger. The soldiers whom McClellan has commanded are doubtless attached to him. They have been trained to it, and he has kindly cared for them while under him. With partiality for him thay have imbibed his pre- judices, and some of the officers have, I fear, a spirit more factious and personal than patriotic. I have thought they might have reason to complain, at the proper time and place, but not on the field of battle, that a young officer of no high reputation should be brought from a Western Department and placed over them. Stanton, in his hate of McC, has aggrieved other officers. The introduction of Pope here, followed by Halleck, is an intrigue of Stanton's and Chase's to get rid of McClellan. A part of this intrigue has been the withdrawal of McClel- lan and the Army of the Potomac from before Richmond and turning it into the Army of Washington under Pope. Chase, who made himself as busy in the management of the army as the Treasury, said to the President one day in my presence, when we were looking over the maps on the table in the War Department, that the whole movement upon Richmond by the York River was wrong, that we should accomplish nothing until the army was recalled and Washington was made the base of operations for an over- land march. McClellan had all the troops with him, and the Capital was exposed to any sudden blow from the Rebels. ''What would you do?" said the President. " Order McClellan to return and start right," replied Chase, putting his finger on the map, and pointing the course to be taken across the country. Pope, who was present, said, ''If Halleck were here, you would have, Mr. President, a competent adviser who would put this matter right." The President, without consulting any one, went about 1862] HALLECK'S CALL TO WASHINGTON 109 this time on a hasty visit to West Point, where he had a brief interview with General Scott, and immediately returned. A few days thereafter General Halleck was detached from the Western Department and ordered to Washington, where he was placed in position as General- in-Chief, and McClellan and the Army of the Potomac, on Halleck's recommendation, first proposed by Chase, were recalled from in the vicinity of Richmond. The defeat of Pope and placing McC. in command of the retreating and disorganized forces after the second disaster at Bull Run interrupted the intrigue which had been planned for the dismissal of McClellan, and was not only a triumph for him but a severe mortification and disappoint- ment for both Stanton and Chase. September 4, Thursday. City full of rumors and but little truth in any of them. Wilkes laid before me his plan for organizing the Poto- mac Flotilla. It is systematic and exhibits capacity. Something energetic must be done in regard to the suspected privateers which, with the connivance of British authorities, are being sent out to depredate on our com- merce. We hear that our new steamer, the Adirondack, is wrecked. She had been sent to watch the Bahama Channel. Her loss, the discharge of the Oreto by the courts of Nas- sau, and the arrival of Steamer 290,^ both piratical British wolves, demand attention, although we have no vessels to spare from the blockade. Must organize a flying squadron, as has been suggested, and put Wilkes in command. Both the President and Seward request he should go on this service. When with the President this a.m., heard Pope read his statement of what had taken place in Virginia during the last few weeks, commencing at or before the battle of Cedar Mountain. It was not exactly a bulletin nor a report, but a manifesto, a narrative, tinged with wounded pride and ^ The cruiser Alabama. 110 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [sept. 4 a keen sense of injustice and wrong. The draft, he said, was rough. It certainly needs modifying before it goes out, or there will be war among the generals, who are now more ready to fight each other than the enemy. No one was present but the President, Pope, and myself. I remained by special request of both to hear the report read. Seward came in for a moment, but immediately left. He shuns these controversies and all subjects where he is liable to become personally involved. I have no doubt Stanton and Chase have seen the paper, and Seward, through Stanton, knows its character. Pope and I left together and walked to the Departments. He declares all his misfortunes are owing to the persistent determination of McClellan, Franklin, and Porter, aided by Ricketts, Griffin, and some others who were prede- termined he should not be successful. They preferred, he said, that the country should be ruined rather than he should triumph. September 5, Friday, We have a report this morning that the Rebels have crossed the Potomac at Edwards Ferry, but the War Department says the report wants confirmation and that we have no stragglers from there, as we should have if the rumors were true. Wilkes claims that he ought to have the position of Act- ing Admiral. There is reason in his claim, though some are opposed to it. He is not in favor with his professional brethren, has given great trouble and annoyance to the Department heretofore and will be likely to give us more trouble, but I believe it best to give him under the circum- stances the position with the squadron. • ••••••••• • The question of publishing the report of General Pope was before us. Some little discussion took place. I did not consider it strictly a report, for it was not accompanied by the reports of the other officers, or any statistics of killed, wounded, losses, or captures, but a statement from an 1862] THE ARMY FOR McCLELLAN 111 officer in command, who felt himself aggrieved and who expressed himself in a manner to give offense. Much was said, and all concurred or acquiesced in non-publication for the present, especially as there is to be an inquiry into the subject-matter reported upon. There is a good deal of demoralization in the army; officers and soldiers are infected. September 6, Saturday, We have information that the Rebels have crossed the Potomac in considerable force, with a view of invading Maryland and pushing on into Pennsylvania. The War Department is bewildered, knows but little, does nothing, proposes nothing. Our army is passing north. This evening some twenty or thirty thousand passed my house within three hours. There was design in having them come up from Pennsyl- vania Avenue to H Street, and pass by McClellan's house, which is at the corner of H and 15th. They cheered the General lustily, instead of passing by the White House and honoring the President. Have unpleasant information concerning privateers, which are getting abroad by connivance of the British au- thorities. Am trying to get Wilkes off as speedily as possi- ble. Wrote out his orders and instructions this evening to cruise with a squadron in the Bahamas and West Indies for certain vessels of no recognized nationality that were pre- paring to prey on our commerce. Will get them copied and in his hands on Monday. As an additional hint, told him to-day I wished he could get off on Monday. McClellan and his partisans have ascendency in the army, but he has lost ground in the confidence of the coun- try, chiefly from delays, or what the President aptly terms the ^^ slows.'' September 7. The report prevalent yesterday that the Rebels had crossed the upper Potomac at or near the Point of Rocks is confirmed, and it is pretty authentic that large reinforcements have since been added. 112 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [sept. 7 Found Chase in Secretary's room at the War Depart- ment with D. D. Field. No others present. Some talk about naval matters. Field censorious and uncomfortable. General Pope soon came in but stayed only a moment. Was angry and vehement. He and Chase had a brief con- versation apart, when he returned to Stanton's room. When I started to come away, Chase followed, and after we came down stairs asked me to walk with him to the President's. As we crossed the lawn, he said with emotion everything was going wrong. He feared the country was ruined. McClellan was having everything his own way, as he (Chase) anticipated he would if decisive measures were not promptly taken for his dismissal. It was a reward for perfidy. My refusal to sign the paper he had prepared was fraught with great evil to the country. I replied that I viewed that matter differently. My estimate of McClellan was in some respects different from his. I agreed he wanted decision, that he hesitated to strike, had also behaved badly in the late trouble, but I did not believe he was un- faithful and destitute of patriotism. But aside from Mc- Clellan, and the fact that it would, with the feeling which pervaded the army, have been an impolitic step to dismiss him, the proposed combination in the Cabinet would have been inexcusably wrong to the President. We had seen the view which the President took of the matter and how he felt at the meeting of the Cabinet on Tuesday. From what I have seen and heard within the last few days, the more highly do I appreciate the President's judg- ment and sagacity in the stand he made, and the course he took. Stanton has carried his dislike or hatred of McC. to great lengths, and from free intercourse with Chase has enlisted him, and to some extent influenced all of us against that officer, who has failings enough of his own to bear with- out the addition of Stanton's enmity to his own infirm- ities. Seward, in whom McC. has confided more than any member of the Administration, from the common belief that Seward was supreme, yielded to Stanton's malignant 1862] THE PRESIDENT'S COURSE 113 feelings, and yet, not willing to encounter that officer, he went off to Auburn, expecting the General would be dis- posed of whilst he was away. The President, who, like the rest of us, has seen and felt McClellan's deficiencies and has heard Stanton's and Halleck's complaints more than we have, finally, and I think not unwillingly, consented to bring Pope here in front of Washington; was also further persuaded by Stanton and Chase to recall the army from Richmond and turn the troops over to Pope. Most of this originated, and has been matured, in the War Depart- ment, Stanton and Chase being the pioneers, Halleck as- senting, the President and Seward under stress of McClel- lan's disease 'Hhe slows," and with the reverses before Richmond, falling in with the idea that a change of com- manders and a change of base was necessary. The recall of the army from the vicinity of Richmond I thought wrong, and I know it was in opposition to the opinion of some of the best military men in the service. Placing Pope over them roused the indignation of many. But in this Stanton had a purpose to accomplish, and in bringing first Pope here, then by Pope's assistance and General Scott's advice bringing Halleck, and concerting measures which followed, he succeeded in breaking down and displacing McClellan, but not in dismissing and disgracing him. This the Pre- sident would not do or permit to be done, though he was more offended with McC. than he ever was before. In a brief conversation with him as we were walking together on Friday, the President said with much emphasis: ^'I must have McClellan to reorganize the army and bring it out of chaos, but there has been a design, a purpose in breaking down Pope, without regard of consequences to the country. It is shocking to see and know this ; but there is no remedy at present, McClellan has the army with him." My convictions are with the President that McClellan and his generals are this day stronger than the Administra- tion with a considerable portion of this Army of the Poto- mac. It is not so elsewhere with the soldiers, or in the 114 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [sept. 7 country, where McClellan has lost favor. The people are disappointed in him, but his leading generals have con- trived to strengthen him in the hearts of the soldiers in front of Washington. Chase and myself found the President alone this Sunday morning. We canvassed fully the condition of the army and country. Chase took an early opportunity, since the report of Pope was suppressed, to urge upon the President the propriety of some announcement of the facts connected with the recent battles. It was, he said, due to the country and also to Pope and McDowell. I at once comprehended why Chase had invited me to accompany him in this visit. It was that it might appear that we were united on this mission. I therefore promptly stated that this was the first time I had heard the subject broached. At a proper time, it seemed to me, there would be propriety in presenting a fair, unprejudiced, and truthful statement of late disasters. The country craved to know the facts, but the question was. Could we just now with prudence give them? Dis- closing might lead to discord and impair the efficiency of the officers. The President spoke favorably of Pope, and thought he would have something prepared for publication by Halleck. When taking a walk this Sunday evening with my son Edgar, we met on Pennsylvania Avenue, near the junction of H Street, what I thought at first sight a squad of cav- alry or mounted men, some twenty or thirty in number. I remarked as they approached that they seemed better mounted than usual, but E. said the cavalcade was General McClellan and his staff. I raised my hand to salute him as they were dashing past, but the General, recognizing us, halted the troop and rode up to me by the sidewalk, to shake hands, he said, and bid me farewell. I asked which . way. He said he was proceeding to take command of the onward movement. ^'Then," I added, ^'you go up the river.'' He said yes, he had just started to take charge of the army and of the operations above. '^Well," said I, 1862] A FORWARD MOVEMENT 115 ^'onward, General, is now the word; the country will ex- pect you to go forward." ^^That," he answered, ^'is my intention." ^'Success to you, then. General, with all my heart." With a mutual farewell we parted. This was our first meeting since we parted at Cumber- land on the Pamunkey in June, for we each had been so occupied during the three or four days he had been in Washington that we had made no calls. On several occa- sions we missed each other. In fact, I had no particular desire to fall in with any of the officers who had contributed to the disasters that had befallen us, or who had in any respect failed to do their whole duty in this great crisis. While McClellan may have had some cause to be offended with Pope, he has no right to permit his personal resent- ments to inflict injury upon the country. I may do him injustice, but I think his management has been generally unfortunate, to say the least, and culpably wrong since his return from the Peninsula. He has now been placed in a position where he may re- trieve himself, and return to Washington a victor in tri- umph, or he may, as he has from the beginning, wilt away in tame delays and criminal inaction. I would not have given him the command, nor have advised it, strong as he is with the army, had I been consulted ; and I feel sad that he has been so intrusted. It may, however, be for the best. There are difficulties in the matter that can scarcely be ap- preciated by those who do not know all the circumstances. The army is, I fear, much demoralized, and its demoraliza- tion is much of it to be attributed to the officers whose highest duty it is to prevent it. To have placed any other general than McClellan, or one of his circle, in command would be to risk disaster. It is painful to entertain the idea that the country is in the hands of such men. I hope I mistake them. September 8, Monday, Less sensation and fewer nimors than we have had for several days. 116 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [sept. 8 The President called on me to know what we had authen- tic of the destruction of the Rebel steamer in Savannah River. He expressed himself very decidedly concerning the management or mismanagement of the army. Said, ^'We had the enemy in the hollow of our hands on Friday, if our generals, who are vexed with Pope, had done their duty; all of our present difficulties and reverses have been brought upon us by these quarrels of the generals." These were, I think, his very words. While we were conversing, Collector Barney of New York came in. The President said, perhaps before B. came, that Halleck had turned to McClellan and advised that he should command the troops against the Maryland invasion. ^^I could not have done it," said he, '^for I can never feel confident that he will do anything effectual." He went on, freely commenting and repeating some things said before B. joined us. Of Pope he spoke in complimentary terms as brave, patriotic, and as having done his duty in every respect in Virginia, to the entire satisfaction of himself and Halleck, who . both knew and watched, day and night, every movement. On only one point had Halleck doubted any order P. had given; that was in directing one division, I think Heintzelman's, to march for the Chain Bridge, by which the flanks of that division were exposed. When that order reached him by telegraph, Halleck was uneasy, for he could not counter- mand it in season, because the dispatch would have to go part of the way by courier. However, all went off without disaster; the division was not attacked. Pope, said the President, did well, but there was here an army prejudice against him, and it was necessary he should leave. He had gone off very angry, and not without cause, but circum- stances controlled us. Barney said he had mingled with all descriptions of per- sons, and particularly with men connected with the army, and perhaps could speak from actual knowledge of public sentiment better than either of us. He was positive that no one but McClellan could do anything just now with this 1862] DISCUSSION OF THE GENERALS 117 army. He had managed to get its confidence, and he meant to keep it, and use it for his own purposes. Barney proceeded to disclose a conversation he had with Barlow some months since. Barlow, a prominent Democratic lawyer and politician of New York, had been to Washing- ton to attend one of McClellan^s grand reviews when he lay here inactive on the Potomac. McClellan had specially invited Barlow to be present, and during this visit opened his mind, said he did not wish the Presidency, would rather have his place at the head of the army, etc., etc., intimating he had no political views or aspirations. All with him was military, and he had no particular desire to close this war immediately, but would pursue a line of policy of his own, regardless of the Administration, its wishes and objects. The combination against Pope was, Barney says, part of the plan carried out, and the worst feature to him was the great demoralization of his soldiers. They were becoming reckless and untamable. In these remarks the President concurred, and said he was shocked to find that of 140,000 whom we were paying for in Pope's army only 60,000 could be found. McClellan brought away 93,000 from the Penin- sula, but could not to-day count on over 45,000. As re- garded demoralization, the President said, there was no doubt that some of our men permitted themselves to be captured in order that they might leave on parole, get dis- charged, and go home. Where there is such rottenness, is there not reason to fear for the country? Barney further remarked that some very reliable men were becoming discouraged, and instanced Cassius M. Clay, who was advocating an armistice and terms of separation or of compromise with the Rebels. The President doubted if Clay had been rightly understood, for he had had a full and free talk with him, when he said had we been success- ful we could have had it in our power to offer terms. In a conversation this morning with Chase, he said it was a doubtful matter whether my declining to sign the 118 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [sept. 8 paper against McClellan was productive of good or harm. If I had done it, he said, McClellan would have been dis- posed of and not now in command, but the condition of the army was such under his long manipulation that it might have been hazardous at this juncture to have dismissed him. I assured him I had seen no moment yet when I re- gretted my decision, and my opinion of McClellan had undergone no change. He has military acquirements and capacity, dash, but has not audacity, lacks decision, de- lays, hesitates, vacillates; will, I fear, persist in delays and inaction and do nothing affirmative. His conduct during late events aggravates his indecision and is wholly unjusti- fiable and inexcusable. But I will not prophesy what he will do in his present command. He has a great opportunity, and I hope and pray he may improve it. The President says truly he has the ^^ slows," but he can gather the army together better than any other man. Let us give him credit when he de- serves it. September 10, Wednesday, Colonel Marston of New Hampshire, who has been with the Army of the Potomac for a year, called on me to-day. Says he has no confidence in McClellan as a general; thinks him neither brave nor capable; expresses distrust of the integrity and patriotism of other generals also. Marston is not a brilliant or great man, nor perhaps a very competent military critic to judge of the higher qualifications of his superiors; but he is polit- ically patriotic, and gives the opinion of others with whom he associates as well as his own. Senator Wilson, who is by nature suspicious and sensa- tional, tells me there is a conspiracy on foot among certain generals for a revolution and the establishment of a pro- visional national government. Has obtained important information from one of McC.'s staff. Wilson is doubtless sincere in all this, but, being on the military committee, is influenced by Stanton, who is mad with the army and 1862] RUMORS OF REVOLUTION 119 officers who stand by McClellan. There may have been random talk and speculation among military men when idle in camp, but there is nothing serious or intentional in their loose remarks. They and the soldiers are citizens. The government and country is theirs as well as ours. Secretary Smith says he has heard of these movements. Imputes misfortune and mismanagement to one (Seward) who has the ear of the President and misadvises and mis- leads him. H. H. Elliott, Chairman of the Prize Commission in New York, writes me that the public mind there is highly ex- cited and on the eve of revolution. There is, undoubtedly, a bad state of things in New York, and he is surrounded by that class of Democratic partisans whose sympathies and associations were with the Rebels, and who are still party opponents of the Administration. There are muttering denunciations on every side, and if McClellan fails to whip the Rebels in Maryland, the wrath and indignation against him and the Administration will be great and unrestrained. If he succeeds, there will be instant relief, and a willing disposition to excuse alleged errors which ought to be investigated. General Halleck is nominally General-in-Chief and dis- charging many of the important functions of the War De- partment. I have as yet no intimacy with him and have seen but little of him. He has a scholarly intellect and, I suppose, some military acquirements, but his mind is heavy and irresolute. It appears to me he does not possess originality and that he has little real military talent. What he has is educational. He is here, and came from the West, the friend of Pope, and is in some degree indebted to Pope for his position. Both were introduced here by an intrigue of the War and Treasury with the design of ultimately displacing McClellan, to whom the President has adhered with tenacity, and from whom Stanton alone and un- assisted could not alienate him. The President was distressed by McClellan's tardy movements and failure 120 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [sept, lo before Richmond, but did not understand the object which the Secretary of War, seconded by Chase, had in view, nor perhaps did either of the two generals. Pope and Halleck, whose capabiUties were wonderfully magnified by Stanton, when ordered here. Pope is a connection of Mrs. Lincoln and was somewhat intimate with the President, with whom he came to Washington in 1861. There were some wonderful military operations on the Mississippi and at Corinth reported of him just before he was ordered here, and which led to it, that have not somehow been fully sub- stantiated. Admiral Foote used to laugh at the gasconade and bluster of Pope. Halleck, Foote insisted, was a mili- tary imbecile, though he might make a good clerk. Pope was first brought here, and soon began to second Stanton by sounding the praises of Halleck. On one or two occa- sions I heard him express his admiration of the extraor- dinary capacity of Halleck and his wish that H. could be on this field, where his great abilities would comprehend and successfully direct military operations. Stanton would on these occasions back Pope so far as to hope there could be some change. The President listened, was influenced, and finally went to West Point and saw General Scott. Chase had in the mean time abandoned McClellan, and I well remember the vehement earnestness with which, on one occasion when we were examining the maps and criticizing operations before Richmond, he maintained with emphasis we had begun wrong, and could have no success until the army was brought back here, and we started from this point to reach the James River. How far Halleck was assenting to or committed to Stanton's implacable hostility to McClellan, or whether he was aware of its extent before he came here, I cannot say. Shortly after he arrived I saw that he partook of the views of Stanton and Chase. By direction of the President he visited the army on the James and became a partner to the scheme for the recall of the troops. This recall or with- drawal he pronounced one of the most difficult things to HENRY W. HALLECK 1862] AN ESTIMATE OF HALLECK 121 achieve successfully that an accomplished commander could execute. The movement was effected successfully, but I did not perceive that the country was indebted to General Halleck in the least for that success. The whole thing at Headquarters was slovenly managed. I know that the Navy, which was in the James River cooperating with the army, was utterly neglected by Halleck. Stanton, when I made inquiry, said the order to bring back the army was not his, and he was not responsible for that neg- lect. I first learned of the order recalling the army, not from the General-in-Chief or the War Department, but from Wilkes, who was left upon the upper waters of the James without orders and a cooperating army. When I called on Halleck, with Wilkes's letter, he seemed stupid, said there was no further use for the Navy, supposed I had been advised by the Secretary of War. When I suggested that it appeared to me important that the naval force should remain, with perhaps a small number of troops to menace Richmond, he rubbed his elbow first, as if that was the seat of thought, and then his eyes, and said he wished the Navy would hold on for a few days to embarrass the Rebels, but he had ordered all the troops to return. I questioned then, and do now, the wisdom of recalling Mc- Clellan and the army; have doubted if H., unprompted, would himself have done it. It was a specimen of Chase's and Stanton's tactics. They had impressed the President with their ideas that a change of base was necessary. The President had, at the beginning, questioned the move- ment on Richmond by way of the Peninsula, but Blair had favored it. Pope having been put in command of the army in front of Washington, it was not difficult to reinforce him with McClellan's men. Stanton, intriguing against that officer, wanted to exclude him from command. Chase seconded the scheme, but, fearing the influence of McClellan with the President and the other generals and the army, the plan of his dismissal at the instigation of the Cabinet was 122 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [sept, lo projected. McClellan, by an unwise political letter, when his duty was military, weakened himself and strengthened his enemies. Events must have convinced him that there was an intrigue against him, that he was in disfavor. Per- haps he was conscious that he had failed to come up to pub- lic expectation and do his whole duty. He certainly com- mitted the great error, if not crime, after Halleck's appoint- ment and his recall, of remaining supine, inactive, at Alex- andria while the great battle was going on in front ; and he imparted his own disaffected feelings to his subordinates. Halleck, destitute of originality, bewildered by the con- duct of McClellan and his generals, without military re- sources, could devise nothing and knew not what to advise or do after Pope's discomfitiu'e. He saw that the dissatis- fied generals triumphed in Pope's defeat, that Pope and the faction that Stanton controlled against McClellan were unequal to the task they were expected to perform, and, distrustful of himself, Halleck, without consulting Stanton, assented to the President's suggestion of reinstating Mc- Clellan in the intrenchments to reorganize the shattered forces; and subsequently recommended giving him again the command of the consolidated armies of Washington and the Potomac. The President assured me that this appointment of McClellan to command the united forces and the onward movement was Halleck's doings. He spoke of it in justi- fication of the act. I was sorry he should permit General H. to select the commander in such a case if against his own judgment. But the same causes which influenced H. prob- ably had some effect on the President, and Stanton, disap- pointed and vexed, beheld his plans miscarry and felt that his resentments were impotent, at least for a time. September 1 1 , Thursday, I find it difficult to hurry Wilkes off with his command. The public, especially the com- mercial community, are impatient; but Wilkes, like many officers, having got position, likes to exhibit himself and 1862] PANIC-STRICKEN NEW YORK 123 snuff incense. He assumed great credit for promptness, and has sometimes shown it, but not on this occasion. Has been fussing about his vessel until I had, to-day, to give him a pretty peremptory order. Men in New York, men who are sensible in most things, are the most easily terrified and panic-stricken of any community. They are just now alarmed lest an ironclad steamer may rush in upon them some fine morning while they are asleep and destroy their city. In their imagin- ation, under the teachings of mischievous persons and papers, they suppose every Rebel cruiser is ironclad, while in fact the Rebels have not one ironclad afloat. It only requires a sensation paragraph in the Times to create alarm. The Times is controlled by Seward through Thur- low Weed, and used through him by Stanton. Whenever the army is in trouble and public opinion sets against its management, the Times immediately sets up a howl against the Navy. Senator Pomeroy of Kansas called yesterday in relation to a scheme, or job, for deporting slaves and colored people to Chiriqui. I cautioned him against committing himself or the Government to Thompson, or any corporation or association. Let him know my opinion of Thompson's project and my opposition to it. Advised him, if anything was seriously and earnestly designed, to go to the Govern- ment of New Granada or any of the Spanish- American States and treat with them direct, and not through schem- ing jobbers. Should suspect P. to have a personal interest in the matter but for the fact that the President, the Blairs, and one or two men of integrity and character favor it. September 12, Friday. A clever rain last night, which I hope may swell the tributaries of the upper Potomac. A call from Wilkes, who is disturbed because I press him so earnestly. Told him I wished him off as soon as possible ; had hoped he would have left before this; Rebel cruisers 124 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [sept. 12 are about and immense in^m-y might result from a single day's delay. I find the officers generally dislike to sail with him. A brief meeting of the Cabinet. Seward was not present. Has met with us but once in several weeks. No cause assigned for this constant absence, yet a reluctance to discuss and bring to a decision any great question without him is apparent. In a long and free discussion on the condition of the army and military affairs by the President, Blair, Smith, and myself, the President repeated what he had before said to me, that the selection of McClellan to command active operations was not made by him but by Halleck, and remarked that the latter was driven to it by necessity. He had arranged his army corps and designated the gen- erals to lead each column, and called on Burnside to take chief command. But Burnside declined and declared him- self unequal to the position. Halleck had no other officer whom he thought capable and said he consequently was left with no alternative but McClellan. ^'The officers and soldiers,'^ the President said, '^were pleased with the reinstatement of that officer, but I wish you to understand it was not made by me. I put McClel- lan in command here to defend the city, for he has great powers of organization and discipline; he comprehends and can arrange military combinations better than any of our generals, and there his usefulness ends. He can't go ahead — he can't strike a blow. He got to Rockville, for instance, last Sunday night, and in four days he advanced to Middlebrook, ten miles, in pursuit of an invading enemy. This was rapid movement for him. When he went up the Peninsula there was no reason why he should have been detained a single day at Yorktown, but he waited, and gave the enemy time to gather his forces and strengthen his position.'' I suggested that this dilatory, defensive policy was partly at least the result of education; that a defensive 1862] THE WEST POINT POLICY 125 policy was the West Point policy. Our Government was not intended to be aggressive but to resist aggression or invasion, — to repel, not to advance. We had good engin- eers and accomplished officers, but that no efficient, ener- getic, audacious, fighting commanding general had yet appeared from that institution. We were all aware that General Scott had, at the very commencement, begun with this error of defense, the Anaconda theory; was unwilling to invade the seceding States, said we must shut off the world from the Rebels by blockade and by our defenses. He had always been reluctant to enter Virginia or strike a blow. Blair said this was so, that we had men of narrow, aristocratic notions from West Point, but as yet no gener- als to command; that there were many clever second-rate men, but no superior mind of the higher class. The dif- ficulty, however, was in the War Department itself. There was bluster but not competency. It should make generals, should search and find them, and bring them up, for there were such somewhere, — far down perhaps. The War De- partment should give character and tone to the army and all military movements. Such, said he, is the fact with the Navy Department, which makes no bluster, has no blow- ers, but quietly and intelligently does its work, inspires its officers and men, and brings forward leaders like Farragut, Foote, and Du Pont. The result tells you the value of system, of rightful discrimination, good sense, judgment, knowledge, and study of men. They make ten times the noise at the War Department, but see what they do or fail to do. The Secretary of War should advise with the best and most experienced minds, avail himself of their opinions, not give way to narrow prejudices and strive to weaken his generals, or impair confidence in them on account of per- sonal dislikes. We have officers of capacity, depend upon it, and they should be hunted out and brought forward. The Secretary should dig up these jewels. That is his duty. B. named Sherman and one or two others who showed capacity. 126 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [sept. 12 '^McClellan/' said B., "is not the man, but he is the best among the major-generals." Smith said he should prefer Banks. Blair said Banks was no general, had no capacity for chief command. Was probably an estimable officer in his proper place, under orders. So was Burnside, and Heintzelman, and Sykes, but the War Department must hunt up greater men, better miUtary minds, than these to carry on successful war. Smith complimented Pope's patriotism and bravery, and the President joined in the encomiums. Said that Halleck declared that Pope had made but one mistake in all the orders he had given, and that was in ordering one column to retreat on Tuesday from Centre ville to Chain Bridge, whereby he exposed his flank, but no harm came of his error. Blair was unwilling to concede any credit whatever to Pope; said he was a blower and a liar and ought never to have been intrusted with such a command as that in front. The President admitted Pope's infirmity, but said a liar might be brave and have skill as an officer. He said Pope had great cunning. He had published his report, for in- stance, which was wrong, — an offense for which, if it can be traced to him, Pope must be made amenable, — " But," said he, ''it can never, by any skill, be traced to him." "That is the man," said Blair. "Old John Pope, ^ his father, was a flatterer, a deceiver, a liar, and a trickster; all the Popes are so." When we left the Executive Mansion, Blair, who came out with me, remarked that he was glad this conversation had taken place. He wanted to let the President know we must have a Secretary of War who can do something besides intrigue, — who can give force and character to the army, administer the Department on correct principles. Cameron, he said, had got into the War Department by the contrivance and cunning of Seward, who used him and other corruptionists as he pleased, with the assistance of 1 General Pope's father was Judge Nathaniel Pope, of the United States District Court for Illinois. 1862] AN ESTIMATE OF STANTON 127 Thurlow Weed; that Seward had tried to get Cameron into the Treasury, but was unable to quite accomplish that, and after a hard underground quarrel against Chase, it ended in the loss of Cameron, who went over to Chase and left Seward. Bedeviled with the belief he might be a candidate for the Presidency, Cameron was beguiled and led to mount the nigger hobby, alarmed the President with his notions, and at the right moment, B. says, he plainly and frankly told the President he ought to get rid of C. at once, that he was not fit to remain in the Cabinet, and was in- competent to manage the War Department, which he had undertaken to run by the aid of Tom A. Scott, a corrupt lobby-jobber from Philadelphia. Seward was ready to get rid of Cameron after he went over to Chase, but instead of bringing in an earnest, vigorous, sincere man like old Ben Wade to fill the place, he picked up this black terrier, who is no better than Cameron, though he has a better assistant than Scott, in Watson. Blair says he now wants assistance to ''get this black terrier out of his kennel." I probably did not respond as he wished, for I am going into no combina- tion or movement against colleagues. He said he must go and see Seward. In his dislike of Stanton, Blair is sincere and earnest, but in his detestation he may fail to allow Stanton qualities that he really possesses. Stanton is no favorite of mine. He has energy and application, is indus- trious and driving, but devises nothing, shuns responsi- bility, and I doubt his sincerity always. He wants no general to overtop him, is jealous of others in any position who have influence and popular regard ; but he has cunning and skill, dissembles his feelings, in short, is a hypocrite, a moral coward, while affecting to be, and to a certain extent being, brusque, overvaliant in words. Blair says he is dis- honest, that he has taken bribes, and that he is a double- dealer; that he is now deceiving both Seward and Chase; that Seward brought him into the Cabinet after Chase stole Cameron, and that Chase is now stealing Stanton. Reminds me that he exposed Stanton's corrupt character, 128 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [sept. 12 and stated an instance which had come to his knowledge and where he has proof of a bribe having been received; that he made this exposure when Stanton was a candidate for Attorney for the District. Yet Seward, knowing these facts, had induced and persuaded the President to bring this corrupt man into the War Department. The country was now suffering for this mistaken act. Seward wanted a creature of his own in the War Department, that he might use, but Stanton was actually using Seward. Stanton's appointment to the War Department was in some respects a strange one. I was never a favorite of Seward, who always wanted personal friends. I was not of his sort, personally or politically. Stanton, knowing his creator, sympathized with him. For several months after his appointment, he exhibited some of his peculiar traits towards me. He is by nature a sensationalist, has from the first been filled with panics and alarms, in which I have not participated ; and I have sometimes exhibited little respect or regard for his mercurial flights and sensational disturb- ances. He saw on more than one occasion that I was cool when he was excited, and he well knew that I neither ad- mired his policy nor indorsed his views. Of course we were courteously civil, but reserved and distant. The opposi- tion in the early days of the Administration were violent against the Navy management, and the class of Repub- licans who had secretly been opposed to my appointment joined in the clamor. In the progress of events there was a change. The Navy and my course, which had been assailed, — and which assaults he countenanced, — grew in favor, while my mercurial colleague failed to give satis- faction. His deportment changed after the naval success at New Orleans, and we have since moved along harmoni- ously at least. He is impulsive, not administrative; has quickness, often rashness, when he has nothing to appre- hend; is more violent than vigorous, more demonstrative than discriminating, more vain than wise ; is rude, arrogant, and domineering towards those in subordinate positions if 1862] THE COUNTRY DISHEARTENED 129 they will submit to his rudeness, but is a sycophant and dissembler in deportment and language with those whom he fears. He has equal cunning but more force and greater capacity than Cameron; yet the qualities I have mentioned and his uneasy, restless nature make him, though possessed of a considerable ability of a certain sort, an unfit man in many respects for the War Department in times like these. I have sometimes thought McClellan would better dis- charge the duties of Secretary of War than those of a gen- eral in the field, and that a similar impression may have crossed Stanton^s mind, and caused or increased his hate of that officer. There is no love lost between them, and their enmity towards each other does not injure McClellan in the estimation of Blair. Should McClellan in this Mary- land campaign display vigor and beat the Rebels, he may overthrow Stanton as well as Lee. Blair will give him act- ive assistance. But he must rid himself of what President Lincoln calls the ''slows.'' This, I fear, is impossible; it is his nature. September 13. The country is very desponding and much disheartened. There is a perceptibly growing distrust of the Administration and of its ability and power to conduct the war. Military doubts were whispered on the Peninsula by McClellan 's favorites before his recall, and when he was reinstated public confidence in the Administration through- out the country was impaired. Citizens and military, though from different causes, were distrustful. It is evi- dent, however, that the reinstatement of McC. has inspired strength, vigor, and hope in the army. Officers and soldiers appear to be united in his favor and willing to follow his lead. It has now been almost a week since he left Wash- ington, yet he has not overtaken the enemy, who are not distant. There is doubt whether he is thirty miles from Washington. Perhaps he ought not to be, until he has gathered up and massed the dispersed elements of his com- mand. I shall not criticize in ignorance, but insist it is the 130 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [sept. 13 duty of all to sustain him. I am not without hopes that his late experience and the strong pressure of public opinion will overcome his hesitancy and rouse him to thorough work. He is never rash. I fear he is not a fighting general. Stanton is cross and grouty. A victory for McClellan will bring no joy to him, though it would gladden the whole country. Rev. Dr. Patton of Chicago, chairman of a committee appointed in northern Illinois, desired an introduction with his associates to the President, to advise with him on the subject of slavery and emancipation. The President assented cheerfully. September 15. Some rumors yesterday and more direct information to-day are cheering to the Union cause. Mc- Clellan telegraphs a victory, defeat of the enemy with loss of 15,000 men, and that '^General Lee admits they are badly whipped." To whom Lee made this admission so that it should be brought straight to McC. and telegraphed here does not appear. A tale like this from Pope would have been classed as one of his fictions. It may be all true, coming from McClellan, but I do not credit Lee^s confes- sion or admission. That we have had a fight and beaten the Rebels, I can believe. It scarcely could have been otherwise. I am afraid it is not as decisive as it should be, and as is the current belief, but shall rejoice if McC. has actually overtaken the Rebels, which is not yet altogether clear. September 16. Chase called on me this morning. Wishes a secret concerted attack on Richmond. Says Stanton will furnish 10,000 men. Told him we would do all that could be expected of the Navy in a sudden movement, but doubted if a military expedition could be improvised as speedily and decisively as he supposed. He thought it could certainly be effected in six days. I told him to try. We would have a naval force ready in that time, though 1862] LINCOLN^S DEFERENCE TO SEWARD 131 not so large and powerful as I would wish ; but we would do our part. Chase tells me that Harrington, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, was at Fortress Monroe last Thursday and heard Bankhead, who commands the Minnesota, say that the Government was a poor affair, that the Administration was inefficient, that it is time the politicians were cleared out of Washington and the army in power. Harrington called subsequently and confirmed the statement, — less strong perhaps in words but about as offensive. I re- quested him to reduce his statement to writing. At the Executive Mansion, the Secretary of State in- formed us there was to be no Cabinet-meeting. He was authorized by the President to conmiunicate the fact. Smith said it would be as well, perhaps, to postpone the Cabinet-meetings altogether and indefinitely, — there seemed no use latterly for our coming together. Others expressed corresponding opinions. Seward turned off, a little annoyed. An unfavorable impression is getting abroad in regard to the President and the Administration, not without rea- son, perhaps, which prompted Smith and others to express their minds freely. There is really very little of a govern- ment here at this time, so far as most of the Cabinet are concerned ; certainly but little consultation in this import- ant period. Seward, when in Washington, spends more or less of each day with the President, absorbs his attention, and I fear to an extent influences his action not always wisely. The President has good sense, intelligence, and an excellent heart, but is sadly perplexed and distressed by events. He, to an extent, distrusts his own administrative ability and experience. Seward, instead of strengthening and fortifying him, encourages this self-distrust, but is not backward in giving his own judgment and experience, which are often defective expedients, to guide the Execu- tive. A conviction of this state of things stirred up Smith to make his remarks. The President has, I believe, sincere 132 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [sept. 16 respect and regard for each and every member of the Cabi- net, but Seward seeks, and has at times, influence, which is sometimes harmful. The President would often do better without him, were he to follow his own instincts, or were he to consult all his advisers in council. He would find his own opinions confirmed and be convinced that Seward's suggestions are frequently unwise and weak and temporizing. No one attempts to obtrude himself, or warn the President, or even to suggest to him that others than S. should be consulted on some of the important measures of the Government. In fact, they are not informed of some of the measures which are of general interest until they see them in operation, or hear of them from others. Chase is much chafed by these things, and endeavors, and to some extent succeeds, in also getting beside the President, and obtaining information of what is going forward. But this only excites and stimulates Seward, who has the inside track and means to keep it. The President is unsuspicious, or apparently so; readily gives his ear to suggestions from any one. Only one of his Cabinet, however, has manifested a disposition to monopolize his attention; but the discus- sion of important measures is sometimes checked almost as soon as introduced, and, without any consultation, or without being again brought forward, they are disposed of, the Secretary of State alone having had sometimes cer- tainly a view, or ear, or eye in the matter. He alone has abbreviated general consultation in many cases. With greater leisure than most of the Cabinet officers, unless it be Smith of the Interior, he runs to the President two or three times a day, gets his ear, gives him his tongue, makes himself interesting by anecdotes, and artfully contrives with Stanton's aid to dispose of measures without action or give them direction independent of his associates. Under the circumstances, I perhaps am, latterly, as little inter- fered with as any one, though the duties of the State and Navy Departments run together; yet I am sometimes excessively annoyed and embarrassed by meddlesome 1862] DEPARTMENT ADMINISTRATION 133 intrusions and inconsiderate and unauthorized action by the Secretary of State. The Navy Department has, neces- sarily, greater intimacy, or connection, with the State Department than any other, for, besides international questions growing out of the blockade, our squadrons and commanders abroad come in contact with our ministers, consuls, and commercial agents, and each has intercourse with the Governments and representatives of other nations. Mutual understanding and cooperation are therefore essen- tial and indispensable. But while I never attempt to direct the agents of the State Department, or think of it, or to meddle with affairs in the appropriate sphere of the Secre- tary of State, an entirely different course is pursued by him as regards the Navy and naval operations. He is anxious to direct, to be the Premier, the real Executive, and give away national rights as a favor. Since our first conflict, however, when he secretly interfered with the Sumter ex- pedition and got up an enterprise to Pensacola, we have had no similar encounter; yet there has been an itching propensity on his part to have a controlling voice in naval matters with which he has no business, — which he really does not understand, — and he sometimes improperly in- terferes as in the disposition of mails on captured vessels. The Attorney-General has experienced similar improper interference, more than any other perhaps; none are ex- empt. But the Secretary of State, while meddlesome with others, is not at all communicative of the affairs of his own Department. Scarcely any important measures or even appointments of that Department are brought before us, except by the President himself or by his express direction. The consequence is that there is reticence by others and the Government is administered in a great measure by Departments. Seward is inquisitive and learns early what is doing by each of his associates, frequently before we meet in council, while the other Cabinet officers limit themselves to their provided duties and are sometimes wholly unadvised of his. 134 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [sept. 16 I have administered the Navy Department almost entirely independent of Cabinet consultation, and I may say almost without direction of the President, who not only gives me his confidence but intrusts all naval matters to me. This has not been my wish. Though glad to have his confidence, I should prefer that every important naval movement should pass a Cabinet review. To-day, for in- stance, Wilkes was given the appointment of Acting Rear- Admiral, and I have sent him off with a squadron to cruise in the West Indies. All this has been done without Cabinet consultation, or advice with any one, except Seward and the President. The detail and the reserve are at the insti- gation of Seward, who wished Wilkes, between whom and himself, since the Trent affair, there seems to be an under- standing, to have a command, without specifying where. In due time our associates in the Cabinet will learn the main facts and infer that I withheld from them my orders. My instructions to our naval officers, — commanders of squadrons or single ships, — cruising on our blockade duty, have never been submitted to the Cabinet, though I have conamunicated them freely to each. I have never read but one of my letters of instructions to the President, and that was to Captain Mercer of the Powhatan in command of the naval expedition to Sumter a few weeks after I en- tered upon my duties, and those instructions were, covertly, set aside and defeated by Seward. So in regard to each and all the Departments ; if I have known of their regulations and instructions, much of it has not been in Cabinet consultations. Seward beyond any and all others is responsible for this state of things. It has given him individual power, but often at the expense of good administration. In everything relating to miUtary operations by land, General Scott first, then McClellan, then Halleck, have directed and controlled. The Government was virtually in the hands of the General-in-Chief, so far as armies and military operations were concerned. The Administration 1862] LINCOLN AND SEWARD 135 had no distinct military policy, was permitted to have none. The President was generally advised and consulted, but Seward was the special confidant of General Scott, was more than any one of McClellan, and, in conjunction with Stanton, of Halleck. With wonderful kindness of heart and deference to others, the President, with little self-esteem and unaffected modesty, has permitted this and in a great measure has surrendered to military officers prerogatives intrusted to himself. The mental qualities of Seward are almost the precise opposite of the President. He is obtrusive and never reserved or diffident of his own powers, is assuming and presuming, meddlesome, and un- certain, ready to exercise authority always, never doubt- ing his right until challenged; then he becomes timid, un- certain, distrustful, and inventive of schemes to extricate himself, or to change his position. He is not particularly scrupulous in accomplishing an end, nor so mindful of what is due to others as would be expected of one who aims to be always courteous towards equals. The Pre- sident he treats with a familiarity that sometimes borders on disrespect. The President, though he observes this ostentatious presumption, never receives it otherwise than pleasantly, but treats it as a weakness in one to whom he attributes qualities essential to statesmanship, whose pliability is pleasant, and whose ready shrewdness he finds convenient and acceptable. With temperaments so constituted and so unlike it is not surprising that the obsequious affability and ready as- sumption of the subordinate presumed on and to an extent influenced the really superior intellect of the principal, and made himself in a degree the centralizing personage. While the President conceded to the Secretary of State almost all that he assumed, not one of his colleagues made that concession. They treated his opinions respectfully, but as no better than the opinions of others, except as they had merit; and his errors. they exposed and opposed as they deserved. One or two have always been ready to 136 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [sept. 16 avail themselves of the opportunity. In the early days of the Administration the Cabinet officers were absorbed by labors and efforts to make themselves familiar with their duties, so as rightly to discharge them. Those duties were more onerous and trying, in consequence of the overthrow of old parties and the advent of new men and new organ- izations, with the great rupture that was going on in the Government, avowedly to destroy it, than had ever been experienced by any of their predecessors. Whilst the other members of the Cabinet were absorbed in familiarizing themselves with their duties and in prepar- ing for impending disaster, the Secretary of State, less apprehensive of disaster, spent a considerable portion of every day with the President, patronizing and instructing him, hearing and telling anecdotes, relating interesting details of occurrences in the Senate, and inculcating his political party notions. I think he has no very profound or sincere convictions. Cabinet-meetings, which should, at that exciting and interesting period, have been daily, were infrequent, irregular, and without system. The Secretary of State notified his associates when the President desired a meeting of the heads of Departments. It seemed unad- visable to the Premier — as he liked to be called and con- sidered — that the members should meet often, and they did not. Consequently there was very little concerted action. At the earlier meetings there was little or no formality; the Cabinet-meetings were a sort of privy council or gathering of equals, much like a Senatorial caucus, where there was no recognized leader and the Secretary of State put himself in advance of the President. No seats were assigned or regularly taken. The Secretary of State was invariably present some little time before the Cabinet as- sembled and from his former position as the chief executive of the largest State in the Union, as well as from his recent place as a Senator, and from his admitted experience and familiarity with affairs, assumed, and was allowed, as was 18G2] CONDUCT OF CABINET-MEETINGS 137 proper, to take the lead in consultations and also to give tone and direction to the manner and mode of proceedings. The President, if he did not actually wish, readily ac- quiesced in, this. Mr. Lincoln, having never had experi- ence in administering the Government, State or National, deferred to the suggestions and course of those who had. Mr. Seward was not slow in taking upon himself to pre- scribe action and doing most of the talking, without much regard to the modest chief, but often to the disgust of his associates, particularly Mr. Bates, who was himself always courteous and respectful, and to the annoyance of Mr. Chase, who had, lilce Mr. Seward, experience as a chief magistrate. Discussions were desultory and without order or system, but in the summing-up and conclusions the President, who was a patient listener and learner, concen- trated results, and often determined questions adverse to the Secretary of State, regarding him and his opinions, as he did those of his other advisers, for what they were worth and generally no more. But the want of system and free communication among all as equals prevented that con- cert and comity which is really strength to an adminis- tration. Each head of a Department took up and managed the affairs which devolved upon him as he best could, fre- quently without consulting his associates, and as a con- sequence without much knowledge of the transactions of other Departments, but as each consulted with the Pre- sident, the Premier, from daily, almost hourly, intercourse with him, continued, if not present at these interviews, to ascertain the doings of each and all, though himself imparting but httle of his own course to any. Great events of a general character began to impel the members to assemble daily, and sometimes General Scott was present, and occasionally Commodore Stringham; at times others were called in. The conduct of affairs during this period was awkward and embarrassing. After a few weeks the members, without preconcert, expressed a wish to be 138 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [sept. 16 better advised on subjects for which they were all meas- urably responsible to the country. The Attorney-General expressed his dissatisfaction with these informal proceed- ings and advised meetings on stated days for general and current affairs, and hoped, when there was occasion, special calls would be made. The Secretary of State alone dissented, hesitated, doubted, objected, thought it inex- pedient, said all had so much to do that we could not spare the time; but the President was pleased with the sugges- tion, if he did not prompt it, and concurred with the rest of the Cabinet. The form of proceeding was discussed; Mr. Seward thought that would take care of itself. Some suggestions were made in regard to important appointments which had been made by each head of Department, the Secretary of State taking the lead in selecting high officials without general consultation. There seemed an understanding between the Secretaries of State and Treasury, who had charge of the most important appointments, of which understanding the President was perhaps cognizant. Chase had extensive patronage, Seward appointments of high character. The two arranged that each should make his own selection of subordinates. These two men had political aspirations which did not extend to their associates (with perhaps a single exception that troubled neither). Chase thought he was fortifying himself by this arrangement, but he often was overreached, and the ar- rangement was one of the mistakes of his life. Without going farther into details, the effect, and prob- ably the intention, of these proceedings in those early days was to dwarf the President and elevate the Secretary of State. The latter also circumscribed the sphere of [the former] so far as he could. Many of the important meas- ures, particularly of his own Department, he managed to dispose of, or contrived to have determined, independent of the Cabinet. My early collision with him in some complications con- 18G2] RIVALRY OF SEWARD AND CHASE 139 nected with the Sumter and Pensacola expeditions, when he was so flagrantly wrong as to be overruled by the Presi- dent, caused us to get along thenceforward without serious difficulties, though, our duties being intimate, we were often brought together and had occasional disagreements. Between Seward and Chase there was perpetual rivalry and mutual but courtly distrust. Each was ambitious. Both had capacity. Seward was supple and dexterous; Chase was clumsy and strong. Seward made constant mistakes, but recovered with a facility that was wonderful and almost always without injury to himself; Chase com- mitted fewer blunders, but persevered in them when made, often to his own serious detriment. In the fevered condi- tion of public opinion, the aims and policies of the [two] were strongly developed. Seward, who had sustained McClellan and came to possess, more than any one else in the Cabinet, his confidence, finally yielded to Stanton's vehement demands and acquiesced in his sacrifice. Chase, from an original friend and self-constituted patron of McC, became disgusted, alienated, an implacable enemy, denouncing McClellan as a coward and military imbecile. In all this he was stimulated by Stanton, and the victim of Seward, who first supplanted him with McC. and then gave up McC. to appease Stanton and pubhc opinion. September 18, Thursday. The last two or three days have been pregnant with rumors and speculations of an exciting character. Some officials on the watch-towers, sentinels and generals, have been alarmed; but on the whole the people have manifested a fair degree of con- fidence and composure. We have authentic news that a long and sanguinary battle has been fought.^ McClellan telegraphs that the fight between the two armies was for fourteen hours. The Rebels must have been in strong position to have main- tained such a fight against our large army. He also tele- ^ The Battle of Antietam was fought on the 16th and 17th. 140 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [sept. 18 graphs that our loss is heavy, particularly in generals, but gives neither names nor results. His dispatches are seldom full, clear, or satisfactory. ^^ Behaved splendidly," ''per- formed handsomely," but wherein or what was accom- plished is never told. Our anxiety is intense. We have but few and foggy dispatches of any kind these troublesome days. Yesterday and day before there were conflicting accounts about Harper's Ferry, which, it is now admitted, was thrown to the Rebels with scarcely a struggle. Miles, ^ who was in command, is reported mor- tally wounded. . . . General Mansfield is reported slain. He was from my State and almost a neighbor. He called on me last week, on his way from Norfolk to join the army above. When parting he once shook hands, there then was a farther brief conversation and he came back from the door after he left and again shook hands. ''Farewell," said I, "suc- cess attend you." He remarked, with emphasis, and some feeling, "We may never meet again." September 19, Friday, Am vexed and disturbed by tid- ings from the squadron off Mobile. Preble, by sheer pusil- lanimous neglect, feebleness, and indecision, let the pirate steamer Oreto run the blockade. She came right up and passed him, flying English colors. Instead of checking her advance or sinking her, he fired all round, made a noise, and is said to have hurt none of her English crew. This case must be investigated and an example made. Had been dismissed, this would not have occurred. Nothing from the army, except that, instead of follow- ing up the victory, attacking and capturing the Rebels, they, after a day's armistice, are rapidly escaping over the river. McClellan says they are crossing and that Pleas- anton is after them. Oh dear! I am not writing a history of the War or its events herein. That will be found in the books. But I record my own 1 Colonel Dixon S. Miles. He died of his wounds, Sept. 16, 1862. 1862] DISMISSAL OF PREBLE 141 impressions and the random speculations, views, and opinions of others also. September 20, Saturday. Am troubled by Preble's con- duct. There must be a stop put to the timid, hesitating, and I fear sometimes traitorous course of some of our officers. Tenderness, remonstrance, reproof do no good. Preble is not a traitor, but loyal. An educated, gentle- manly officer of a distinguished family and more than ordinary acquirements, but wants promptitude, energy, de- cision, audacity, perhaps courage. I am inclined to believe, however, an excess of reading, and a fear that he might violate etiquette, some point of international law, or that he should give offense to Great Britain, whose insolence the State Department fears and deprecates and submits to with all humility, had its influence. He paused at a crit- ical moment to reflect on what he had read and the state of affairs. A man less versed in books would have sunk the pirate if she did not stop when challenged, regardless of her colors. No Englishman had a right to approach and pass the sentinel on duty. Preble was placed there to pre- vent intercourse, — was a sentinel to watch the Rebels and all others, — and no Englishman had a right to tres- pass. A board of officers would be likely to excuse him, as in the case of and ,^ on account of his amiable qualities, general intelligence, and good intentions. The time has arrived when these derelictions must not go unpunished. I should have preferred that some other man should have been punished. I have had the subject under consideration with some of the best minds I could consult, and found no difference of opinion. I then took the dis- patches to the President and submitted them to him. He said promptly: '^Dismiss him. If that is your opinion, it is mine. I will do it." Secretary Seward and Attorney- General Bates, each of whom I casually met, advised dis- missal. It is painful, but an unavoidable duty. I am sorry ^ No names in original. 142 DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES [sept. 20 for Preble, but shall be sorry for my country if it is not done. Its effect upon the Navy will be more salutary than were he and fifty like him to fall in battle. Commander Joe Smith/ who died at his post when the ill-fated Congress went down from the assault of the Mer- rimac, perished in the line of duty. I have never been satisfied with the conduct of the flag-officer^ in those days, who was absent in the waters of North Carolina, — pur- posely and unnecessarily absent, in my apprehension, through fear of the Merrimac, which he knew was com- pleted, and ready to come out. It was like dread of the new Merrimac at Richmond, which was nearly ready, that led him finally to resign his squadron command. He has wordy pretensions, some capacity, but no hard courage. There is a clan of such men in the Navy, varying in shade and degree, who in long years of peace have been students and acquired position, but whose real traits are not gener- ally understood. The Department is compelled to give them commands, and at the same time is held responsible for their weakness, errors, and want of fighting qualities. Nothing conclusive from the army. The Rebels have crossed the river without being hurt or seriously molested, — much in character with the general army management of the war. Little is said on the subject. Stanton makes an occasional sneering remark, Chase now and then a better one, but there is no general review, inquiry, or dis- cussion. There is no abatement of hostility to McClellan. September 22. A special Cabinet-meeting. The subject was the Proclamation for emancipating the slaves after a certain date, in States that shall then be in rebellion. For several weeks the subject has been suspended, but the President says never lost sight of. When it was submitted, and now in taking up the Proclamation, the President stated that the question was finally decided, the act and ^ Lieutenant Joseph B. Smith. * Captain, afterwards Rear-Admiral, Louis M. Goldsborough. o I— t H < < o o >^ o H -I* u fe: ^ W ~, W J2 w H *-C s <1 e3 P. H -» o 1— 1 N w <1 o Q ^