J. Be it further resolved, &c., That his Excellency, the Governor, be, and he is hereby, requested to transmit a copy of these resolutions to the Governor of Virginia, to be by him communicated to the citizens of that State in such manner as he may deem appropriate.

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Lieutenant- Goveryior and President of the Senate.

Governor of the State of Louisiana. A true copy:

General Bragg and the Chickamauga Campaign — A Reply to General

By Captain W. M. Polk.

The recent publication of Major Sykes' papers on the army of Tennessee, and of the replies that have been called forth, furnishes an opportunity to settle some of the disputed matters appertaining to the campaigns and battles of that army.

There are a number about which there is much conflict of statement— too many, in fact, to be grouped in one enquiry, I shall, therefore, as a commencement, select one of sufficient interest to call forth comment, and I hope discussion.

I will go back to the number of your journal published April and May, 1883. In that issue is an article from General Will. T. Martin, of Miss,, headed "A Defence of General Bragg' s Conduct at Chickamauga." On page 202 he says: "There are many living officers and men who know how little blame should have attached to him (General Bragg) for Hindman's palpable disobedience of orders in McLemore' Cove,

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Of Hindman's failure I know nothing save what is to be found in the official reports. Hindman, although commanding one of the divisions in General Polk's corps, having been assigned to it just before the campaign, was, with his division, on September 9th, detached from Polk's corps in order that he might make the movement into McLemore's Cove, under the direct supervision of army headquarters, it being understood that General Bragg was then quite partial to him.

The order detaching him was this :

Headquarters Army of Tennessee,

General: Orders have been given to Major- General Hindman detaching him from your corps. He is directed to move at once.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

Kinlock Falconer, A. A. G. Lieutenant- General Polk.

This placed him outside General Polk's jurisdiction for that movement; consequently I do not now ask for any discussion of the McLemore's Cove affair. What I wish to bring out is the history of what General Martin — and General Bragg before him — calls General Polk's failure to attack Crittenden immediately after Hindman's fiasco.

I fully understand that General Martin has but one object in view, viz., the defence of a man that he believes has been misrepresented. He believes that General Polk, and not General Bragg, was responsible for the failure to crush Crittenden ; else he would not say that there are many living officers and men who know how little blame should attach to General Bragg for the failure in that emergency.

It is in the same spirit that I now seek the fullest information. If General Polk was to blame, neither he nor any friend of his would wish the responsibility to rest upon another ; and in like manner I am sure General Bragg's memory will be best served by resting upon him such responsibilities as a candid enquiry may show to belong to him.

In order to aid in the solution of the question, I shall tell the story from my point of view.

By mid-day, September nth, 1863, General Bragg knew that Hindman's movement against Thomas in McLemore's Cove had

failed. He then had his forces disposed as follows : Hindman's and Walker's divisions, with Buckner's corps and Cleburn's division of Hill's corps — five divisions in all, some 25,000 men — were in McLemore's Cove. Polk, with Cheatham's division — some 7,000 more — was at Anderson's house, four miles south of Gordon's Mills, while Breckenridge's division was at Lafayette, some twelve or more miles to the south again of Gordon's Mills. The relation of the three corps of the enemy to the position of Bragg's force, in the Cove and at Anderson's, was then as follows :

McCook was far away to the south of Lafayette, near Alpine, and Thomas to the west, well out of reach on the top of Lookout Mountain, while Crittenden, completely isolated, was to the east and north, near Ringgold and Gordon's Mills. Two of Crittenden's divisions — Vancleveand Palmer — camped at Ringgold that night; the remaining division — Wood's — camped the same night at Gordon's Mills, west of the Chickamauga. Crittenden's entire force, including Wilder' s mounted infantry, was some 16,000 men, less by 15,000 than the force of Confederates that lay between him and the remainder of the Federal army. To secure him it was necessary for General Bragg, immediately after Hindman's failure, only to face about and march towards him.

If one did not refer to the map, in reading General Bragg's official report (page 55, vol. II, Southern Historical Society Papers), he would infer that this was the movement next attempted ; for, after speaking of the failure in the Cove, he says : " Our movement having failed in its justly anticipated results, it was determined to turn upon the third corps of the enemy, approaching us from the direction of Chatanooga. The forces were accordingly withdrawn to Lafayette, and Polk's and Walker's corps were moved immediately in the direction of Lee and Gordon's Mills." In other words, the withdrawal to Lafayette was a necessary part of the movement of Polk and Walker in the direction of Lee and Gordon's Mills. This is clearly the interpretation to be put upon General Bragg's statement — the one he intended.

If the extract is a full statement of General Bragg's designs immediately after Hindman's failure, a glance at any good map of the State of Georgia will show how much useless marching was done by the forces that he wished to use against Crittenden.

Polk lay at Anderson's, four miles from the Mills ; Hindman and Walker were in McLemore's Cove. Polk was marched to Lafayette and then marched back to his original position. Hindman and

General Bragg and the Chickamauga Campaign. 381

Walker, instead of moving down the Chickamauga Valley towards Crittenden's position, at Ringgold and the Mills, moved to Lafayette, and then from Lafayette in the direction of Lee and Gordon's Mills.

We may get a fair idea of this manoeuvre by likening the position to a triangle— A, B, C. The enemy is just without the limits of the triangle near B. Our forces being at A, and near B, we move all to C, and then move them to B. The distance from the Confederate position in the Cove to the Mills was about equal to that from Lafayette to the Mills, while the distance from the Cove to Lafayette was somewhat less. All the roads were good and open, having been traversed but the day before by various portions of General Bragg's army.

This concentration at Lafayette, being then a movement away from Crittenden rather than towards him, it is impossible to accept it as a part of a movement upon that corps of the Federal army. The key to it will be found in the following dispatch to Hindman. (See General Bragg's official report) :

Headquarters Army Tennessee, Lafayette, Ga., 12 P. M., Septeynber 10, i86j.

Major General Hindman, Commanding:

General : Headquarters are here, and the following is the information :

Crittenden's corps is advancing on us from Chatanooga. A large force from, the south has advaiced to withiyi seve?i miles of this poiyit. Polk is left at Anderson's to cover your rear. General Bragg orders you to attack and force your way through the enemy to this point at the earliest hour you can see him in the morning. Cleburn will attack in front the moment your guns are heard.

I am, General, etc.,

Geo, W. Brent, A. A. Geii' I.

The force seven miles to the south of Lafayette was the cause of the concentration at that point; and as every one on the ground knew, this concentration was not a part of the movement on Crittenden.

This dispatch, together with the extract from General Bragg's report, already given, shows that not only after, but even before Hindman's failure, the Confederate commander had very good knowledge of his enemy's whereabouts. Standing in McLemore's Cove, he

knew, and his splendid army of not less than thirty-five thousand men knew, that he held the central position, and that the disjointed corps of the enemy lay around so widely separated that they could render one another no assistance.

A blow had been aimed at Thomas, and although it failed, it sent him up the mountain still further away from his companion corps.

McCook and Crittenden remained. It was for General Bragg to elect which he would strike.

There was scarcely a man in that army of Confederates, having knowledge of the affair, who doubted the direction of the blow. The force seven miles to the south of Lafayette might or might not be McCook's corps. If it were, but little was to be gained by marching towards it, especially as the proximity to the range of Lookout Mountain was such that it could easily escape, as Thomas had just done. But there lay Crittenden well out in the plain, isolated, at our mercy. A march of twelve or fifteen miles at furthest would secure him. With this corps crushed we were free to march through Chatanooga, around the head of Lookout Mountain, and arrange matters with Thomas and McCook as they should attempt to pass northward. No serious opposition could have been offered to this movement by Steedman's force, as it was yet near Bridgeport. It was a mighty opportunity.

The Confederate commander turned towards McCook. He concentrated at Fayette. This, as was expected by many, was a fruitless effort; for McCook was faraway at Alpine; and the enemy, seven miles oft, who had been the cause of our march, proved to be merely a small reconnoitering force. Then it was that the Confederate commander turned his attention to Crittenden. But it was the twelfth, and twenty-four hours had been lost — twenty-four as precious hours as were ever wasted. Instead of having his army across Crittenden's path. General Bragg had it at Lafayette. Thus was sacrificed not only the ground between Crittenden and Thomas, but the only position the Confederate army ever held commanding Crittenden's sole line of retreat — that by way of Chatanooga.

Crittenden now covered his line of retreat; but as he was still separated from Thomas, the prompt marching of the Confederate army to Lee and Gordon's Mills would have engaged and perhaps have captured him.

This brings us to the movement entrusted to General Polk, the movement that General Martin terms " General Polk's failure to attack Crittenden's corps in its isolated position immediately after

General Bragg and the Ohickamauga Campaign. 383

Hindman's fiasco." The movement that General Bragg intimates he made "'immediately'' after the failure in the Cove.

The first positive step towards it was the following order :

Headquarters, Lafayette, Ga.,

General: The General commanding directs that you will at once proceed with Cheatham's division and take position at Rock Spring. You will order forward also the rest of your corps as soon as practicable.

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Geo. Wm. Brent.

If we look a short distance to the southeast of Lee and Gordon's Mills, we will find Rock Spring. It is about four miles southeast of the Mills, about twelve north of Lafayette, and about seven southwest of Ringgold. It marks the intersection of roads leading from Gordon's Mills on the west, Peavine Church and Greysville on the north, and Ringgold on the east; a line drawn from Ringgold to the Mills passes a few miles to the north of it; and it will be noticed that the Chickamauga flows between it and the Mills.