im by Miss Hettie Carey, afterwards the wife of General i-egram, the heroic Pegram, killed in battle around Petersburg, at the end of the war, leaving to mourn his 'dhtimely death, besides near relatives and comrades in arms, a widowed bride of scarce two weeks' marriage.

After keeping this precious memento a short time at his headquarters, at Centreville, where it was greatly admired, and shown as a model for those ordered for the army, General Beauregard finally sent it to New Orleans for security and preservation. When our city fell, in April, 1862, that banner and General Beauregard's swords of honor were conveyed to a French war steamer, then lying in the port, and taken to Havana. There they remained, under the care of a Spanish gentleman known to be in sympathy with the South, until safely returned, some three years after the close of the struggle.

And now, officers and soldiers of the Washington Artillery, in the name of General Beauregard, under whose eyes you first went under fire, at Bull Run and Manassas, and — besides your brilliant achievements in fifty-six other battles and engagements — under whom you again distinguished yourselves, on the bloody field of Shiloh, with Hodgson, Slocomb, McVaught, Hewes, and Chalaron, and, later on, at Drevvry's Bluff, with Eschleman, W. M. Owen, Richardson, Hero and Norcum, I have the honor to present to you this sacred emblem of Southern valor and patriotism. Its colors are yet as fresh as when it received the parting look of its fair maker. Its value is enhanced by the fact that the upper portion of its staff is made of a piece of the flag-staff of Fort Sumter, shot down by the Confederate gunners, in April, 1861. Unsullied though it be by the smoke of battle, it was, none the less, born in war, and the breeze first kissed it in the tented field. It is the genuine model of the glorious flag around which all of us fought, and so many of us bled, and so many of us fell. Colonel Richardson, I now intrust it to your hands. The Washington Artillery is worthy of it ; it is, in every respect, worthy of the Washington Artillery. General Beauregard, who will ever regret his enforced absence from among you on this occasion, knows that it will be treasured and revered by you, and that it will find a fitting place among the many trophies and decorations which already adorn the walls of your vast armory. He trusts that, in the peaceful years succeeding the troublous era, over which we have just cast a backward glance, it will serve you and those under you as a touching reminder, not only of himself, your fast friend and former commander, but also of her from whose love and devotion to a cause dear to us — then, now, and I say forever — it originally came.

Reminiscences of the Last Campaign of the Army of Tennessee, from May,

By P. D. Stkphenson, Private Piece 4, Serjeant Thomas C Allen, Fifth Company IVashiftgton Artillery, Captain C H. Slocomb, Commandijig.

Paper No. I.

Reminiscences of Last Campaign Army of Tennessee. 3?

private's standpoint. Its only merit is sincerity. On the principle that everything may be of use that bears upon the war, it is offered for what it is worth.]

"after missionary ridge."

It was whilst we, the shattered remnants of Bragg's army, lay cowering among the hills of Dalton, Ga., in the winter of 1863, that General Joseph E. Johnston came to us and assumed command.

He arrived on the 27th of December, and immediately bent all his energies to the almost superhuman task before him : the task of shaping from a starved, ragged, ill-used mob of men, a disciplined command, which in three months' time was to be the sole defense, the sole obstacle, against the mighty and splendidly-equipped army of Sherman.

I call his task a superhuman one — and justly so. The calamity which preceded his arrival, and, indeed, made his presence necessary, was one of the most mournful events in our Confederacy's mournful existence, and it had a lasting influence on the subsequent fortunes of our ill-fated cause. Following so soon after the overwhelming victory of Chickamauga, the defeat at Missionary Ridge was an astounding revelation of bad management sorne-whre, and of the rapidity with which a fine army can be demoralized.

The battle of Chickamauga was won by hard fighting. It was emphatically a victory for the men. But indifferently armed and equipped, with little discipline, they turned on a pursuing army, onethird larger than their own, carried their breastworks, forced them back from their positions, and at last put them to an overwhelming rout.

This was the work of men who had just retreated one hundred and eight miles. It seems strange that under such depressing circumstances they could have preserved so well their morale, and so gallantly have done their duty. But it is easily explained. Every veteran soldier knows that a well-regulated retreat does not materially affect the spirits of the men. Our withdrawal from Tennessee was such an one. It was conducted quietly and systematically. Although the rigors of military law had then little or no existence in our camp, and we, therefore, were not in a high state of discipline, yet our march was an orderly one, and the men were cheerful and well-disposed. They had many good causes for being so. They had never known defeat, and although that absurd notion, that their foes were naturally cowards, had long been abandoned, their expe-

rience on several fields had sufficed to give them just confidence in their own ability. Their experience at Corinth, Miss., had amply proven to them that a retreat is not always a disaster, for had they not afterwards turned around and threatened Cincinnati itself? " Who knows," said they, " but this falling back is but the presage to another advance into Kentucky, more glorious and more permanent than the first ?" And, again, their confidence in their leader, General Bragg, although not great, was still sufficient to preserve them from demoralization. They knew that he was a skillful officer, although not a great commander. They thought he was safe and careful, and therefore, although not likely to do great deeds, yet was, on the other hand, not likely to expose them to great disaster. All this they felt towards him, although he was never personally popular. His men never forgot his harshness at the outset of his career, and all his subsequent laxity of discipline could never wipe out the first impressions of his " tyranny." But their wants had in a measure been supplied. Their rations were sufficient, their clothing passable, they had not been through the extreme privations and destitutions which were the daily attendants of their subsequent campaign. So they preserved a hopeful and buoyant disposition, and can be said to have been in as high a state of efficiency as a volunteer ar.Tiy could, under the circumstances, arrive at.

Under such encouraging auspices did Bragg fight at Chickamauga. He had received large reinforcements from Virginia, consisting of two divisions of Longstreet's corps, and also other accessions from different portions of the country. His whole force was about seventy-five thousand men; but for some reason not over fifty-five thousand were actually engaged. Rosecrans carried into battle an army which equalled, if it did not exceed, our entire command.

From the unusual combinations on our side, it looks as if our leaders intended to verify the hopes of the men, and after completely annihilating the enemy, to advance and take permanent possession of : Tennessee and Kentucky. The opportunity seemed a golden one. Rosecrans had, in his eagerness, placed himself in the snare made for him. His forces were divided, and ours for once, equal in numbers to the foe, formed one united and enthusiastic band. The battle, as has been said already, was fought with but a little over two-thirds of our entire army, and Bragg had a force of over twenty thousand fresh men, with which to complete the rout. Why he did not do so, I have not the means of determining. He charged General Polk with negligence, and the latter was relieved temporarily of his command.

Reminiscences of Last Campaigii Army of Tennessee. 35

Yet General Bragg' s complaint could not have made much impression at Richmond, for Polk, after remaining under suspension a few days, was given an even more responsible position than he had held before.

The real cause of the blunder is open to conjecture. It was generally remarked at the time that Bragg did not seem to know how complete his victory had been. The bold front which Thomas made with his single corps, had the same effect on Bragg which General Forrest's conduct on a similar occasion, a year after, had on himself. Many officers, it was said, high in rank, were for marching into Chatanooga, even after a lapse of several days. The reports of the people by whose doors we passed in our advance to Missionary Ridge, confirmed the universal conviction of the complete demoralization of the enemy. Yet we contented ourselves, with what we had done, and soon afterwards, from the heights of Missionary Ridge, in the rapidly increasing fortifications of the foe, and his daily reinforcements, beheld the real fruits of that contest grow more and more impossible

Our sojourn on Missionary Ridge was the introduction to that series of privations, which, imposed, as it seemed to us in the ranks, by the incompetency and indifference of our leaders, did more to ruin the army than almost anything else.

General Bragg, although beseiger, began to make preparations to resist an attack. During several days while he was entrenching, the enemy was summoning all his energies to strengthen his ranks, and it was not long before we heard of immense reinforcements, pouring through the mountains to the rescue. General U. S Grant was with them and they gave prompt notice to Bragg of their approach by surprising his extreme left, and thereby opening a way to Chattanooga. Their arrival swelled their numbers to over a hundred thousand men, and, combined with the presence of their one successful leader. Grant, gave new zeal and courage to the old whipped army of Rosecrans.

Our commander made but feeble attempts at entrenchment., and after his enemy had made the great accessions to his forces above referred to. General Bragg detached Longstreet's corps and hurried it ofit to besiege Knoxville. Even the day before the battle, our command was withdrawn from our position on the Ridge (I was then in Cleburne's command) and we lay sometime, irresolutely at the depot, waiting, as we supposed, to be sent to reinforce Longstreet.

Thus, by his own act, our commander seemed to make his position

untenable. Had it been held by sufficient numbers, Missionary Ridge could never have been stormed. The real cause and manner of its capture will appear hereafter.

Our stay on " The Ridge" was attended with a great deal of suffering. It was mid-winter, and the low-grounds behind us (that fearful " Chickamauga bottom "), over which ran our roads of supplies, were nearly all the time covered with water. " Corduroy roads " were built for miles, yet every rain would undo all our work and make it worse than before. The weather was stormy, and the camps would be flooded day and night. Winter quarters were not allowed to be built, and we therefore had no shelter. Starvation seemed to stare us in the face. For weeks at a time, we subsisted on two meals a day, and those " meals" were a small "pone" of corn-bread, and a cup of " corn coffee." Our duties, meantime, were increased, for our ranks had been lessened, and the enemy were becoming active and annoying. Sickness, for the first time since our stay in and around Corinth (Miss.), broke out in our ranks, and many were swept away. Demoralization spread fearfully among those men, who, but a few days before, had gained one of the bloodiest victories of the war. " Our sufferings are great," said they, "but we could bear them, if we felt there was no help for it." It was their secret conviction that there was help, and that they were the victims of official blunders. Their disaffection was increased by the rumors of bickerings among our leaders. Reports of quarrels between Bragg and his leading officers came down to us, and his removing from command, on the eve of the battle, one of the most popular Generals in the army, Frank Cheatham, looked very much like a confirmation of the reports. So, between the dissensions of the leaders and the various causes of discontent among the men, the army grew rapidly demoralized. The withdrawal of Longstreet to East Tennessee, together with the sickness which existed, had thinned the ranks greatly, so that at the time of the batde we did not have thirty thousand men. (In many places in the line, our men were in single rank, and sprinkled seven or eight feet apart, and there were gaps where there were no men at all.) Our sufferings from hunger were such that Bragg was on the point of withdrawing (such was the general impression) when the attack of the enemy began. It was thought, too, that it was a doubtful question : which was the most famished, the besiegers or besieged ? General Grant must have had very accurate accounts of our condition ; for, unless he did, his movement was a very bold one. Had those thirty thousand men been able to cover all the ground, he